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UUU

TEN VOLUMES

VOL. III.

ST. LOUIS

CHICAGO

FERD. P. KAISER

1899



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

VOL. III

	LIVED	PAGE
BUSHNELL, HORACE	1802-1876	825
The Dignity of Human Nature		
BUTLER, BENJAMIN F.	1818-1893	830
Article Ten (Argument Impeaching Andrew Johnson)		
BUTLER, JOSEPH	1692-1752	842
The Government of the Tongue		
CÆSAR, CAIUS JULIUS	100-44 B. C.	846
On the Conspiracy of Catiline		
CAHILL, DANIEL W.	1802-1864	851
The Last Judgment		
CAIRD, JOHN	1820-	855
The Art of Eloquence		
CALHOUN, JOHN C.	1782-1850	864
Against the Force Bill		
Denouncing Andrew Jackson		
Replying to Henry Clay		
Self-Government and Civilization		
Individual Liberty		
CALVIN, JOHN	1509-1564	927
The Necessity for Courage		
CAMBON, PIERRE JOSEPH	1754-1820	930
The Crisis of 1793		

	LIVED	AGE
CAMPBELL, ALEXANDER	1788-1866	935
Mind the Master Force		
CANNING, GEORGE	1770-1827	940
England in Repose		
Christianity and Oppression		
Hate in Politics		
CARLYLE, THOMAS	1795-1881	950
The Edinburgh Address		
The Heroic in History		
CARNOT, LAZARE NICOLAS MARGUERITE	1753-1823	966
Against Imperialism in France		
CARPENTER, MATTHEW HALE	1824-1881	973
Replying to the Grand Duke Alexis		
The Louisiana Returning Board		
In Favor of Universal Suffrage		
CARSON, ALEXANDER	1776-1844	981
The Glories of Immortality		
CARSON, HAMPTON L.	1852-	985
American Liberty		
CASS, LEWIS	1762-1866	988
American Progress and Foreign Oppression		
CASTELAR, EMILIO	1832-1899	997
A Plea for Republican Institutions		
In the Campo Santo of Pisa		
CATO UTICENSIS	95-46 B. C.	1006
Against the Accomplices of Catiline		
CAVOUR, CAMILLO BENSO, COUNT DI	1810-1861	1011
Rome and Italy		
CHALLEMEL-LACOUR, PAUL AMAND	1827-1896	1018
Humboldt and the Teutonic Intellect		

	LIVED	PAGE
CHALMERS, THOMAS	1780-1847	1023
When Old Things Pass Away		
War and Truth		
The Use of Living		
CHAMBERLAIN, JOSEPH	1836-	1026
Manhood Suffrage		
CHANDLER, ZACHARIAH	1813-1879	1030
On Jefferson Davis		
CHANNING, WILLIAM ELLERY	1780-1842	1032
The Man Above the State		
CHAPIN, EDWIN HUBBELL	1814-1880	1036
The Sovereignty of Ideas		
Peaceful Industry		
The Source of Modern Progress		
Scientia Liberatrix		
Rectitude Higher Than Morality		
CHASE, SALMON P.	1808-1873	1043
Thomas Jefferson and the Colonial View of Man-		
hood Rights		
Three Great Eras		
CHATEAUBRIAND, FRANÇOIS RENÉ, VISCOUNT DE	1768-1848	1059
Has One Government the Right to Intervene in		
the Internal Affairs of Another ?		
CHATHAM, WILLIAM, VISCOUNT PITT AND EARL OF	1708-1778	1065
The Attempt to Subjugate America		
The English Constitution		
His Last Speech		
CHAUNCEY, CHARLES	1705-1787	1089
Good News from a Far Country		
CHESTERFIELD, PHILIP DORMER STANHOPE, FOURTH EARL OF	1694-1773	1095
Against Revenues from Drunkenness and Vice		

	LIVED	PAGE
CHEVES, LANGDON	1776-1857	1101
In Favor of a Stronger Navy		
CHILLINGWORTH, WILLIAM	1602-1644	1106
False Pretenses		
CHOATE, JOSEPH HODGES	1832-	1109
" Farragut "; An Address at the Unveiling of the Saint-Gaudens Statue		
CHOATE, RUFUS	1799-1859	1119
Books and Civilization in America		
The Necessity of Compromises in American Politics		
Heroism of the Early Colonists		
CHRYSOSTOM, SAINT JOHN	347-407	1137
The Blessing of Death		
The Heroes of Faith		
Avarice and Usury		
CHURCHILL, RANDOLPH HENRY SPENCER	1849-1895	1143
The Age of Action		
Gladstone's Egyptian Inconsistencies		
CICERO, MARCUS TULLIUS	106-43 B. C.	1156
The First Oration Against Catiline		
Catiline's Departure		
The Crucifixion of Gavius		
Supernatural Justice		
Cato and the Stoics		
For the Poet Archias		
The Fourth Philippic		
CLARK, CHAMP	1850-	1207
The Courage of Leadership		
CLAY, CASSIUS M.	1810-	1211
A Rhapsody		
Aspirations for the Union		
America as a Moral Force		
CLAY, CLEMENT C.	1789-1866	1216
The Subtreasury Bill		

FULL-PAGE ILLUSTRATIONS

VOLUME III

	PAGE
The Plaintiff's Appeal at the First Trial by Jury (Photogravure)	Frontispiece
John C. Calhoun (Portrait)	864
Clock Tower of the Houses of Parliament (Photogravure)	940
The Cavour Monument at Milan (Photogravure)	1011
First Reading of the Emancipation Proclamation (Photogravure)	1043
Rufus Choate (Portrait, Photogravure)	1119
Christ Leaving the Prætorium (Photogravure)	1137
Cicero Arraigning Catiline (Photogravure)	1156

HORACE BUSHNELL

(1802-1876)

HORACE BUSHNELL illustrates a style of eloquence less suited than that of Henry Ward Beecher to subjects involving the emotions, but for many purposes equally effective. His "Discourse on the Dignity of Human Nature Shown from Its Ruins" is governed by the same idea which inspired Taine in his remarkable analysis of Shakespeare's purposes and methods. Whether or not the world is a "hospital for the sick of soul and mind," as Bushnell thought and as Taine concludes that Shakespeare believed, there can be no question of the great power and extraordinary beauty of Bushnell's argument. It is perhaps his best example of sustained thought and eloquent expression, but his discourses abound in beauty and are generally characterized by power. When he surpasses himself, as he often does, he is equalled only by a very few among the most famous orators of the world.

He was born at Litchfield, Connecticut, April 14th, 1802. His pastorate at Hartford, which began in 1833, brought him continually increasing reputation. At a time when most pulpit reputations were made by sermons on politics, he devoted his mind to the elucidation of permanent truths, and, however far short of his best he may seem to fall at times, not a few of his characteristic passages are likely to live as long as the language. He died February 17th, 1876.

THE DIGNITY OF HUMAN NATURE

(From the "Discourse on the Dignity of Human Nature Shown from Its Ruins")

THE great characters of the world furnish striking proof of the transcendent quality of human nature, by the dignity they are able to connect even with their littleness and meanness. On a small island of the southern Atlantic, is shut up a remarkable prisoner, wearing himself out there in a feeble mixture of peevishness and jealousy, solaced by no great thoughts and no heroic spirit; a kind of dotard before his time, killing and consuming himself by the intense littleness into which he has shrunk. And this is the great conqueror of the modern

observed is that people should learn to decline it; to get over that strong inclination most have to be talking of the concerns and behavior of their neighbor.

But since it is impossible that this subject should be wholly excluded conversation; and since it is necessary that the characters of men should be known: the next thing is that it is a matter of importance what is said; and, therefore, that we should be religiously scrupulous and exact to say nothing, either good or bad, but what is true. I put it thus, because it is in reality of as great importance to the good of society, that the characters of bad men should be known, as that the characters of good men should. People who are given to scandal and detraction may indeed make an ill-use of this observation; but truths, which are of service towards regulating our conduct, are not to be disowned, or even concealed, because a bad use may be made of them. This, however, would be effectually prevented if these two things were attended to. First, That, though it is equally of bad consequence to society that men should have either good or ill characters which they do not deserve; yet, when you say somewhat good of a man which he does not deserve, there is no wrong done him in particular; whereas, when you say evil of a man which he does not deserve, here is a direct formal injury, a real piece of injustice done him. This, therefore, makes a wide difference; and gives us, in point of virtue, much greater latitude in speaking well than ill of others. Secondly, A good man is friendly to his fellow-creatures, and a lover of mankind; and so will, upon every occasion, and often without any, say all the good he can of everybody; but, so far as he is a good man, will never be disposed to speak evil of any, unless there be some other reason for it, besides, barely that it is true. If he be charged with having given an ill character, he will scarce think it a sufficient justification of himself to say it was a true one, unless he can also give some further account how he came to do so: a just indignation against particular instances of villainy, where they are great and scandalous; or to prevent an innocent man from being deceived and betrayed, when he has great trust and confidence in one who does not deserve it. Justice must be done to every part of a subject when we are considering it. If there be a man who bears a fair character in the world, whom yet we know to be without faith or honesty, to be really an ill man; it must be allowed in general that we shall do a piece of

or revenge, will deliberately take the life of a fellow man, and then dispatch his own to avoid the ignominy of a public execution. Suppose there might be found some tiger that, for the mere bitterness of his grudge against some other whelp of his mother, springs upon him in his sleep and rends him in pieces, and then deliberately tears open his own throat to escape the vengeance of the family. No tiger of the desert is ever instigated by any so intense and terrible passion, that, for the sweetness of revenge, it is willing afterward to rush on death itself. This kind of frenzy plainly belongs to none but a creature immortal, an archangel ruined, in whose breast a fire of hell may burn high enough and deep enough to scorch down even reason and the innate love of life. Or take the passion of covetousness, generally regarded as one essentially mean and degraded. After all, how great a creature must that be who is goaded by a zeal of acquisition so restless, so self-sacrificing, so insatiable. The poor, gaunt miser, starving for want, that he may keep the count of his gold—whom do we more naturally pity and despise. And yet he were even the greatest of heroes, if he could deny himself with so great patience, in a good and holy cause. How grand a gift that immortality, how deep those gulfs of want in the soul, that instigate a madness so desolating to character, a self-immolation so relentless, a niggard suffering so sublime. The same is even true of the licentious and gluttonous lusts and their loathsome results. No race of animals can show the parallel of such vices; because they are none of them instigated by a nature so insatiable, so essentially great in the magnificence of wants that find no good to satisfy their cravings. The ruin we say is beastly, but the beasts are clear of the comparison; it requires a mold vaster than theirs to burst the limits of nature in excesses so disgusting.

Consider again the wild mixtures of thought, displayed both in the waking life and the dreams of mankind. How grand! how mean! how sudden the leap from one to the other! how inscrutable the succession! how defiant of orderly control! It is as if the soul were a thinking ruin; which it verily is. The angel and the demon life appear to be contending in it. The imagination revels in beauty exceeding all the beauty of things, wails in images dire and monstrous, wallows in murderous and base suggestions that shame our inward dignity; so that a great part of the study and a principal art of life, is to keep our decency,

by a wise selection from what we think and a careful suppression of the remainder. A diseased and crazy mixture, such as represents a ruin, is the form of our inward experience. And yet, a ruin how magnificent, one which a buried Nineveh, or a desolated Thebes can parallel only in the faintest degree; comprehending all that is purest, brightest, most divine, even that which is above the firmament itself; all that is worst, most sordid, meanest, most deformed.

Notice, also, the significance of remorse. How great a creature must that be that, looking down upon itself from some high summit in itself, some throne of truth and judgment which no devastation of order can reach, withers in relentless condemnation of itself, gnaws and chastises itself in the sense of what it is! Call it a ruin, as it plainly is, there rises out of the desolated wreck of its former splendor, that which indicates and measures the sublimity of the original temple. The conscience stands erect, resisting all the ravages of violence and decay, and by this, we distinguish the temple of God that was; a soul divinely gifted, made to be the abode of his spirit, the vehicle of his power, the mirror of his glory. A creature of remorse is a divine creature of necessity, only it is the wreck of a divinity that was.

So again you may conceive the greatness of man by the ruin he makes, if you advert to the dissonance and obstinacy of his evil will. It is dissonant as being out of harmony with God and the world, and all beside in the soul itself; *viz.*, the reason, the conscience, the wants, the hopes, and even the remembrances of the soul. How great a creature is it that, knowing God, can set itself off from God and resist him, can make itself a unit, separate from all beings beside, and maintain a persistent rebellion even against its own convictions, fears, and aspirations. Like a Pharaoh, it sits on its Egyptian throne, quailing in darkness, under the successive fears and judgments of life, relenting for the moment, then gathering itself up again to reassert the obstinacy of its pride, and die, it may be, in its evil. What a power is this, capable of a dominion how sublime, a work and sphere how transcendent! If sin is weak, if it is mean, little, selfish, and deformed, and we are ready to set humanity down as a low and paltry thing of nothing worth, how terrible and tragic in its evil grandeur does it appear, when we turn to look upon its defiance of God and the desperate obstinacy of its warfare. Who,


knowing the judgment of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but have pleasure in them that do them. Or, as we have it in the text—There is no fear of God before their eyes. In one view there is fear enough, the soul is all its life long haunted by this fear, but there is a desperation of will that tramples fear and makes it as though it were not.

Consider once more the religious aspirations and capacities of religious attraction that are garnered up and still live in the ruins of humanity. How plain it is, in all the most forward demonstrations of the race, that man is a creature for religion; a creature secretly allied to God himself, as the needle is to the pole, attracted toward God, aspiring consciously, or unconsciously, to the friendship and love of God. Neither is it true that, in his fallen state, he has no capacity left of religious affection, or attraction, till it is first newly created in him. All his capacities of love and truth are in him still, only buried and stifled by the smoldering ruin in which he lies. There is a capacity in him still to be moved and drawn, to be charmed and melted by the divine love and beauty. The old affinity lives though smothered in selfishness and lust, and even proves itself in sorrowful evidence, when he bows himself down to a reptile or an idol. He will do his most expensive works for religion. There is a deep panting still in his bosom, however suppressed, that cries inaudibly and sobs with secret longing after God. Hence the sublime unhappiness of the race. There is a vast, immortal want stirring on the world and forbidding it to rest. In the cursing and bitterness, in the deceit of tongues, in the poison of asps, in the swiftness of blood, in all the destruction and misery of the world's ruin, there is yet a vast insatiate hunger for the good, the true, the divine, and a great part of the misery of the ruin is that it is so great a ruin; a desolation of that which cannot utterly perish, and still lives, asserting its defrauded rights and reclaiming its lost glories. And, therefore, it is that life becomes an experience to the race so tragic in its character, so dark and wild, so bitter, so incapable of peace. The way of peace we cannot know, till we find our peace, where our immortal aspirations place it, in the fullness and the friendly eternity of God.

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verdict on his career and his character. He can be called everything and evidence of some kind can be adduced on every point—amounting nowhere to absolute proof except as it completely bars any one who can recognize almost unparalleled intellectual activity and subtlety from calling him a fool.

He was born in Deerfield, New Hampshire, November 3th, 1818. His father was a captain of dragoons who served under General Jackson at New Orleans. His mother, left a widow without adequate resources, supported herself for a time by keeping a boarding house in Lowell. Benjamin, however, was sent to Waterville College where he graduated in 1838, going very soon thereafter for a post-graduate course on his uncle's fishing schooner to the banks of Labrador. He was admitted to the bar in 1840, and, after ten years at Lowell, went to Boston. He served in the Massachusetts legislature as a Democrat and in 1860 was a delegate to the National conventions at Charleston and Baltimore. His enemies delighted to republish over and over, with all possible variations, the story of his championship of Jefferson Davis as a presidential candidate at Charleston. After the close of the war he was elected to Congress by the Massachusetts Republicans. Entering the House of Representatives in 1867, he left it in 1879 and in 1880 supported the Democratic party in the Hancock campaign. After several unsuccessful canvasses for governor he was elected by the Democrats in 1882 and during his term, especially in his management of the Tewkesbury Almshouse investigation, he seems to have enjoyed himself even more fully than he did while in military charge of New Orleans. That his great abilities in some other directions had been exercised at the expense of his judgment, especially as it involved ability to forecast results in politics, he showed in his candidacy for the Presidency, the result of which, however, seemed to occasion him neither humiliation, disappointment, nor regret. Perhaps history ought to disapprove him most in his radical fault of readiness to see the grotesque side of the desperate earnestness of others, but it is doubtful if any one who studies him impartially will ever be able to resist wholly the temptation to sympathize with him in his tendency to inward laughter at the suggestion of the absurd latent under the tragic.

He was chosen to open the case against Andrew Johnson at the impeachment trial and he did so with great ability, both as a lawyer and as an orator. Article Ten of the bill of impeachment dealt with what was known at the time as the "Swing Around the Circle" during which, in a series of public speeches, President Johnson arraigned Congress in very much the same style of free and unstudied invective he and "Parson" Brownlow had once employed in arraigning other Tennesseans for attempting to take the State out of the Union.

W. V. B.

«ARTICLE TEN»

(Argument Impeaching Andrew Johnson, March 30th, 1868)

ARTICLE TEN alleges that, intending to set aside the rightful authority and powers of Congress, and to bring into disgrace and contempt the Congress of the United States, and to destroy confidence in and to excite odium against Congress and its laws, he, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, made divers speeches set out therein, whereby he brought the office of President into contempt, ridicule, and disgrace.

To sustain these charges, there will be put in evidence the shorthand notes of reporters in each instance, who took these speeches, or examined the sworn copies thereof, and one instance where the speech was examined and corrected by the private secretary of the President himself.

To the charges of this article the respondent answers that a convention of delegates, of whom composed he does not say, sat in Philadelphia for certain political purposes mentioned, and appointed a committee to wait upon the respondent as President of the United States; that they were received, and by their chairman, the Hon. Reverdy Johnson, then and now a Senator of the United States, addressed the respondent in a speech, a copy of which the respondent believes from a substantially correct report is made part of the answer; that the respondent made a reply to the address of the committee. While, however, he gives us in his answer a copy of the speech made to him by Mr. Reverdy Johnson, taken from a newspaper, he wholly omits to give us an authorized version of his own speech, about which he may be supposed to know quite as much, and thus saved us some testimony. He does not admit that the extracts from his speech in the article are correct, nor does he deny that they are so.

In regard to the speech at Cleveland, he, again, does not admit that the extracts correctly or justly present his speech; but, again, he does not deny that they do so far as the same is set out.

As to the speech at St. Louis, he does not deny that he made it—says only that he does not admit it, and requires, in each case, that the whole speech shall be proved. In that, I beg leave to assure him and the Senate, his wishes shall be gratified to their fullest fruition. The Senate shall see the performance, so far as in our power to photograph the scene by evidence, on

each of these occasions, and shall hear every material word that he said. His defense, however, to the Article is that "he felt himself in duty bound to express opinions of and concerning the public character, conduct, views, purposes, motives, and tendencies of all men engaged in the public service, as well in Congress as otherwise," "and that for anything he may have said on either of these occasions he is justified under the constitutional right of freedom of opinion and freedom of speech, and is not subject to question, inquisition, impeachment, or inculpation in any manner or form whatsoever;" he denies, however, that, by reason of any matter in said Article or its specifications alleged, he has said or done anything indecent or unbecoming in the Chief Magistrate of the United States, or tending to bring his high office into contempt, ridicule, or disgrace.

The issue, then, finally, is this: that those utterances of his, in the manner and form in which they are alleged to have been made, and under the circumstances and at the time they were made, are decent and becoming the President of the United States, and do not tend to bring the office into ridicule and disgrace.

We accept the issues. They are two:—

First. That he has the right to say what he did of Congress in the exercise of freedom of speech; and, second, That what he did say in those speeches was a highly gentlemanlike and proper performance in a citizen, and still more becoming in a President of the United States.

Let us first consider the graver matter of the assertion of the right to cast contumely upon Congress; to denounce it as a "body hanging on the verge of the government;" "pretending to be a Congress when in fact it was not a Congress;" "a Congress pretending to be for the Union when its every step and act tended to perpetuate disunion," "and make a disruption of the States inevitable;" "a Congress in a minority assuming to exercise power which, if allowed to be consummated, would result in despotism and monarchy itself;" "a Congress which had done everything to prevent the union of the States;" "a Congress factious and domineering;" "a radical Congress, which gave origin to another rebellion;" "a Congress upon whose skirts was every drop of blood that was shed in the New Orleans riots."

You will find these denunciations had a deeper meaning than mere expressions of opinion. It may be taken as an axiom in

the affairs of nations that no usurper has ever seized upon the legislature of his country until he has familiarized the people with the possibility of so doing by vituperating and decrying it. Denunciatory attacks upon the legislature have always preceded, slanderous abuse of the individuals composing it have always accompanied, a seizure by a despot of the legislative power of a country.

Two memorable examples in modern history will spring to the recollection of every man. Before Cromwell drove out by the bayonet the Parliament of England, he and his partisans had denounced it, derided it, decried it, and defamed it, and thus brought it into ridicule and contempt. He vilified it with the same name which it is a significant fact the partisans of Johnson, by a concerted cry, applied to the Congress of the United States when he commenced his memorable pilgrimage and crusade against it. It is a still more significant fact that the justification made by Cromwell and by Johnson for setting aside the authority of Parliament and Congress respectively was precisely the same, to wit: That they were elected by part of the people only. When Cromwell, by his soldiers, finally entered the hall of Parliament to disperse its members, he attempted to cover the enormity of his usurpation by denouncing this man personally as a libertine, that as a drunkard, another as the betrayer of the liberties of the people. Johnson started out on precisely the same course, but, forgetting the parallel, too early he proclaims this patriot an assassin, that statesman a traitor; threatens to hang that man whom the people delight to honor, and breathes out "threatenings and slaughter" against this man whose services in the cause of human freedom has made his name a household word wherever the language is spoken. There is, however, an appreciable difference between Cromwell and Johnson, and there is a like difference in the results accomplished by each.

When Bonaparte extinguished the legislature of France, he waited until, through his press and his partisans, and by his own denunciations, he brought its authority into disgrace and contempt; and when, finally, he drove the council of the nation from their chamber, like Cromwell, he justified himself by personal abuse of the individuals themselves as they passed by him.

That the attempt of Andrew Johnson to overthrow Congress has failed, is because of the want of ability and power, not of malignity and will.

We are too apt to overlook the danger which may come from words; we are inclined to say "that is only talk—wait till some act is done, and then it will be time to move." But words may be, and sometimes are, things—living, burning things that set a world on fire.

As a most notable instance of the power of words, look at the inception of the rebellion through which we have just passed. For a quarter of a century the nation took no notice of the talk of disunion and secession which was heard in Congress and on the "stump" until in the South a generation was taught them by words, and the words suddenly burst forth into terrible, awful war. Does any one think that if Jackson had hanged Calhoun in 1832 for talking nullification and secession, which was embryo treason, the cannon of South Carolina against Fort Sumter would ever have been heard with all their fearful and deadly consequences? Nay, more; if the United States officers, Senators, and Representatives had been impeached or disqualified from office in 1832 for advocating secession on the "stump," as was done in 1862 by Congress, then our sons and brothers, now dead in battle, or starved in prison, had been alive and happy, and a peaceful solution of the question of slavery had been found.

Does any one doubt that if the intentions of the respondent could have been carried out, and his denunciations had weakened the Congress in the affections of the people, so that those who had in the North sympathized with the rebellion could have elected such a minority even, of the Representatives to Congress as, together with those sent up from the governments organized by Johnson in the rebellious States, they should have formed a majority of both or either House of Congress, that the President would have recognized such body as the legitimate Congress, and attempted to carry out its decrees with the aid of the army and navy and the treasury of the United States, over which he now claims such unheard-of and illimitable powers, and thus lighted the torch of civil war?

In all earnestness, Senators, I call each one of you upon his conscience to say whether he does not believe, by a preponderance of evidence drawn from the acts of the respondent since he has been in office, that if the people had not been, as they ever have been, true and loyal to their Congress and themselves, such would not have been the result of these usurpations of power in the Executive?

Is it, indeed, to be seriously argued here that there is a constitutional right in the President of the United States, who, during his official life, can never lay aside his official character, to denounce, malign, abuse, ridicule, and condemn, openly and publicly, the Congress of the United States—a co-ordinate branch of the Government?

It cannot fail to be observed that the President (shall I dare say his counsel, or are they compelled by the exigencies of their defense?) have deceived themselves as to the *gravamen* of the charge in this article? It does not raise the question of freedom of speech, but of propriety and decency of speech and conduct in a high officer of the Government.

Andrew Johnson, the private citizen, as I may reverently hope and trust he soon will be, has the full constitutional right to think and speak what he pleases, in the manner he pleases, and where he pleases, provided always he does not bring himself within the purview of the common law offenses of being a common railer and brawler, or a common scold, which he may do, (if a male person is ever liable to commit this crime;) but the dignity of station, the proprieties of position, the courtesies of office, all of which are a part of the common law of the land, require the President of the United States to observe that gravity of deportment, that fitness of conduct, that appropriateness of demeanor, and those amenities of behavior which are a part of his high official functions. He stands before the youth of the country, the exemplar of all that is worthy in ambition, and all that is to be sought in aspiration; he stands before the men of the country as the grave magistrate who occupies, if he does not fill, the place once honored by Washington; nay, far higher and of greater consequence, he stands before the world as the representative of free institutions, as the type of man whom the suffrages of a free people have chosen as their chief. He should be the living evidence of how much better, higher, nobler, and more in the image of God, is the elected ruler of a free people than a hereditary monarch, coming into power by the accident of birth; and when he disappoints all these hopes and all these expectations, and becomes the ribald, scurrilous blasphemer, bandying epithets and taunts with a jeering mob, shall he be heard to say that such conduct is not a high misdemeanor in office? Nay, disappointing the hopes, causing the cheek to burn with shame, exposing to the taunts and ridicule of every nation the good

name and fame of the chosen institutions of thirty millions of people, is it not the highest possible crime and misdemeanor in office, and, under the circumstances, the *gravamen* of these charges? The words are not alleged to be either false or defamatory, because it is not within the power of any man, however high his official position, in effect to slander the Congress of the United States, in the ordinary sense of that word, so as to call on Congress to answer as to the truth of the accusation. We do not go in, therefore, to any question of truth or falsity. We rest upon the scandal of the scene. We would as soon think, in the trial of an indictment against a termagant as a common scold, of summoning witnesses to prove that what she said was not true. It is the noise and disturbance in the neighborhood that is the offense, and not a question of a provocation or irritation which causes the outbreak.

At the risk of being almost offensive, but protesting that if so it is not my fault but that of the person whose acts I am describing, let me but faintly picture to you the scenes at Cleveland and St. Louis.

It is evening; the President of the United States on a journey to do homage at the tomb of an illustrious statesman, accompanied by the head of the army and navy and Secretary of State, has arrived in the great central city of the continent. He has been welcomed by the civic authorities. He has been escorted by a procession of the benevolent charitable societies and citizens and soldiers to his hotel. He has returned thanks in answer to addresses of the mayor and the citizens who have received him. The hospitality of the city has provided a banquet for him and his suite, when he is again expected to address the chosen guests of the city where all things may be conducted in decency and in order. While he was resting, as one would have supposed he would have wished to do, from the fatigue of the day, a noisy crowd of men and boys, washed and unwashed, drunk and sober, black and white, assemble in the street, who make night hideous by their bawling; quitting the drawing-room without the advice of his friends, the President of the United States rushes forth on to the balcony of the hotel to address what proves to have been a mob. And this he calls in his answer a "fit occasion on which he is held to the high duty of expressing opinions of and concerning the legislation of Congress, proposed or completed, in respect of its wisdom, expediency,

justice, worthiness, objects, purposes, and public and political motives and tendencies!"

Observe now, upon this "fit occasion," like in all respects to that at Cleveland, when the President is called upon by the constitutional requirements of his office to expound "the wisdom, expediency, justice, worthiness, objects, purposes, and tendencies of the acts of Congress," what he says and the manner in which he says it. Does he speak with the gravity of a Marshall when expounding constitutional law? Does he use the polished sentences of a Wirt? Or, failing in these, which may be his misfortune, does he, in plain homely words of truth and soberness, endeavor to instruct the men and youth before him in their duty to obey the laws and to reverence their rulers, and to prize their institutions of government? Although he may have been mistaken in the aptness of the occasion for such didactic instruction, still good teaching is never thrown away. He shows, however, by his language, as he had shown at Cleveland, that he meant to adapt himself to the occasion. He has hardly opened his mouth, as we shall show you, when some one in the crowd cries, "How about our British subjects?"

The Chief Executive, supported by his Secretary of State, so that all the foreign relations and diplomatic service were fully represented, with a dignity that not even his counsel can appreciate, and with an amenity which must have delighted Downing Street, answers: "We will attend to John Bull after awhile, so far as that is concerned." The mob, ungrateful, receive this bit of "expression of opinion upon the justice, worthiness, objects, purposes, and public and political motives and tendencies" of our relations with the kingdom of Great Britain, as they fall from the honored lips of the President of the United States, with "laughter," and the more unthinking with "cheers."

Having thus disposed of our diplomatic relations with the first naval and commercial nation on earth, the President next proceeds to "express his opinion in manner aforesaid, and for the purposes aforesaid," to this noisy mob, of the subject of the riot upon which his answer says, "it is the constitutional duty of the President to express opinions for the purposes aforesaid." A voice calls out "New Orleans, go on." After a graceful exordium the President expresses his high opinion that a massacre, wherein his pardoned and unpardoned rebel associates and friends deliberately shot down and murdered unarmed Union men, with-

out provocation, even Horton, the minister of the living God, as his hands were raised to the Prince of Peace, praying in the language of the great martyr, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do," was the result of the laws passed by the legislative department of your government, in the words following, that is to say:—

"If you will take up the riot at New Orleans and trace it back to its source, or to its immediate cause, you will find out who was responsible for the blood that was shed there."

"If you take up the riot at New Orleans and trace it back to the radical Congress"——

This, as we might expect, was received by the mob, composed, doubtless, in large part of unrepentant rebels, with great cheering and cries of "bully!" It was "bully," if that means encouraging for them to learn, on the authority of the President of the United States, that they might shoot down Union men and patriots, and lay the sin of murder upon the Congress of the United States; and this was another bit of "opinion" which the counsel say it was the high duty of the President to express upon the justice, the worthiness, objects, "purposes, and public and political motives, and tendencies of the legislation of your Congress."

After some further debate with the mob, some one, it seems, had called out "traitor." The President of the United States, on this fitting, constitutional occasion, immediately took this as personal, and replies to it, "Now, my countrymen, it is very easy to indulge in epithets, it is very easy to call a man a Judas, and cry out 'traitor,' but when he is called upon to give arguments and facts he is very often found wanting."

What were the "facts that were found wanting," which in the mind of the President prevented him from being a Judas Iscariot? He shall state the "wanting facts" in his own language on this occasion when he is exercising his "high constitutional prerogative."

"Judas Iscariot. There was a Judas once, one of the twelve Apostles. Oh, yes, the twelve Apostles had a Christ. [A voice, "and a Moses, too;" great laughter.] The twelve Apostles had a Christ, and he never could have had a Judas unless he had had the twelve Apostles. If I have played the Judas, who has been my Christ that I have played the Judas with? Was it Thad. Stevens? Was it Wendell Phillips? Was it Charles Sumner?"

If it were not that the blasphemy shocks us, we should gather from all this that it dwelt in the mind of the President of the United States that the only reason why he was not a Judas was that he had not been able to find a Christ toward whom to play the Judas.

It will appear that this bit of "opinion," given in pursuance of his constitutional obligation, was received with cheers and hisses. Whether the cheers were that certain patriotic persons named by him might be hanged, or the hissing was because of the inability of the President to play the part of Judas, for the reason before stated, I am sorry to say the evidence will not inform us.

His answer makes the President say that it is his "duty to express opinions concerning the public characters, and the conduct, views, purposes, objects, motives, and tendencies of all men engaged in the public service."

Now, as "the character, motives, tendencies, purposes, objects, and views" of Judas alone had "opinions expressed" about them on this "fit occasion," (although he seemed to desire to have some others, whose names he mentioned, hanged,) I shall leave his counsel to inform you what were the "public services" of Judas Iscariot, to say nothing of Moses, which it was the constitutional duty and right of the President of the United States to discuss on this particularly "fit occasion."

But I will not pursue this revolting exhibition any further.

I will only show you at Cleveland the crowd and the President of the United States, in the darkness of the night, bandying epithets with each other, crying, "Mind your dignity, Andy!" "Don't get mad, Andy!" "Bully for you, Andy!" I hardly dare shock, as I must, every sense of propriety by calling your attention to the President's allusion to the death of the sainted martyr, Lincoln, as the means by which he attained his office, and if it can be justified in any man, public or private, I am entirely mistaken in the commonest proprieties of life. The President shall tell his own story:—

"There was, two years ago, a ticket before you for the Presidency. I was placed upon that ticket with a distinguished citizen now no more. [Voices, "It's a pity;" "Too bad;" "Unfortunate."] Yes, I know there are some who say 'unfortunate.' Yes, unfortunate for some that God rules on high and deals in justice. [Cheers.] Yes, unfortunate. The ways of

Providence are mysterious and incomprehensible, controlling all who exclaim 'unfortunate.' »

Is it wonderful at all that such a speech, which seems to have been unprovoked and coolly uttered, should have elicited the single response from the crowd, "Bully for you"?

I go no further. I might follow this *ad nauseam*. I grant the President of the United States further upon this disgraceful scene the mercy of my silence. Tell me, now, who can read the accounts of this exhibition, and reflect that the result of our institutions of government has been to place such a man, so lost to decency and propriety of conduct, so unfit, in the high office of ruler of this nation, without blushing and hanging his head in shame as the finger of scorn and contempt for republican democracy is pointed at him by some advocate of monarchy in the Old World. What answer have you when an intelligent foreigner says, "Look, see, this is the culmination of the ballot unrestrained in the hands of a free people, in a country where any man may aspire to the office of President. Is not our government of a hereditary king or emperor a better one, where at least our sovereign is born a gentleman, than to have such a *thing* as this for a ruler?"

Yes, we have an answer. We can say this man was not the choice of the people for President of the United States. He was thrown to the surface by the whirlpool of civil war, and carelessly, we grant, elected to the second place in the government, without thought that he might ever fill the first.

By murder most foul he succeeded to the Presidency, and is the elect of an assassin to that high office, and not of the people. "It was a grievous fault, and grievously have we answered it;" but let me tell you, oh advocate of monarchy, that our form of government gives us a remedy for such a misfortune, which yours, with its divine right of kings, does not. We can remove him—as we are about to do—from the office he has disgraced, by the sure, safe, and constitutional method of impeachment; while your king, if he becomes a buffoon, or a jester, or a tyrant, can only be displaced through revolution, bloodshed, and civil war.

This,—this, oh monarchist,—is the crowning glory of our institutions, because of which, if for no other reason, our form of government claims precedence over all other governments of the earth.

JOSEPH BUTLER

(1692-1752)



JOSEPH BUTLER stands for a style of oratory which will always have the strongest attraction to minds addicted to directness of thought. In his sermons on "Human Nature," and still more in that on "The Government of the Tongue," he uses plain English as it never can be used except by one whom candor of thought has made its master. Those who hold that the use of language is to conceal thought rather than to express it, would be embarrassed if compelled to use either the language or the syntax of Butler's denunciation of lying, tattling, and slandering.

He was born in 1692 at Wantage in Berkshire, England, the youngest of the eight children of a linen-draper. His father was a Presbyterian who indulged him in his wish to enter the Church of England. Educated at Oxford, Butler, after entering the Church, became rector of Stanhope, where he published his celebrated work, "The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature." The talent shown in this work recommended him to Queen Caroline, and after her death, in 1737, in fulfillment of her strongly expressed wish, he was made Bishop, first of Bristol, and afterwards of Durham. He died in 1752.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE TONGUE

THE occasions of silence are obvious, and, one would think, should be easily distinguished by everybody: namely, when a man has nothing to say; or nothing but what is better unsaid: better, either in regard to the particular persons he is present with; or from its being an interruption to conversation itself; or to conversation of a more agreeable kind; or better, lastly, with regard to himself. I will end this particular with two reflections of the Wise Man; one of which, in the strongest manner, exposes the ridiculous part of this licentiousness of the tongue; and the other, the great danger and viciousness of it. When he that is a fool walketh by the wayside, his wisdom

faileth him, and he saith to every one that he is a fool. The other is, in the multitude of words there wanteth not sin.

As to the government of the tongue in respect to talking upon indifferent subjects: after what has been said concerning the due government of it in respect to the occasions and times for silence, there is little more necessary than only to caution men to be fully satisfied that the subjects are indeed of an indifferent nature; and not to spend too much time in conversation of this kind. But persons must be sure to take heed that the subject of their discourse be at least of an indifferent nature; that it be no way offensive to virtue, religion, or good manners: that it be not of a licentious, dissolute sort, this leaving always ill impressions upon the mind; that it be no way injurious or vexatious to others; and that too much time be not spent this way, to the neglect of those duties and offices of life which belong to their station and condition in the world. However, though there is not any necessity that men should aim at being important and weighty in every sentence they speak: yet since useful subjects, at least of some kinds, are as entertaining as others, a wise man, even when he desires to unbend his mind from business, would choose that the conversation might turn upon somewhat instructive.

The last thing is, the government of the tongue as relating to discourse of the affairs of others, and giving of characters. These are in a manner the same; and one can scarce call it an indifferent subject, because discourse upon it almost perpetually runs into somewhat criminal.

And, first of all, it were very much to be wished that this did not take up so great a part of conversation; because it is indeed a subject of a dangerous nature. Let any one consider the various interests, competitions, and little misunderstandings which arise amongst men; and he will soon see that he is not unprejudiced and impartial; that he is not, as I may speak, neutral enough to trust himself with talking of the character and concerns of his neighbor, in a free, careless, and unreserved manner. There is perpetually, and often it is not attended to, a rivalry amongst people of one kind or another in respect to wit, beauty, learning, fortune, and that one thing will insensibly influence them to speak to the disadvantage of others, even where there is no formed malice or ill-design. Since, therefore, it is so hard to enter into this subject without offending, the first thing to be

observed is that people should learn to decline it; to get over that strong inclination most have to be talking of the concerns and behavior of their neighbor.

But since it is impossible that this subject should be wholly excluded conversation; and since it is necessary that the characters of men should be known: the next thing is that it is a matter of importance what is said; and, therefore, that we should be religiously scrupulous and exact to say nothing, either good or bad, but what is true. I put it thus, because it is in reality of as great importance to the good of society, that the characters of bad men should be known, as that the characters of good men should. People who are given to scandal and detraction may indeed make an ill-use of this observation; but truths, which are of service towards regulating our conduct, are not to be disowned, or even concealed, because a bad use may be made of them. This, however, would be effectually prevented if these two things were attended to. First, That, though it is equally of bad consequence to society that men should have either good or ill characters which they do not deserve; yet, when you say somewhat good of a man which he does not deserve, there is no wrong done him in particular; whereas, when you say evil of a man which he does not deserve, here is a direct formal injury, a real piece of injustice done him. This, therefore, makes a wide difference; and gives us, in point of virtue, much greater latitude in speaking well than ill of others. Secondly, A good man is friendly to his fellow-creatures, and a lover of mankind; and so will, upon every occasion, and often without any, say all the good he can of everybody; but, so far as he is a good man, will never be disposed to speak evil of any, unless there be some other reason for it, besides, barely that it is true. If he be charged with having given an ill character, he will scarce think it a sufficient justification of himself to say it was a true one, unless he can also give some further account how he came to do so: a just indignation against particular instances of villainy, where they are great and scandalous; or to prevent an innocent man from being deceived and betrayed, when he has great trust and confidence in one who does not deserve it. Justice must be done to every part of a subject when we are considering it. If there be a man who bears a fair character in the world, whom yet we know to be without faith or honesty, to be really an ill man; it must be allowed in general that we shall do a piece of


service to society by letting such a one's true character be known. This is no more than what we have an instance of in our Savior himself; though he was mild and gentle beyond example. However, no words can express too strongly the caution which should be used in such a case as this.

Upon the whole matter: If people would observe the obvious occasions of silence, if they would subdue the inclination to tale-bearing, and that eager desire to engage attention, which is an original disease in some minds, they would be in little danger of offending with their tongue; and would, in a moral and religious sense, have due government over it.

I will conclude with some precepts and reflections of the Son of Sirach upon this subject. Be swift to hear; and, if thou hast understanding, answer thy neighbor; if not, lay thy hand upon thy mouth. Honor and shame is in talk.

CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR

(100-44 B. C.)

 DOCTOR WILLIAM ROSE, the translator of Sallust, says that the speeches in the Senate, reported by Sallust as delivered by Cæsar and Cato during the conspiracy of Catiline "have been ranked as masterpieces of ancient composition and must not be considered as merely the production of the historian." He adds that both speeches were "addressed to the Senate in nearly such terms as those reported by Sallust." Doctor Rose believes that this is generally admitted, and it is easily credible at any rate.

Cæsar sympathized with Catiline and he was strongly suspected of complicity in the conspiracy. His enormous debts, his luxurious life, his great ambition and his recollections of the times of Marius, inclined him to look with favor on the overthrow of the Senatorial oligarchy which dominated Rome. He showed afterwards that in opposing the Senatorial order, he aimed at a dictatorship, supported by the masses of Rome and by the army, but at the time of the conspiracy of Catiline, his purposes, if already formulated, were not yet understood. When it was proposed to punish the associates of Catiline, Cæsar was placed in a position of great difficulty. He met it with characteristic promptness by protesting against extraordinary severity as unlawful. Silanus having voted for capital punishment, Cæsar, when called on to declare himself, delivered the celebrated oration preserved by Sallust.

ON THE CONSPIRACY OF CATILINE

(Delivered in the Roman Senate, 64 B. C.)

IT is the duty of all men, Conscript Fathers, in their deliberations on subjects of difficult determination, to divest themselves of hatred and affection, of revenge and pity. The mind when clouded with such passions cannot easily discern the truth, nor has any man ever gratified his own headstrong inclination and at the same time answered any worthy purpose. When we exercise our judgment only, it has sufficient force, but when passion possesses us, it bears sovereign sway and reason is

of no avail. I could produce a great many instances of Kings and States pursuing wrong measures when influenced by resentment or compassion. But I had rather set before you the example of our forefathers, and show how they acted in opposition to the impulses of passion, but agreeably to wisdom and sound policy. In the war which we carried on with Perses, King of Macedonia, Rhodes, a mighty and flourishing city, which owed all its grandeur, too, to the Roman aid, proved faithless, and became our enemy: but when the war was ended, and the conduct of the Rhodians came to be taken into consideration, our ancestors pardoned them, that none might say the war had been undertaken more on account of their riches than of injuries. In all the Punic wars, too, though the Carthaginians, both in time of peace and even during a truce, had often insulted us in the most outrageous manner, yet our ancestors never improved any opportunity of retaliating; considering more what was worthy of themselves than what might in justice be done against them.

In like manner, Conscript Fathers, ought you to take care that the wickedness of Lentulus and the rest of the conspirators weigh not more with you than a regard to your own honor; and that, while you gratify your resentment, you do not forfeit your reputation. If a punishment, indeed, can be invented adequate to their crimes, I approve the extraordinary proposal made; but if the enormity of their guilt is such that human invention cannot find out a chastisement proportioned to it, my opinion is, that we ought to be contented with such as the law has provided.

Most of those who have spoken before me have in a pompous and affecting manner lamented the situation of the State; they have enumerated all the calamities of war, and the many distresses of the conquered; virgins and youths violated; children torn from the embraces of their parents; matrons forced to bear the brutal insults of victorious soldiers; temples and private houses plundered; all places filled with flames and slaughter; finally, nothing but arms, carcasses, blood, and lamentations to be seen.

But, for the sake of the immortal gods, to what purpose were such affecting strains? Was it to raise in your minds an abhorrence of the conspiracy, as if he whom so daring and threatening a danger cannot move, could be inflamed by the breath of eloquence? No; this is not the way: nor do injuries

appear light to any one that suffers them; many stretch them beyond their due size. But, Conscript Fathers, different allowances are made to different persons: when such as live in obscurity are transported by passion to the commission of any offenses, there are few who know it, their reputation and fortune being on a level: but those who are invested with great power are placed on an eminence, and their actions viewed by all; and thus the least allowance is made to the highest dignity. There must be no partiality, no hatred, far less any resentment or animosity, in such a station. What goes by the name of passion only in others, when seen in men of power, is called pride and cruelty.

As for me, Conscript Fathers, I look on all tortures as far short of what these criminals deserve. But most men remember best what happened last; and, forgetting the guilt of wicked men, talk only of their punishment, if more severe than ordinary. I am convinced that what Decius Silanus, brave and worthy man, said, was from his zeal to the State, and that he was neither biased by partiality nor enmity; such is his integrity and moderation, as I well know. But his proposal appears to me not, indeed, cruel, (for against such men what can be cruel?) but contrary to the genius of our government. Surely, Silanus, you were urged by fear, or the enormity of the treason, to propose a punishment quite new. How groundless such fear is it is needless to show; especially when, by the diligence of so able a consul, such powerful forces are provided for our security; and, as to the punishment, we may say, what indeed is the truth, that, to those who live in sorrow and misery, death is but a release from trouble; that it is death which puts an end to all the calamities of men, beyond which there is no room for care and joy. But why, in the name of the gods, did not you add to your proposal that they should be punished with stripes? Was it because the Porcian law forbids it? But there are other laws, too, which forbid the putting to death a condemned Roman, and allow him the privilege of banishment. Or was it because whipping is a more severe punishment than death? Can anything be reckoned too cruel or severe against men convicted of such treason? But if stripes are a lighter punishment, how is it consistent to observe the law in a matter of small concern, and disregard it in one that is of greater?

But you will say, "Who will find fault with any punishment decreed against traitors to the State?" I answer, time may, so

may sudden conjectures; and fortune, too, that governs the world at pleasure. Whatever punishment is inflicted on these paricides will be justly inflicted. But take care, Conscript Fathers, how your present decrees may affect posterity. All bad precedents spring from good beginnings, but when the administration is in the hands of wicked or ignorant men, these precedents, at first just, are transferred from proper and deserving objects to such as are not so.

The Lacedæmonians, when they had conquered the Athenians, placed thirty governors over them; who began their power by putting to death, without any trial, such as were remarkably wicked and universally hated. The people were highly pleased at this, and applauded the justice of such executions. But when they had by degrees established their lawless authority, they wantonly butchered both good and bad without distinction; and thus kept the State in awe. Such was the severe punishment which the people, oppressed with slavery, suffered for their foolish joy.

In our own times, when Sylla, after his success, ordered Damasippus, and others of the like character, who raised themselves on the misfortunes of the State, to be put to death, who did not commend him for it? All agreed that such wicked and factious instruments, who were constantly embroiling the commonwealth, were justly put to death. Yet this was an introduction to a bloody massacre: for whoever coveted his fellow-citizen's house, either in town or country, nay, even any curious vase or fine raiment, took care to have the possessor of it put on the list of the proscribed.

Thus they who had rejoiced at the punishment of Damasippus were soon after dragged to death themselves; nor was an end put to this butchery till Sylla had glutted all his followers with riches. I do not, indeed, apprehend any such proceedings from M. Cicero, nor from these times. But in so great a city as ours there are various characters and dispositions. At another time, and under another consul, who may have an army too at his command, any falsehood may pass for fact; and when, on this precedent, the consul shall, by a decree of the Senate, draw the sword, who is to set bounds to it? who to moderate its fury?


Our ancestors, Conscript Fathers, never wanted conduct nor courage; nor did they think it unworthy of them to imitate the customs of other nations, if they were useful and praiseworthy.

From the Samnites they learned the exercise of arms, and borrowed from them their weapons of war; and most of their ensigns of magistracy from the Tuscans; in a word, they were very careful to practice whatever appeared useful to them, whether among their allies or their enemies; choosing rather to imitate than envy what was excellent.

Now, in those days, in imitation of the custom of Greece, they inflicted stripes on guilty citizens, and capital punishment on such as were condemned: but when the commonwealth became great and powerful, and the vast number of citizens gave rise to factions; when the innocent began to be circumvented, and other such inconveniences to take place; then the Porcian and other laws were made, which provided no higher punishment than banishment for the greatest crimes. These considerations, Conscript Fathers, appear to me of the greatest weight against our pursuing any new resolution on this occasion: for surely their share of virtue and wisdom, who from so small beginnings raised so mighty an empire, far exceeds ours, who are scarce able to preserve what they acquired so gloriously.—“What! shall we discharge the conspirators,” you will say, “to reinforce Catiline’s army?” By no means: but my opinion is this; that their estates should be confiscated; their persons closely confined in the most powerful cities of Italy; and that no one move the Senate or the people for any favor towards them, under the penalty of being declared by the Senate an enemy to the State and the welfare of its members.

DANIEL W. CAHILL

(1802-1864)

ANIEL W. CAHILL, D.D., celebrated as an American pulpit orator and lecturer on social, religious, and scientific subjects, had a remarkable command of fervid and picturesque eloquence. Born in Queens County, Ireland, in 1802, he studied at Carlow College and at Maynooth, where he was ordained a priest. He was for a time Professor of Natural History at Carlow College, and at another time editor of the Dublin Telegraph. He became a learned chemist and astronomer also, and, after living from 1851 to 1855 in England, came as a priest to America, where his labors gained for him a distinction that led to the publication of a large volume of his sermons and lectures after his death. He died in Boston October 24th, 1864.

THE LAST JUDGMENT

(From a Sermon Delivered by Very Rev. D. W. Cahill, D.D., in St. Peter's Church, Barclay Street, New York, on Sunday Evening, November 29th, 1863)

THERE was a time when there was no earth, no sun, no moon, no stars; when all the eye now beholds had no existence; when there was nothing,—all darkness, chaos,—when the Divinity reigned alone; when no created voice was heard through God's territories to break the silence of illimitable space. Six thousand years only have elapsed since he built the present world and peopled the skies with the myriad spheres that hang in the arched roof above us. The mere shell, the mere framework of this world may, perhaps, be somewhat older, but we know when Adam was created with the certainty of a parish register. It may be about six thousand years ago: and since that period the history of man is one unbroken page of wickedness and infidelity. Heaven once, in anger, nearly extirpated our race; and once, in mercy, forgave us. Yet, since, the earth is stained with guilt red as scarlet; and the patience of a God—

patience infinite—can alone bear it. Who can tell the amount of the crime of even one city for one day? But who can conceive the infinite guilt of all peoples, of all nations, and all ages, ascending and accumulating before God's throne since the beginning? God is great in power, great in goodness, great in mercy, great in wisdom; but he is more than great in patience, to bear the congregated offenses of countless millions, daily, hourly, provoking his anger and opposing his will.

But, as the hour of man's creation and man's redemption was arranged by God, and in due time occurred, so the moment for man's total extinction on earth is approaching, and when the time written in the records of heaven shall have arrived, that unerring decree will be executed. By one word he made this world; by one word he can destroy it. By one stroke of his omnipotent pencil he drew the present picture of creation; by one dash of the same brush he can blot it out again and expunge all the work of the skies. Who can limit his power? In one second he can reduce all things to their original chaos, and live again as he did before creation began. He can, when he pleases, destroy all things—the soul excepted. The soul he cannot annihilate. He made the world himself—of course, he can himself destroy it. But Christ is the redeemer of the soul, and, therefore, its immortal existence is as indestructible as the eternity of God. Redemption is a contract between the Father and the Son. That contract cannot be broken without ignoring the Cross. Hence, while God is at liberty to blot out his own creation, he cannot annihilate the work purchased with the blood of Christ. Hence, in the coming wreck, the soul cannot be destroyed. And this is the idea that renders that awful hour a source of joy unlimited to the blessed, and of terrors unspeakable to the wicked. Yet although no one can tell when this fatal day will arrive, still it may be fairly presumed to be at hand, when Christ's passion will be disregarded on earth; when vice will so predominate over virtue that the worship of God may be said to cease; when the destruction of the earth will be a mercy, a duty of justice which God owes to his own character and to the eternal laws of his kingdom. When this time shall have arrived, we may fairly expect the day of the general judgment. . . .

Who can paint Omnipotent power pulling down firmaments, and suns, and stars, and moons: his will reversing his former

creation; the earth trembling in desolation? How minutely graphic is Christ in this terrible description; and have you noticed his last words, where he says: "Have I not foretold all to you?" This single phrase is worth the entire history; since it stamps the terrors of this day with the certitude of any other truth of faith, any other fact of the Gospel.

St. Mark continues to detail the order of this terrible hour. Terror will follow on terror; curse upon curse, "till men will fall away with fear." The sun being not quite extinguished, fatal gloom will be spread over all things like a veil over the face of the dead: terrific signs are seen in the heavens, and all things announce that time is at an end. St. John says, that before God pronounces the final word there is silence in heaven; and voices are heard in the air, on the water, and on the earth. At length the skies open and he pours out the first vial of his anger. And the end is come. God speaks the command; and all nature trembles as if in agony. The seas swell, and boil, and rise, and lash the skies. The mountains nod and sink, and the poles collapse. The lightnings flash, and the moaning tempests sweep over the furious deep, piling up ocean upon ocean on the trembling globe. The earth reels in convulsion, and the whole frame of creation struggles.


A mighty conflagration bursts from the melting earth, rages like a hurricane roundabout, devouring all things in its storm and flood of fire, consuming the crumbling wreck of the condemned world. The heavens become terrible, as the kindling earth and seas show their overwhelming flashes on the crimson skies. The sun muffled, the moon black, the stars fallen, floating masses like clouds of blood sweep the skies in circling fury. The Omnipotence which, in the beginning of time, formed all creation, is now concentrated in a point; and, as it were, intensifies the infinity of his wrath, till his anger can swell no higher; and his voice is heard like thunder in the distance. With what eloquent terror does the Savior paint this scene in his own words: "Men fainting away with fear, running in wild distraction, calling on the ground to open and swallow them, and the rocks to fall on them and hide them from the face of the Lord." The earth on fire: the skies faded: the sun and the stars darkened or extinguished: mankind burning, dying: the angry voice of God coming to judge the world: and Jesus Christ describing the scene,—are realities which the history of God has never seen

before; and which never again will be repeated during the endless round of eternity.

Reason asks: Oh, who is God? and what is nature? and whence is man? and where is heaven? and why is hell? and what is our destiny? Was the world made in pleasure, moved for a moment in trial and suffering, and then blotted out in anger? In one revolution of the earth on fire it is a blank. Like a burning ship at sea, sinking to the bottom on fire, the earth vanishes into nonexistence under the blue vault, where it once careered in its brilliant circle. Not a vestige remains of its omnipotent path. Its wide territory is a tenantless, dark waste—the myriad lamps of the skies extinguished: all former existences crumbled: silent forever: all chaos: things are as if they had never been: the history of Earth and Time a mere record of the forgotten past: a mere hollow vault in the infinitude of space.

JOHN CAIRD

(1820-)

 OHN CAIRD'S 'University Addresses' represent the best thought of one of the strongest and clearest minds of the nineteenth century. In lucidity and directness and often in beauty of diction, they are models of their class. Though probably carefully prepared before their delivery, they often show the freedom and force of the extemporaneous speech. The address on the 'Art of Public Speaking' has compressed into it more thought than often goes to make an entire volume, and it has many periods of striking eloquence.

CaIRD was born at Greenock, Scotland, in 1820. Educated for the pulpit, he became Professor of Divinity at Glasgow University in 1862, and it was there that he delivered the addresses by which he is likely to be longest remembered. He is the author of numerous works on philosophy, metaphysics, and theology. He became Principal of the University in 1873, and is generally spoken of as Principal CaIRD.

THE ART OF ELOQUENCE

(From the address on the 'Art of Public Speaking,' delivered at the University of Glasgow, November 9th, 1889)

OF ALL intellectual agencies, the faculty of public speaking is that which, in proportion to its practical influence and importance, has received the least attention in our educational system. Of course, seeing that the first condition of good speaking is that the speaker should have something to say, indirectly all education is an education of the orator. External gifts of voice and manner, apart from more solid acquirements, may deceive and dazzle the unwary and make a slender stock of ideas go a long way with an uneducated or half-educated auditory. But such superficial qualities in the long run lose their effect, even on uncritical ears, and to the better instructed may even become offensive as a kind of tacit insult to their judgment. Knowledge and a disciplined intelligence therefore constitute the

first condition of effective speaking. But if it be true, as we must all admit, that the possession of knowledge does not imply the power of imparting it, that profound thinkers and ripe scholars may be poor and ineffective speakers; if experience proves that men who are strong in the study may be weak on the platform or in the pulpit, and that even men whose books evince a masterly grasp of their subject may be distanced as teachers or preachers or public speakers by persons of greatly inferior gifts and attainments—then it is obvious that something more than the possession of ideas goes to the making of the orator, and that that system of education is incomplete which confines itself to the acquirement of knowledge and neglects the art of oral expression.

Every one knows of the immense pains that were bestowed on the cultivation of this art in ancient times. "Ancient oratory," writes Professor Jebb, "is a fine art, an art regarded by its cultivators as analogous to sculpture, to poetry, to music." Already before the art of rhetoric had become an elaborate system, the orators were accustomed to prepare themselves for their task, first in composition, then in delivery. "Great is the labor of oratory," says Cicero, "as is its field, its dignity, its reward." And though it may be true that in this as in other arts, nature and original aptitude count for much, and the highest eminence is attainable by few, yet moderate success is not beyond the reach of average ability industriously and carefully cultivated. How then shall we explain the comparative neglect into which, in our modern educational system, this art has fallen; how shall we account for the fact that whilst every other art has its principles and methods, its long and laborious discipline, its assiduous study of the best models, the acquisition of this art is for the most part left to chance or to such proficiency as can be gained in course of time and at the expense of long-suffering audiences? How is it that in our schools and colleges everything is done for the attainment of knowledge, and nothing at all for the capacity of communicating it?

At first sight we might suppose that this neglect is to be ascribed to the diffusion of literature and the growing influence of the press. Oral teaching, we might naturally suppose, would count for more in times when there was almost no other access to the popular mind, and, with the spread of education and the multiplication of books, would gradually be superseded by instruc-

tion conveyed in a literary form. That the gift of eloquence should be rated high, and should be sedulously cultivated in an age before books existed in printed form, or when books were few and costly and readers a very limited class, and when for the great mass of men the preacher or public speaker was in himself all that books, newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, popular manuals, organs of political parties and religious sects, the vast and varied mass of publications that are constantly pouring forth from the press, are for us in the present day—that at such a period the faculty of oral address should be supremely important is only what we might expect. But as education advances, and ideas in the more exact and permanent form of printed matter, suited to every variety of taste and intelligence, become almost universally accessible, we might also expect that the speaker's function, if it did not become extinct, would fall into the background; and also that, in so far that it survived, the improved taste of society would tend at once to diminish the quantity and to raise the quality of public speaking.

How groundless such expectations would prove you need not be told. The vocation of the speaker has not only lost nothing, but has enormously gained in public consequence with the gradual diffusion of knowledge in printed form. There never was a time, in modern history at least, when it constituted so potent a factor in the national life as in our own day. There never was a time when the gift of oratory or the talent for debate brought so much influence, social, political, ecclesiastical, or when he who was endowed with it found the power of ready utterance so much in demand. In this country, at least, the man who can speak is under a perpetual pressure to exercise his gift. Lecture platforms, public meetings, associations for all sorts of objects; festivals, banquets, ceremonials, conferences, anniversaries, meetings to offer testimonials to retiring, or to organize memorials to departed, officials and celebrities, great and small—public occasions of all sorts, in short, create a perpetual call on his power of utterance. Nor is the demand confined to public occasions. The rage for oratory pursues him in his hours of relaxation and into the retreats of social and private life. In the pauses of a railway journey admiring auditors insist on a modicum of their favorite stimulant. At a private dinner or a garden party, the reporter, note-book in hand, is either openly or furtively introduced; and, sometimes, it must be confessed, not without his own connivance,

opportunity is afforded to the oratorical celebrity to give the world another taste of his quality.

Moreover, it is to be observed that, contrary to the natural anticipation I have just suggested, the public taste for public qualification does not become more fastidious with the progress of education. Public speaking, with rare exceptions, does not in our day improve in quality. The palmy days of oratory, when it was regarded as an art on a level with painting, and sculpture, and poetry, when the severest canons of criticism were applied to it, when the great speaker cultivated his gift by laborious and varied discipline, speaking seldom, and only on occasions worthy of his powers, and grudging no pains to meet the claims of an exacting but appreciative audience—these days are long passed away. How could it be otherwise? An epicure could not expect a chef in the culinary art to send up, day after day, at a moment's notice, a perpetual series of *recherche* viands; and from even men of the highest abilities it would be too much to ask for the production of off-hand, extempore, oratorical feasts. Hence we need not wonder if, when we examine the speeches of even the most renowned purveyors of modern oratory, political and other, we should find that, in the best qualities of eloquence, in clearness of thought, precision of aim, consecution of argument, force, aptitude, and elegance of expression, they fall miserably short of the best types of ancient oratory; and that loose, slipshod, and ambiguous phraseology, involved and interminable sentences, sounding but empty declamation, perplexed and inconclusive argument, and the cheap impressiveness of appeals to vulgar prejudice and passion, should be their too common characteristics.

There are, however, some considerations which may serve to abate the severity of the censure we pass on these and other defects of modern oratory. Much, of course, depends on our canons of criticism. We must consider how far the blemishes on which we animadvert arise, not from the incapacity or carelessness of the artist, but from the necessary limits and conditions of his art. It is obvious, for one thing, that we cannot apply the same standard, either as to matter or form, to written or spoken prose composition. It is even possible that the speaker who should aim at literary excellence would be going on a false quest, and that the qualities which made his work good as literature would mar or vitiate it as oratory. A reported speech, indeed, becomes

literature, but it is not to be judged of as such, but as a composition primarily addressed to the ear, and producing its effect, whether instruction or persuasion, whether intelligent conviction or emotion and action, under the condition of being rapidly spoken and rapidly apprehended. And this condition obviously implies that many qualities which are meritorious in a book or treatise—profundity or subtlety of thought, closeness and consecution of argument, elaborate refinement and beauty of style, expression nicely adapted to the most delicate shades of thought—would not only involve a waste of labor in a spoken address, but might mar or frustrate its effectiveness. A realistic painter who bestows infinite pains in copying the form and color of every pebble on the bank of brook or stream, and every reticulation of each leaf on the spray that overhangs it, not only squanders effort in achieving microscopic accuracy, but distracts by irrelevant detail the eye of the observer, and destroys the general idea or impression of the landscape. And a like result may attend elaboration of thought and fastidious nicety of form in a spoken composition. Such minute finish is either lost or unappreciated by the auditor, or, while he pauses to admire it, his attention is diverted, and he loses the thread of the discourse or argument.

Moreover, in studying a written composition, a reader has no right to complain of compression or conciseness, or, on the other hand, of the space occupied in the development of the thought. If the sense be not immediately obvious, or if he fails to catch it on a first reading, he can pause on a phrase or sentence; he can go back on a paragraph; if the matter sets his own mind aworking in a different track, he can suspend his reading to follow out the suggested train of thought, and then come back to take up the interrupted sequence of the author's argument; or again, if the strain on his attention or intelligence becomes too great, he can stop and resume his reading at will.

But an oral address admits of no such delays and interruptions. The meaning must be understood at a first hearing or not at all, the discourse must be so framed that the mind of the hearer can move on at least as fast as that of the speaker; and seeing you cannot, on many occasions at any rate, shut up a speaker as you can a book, there are limits of length to which every public address must conform. Obviously, therefore, oral composition not only admits, but requires, certain characteristics which

would not be only illegitimate, but positive blemishes in matter intended to be read. Hearers, of course, vary in quickness of apprehension, and no speaker is bound to be plain to auditors whose intelligence must be supplemented by a surgical operation. But though it is true that greater condensation is possible in addressing a select audience, an average audience cannot be fed with intellectual pemmican. To present the same thought in varied language or in diversified aspects, to make use of pictorial forms and abundant and familiar illustrations; to go at a slow pace in argument; to avoid rapid transitions and elliptical reasoning; to arrest wavering attention at the cost even of irrelevancy and digression; to be not over-scrupulous as to grammatical and dialectic proprieties or a telling roughness that jars on a fastidious ear; to make sure not merely that the ideas are there, but that they are so presented as to interest, strike, sustain the attention, and tell on the heart and soul of the hearers—these and such as these must be aims present to the mind of the public speaker and controlling the form and substance of his talk. But all this implies that a certain latitude must be conceded to oral, which is denied to written composition, and that the very effectiveness and success of a speech may be due to its offenses against the strict canons of literary criticism.

It is on this principle that we explain the fact that good speakers are often bad writers, good writers bad speakers, and that the instances are rare in which men attain to great and equal excellence as authors and as orators.

Following out a little further this comparison of speaking and writing, or of oral and written and prose composition, there is another characteristic by reason of which, at first sight at least, we must ascribe an inferior value to the former; *viz.*, its evanescence. Written or printed matter has the advantage not only of greater precision but of greater permanence. A great book is a treasure for all time. The thinker passes away, but the thoughts that are enshrined in the literature of the past live on for the instruction and delight of succeeding generations. It is of the very essence of oratory, on the other hand, to be ephemeral. Its most brilliant effects, like the finest aspects of nature, vanish in the very moment of observation. They can no more be arrested than the light of morning on the mountain summit, or the flashing radiance on the river's rippling waves, "a moment here, then gone forever." The words that touch us by their pathos, or

rouse us by their lofty eloquence, pass away like the successive notes of a song in the very act of falling on the enraptured ear.

It may even be said that the best and noblest effects of oratory are more evanescent than those of music. The song may be sung, the great composer's work that delights us at a first hearing may be repeated with equal or higher artistic skill. But often the power of spoken words depends on a combination of circumstances that can never be reproduced. The speech of a great statesman in debate—say on some critical emergency when the vote is about to be taken that is to decide the fate of a ministry, or the passing of a measure of reform or of domestic or foreign policy on which the interests of millions are staked; or again, the speech spoken by an illustrious pleader in a great State trial, and before an audience composed of all the elements, social and intellectual, that stimulate to their very highest an orator's powers; or, to name no other instance, the words in which no one knows how to sympathize with and touch the hidden springs of human emotion, give expression to the sorrow of a community for departed greatness, or the proud reaction with which it rises to face some national calamity or peril—in these and in many similar instances the conditions of a great speech, and therefore the speech itself, can never recur. A song may be sung again by the same or other voice, but the speech can never be respoken even by the voice that uttered it; and that not merely because, under the inspiration of a great occasion, it may have reached the climax of its powers, but because the moving panorama of history never repeats itself, never revives again the circumstances that gave it its power to affect us. And when the eloquent voice has itself been silenced, unlike the song, no other voice can reproduce its music. On the lips of *Æschines* it may seem still instinct with power, but all his art cannot make us feel as we should have done, had we heard *Demosthenes*.

But if we reflect for a moment on this distinction between oral and written composition, may not the very fact of the evanescence of the former suggest to us that there is in good oratory an element of power which written or printed matter does not and cannot possess? Society will never, by reason of advancing culture and the diffusion of literature, outgrow the relish and demand for good speaking, for this, if for no other reason, that,

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besides outward circumstances and accessories, there is something in what we call eloquent speech which by no effort or artifice can be produced in literary form. . . . There is a universal language which, long ere we have mastered the meaning of articulate words, carries with it for each and all of us its own interpretation, and with the potent aid of which the most consummate linguist can never dispense. Betwixt parent and child in all lands and climes, the light in the eye, the smile on the cheek, the tones of the voice, the thousand movements, touches, caresses of the enfolding arms, constitute a medium of communication intuitively understood, which not art but nature has taught. And this, too, is a language which we never outgrow, and which, in the hands of one who knows how to use it, reinforces and in some measure transcends the capacities of oral address. The artifices of the printer, the notation of the musician, can no doubt do much to reduce this language of nature to formal expression. But even musical notation, though much more complete than any that could be adapted to speaking, leaves—as any one knows who has ever listened to a great artist and compared his singing or playing with that of an inferior and common-place performer—an almost boundless latitude of expression to individual taste and feeling.

And even more remarkable is this untaught and unteachable power in the case of the speaker. What ingenuity could invent a written or printed notation that would represent the infinite, nicely-discriminated, subtle shades of tone and accent which a great speaker instinctively employs, and which the ear and soul of a sympathetic auditory instinctively interprets. Even in deliberate speech, in exposition, narrative, calm and unimpassioned argument, there are innumerable subtle changes by which corresponding variations of thought are indicated. And when he rises to the region of emotion, has not nature wedded its own symbols to the whole gamut of feeling,—entreaty, passion, pathos, tenderness, grief subdued or unrepressed, remonstrance, anger, scorn, sarcasm, reverence, awe, aspiration, homage, the agony of the penitent, the hope and trust of the believer, the mystical rapture of the saint,—has not each of these and a thousand other varieties of feeling its own appropriate form of expression, so that, through the whole continuity of speech or sermon, a speaker can suffuse articulate language with this deeper, subtler, underlying and all-potent language of nature? Lacking this

organ of spiritual power a discourse may have every intellectual excellence, but it will fall short of the highest effect. For often

“Words are weak and far to seek
When wanted fifty-fold,
And so if silence do not speak,
And trembling lip and tearful cheek,
There’s nothing told.”

In one word, the ultimate reason for the greater effectiveness of spoken than of written matter is simply this, that the latter is dead and silent, the former quick with the glow and vitality of intelligence and emotion. In certain scientific observations you must eliminate what is called the personal equation; but in good speaking, the personality of the speaker, instead of needing to be discounted, is that which lends its special value to the result. What reaches the auditor is not thought frozen into abstract form, but thought welling warm and fluent from a living source. In reading a book or report the whole burden of the process is thrown upon the reader. In listening to a spoken address more than half of the burden is borne by the speaker; or rather, activity and receptivity become almost indistinguishable. Charged alike with the electric force of sympathy, the minds of speaker and hearer meet and mingle in a common medium of intelligence and emotion.

JOHN C. CALHOUN

(1782-1850)



CALHOUN is one of the very few modern orators who actually represent the Attic school of the time of Demosthenes as closely as a majority of educated public speakers, consciously or unconsciously, represent that of Rome in the time of Cicero. Cicero's mind, like that of Burke, was at all times exuberant and the primary object of his art was to give it the freest and fullest possible expression. The primary object of Attic art, as it is illustrated not only in oratory, but in poetry, architecture, and sculpture, is chastity,—the rejection of everything but the fitting. In its logical extreme, this idea which created Greek civilization, gave the Spartans their biting wit and contempt for long speeches. Its loss, under the Persian influences which substituted Oriental moral and artistic standards for those of Greece, led to the complete corruption of later Greek poetry and brought about conditions under which Athens, though overflowing with wrangling and declamatory sophists, had not for generations a single orator of the first rank.

Imitating Demosthenes seemingly with the greatest pains and having the ability to appreciate his peculiar excellencies, Calhoun is, nevertheless, by the necessity of the case, an English orator—not a Grecian. The English language is by its genius as severe as the artistic intellect of Attica was in its processes, while on the other hand the Greek intellect expressed itself in a language of unequalled music. Exuberance of idea in a language so surpassing in its melody, would have been an intolerable excess, while, in a language so severe as English, the Attic severity of thought may often force its conscious imitator beyond the line of mere chastity into poverty of expression. It is on this side that Calhoun errs when he errs at all.

His tendency to excessive severity of expression is fully illustrated in his celebrated speech of February 15th and 16th, 1833, against the Force Bill. It is without rhetorical ornament and almost without metaphor. In it the attempt is made to supplant the graces of rhetoric with the impulses of force. It has at times a directness and intensity which are hardly compatible with any other style, and if there are many now who will hold with Thomas H. Benton that, considered as a whole, it is one of those characteristic productions of Calhoun's intellect which make almost intolerably hard reading, few will deny that it is necessary to read it in order to know American



J. C. Calhoun

history, and to understand the logical method of a mind which, as much as any other intellect of that generation in Europe or America, worked to influence, if not to control, the course of events.

Nothing but the speech itself will show adequately what Calhoun stands for in American history, but at the close of the second day's speech, he came as near to a summary of his idea as it was possible to make. His argument there was that the States, in order to prevent the Constitution from becoming a dead letter, must exercise the functions of the Roman tribunes in "interposing their veto not only against the passage of laws but against their execution." As this theory was practically abandoned at Appomattox, it appeals for consideration now chiefly because of its influence on the history of the past.

Calhoun was born in the Abbeville district of South Carolina, March 18th, 1782. His father, Patrick Calhoun, a member of the South Carolina provincial legislature during the Revolution, held, as he told his son, that "the government is best which allows the largest amount of individual liberty compatible with good order and tranquillity," and that "improvement in political science will be found to consist in throwing off many of the restraints imposed by law and once deemed necessary to an organized society." Educated at Yale College and at the Litchfield (Conn.) Law School, John C. Calhoun was an intense student, with a power of concentration which is only attained as a habit by a small minority even of those who attempt to use their intellects habitually. It was a power which would have made him a leader in any epoch, but as he lived at a time when the reverence of the American people for great intellectual powers was almost idolatrous, it gave him influence over those who sympathized with him, so unbounded that he steadily forced out of leadership at the South the "Jacksonian Democrats" of the school represented in the Senate by his unyielding opponent, Benton.

After service in the South Carolina legislature, Calhoun entered Congress in 1811 and at once created a deep impression by his power as an orator. His strong support of the War party gave him the standing which made him Vice-President (from 1825 to 1832). When he resigned the Vice-Presidency in 1832 and entered the United States Senate, it was to take the place of Hayne who had shown himself an unequal match for Webster in the great debate precipitated by Calhoun's "Exposition of State Rights" published by the South Carolina legislature in 1829 as a preliminary definition of the same theory which he elaborated in his speech against the Force Bill. Under that bill, introduced by Mr. Wilkins, of Pennsylvania, it was proposed to give President Jackson power to coerce South Carolina or any other State resisting the collection of tariff duties or other Federal imposts. After the crisis was averted by Henry Clay's Compromise

Act, Calhoun's influence was greatly enhanced. He served as Secretary of State under Tyler and was afterwards re-elected to the Senate where he remained until his death March 31st, 1850. In summing up his character Webster said of him:—

"Sir, the eloquence of Mr. Calhoun, or the manner of his exhibition of his sentiments in public bodies, was part of his intellectual character. It grew out of the qualities of his mind. It was plain, strong, terse, condensed, concise; sometimes impassioned—still always severe. Rejecting ornament, not often seeking far for illustration, his power consisted in the plainness of his propositions, in the closeness of his logic, and in the earnestness and energy of his manner. These are the qualities, as I think, which have enabled him through such a long course of years to speak often, and yet always command attention. His demeanor as a Senator is known to us all—is appreciated, venerated by us all. No man was more respectful to others; no man carried himself with greater decorum, no man with superior dignity. . . . Mr. President, he had the basis, the indispensable basis, of all high character; and that was unspotted integrity—unimpeached honor and character. If he had aspirations, they were high, and honorable, and noble. There was nothing groveling, or low, or meanly selfish, that came near the head or the heart of Mr. Calhoun. Firm in his purpose, perfectly patriotic and honest, as I am sure he was, in the principles that he espoused, and in the measures that he defended, aside from that large regard for that species of distinction that conducted him to eminent stations for the benefit of the Republic, I do not believe he had a selfish motive, or selfish feeling."

Calhoun had been an active supporter of the annexation of Texas, and in 1850, the year in which he died, the questions presented by his speech on the Force Bill came to direct issue on the admission of California, the first State organized from the territory acquired as a result of the conquest of Mexico. This agitation provoked the spirit which resulted in William H. Seward's "Irrepressible Conflict" speech at Rochester in 1858—a speech in which, rather than in the always considerate eloquence of Webster, Calhoun's argument against the Force Bill was answered for the first time. W. V. B.

AGAINST THE FORCE BILL

(Delivered in the Senate of the United States, on the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Days of February, 1833)

Mr. President:—

I KNOW not which is most objectionable, the provisions of the bill, or the temper in which its adoption has been urged. If the extraordinary powers with which the bill proposes to clothe the Executive, to the utter prostration of the Constitution and the rights of the States, be calculated to impress our minds

with alarm at the rapid progress of despotism in our country, the zeal with which every circumstance calculated to misrepresent or exaggerate the conduct of Carolina in the controversy is seized on with a view to excite hostility against her, but too plainly indicates the deep decay of that brotherly feeling which once existed between these States, and to which we are indebted for our beautiful federal system, and by the continuance of which alone it can be preserved. It is not my intention to advert to all these misrepresentations; but there are some so well calculated to mislead the mind as to the real character of the controversy, and to hold up the State in a light so odious, that I do not feel myself justified in permitting them to pass unnoticed.

Among them one of the most prominent is the false statement that the object of South Carolina is to exempt herself from her share of the public burdens, while she participates in the advantages of the Government. If the charge were true—if the State were capable of being actuated by such low and unworthy motives, mother as I consider her, I would not stand up on this floor to vindicate her conduct. Among her faults,—and faults I will not deny she has,—no one has ever yet charged her with that low and most sordid of vices,—avarice. Her conduct on all occasions has been marked with the very opposite quality. From the commencement of the Revolution—from its first breaking out at Boston till this hour, no State has been more profuse of its blood in the cause of the country; nor has any contributed so largely to the common treasury in proportion to wealth and population. She has, in that proportion, contributed more to the exports of the Union—on the exchange of which with the rest of the world the greater portion of the public burden has been levied—than any other State. No: the controversy is not such as has been stated; the State does not seek to participate in the advantages of the Government without contributing her full share to the public treasury. Her object is far different. A deep constitutional question lies at the bottom of the controversy. The real question at issue is: Has this Government a right to impose burdens on the capital and industry of one portion of the country, not with a view to revenue, but to benefit another? And I must be permitted to say that, after the long and deep agitation of this controversy, it is with surprise that I perceive so strong a disposition to misrepresent its real character. To correct the impression which those misrepresentations are calculated to make, I

will dwell on the point under consideration for a few moments longer.

The Federal Government has, by an express provision of the Constitution, the right to lay on imposts. The State has never denied or resisted this right, nor even thought of so doing. The Government has, however, not been contented with exercising this power as she had a right to do, but has gone a step beyond it, by laying imposts, not for revenue, but protection. This the State considers as an unconstitutional exercise of power—highly injurious and oppressive to her and the other staple States, and has, accordingly, met it with the most determined resistance. I do not intend to enter, at this time, into the argument as to the unconstitutionality of the protective system. It is not necessary. It is sufficient that the power is nowhere granted; and that, from the journals of the convention which formed the Constitution, it would seem that it was refused. In support of the journals, I might cite the statement of Luther Martin, which has already been referred to, to show that the convention, so far from conferring the power on the Federal Government, left to the State the right to impose duties on imports, with the express view of enabling the several States to protect their own manufactures. Notwithstanding this, Congress has assumed, without any warrant from the Constitution, the right of exercising this most important power, and has so exercised it as to impose a ruinous burden on the labor and capital of the State, by which her resources are exhausted, the enjoyments of her citizens curtailed, the means of education contracted, and all her interests essentially and injuriously affected. We have been sneeringly told that she is a small State; that her population does not much exceed half a million of souls, and that more than one-half are not of the European race. The facts are so. I know she never can be a great State, and that the only distinction to which she can aspire must be based on the moral and intellectual acquirements of her sons. To the development of these much of her attention has been directed; but this restrictive system which has so unjustly exacted the proceeds of her labor, to be bestowed on other sections, has so impaired her resources that, if not speedily arrested, it will dry up the means of education, and with it deprive her of the only source through which she can aspire to distinction.

There is another misstatement as to the nature of the controversy, so frequently made in debate, and so well calculated to

mislead, that I feel bound to notice it. It has been said that South Carolina claims the right to annul the Constitution and laws of the United States; and to rebut this supposed claim the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Rives] has gravely quoted the Constitution, to prove that the Constitution, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, are the supreme laws of the land—as if the State claimed the right to act contrary to this provision of the Constitution. Nothing can be more erroneous: her object is not to resist laws made in pursuance of the Constitution, but those made without its authority, and which encroached on her reserved powers. She claims not even the right of judging of the delegated powers, but of those that are reserved, and to resist the former when they encroach upon the latter. I will pause to illustrate this important point.

All must admit that there are delegated and reserved powers, and that the powers reserved are reserved to the States respectively. The powers, then, of the system are divided between the General and the State governments; and the point immediately under consideration is, whether a State has any right to judge as to the extent of its reserved powers, and to defend them against the encroachments of the General Government. Without going deeply into this point at this stage of the argument, or looking into the nature and origin of the Government, there is a simple view of the subject which I consider as conclusive. The very idea of a divided power implies the right on the part of the State for which I contend. The expression is metaphorical when applied to power. Every one readily understands that the division of matter consists in the separation of the parts. But in this sense it is not applicable to power. What, then, is meant by a division of power? I cannot conceive of a division, without giving an equal right to each to judge of the extent of the power allotted to each. Such right I hold to be essential to the existence of a division; and that to give to either party the conclusive right of judging, not only of the share allotted to it, but of that allotted to the other, is to annul the division and to confer the whole power on the party vested with such right.

But it is contended that the Constitution has conferred on the Supreme Court the right of judging between the States and the General Government. Those who make this objection overlook, I conceive, an important provision of the Constitution. By turning to the tenth amended article, it will be seen that the reservation

of power to the States is not only against the powers delegated to Congress, but against the United States themselves, and extends, of course, as well to the judiciary as to the other departments of the government. The article provides that all powers not delegated to the United States, or prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. This presents the inquiry: What powers are delegated to the United States? They may be classed under four divisions: First, those that are delegated by the States to each other, by virtue of which the Constitution may be altered or amended by three-fourths of the States, when, without which, it would have required the unanimous vote of all; next, the powers conferred on Congress; then, those on the President; and, finally, those on the judicial department—all of which are particularly enumerated in the parts of the Constitution which organize the respective departments. The reservation of powers to the States is, as I have said, against the whole, and is as full against the judicial as it is against the executive and legislative departments of the government. It cannot be claimed for the one without claiming it for the whole, and without, in fact, annulling this important provision of the Constitution.

Against this, as it appears to me, conclusive view of the subject, it has been urged that this power is expressly conferred on the Supreme Court by that portion of the Constitution which provides that the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made under their authority. I believe the assertion to be utterly destitute of any foundation. It obviously is the intention of the Constitution simply to make the judicial power commensurate with the law-making and treaty-making powers; and to vest it with the right of applying the Constitution, the laws, and the treaties, to the cases which might arise under them, and not to make it the judge of the Constitution, the laws, and the treaties themselves. In fact, the power of applying the laws to the facts of the case, and deciding upon such application, constitutes, in truth, the judicial power. The distinction between such power and that of judging of the laws will be perfectly apparent when we advert to what is the acknowledged power of the court in reference to treaties or compacts between sovereigns. It is perfectly established that the courts have no right to judge of the violation of treaties; and that in reference

to them their power is limited to the right of judging simply of the violation of rights under them; and that the right of judging of infractions belongs exclusively to the parties themselves, and not to the courts: of which we have an example in the French treaty, which was declared by Congress null and void, in consequence of its violation by the government of France. Without such declaration, had a French citizen sued a citizen of this country under the treaty the court could have taken no cognizance of its infraction; nor, after such a declaration, would it have heard any argument or proof going to show that the treaty had not been violated.

The declaration, of itself, is conclusive on the court. But it will be asked how the court obtained the power to pronounce a law or treaty unconstitutional, when it comes in conflict with that instrument. I do not deny that it possesses the right; but I can by no means concede that it was derived from the Constitution. It had its origin in the necessity of the case. Where there are two or more rules established, one from a higher, the other from a lower authority, which may come into conflict in applying them to a particular case, the judge cannot avoid pronouncing in favor of the superior against the inferior. It is from this necessity, and this alone, that the power which is now set up to overrule the rights of the States against an express provision of the Constitution was derived. It had no other origin. That I have traced it to its true source will be manifest from the fact that it is a power which, so far from being conferred exclusively on the Supreme Court, as is insisted, belongs to every court—inferior and superior—State and general—and even to foreign courts.

But the Senator from Delaware [Mr. Clayton] relies on the journals of the convention to prove that it was the intention of that body to confer on the Supreme Court the right of deciding, in the last resort between a State and the General Government. I will not follow him through the journals, as I do not deem that to be necessary to refute his argument. It is sufficient for this purpose to state that Mr. Rutledge reported a resolution providing expressly that the United States and the States might be parties before the Supreme Court. If this proposition had been adopted, I would ask the Senator whether this very controversy between the United States and South Carolina might not have been brought before the court? I would also ask him whether it can be brought before the court as the Constitution

now stands? If he answer the former in the affirmative, and the latter in the negative, as he must, then it is clear, his elaborate argument to the contrary notwithstanding, that the report of Mr. Rutledge was not, in substance, adopted as he contended, and that the journals, so far from supporting, are in direct opposition to the position which he attempts to maintain. I might push the argument much further against the power of the court, but I do not deem it necessary, at least in this stage of the discussion. If the views which have already been presented be correct, and I do not see how they can be resisted, the conclusion is inevitable, that the reserved powers were reserved equally against every department of the Government, and as strongly against the judicial as against the other departments, and, of course, were left under the exclusive will of the States.

There still remains another misrepresentation of the conduct of the State, which has been made with the view of exciting odium. I allude to the charge that South Carolina supported the tariff of 1816, and is, therefore, responsible for the protective system. To determine the truth of this charge, it becomes necessary to ascertain the real character of that law—whether it was a tariff for revenue or for protection—and, as involved in this, to inquire, What was the condition of the country at the period? The late war with Great Britain had just terminated, which, with the restrictive system that preceded it, had diverted a large amount of capital and industry from commerce to manufactures, particularly to the cotton and woollen branches. There was a debt at the same time of one hundred and thirty millions of dollars hanging over the country, and the heavy war duties were still in existence. Under these circumstances, the question was presented, as to what point the duties ought to be reduced. This question involved another—at what time the debt ought to be paid? which was a question of policy, involving in its consideration all the circumstances connected with the then condition of the country. Among the most prominent arguments in favor of an early discharge of the debt was, that the high duties which it would require to effect it would have, at the same time, the effect of sustaining the infant manufactures, which had been forced up under the circumstances to which I have adverted. This view of the subject had a decided influence in determining in favor of an early payment of the debt. The sinking fund was, accordingly, raised from seven to ten millions of dollars,

with the provision to apply the surplus which might remain in the treasury as a contingent appropriation to that fund; and the duties were graduated to meet this increased expenditure. It was thus that the policy and justice of protecting the large amount of capital and industry which had been diverted by the measures of the Government into new channels, as I have stated, were combined with the fiscal action of the Government, and which, while it secured a prompt payment of the debt, prevented the immense losses to the manufacturers which would have followed a sudden and great reduction. Still, revenue was the main object, and protection but the incidental. The bill to reduce the duties was reported by the Committee of Ways and Means, and not of Manufactures, and it proposed a heavy reduction on the then existing rate of duties. But what of itself, without other evidence, is decisive as to the character of the bill is the fact that it fixed a much higher rate of duties on the unprotected than on the protected articles. I will enumerate a few leading articles only. Woolen and cotton above the value of twenty-five cents on the square yard, though they were the leading objects of protection, were subject to a permanent duty of only twenty per cent. Iron, another leading article among the protected, had a protection of not more than nine per cent. as fixed by the act, and of but fifteen as reported in the bill. These rates were all below the average duties as fixed in the act, including the protected, the unprotected, and even the free articles. I have entered into some calculation, in order to ascertain the average rate of duties under the act. There is some uncertainty in the data, but I feel assured that it is not less than thirty per cent. *ad valorem*: showing an excess of the average duties above that imposed on the protected articles enumerated of more than ten per cent., and thus clearly establishing the character of the measure—that it was for revenue and not protection.

Looking back, even at this distant period, with all our experience, I perceive but two errors in the act: the one in reference to iron, and the other the minimum duty on coarse cottons. As to the former, I conceive that the bill, as reported, proposed a duty relatively too low, which was still further reduced in its passage through Congress. The duty, at first, was fixed at seventy-five cents the hundredweight; but, in the last stage of its passage, it was reduced, by a sort of caprice, occasioned by an unfortunate motion, to forty-five cents. This injustice was

severely felt in Pennsylvania, the State, above all others, most productive of iron, and was the principal cause of that great reaction which has since thrown her so decidedly on the side of the protective policy. The other error was that as to coarse cottons, on which the duty was as much too high as that on iron was too low. It introduced, besides, the obnoxious minimum principle, which has since been so mischievously extended; and to that extent, I am constrained in candor to acknowledge, as I wish to disguise nothing, the protective principle was recognized by the Act of 1816. How this was overlooked at the time, it is not in my power to say. It escaped my observation, which I can account for only on the ground that the principle was then new, and that my attention was engaged by another important subject—the question of the currency, then so urgent, and with which, as chairman of the committee, I was particularly charged. With these exceptions, I again repeat, I see nothing in the bill to condemn; yet it is on the ground that the Members from the State voted for the bill, that the attempt is now made to hold up Carolina as responsible for the whole system of protection which has since followed, though she has resisted its progress in every stage. Was there ever greater injustice? And how is it to be accounted for, but as forming a part of that systematic misrepresentation and calumny which has been directed for so many years, without interruption, against that gallant and generous State? And why has she thus been assailed? Merely because she abstained from taking any part in the presidential canvass—believing that it had degenerated into a mere system of imposition on the people—controlled, almost exclusively, by those whose object it is to obtain the patronage of the government, and that without regard to principle or policy. Standing apart from what she considered a contest in which the public had no interest, she has been assailed by both parties with a fury altogether unparalleled; but which, pursuing the course which she believed liberty and duty required, she has met with a firmness equal to the fierceness of the assault. In the midst of this attack, I have not escaped. With a view of inflicting a wound on the State through me, I have been held up as the author of the protective system, and one of its most strenuous advocates. It is with pain that I allude to myself on so deep and grave a subject as that now under discussion, and which, I sincerely believe, involves the liberty of the country. I now regret that, under the

sense of injustice which the remarks of a Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. Wilkins] excited for the moment, I hastily gave my pledge to defend myself against the charge which has been made in reference to my course in 1816: not that there will be any difficulty in repelling the charge, but because I feel a deep reluctance in turning the discussion, in any degree, from a subject of so much magnitude to one of so little importance as the consistency or inconsistency of myself, or any other individual, particularly in connection with an event so long since passed. But for this hasty pledge, I would have remained silent as to my own course on this occasion, and would have borne with patience and calmness this, with the many other misrepresentations with which I have been so incessantly assailed for so many years.

The charge that I was the author of the protective system, has no other foundation but that I, in common with the almost entire South, gave my support to the tariff of 1816. It is true that I advocated that measure, for which I may rest my defense, without taking any other, on the ground that it was a tariff for revenue, and not for protection, which I have established beyond the power of controversy. But my speech on the occasion, has been brought in judgment against me by the Senator from Pennsylvania. I have since cast my eyes over the speech; and I will surprise, I have no doubt, the Senator, by telling him that, with the exception of some hasty and unguarded expressions, I retract nothing I uttered on that occasion. I only ask that I may be judged, in reference to it, in that spirit of fairness and justice which is due to the occasion; taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was delivered, and bearing in mind that the subject was a tariff for revenue, and not for protection; for reducing, and not raising the duties. But, before I explain the then condition of the country, from which my main arguments in favor of the measure were drawn, it is nothing but an act of justice to myself that I should state a fact in connection with my speech, that is necessary to explain what I have called hasty and unguarded expressions. My speech was an *impromptu*; and, as such, I apologized to the House, as appears from the speech as printed, for offering my sentiments on the question without having duly reflected on the subject. It was delivered at the request of a friend, when I had not previously the least intention of addressing the House. I allude to Samuel D. Ingham, then and now, as I am proud to say, a personal and political

friend—a man of talents and integrity—with a clear head, and firm and patriotic heart; then among the leading Members of the House; in the palmy state of his political glory, though now for a moment depressed;—depressed, did I say? no! it is his State which is depressed—Pennsylvania, and not Samuel D. Ingham! Pennsylvania, which has deserted him under circumstances which, instead of depressing, ought to have elevated him in her estimation. He came to me, when sitting at my desk writing, and said that the House was falling into some confusion, accompanying it with a remark, that I knew how difficult it was to rally so large a body when once broken on a tax bill, as had been experienced during the late war. Having a higher opinion of my influence than it deserved, he requested me to say something to prevent the confusion. I replied that I was at a loss what to say; that I had been busily engaged on the currency, which was then in great confusion, and which, as I have stated, had been placed particularly under my charge, as the chairman of the committee on that subject. He repeated his request, and the speech which the Senator from Pennsylvania has complimented so highly, was the result.

I will ask whether the facts stated ought not, in justice, to be borne in mind by those who would hold me accountable, not only for the general scope of the speech, but for every word and sentence which it contains? But, in asking this question, it is not my intention to repudiate the speech. All I ask is, that I may be judged by the rules which, in justice, belong to the case. Let it be recollected that the bill was a revenue bill, and, of course, that it was constitutional. I need not remind the Senate that, when the measure is constitutional, all arguments calculated to show its beneficial operation may be legitimately pressed into service, without taking into consideration whether the subject to which the arguments refer be within the sphere of the Constitution or not. If, for instance, a question were before this body to lay a duty on Bibles, and a motion were made to reduce the duty, or admit Bibles duty free, who could doubt that the argument in favor of the motion—that the increased circulation of the Bible would be in favor of the morality and religion of the country, would be strictly proper? But who would suppose that he who adduced it had committed himself on the constitutionality of taking the religion or morals of the country under the charge of the Federal Government? Again: suppose the question to be,

to raise the duty on silk, or any other article of luxury; and that it should be supported on the ground that it was an article mainly consumed by the rich and extravagant—could it be fairly inferred that in the opinion of the speaker, Congress had a right to pass sumptuary laws? I only ask that these plain rules may be applied to my argument on the tariff of 1816. They turn almost entirely on the benefits which manufactures conferred on the country in time of war, and which no one could doubt. The country had recently passed through such a state. The world was at that time deeply agitated by the effects of the great conflict which had so long raged in Europe, and which no one could tell how soon again might return. Bonaparte had but recently been overthrown; the whole southern part of this continent was in a state of revolution, and threatened with the interference of the Holy Alliance, which, had it occurred, must almost necessarily have involved this country in a most dangerous conflict. It was under these circumstances that I delivered the speech, in which I urged the House that, in the adjustment of the tariff, reference ought to be had to a state of war as well as peace, and that its provisions ought to be fixed on the compound views of the two periods—making some sacrifice in peace, in order that less might be made in war. Was this principle false? and, in urging it, did I commit myself to that system of oppression since grown up, and which has for its object the enriching of one portion of the country at the expense of the other?

The plain rule in all such cases is, that when a measure is proposed, the first thing is to ascertain its constitutionality; and, that being ascertained, the next is its expediency; which last opens the whole field of argument for and against. Every topic may be urged calculated to prove it wise or unwise: so in a bill to raise imposts. It must first be ascertained that the bill is based on the principles of revenue, and that the money raised is necessary for the wants of the country. These being ascertained, every argument, direct and indirect, may be fairly offered, which may go to show that, under all the circumstances, the provisions of the bill are proper or improper. Had this plain and simple rule been adhered to, we should never have heard of the complaint of Carolina. Her objection is not against the improper modification of a bill acknowledged to be for revenue, but that, under the name of imposts, a power essentially different from the taxing power is exercised—partaking much more of the character of a penalty

than a tax. Nothing is more common than that things closely resembling in appearance should widely and essentially differ in their character. Arsenic, for instance, resembles flour, yet one is a deadly poison, and the other that which constitutes the staff of life. So duties imposed, whether for revenue or protection, may be called imposts; though nominally and apparently the same, yet they differ essentially in their real character.

I shall now return to my speech on the tariff of 1816. To determine what my opinions really were on the subject of protection at that time, it will be proper to advert to my sentiments before and after that period. My sentiments preceding 1816, on this subject, are a matter of record. I came into Congress in 1812, a devoted friend and supporter of the then administration; yet one of my first efforts was to brave the administration, by opposing its favorite measure, the restrictive system—embargo, nonintercourse, and all—and that upon the principle of free trade. The system remained in fashion for a time; but, after the overthrow of Bonaparte, I reported a bill from the Committee on Foreign Relations, to repeal the whole system of restrictive measures. While the bill was under consideration, a worthy man, then a Member of the House [Mr. McKim, of Baltimore], moved to except the nonimportation act, which he supported on the ground of encouragement to manufactures. I resisted the motion on the very grounds on which Mr. McKim supported it. I maintained that the manufacturers were then receiving too much protection, and warned its friends that the withdrawal of the protection which the war and the high duties then afforded, would cause great embarrassment; and that the true policy, in the meantime, was to admit foreign goods as freely as possible, in order to diminish the anticipated embarrassment on the return of peace; intimating, at the same time, my desire to see the tariff revised, with a view of affording a moderate and permanent protection.

Such was my conduct before 1816. Shortly after that period I left Congress, and had no opportunity of making known my sentiments in reference to the protective system, which shortly after began to be agitated. But I have the most conclusive evidence that I considered the arrangement of the revenue, in 1816, as growing out of the necessity of the case, and due to the consideration of justice. But, even at that early period, I was not without my fears that even that arrangement would lead to abuse

and future difficulties. I regret that I have been compelled to dwell so long on myself; but trust that, whatever censure may be incurred, will not be directed against me, but against those who have drawn my conduct into the controversy; and who may hope, by assailing my motives, to wound the cause with which I am proud to be identified.

I may add, that all the Southern States voted with South Carolina in support of the bill: not that they had any interest in manufactures, but on the ground that they had supported the war, and, of course, felt a corresponding obligation to sustain those establishments which had grown up under the encouragement it had incidentally afforded; whilst most of the New England Members were opposed to the measure, principally, as I believe, on opposite principles.

I have now, I trust, satisfactorily repelled the charge against the State, and myself personally, in reference to the tariff of 1816. Whatever support the State has given the bill, originated in the most disinterested motives. There was not within the limits of the State, so far as my memory serves me, a single cotton or woolen establishment. Her whole dependence was on agriculture, and the cultivation of two great staples, rice and cotton. Her obvious policy was to keep open the market of the world, unchecked and unrestricted;—to buy cheap and to sell high: but from a feeling of kindness, combined with a sense of justice, she added her support to the bill. We had been told by the agents of the manufacturers that the protection which the measure afforded would be sufficient; to which we the more readily conceded, as it was considered a final adjustment of the question.

Let us now turn our eyes forward, and see what has been the conduct of the parties to this arrangement. Have Carolina and the South disturbed this adjustment? No; they have never raised their voice in a single instance against it, even though this measure, moderate, comparatively, as it is, was felt with no inconsiderable pressure on their interests. Was this example imitated on the opposite side? Far otherwise. Scarcely had the President signed his name, before application was made for an increase of duties, which was repeated, with demands continually growing, till the passage of the Act of 1828. What course now, I would ask, did it become Carolina to pursue in reference to these demands? Instead of acquiescing in them, because she had

acted generously in adjusting the tariff of 1816, she saw, in her generosity on that occasion, additional motives for that firm and decided resistance which she has since made against the system of protection. She accordingly commenced a systematic opposition to all further encroachments, which continued from 1818 till 1828; by discussions and by resolutions, by remonstrances and by protests through her legislature. These all proved insufficient to stem the current of encroachment: but, notwithstanding the heavy pressure on her industry, she never despaired of relief till the passage of the Act of 1828—that bill of abominations—engendered by avarice and political intrigue. Its adoption opened the eyes of the State, and gave a new character to the controversy. Till then, the question had been, whether the protective system was constitutional and expedient; but, after that, she no longer considered the question whether the right of regulating the industry of the States was a reserved or delegated power, but what right a State possesses to defend her reserved powers against the encroachments of the Federal Government: a question on the decision of which the value of all the reserved powers depends. The passage of the Act of 1828, with all its objectionable features, and under the circumstances connected with it, almost, if not entirely, closed the door of hope through the General Government. It afforded conclusive evidence that no reasonable prospect of relief from Congress could be entertained; yet, the near approach of the period of the payment of the public debt, and the elevation of General Jackson to the presidency, still afforded a ray of hope—not so strong, however, as to prevent the State from turning her eyes for final relief to her reserved powers.

Under these circumstances commenced that inquiry into the nature and extent of the reserved powers of a State, and the means which they afford of resistance against the encroachments of the General Government, which has been pursued with so much zeal and energy, and, I may add, intelligence. Never was there a political discussion carried on with greater activity, and which appealed more directly to the intelligence of a community. Throughout the whole, no address has been made to the low and vulgar passions; but, on the contrary, the discussion has turned upon the higher principles of political economy, connected with the operations of the tariff system, calculated to show its real bearing on the interests of the State, and on the structure of

our political system; and to show the true character of the relations between the State and the General Government, and the means which the States possess of defending those powers which they reserved in forming the Federal Government.

In this great canvass, men of the most commanding talents and acquirements have engaged with the greatest ardor; and the people have been addressed through every channel—by essays in the public press, and by speeches in their public assemblies—until they have become thoroughly instructed on the nature of the oppression, and on the rights which they possess, under the Constitution, to throw it off.

If gentlemen suppose that the stand taken by the people of Carolina rests on passion and delusion, they are wholly mistaken. The case is far otherwise. No community, from the legislator to the plowman, were ever better instructed in their rights; and the resistance on which the State has resolved, is the result of mature reflection, accompanied with a deep conviction that their rights have been violated, and that the means of redress which they have adopted are consistent with the principles of the Constitution.

But while this active canvass was carried on, which looked to the reserved powers as the final means of redress if all others failed, the State at the same time cherished a hope, as I have already stated, that the election of General Jackson to the presidency would prevent the necessity of a resort to extremities. He was identified with the interests of the staple States; and, having the same interest, it was believed that his great popularity—a popularity of the strongest character, as it rested on military services—would enable him, as they hoped, gradually to bring down the system of protection, without shock or injury to any interest. Under these views, the canvass in favor of General Jackson's election to the presidency was carried on with great zeal, in conjunction with that active inquiry into the reserved powers of the States on which final reliance was placed. But little did the people of Carolina dream that the man whom they were thus striving to elevate to the highest seat of power would prove so utterly false to all their hopes. Man is, indeed, ignorant of the future; nor was there ever a stronger illustration of the observation than is afforded by the result of that election! The very event on which they had built their hopes has been turned against them; and the very individual to whom they

looked as a deliverer, and whom, under that impression, they strove for so many years to elevate to power, is now the most powerful instrument in the hands of his and their bitterest opponents to put down them and their cause!

Scarcely had he been elected, when it became apparent, from the organization of his cabinet and other indications, that all their hopes of relief through him were blasted. The admission of a single individual into the cabinet, under the circumstances which accompanied that admission, threw all into confusion. The mischievous influence over the President, through which this individual was admitted into the cabinet, soon became apparent. Instead of turning his eyes forward to the period of the payment of the public debt, which was then near at hand, and to the present dangerous political crisis, which was inevitable unless averted by a timely and wise system of measures, the attention of the President was absorbed by mere party arrangements, and circumstances too disreputable to be mentioned here, except by the most distant allusion.

Here I must pause for a moment to repel a charge which has been so often made, and which even the President has reiterated in his proclamation—the charge that I have been actuated, in the part which I have taken, by feelings of disappointed ambition. I again repeat that I deeply regret the necessity of noticing myself in so important a discussion; and that nothing can induce me to advert to my own course but the conviction that it is due to the cause, at which a blow is aimed through me. It is only in this view that I notice it.

It illly became the Chief Magistrate to make this charge. The course which the State took, and which led to the present controversy between her and the General Government, was taken as far back as 1828—in the very midst of that severe canvass which placed him in power—and in that very canvass Carolina openly avowed and zealously maintained those very principles which he, the Chief Magistrate, now officially pronounces to be treason and rebellion. That was the period at which he ought to have spoken. Having remained silent then, and having, under his approval, implied by that silence, received the support and the vote of the State, I, if a sense of decorum did not prevent it, might recriminate with the double charge of deception and ingratitude. My object, however, is not to assail the President, but to defend myself against a most unfounded charge. The time alone when

that course was taken, on which this charge of disappointed ambition is founded, will of itself repel it, in the eye of every unprejudiced and honest man. The doctrine which I now sustain, under the present difficulties, I openly avowed and maintained immediately after the Act of 1828, that "bill of abominations," as it has been so often and properly termed. Was I, at that period, disappointed in any views of ambition which I might be supposed to entertain? I was Vice-President of the United States, elected by an overwhelming majority. I was a candidate for re-election on the ticket with General Jackson himself, with a certain prospect of the triumphant success of that ticket, and with a fair prospect of the highest office to which an American citizen can aspire. What was my course under these prospects? Did I look to my own advancement, or to an honest and faithful discharge of my duty? Let facts speak for themselves. When the bill to which I have referred came from the other House to the Senate, the almost universal impression was, that its fate would depend upon my casting vote. It was known that, as the bill then stood, the Senate was nearly equally divided; and as it was a combined measure, originating with the politicians and manufacturers, and intended as much to bear upon the presidential election as to protect manufactures, it was believed that, as a stroke of political policy, its fate would be made to depend on my vote, in order to defeat General Jackson's election, as well as my own. The friends of General Jackson were alarmed, and I was earnestly entreated to leave the chair in order to avoid the responsibility, under the plausible argument that, if the Senate should be equally divided, the bill would be lost without the aid of my casting vote. The reply to this entreaty was, that no consideration personal to myself could induce me to take such a course; that I considered the measure as of the most dangerous character, and calculated to produce the most fearful crisis; that the payment of the public debt was just at hand; and that the great increase of revenue which it would pour into the treasury would accelerate the approach of that period, and that the country would be placed in the most trying of situations—with an immense revenue without the means of absorption upon any legitimate or constitutional object of appropriation, and compelled to submit to all the corrupting consequences of a large surplus, or to make a sudden reduction of the rates of duties, which would prove ruinous to the very interests which were then

forcing the passage of the bill. Under these views I determined to remain in the chair, and if the bill came to me, to give my casting vote against it, and in doing so, to give my reasons at large; but at the same time I informed my friends that I would retire from the ticket, so that the election of General Jackson might not be embarrassed by any act of mine. Sir, I was amazed at the folly and infatuation of that period. So completely absorbed was Congress in the game of ambition and avarice—from the double impulse of the manufacturers and politicians—that none but a few appeared to anticipate the present crisis, at which all are now alarmed, but which is the inevitable result of what was then done. As to myself, I clearly foresaw what has since followed. The road of ambition lay open before me—I had but to follow the corrupt tendency of the times—but I chose to tread the rugged path of duty.

It was thus that the reasonable hope of relief through the election of General Jackson was blasted; but still one other hope remained: that the final discharge of the public debt—an event near at hand—would remove our burden. That event would leave in the treasury a large surplus: a surplus that could not be expended under the most extravagant schemes of appropriation, having the least color of decency or constitutionality. That event at last arrived. At the last session of Congress, it was avowed on all sides that the public debt, as to all practical purposes, was in fact paid, the small surplus remaining being nearly covered by the money in the treasury and the bonds for duties which had already accrued; but with the arrival of this event our last hope was doomed to be disappointed. After a long session of many months and the most earnest effort on the part of South Carolina and the other Southern States to obtain relief, all that could be effected was a small reduction in the amount of the duties; but a reduction of such a character, that, while it diminished the amount of burden, distributed that burden more unequally than even the obnoxious Act of 1828: reversing the principle adopted by the bill of 1816, of laying higher duties on the unprotected than the protected articles, by repealing almost entirely the duties laid upon the former, and imposing the burden almost entirely on the latter. It was thus that instead of relief—instead of an equal distribution of the burdens and benefits of the Government, on the payment of the debt, as had been fondly anticipated—the duties were so arranged as to be, in fact, bounties

on one side and taxation on the other; thus placing the two great sections of the country in direct conflict in reference to its fiscal action, and thereby letting in that flood of political corruption which threatens to sweep away our Constitution and our liberty.

This unequal and unjust arrangement was pronounced, both by the administration, through its proper organ, the Secretary of the Treasury, and by the opposition, to be a permanent adjustment; and it was thus that all hope of relief through the action of the General Government terminated; and the crisis so long apprehended at length arrived, at which the State was compelled to choose between absolute acquiescence in a ruinous system of oppression, or a resort to her reserved powers—powers of which she alone was the rightful judge, and which only, in this momentous juncture, could save her. She determined on the latter.

The consent of two-thirds of her legislature was necessary for the call of a convention, which was considered the only legitimate organ through which the people, in their sovereignty, could speak. After an arduous struggle the State Rights party succeeded; more than two-thirds of both branches of the legislature favorable to a convention were elected; a convention was called—the ordinance adopted. The convention was succeeded by a meeting of the legislature, when the laws to carry the ordinance into execution were enacted: all of which have been communicated by the President, have been referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and this bill is the result of their labor.

Having now corrected some of the prominent misrepresentations as to the nature of this controversy, and given a rapid sketch of the movement of the State in reference to it, I will next proceed to notice some objections connected with the ordinance and the proceedings under it.

The first and most prominent of these is directed against what is called the test oath, which an effort has been made to render odious. So far from deserving the denunciation which has been levelled against it, I view this provision of the ordinance as but the natural result of the doctrines entertained by the State, and the position which she occupies. The people of Carolina believe that the Union is a union of States, and not of individuals; that it was formed by the States, and that the citizens of the several States were bound to it through the acts of

their several States; that each State ratified the Constitution for itself, and that it was only by such ratification of a State that any obligation was imposed upon its citizens. Thus believing, it is the opinion of the people of Carolina that it belongs to the State which has imposed the obligation to declare, in the last resort, the extent of this obligation, as far as her citizens are concerned; and this upon the plain principles which exist in all analogous cases of compact between sovereign bodies. On this principle the people of the State, acting in their sovereign capacity in convention, precisely as they did in the adoption of their own and the Federal Constitution, have declared, by the ordinance, that the acts of Congress which imposed duties under the authority to lay imposts, are acts, not for revenue, as intended by the Constitution, but for protection, and therefore null and void. The ordinance thus enacted by the people of the State themselves, acting as a sovereign community, is as obligatory on the citizens of the State as any portion of the Constitution. In prescribing, then, the oath to obey the ordinance, no more was done than to prescribe an oath to obey the Constitution.. It is, in fact, but a particular oath of allegiance, and in every respect similar to that which is prescribed, under the Constitution of the United States, to be administered to all the officers of the State and Federal Governments; and is no more deserving the harsh and bitter epithets which have been heaped upon it, than that, or any similar oath. It ought to be borne in mind that according to the opinion which prevails in Carolina, the right of resistance to the unconstitutional acts of Congress belongs to the State, and not to her individual citizens; and that, though the latter may, in a mere question of *meum* and *tuum*, resist, through the courts, an unconstitutional encroachment upon their rights, yet the final stand against usurpation rests not with them, but with the State of which they are members; and such act of resistance by a State binds the conscience and allegiance of the citizen. But there appears to be a general misapprehension as to the extent to which the State has acted under this part of the ordinance. Instead of sweeping every officer by a general proscription of the minority, as has been represented in debate, as far as my knowledge extends, not a single individual has been removed. The State has, in fact, acted with the greatest tenderness, all circumstances considered, towards citizens who differed from the majority; and in that spirit has directed the oath to be

administered only in case of some official act directed to be performed, in which obedience to the ordinance is involved.

It has been further objected that the State has acted precipitately. What! precipitately! after making a strenuous resistance for twelve years—by discussion here and in the other House of Congress—by essays in all forms—by resolutions, remonstrances, and protests on the part of her legislature—and, finally, by attempting an appeal to the judicial power of the United States? I say attempting, for they have been prevented from bringing the question fairly before the court, and that by an act of that very majority in Congress who now upbraid them for not making that appeal; of that majority who on a motion of one of the Members in the other House from South Carolina, refused to give to the Act of 1828 its true title—that it was a protective, and not a revenue Act. The State has never, it is true, relied upon that tribunal, the Supreme Court, to vindicate its reserved rights; yet they have always considered it as an auxiliary means of defense, of which they would gladly have availed themselves to test the constitutionality of protection, had they not been deprived of the means of doing so by the act of the majority.

Notwithstanding this long delay of more than ten years, under this continued encroachment of the Government, we now hear it on all sides, by friends and foes, gravely pronounced that the State has acted precipitately—that her conduct has been rash! That such should be the language of an interested majority, who, by means of this unconstitutional and oppressive system, are annually extorting millions from the South, to be bestowed upon other sections, is not at all surprising. Whatever impedes the course of avarice and ambition will ever be denounced as rash and precipitate; and had South Carolina delayed her resistance fifty instead of twelve years, she would have heard from the same quarter the same language; but it is really surprising that those who are suffering in common with herself, and who have complained equally loud of their grievances; who have pronounced the very acts which she has asserted within her limits to be oppressive, unconstitutional, and ruinous, after so long a struggle—a struggle longer than that which preceded the separation of these States from the mother-country—longer than the period of the Trojan war—should now complain of precipitancy! No, it is not Carolina which has acted precipitately; but her sister States, who have suffered in common with her, have acted

tardily. Had they acted as she has done; had they performed their duty with equal energy and promptness, our situation this day would be very different from what we now find it. Delays are said to be dangerous; and never was the maxim more true than in the present case, a case of monopoly. It is the very nature of monopolies to grow. If we take from one side a large portion of the proceeds of its labor and give it to the other, the side from which we take must constantly decay, and that to which we give must prosper and increase. Such is the action of the protective system. It exacts from the South a large portion of the proceeds of its industry, which it bestows upon the other sections in the shape of bounties to manufactures, and appropriations in a thousand forms; pensions, improvement of rivers and harbors, roads and canals, and in every shape that wit or ingenuity can devise. Can we, then, be surprised that the principle of monopoly grows, when it is so amply remunerated at the expense of those who support it? And this is the real reason of the fact which we witness, that all acts for protection pass with small minorities, but soon come to be sustained by great and overwhelming majorities. Those who seek the monopoly endeavor to obtain it in the most exclusive shape; and they take care, accordingly, to associate only a sufficient number of interests barely to pass it through the two Houses of Congress, on the plain principle that the greater the number from whom the monopoly takes, and the fewer on whom it bestows, the greater is the advantage to the monopolists. Acting in this spirit, we have often seen with what exact precision they count: adding wool to woollens, associating lead and iron, feeling their way, until a bare majority is obtained, when the bill passes, connecting just as many interests as are sufficient to ensure its success, and no more. In a short time, however, we have invariably found that this *lean* becomes a decided majority, under the certain operation which compels individuals to desert the pursuits which the monopoly has rendered unprofitable, that they may participate in those which it has rendered profitable. It is against this dangerous and growing disease that South Carolina has acted—a disease, whose cancerous action would soon have spread to every part of the system, if not arrested.

There is another powerful reason why the action of the State could not have been safely delayed. The public debt, as I have already stated, for all practical purposes, has already been paid;

and, under the existing duties, a large annual surplus of many millions must come into the treasury. It is impossible to look at this state of things without seeing the most mischievous consequences; and, among others, if not speedily corrected, it would interpose powerful and almost insuperable obstacles to throwing off the burden under which the South has been so long laboring. The disposition of the surplus would become a subject of violent and corrupt struggle, and could not fail to rear up new and powerful interests in support of the existing system, not only in those sections which have been heretofore benefitted by it, but even in the South itself. I cannot but trace to the anticipation of this state of the treasury the sudden and extraordinary movements which took place at the last session in the Virginia legislature, in which the whole South is vitally interested. It is impossible for any rational man to believe that that State could seriously have thought of effecting the scheme to which I allude by her own resources, without powerful aid from the General Government.

It is next objected that the enforcing acts have legislated the United States out of South Carolina. I have already replied to this objection on another occasion, and I will now but repeat what I then said: that they have been legislated out only to the extent that they had no right to enter. The Constitution has admitted the jurisdiction of the United States within the limits of the several States only so far as the delegated powers authorize; beyond that they are intruders and may rightfully be expelled; and that they have been efficiently expelled by the legislation of the State through her civil process, as has been acknowledged on all sides in the debate, is only a confirmation of the truth of the doctrine for which the majority in Carolina have contended.

The very point at issue between the two parties there, is, whether nullification is a peaceable and an efficient remedy against an unconstitutional act of the General Government, and may be asserted as such through the State tribunals. Both parties agree that the acts against which it is directed are unconstitutional and oppressive. The controversy is only as to the means by which our citizens may be protected against the acknowledged encroachments on their rights. This being the point at issue between the parties, and the very object of the majority being an efficient protection of the citizens through the State tribunals, the measures adopted to enforce the ordinance, of

course, received the most decisive character. We were not children, to act by halves. Yet for acting thus efficiently the State is denounced, and this bill reported, to overrule, by military force, the civil tribunals and civil process of the State! Sir, I consider this bill, and the arguments which have been urged on this floor in its support, as the most triumphant acknowledgment that nullification is peaceful and efficient, and so deeply entrenched in the principles of our system, that it cannot be assailed but by prostrating the Constitution, and substituting the supremacy of military force in lieu of the supremacy of the laws. In fact, the advocates of this bill refute their own argument. They tell us that the ordinance is unconstitutional; that it infracts the constitution of South Carolina, although to me, the objection appears absurd, as it was adopted by the very authority which adopted the constitution itself. They also tell us that the Supreme Court is the appointed arbiter of all controversies between a State and the General Government. Why, then, do they not leave this controversy to that tribunal? Why do they not confide to them the abrogation of the ordinance, and the laws made in pursuance of it, and the assertion of that supremacy which they claim for the laws of Congress? The State stands pledged to resist no process of the court. Why, then, confer on the President the extensive and unlimited powers provided in this bill? Why authorize him to use military force to arrest the civil process of the State? But one answer can be given: That, in a contest between the State and the General Government, if the resistance be limited on both sides to the civil process, the State, by its inherent sovereignty, standing upon its reserved powers, will prove too powerful in such a controversy, and must triumph over the Federal Government, sustained by its delegated and unlimited authority; and in this answer we have an acknowledgment of the truth of those great principles for which the State has so firmly and nobly contended.

Having made these remarks, the great question is now presented, Has Congress the right to pass this bill? which I will next proceed to consider. The decision of this question involves an inquiry into the provisions of the bill. What are they? It puts at the disposal of the President the army and navy, and the entire militia of the country; it enables him, at his pleasure, to subject every man in the United States, not exempt from militia duty, to martial law; to call him from his ordinary occupation to

the field, and under the penalty of fine and imprisonment, inflicted by a court-martial, to imbrue his hand in his brother's blood. There is no limitation on the power of the sword;—and that over the purse is equally without restraint; for among the extraordinary features of the bill, it contains no appropriation, which, under existing circumstances, is tantamount to an unlimited appropriation. The President may, under its authority, incur any expenditure, and pledge the national faith to meet it. He may create a new national debt, at the very moment of the termination of the former—a debt of millions, to be paid out of the proceeds of the labor of that section of the country whose dearest constitutional rights this bill prostrates! Thus exhibiting the extraordinary spectacle, that the very section of the country which is urging this measure, and carrying the sword of devastation against us, is, at the same time, incurring a new debt, to be paid by those whose rights are violated; while those who violate them are to receive the benefits in the shape of bounties and expenditures.

And for what purpose is the unlimited control of the purse and of the sword thus placed at the disposition of the Executive? To make war against one of the free and sovereign members of this confederation, which the bill proposes to deal with, not as a State, but as a collection of banditti or outlaws. Thus exhibiting the impious spectacle of this Government, the creature of the States, making war against the power to which it owes its existence.

The bill violates the Constitution, plainly and palpably, in many of its provisions, by authorizing the President, at his pleasure, to place the different ports of this Union on an unequal footing, contrary to that provision of the Constitution which declares that no preference shall be given to one port over another. It also violates the Constitution by authorizing him, at his discretion, to impose cash duties in one port, while credit is allowed in others; by enabling the President to regulate commerce, a power vested in Congress alone; and by drawing within the jurisdiction of the United States courts, powers never intended to be conferred on them. As great as these objections are, they become insignificant in the provisions of a bill which, by a single blow—by treating the States as a mere lawless mass of individuals—prostrates all the barriers of the Constitution. I will pass over the minor considerations, and proceed directly to the great

point. This bill proceeds on the ground that the entire sovereignty of this country belongs to the American people, as forming one great community, and regards the States as mere fractions or counties, and not as integral parts of the Union; having no more right to resist the encroachments of the Government than a county has to resist the authority of a State; and treating such resistance as the lawless acts of so many individuals, without possessing sovereignty or political rights. It has been said that the bill declares war against South Carolina. No. It decrees a massacre of her citizens! War has something ennobling about it, and, with all its horrors, brings into action the highest qualities, intellectual and moral. It was, perhaps, in the order of Providence that it should be permitted for that very purpose. But this bill declares no war, except, indeed, it be that which savages wage—a war, not against the community, but the citizens of whom that community is composed. But I regard it as worse than savage warfare—as an attempt to take away life under the color of law, without the trial by jury, or any other safeguard which the Constitution has thrown around the life of the citizen. It authorizes the President, or even his deputies, when they may suppose the law to be violated, without the intervention of a court or jury, to kill without mercy or discrimination!

It has been said by the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. Grundy] to be a measure of peace! Yes, such peace as the wolf gives to the lamb—the kite to the dove! Such peace as Russia gives to Poland, or death to its victim! A peace, by extinguishing the political existence of the State, by awing her into an abandonment of the exercise of every power which constitutes her a sovereign community. It is to South Carolina a question of self-preservation; and I proclaim it, that, should this bill pass, and an attempt be made to enforce it, it will be resisted, at every hazard—even that of death itself. Death is not the greatest calamity: there are others still more terrible to the free and brave, and among them may be placed the loss of liberty and honor. There are thousands of her brave sons, who, if need be, are prepared cheerfully to lay down their lives in defense of the State, and the great principles of constitutional liberty for which she is contending. God forbid that this should become necessary! It never can be, unless this Government is resolved to bring the question to extremity, when her gallant sons will stand prepared to perform the last duty—to die nobly.

I go on the ground that this Constitution was made by the States; that it is a federal union of the States, in which the several States still retain their sovereignty. If these views be correct, I have not characterized the bill too strongly: and the question is, whether they be or be not. I will not enter into the discussion of this question now. I will rest it, for the present, on what I have said on the introduction of the resolutions now on the table, under a hope that another opportunity will be afforded for more ample discussion. I will, for the present, confine my remarks to the objections which have been raised to the views which I presented when I introduced them. The authority of Luther Martin has been adduced by the Senator from Delaware, to prove that the citizens of a State, acting under the authority of a State, are liable to be punished as traitors by this Government. Eminent as Mr. Martin was as a lawyer, and high as his authority may be considered on a legal point, I cannot accept it in determining the point at issue. The attitude which he occupied, if taken into view, would lessen if not destroy, the weight of his authority. He had been violently opposed in convention to the Constitution, and the very letter from which the Senator has quoted was intended to dissuade Maryland from its adoption. With this view, it was to be expected that every consideration calculated to effect that object should be urged; that real objections should be exaggerated; and that those having no foundation, except mere plausible deductions, should be presented. It is to this spirit that I attribute the opinion of Mr. Martin in reference to the point under consideration. But if his authority be good on one point, it must be admitted to be equally so on another. If his opinion be sufficient to prove that a citizen of a State may be punished as a traitor when acting under allegiance to the State, it is also sufficient to show that no authority was intended to be given in the Constitution for the protection of manufactures by the General Government, and that the provision in the Constitution permitting a State to lay an impost duty, with the consent of Congress, was intended to reserve the right of protection to the States themselves, and that each State should protect its own industry. Assuming his opinion to be of equal authority on both points, how embarrassing would be the attitude in which it would place the Senator from Delaware, and those with whom he is acting—that of using the

sword and bayonet to enforce the execution of an unconstitutional act of Congress. I must express my surprise that the slightest authority in favor of *power* should be received as the most conclusive evidence, while that which is, at least, equally strong in favor of right and *liberty*, is wholly overlooked or rejected.

Notwithstanding all that has been said, I may say that neither the Senator from Delaware [Mr. Clayton], nor any other who has spoken on the same side, has directly and fairly met the great question at issue: Is this a federal union? a union of States, as distinct from that of individuals? Is the sovereignty in the several States, or in the American people in the aggregate? The very language which we are compelled to use when speaking of our political institutions affords proof conclusive as to its real character. The terms union, federal, united, all imply a combination of sovereignties, a confederation of States. They are never applied to an association of individuals. Who ever heard of the United State of New York, of Massachusetts, or of Virginia? Who ever heard the term federal or union applied to the aggregation of individuals into one community? Nor is the other point less clear—that the sovereignty is in the several States, and that our system is a union of twenty-four sovereign powers, under a constitutional compact, and not of a divided sovereignty between the States severally and the United States. In spite of all that has been said, I maintain that sovereignty is in its nature indivisible. It is the supreme power in a State, and we might just as well speak of half a square, or of half a triangle, as of half a sovereignty. It is a gross error to confound the exercise of sovereign powers with sovereignty itself, or the delegation of such powers with the surrender of them. A sovereign may delegate his powers to be exercised by as many agents as he may think proper, under such conditions and with such limitations as he may impose; but to surrender any portion of his sovereignty to another is to annihilate the whole. The Senator from Delaware [Mr. Clayton] calls this metaphysical reasoning, which, he says, he cannot comprehend. If by metaphysics he means that scholastic refinement which makes distinctions without difference, no one can hold it in more utter contempt than I do; but if, on the contrary, he means the power of analysis and combination—that power which reduces the most complex idea into its elements,

which traces causes to their first principle, and, by the power of generalization and combination, unites the whole in one harmonious system—then, so far from deserving contempt, it is the highest attribute of the human mind. It is the power which raises man above the brute—which distinguishes his faculties from mere sagacity, which he holds in common with inferior animals. It is this power which has raised the astronomer from being a mere gazer at the stars to the high intellectual eminence of a Newton or a Laplace, and astronomy itself from a mere observation of insulated facts into that noble science which displays to our admiration the system of the universe. And shall this high power of the mind, which has effected such wonders when directed to the laws which control the material world, be forever prohibited, under a senseless cry of metaphysics, from being applied to the high purpose of political science and legislation? I hold them to be subject to laws as fixed as matter itself, and to be as fit a subject for the application of the highest intellectual power. Denunciation may, indeed, fall upon the philosophical inquirer into these first principles, as it did upon Galileo and Bacon when they first unfolded the great discoveries which have immortalized their names; but the time will come when truth will prevail in spite of prejudice and denunciation, and when politics and legislation will be considered as much a science as astronomy and chemistry.

In connection with this part of the subject, I understood the Senator from Virginia [Mr. Rives] to say that sovereignty was divided, and that a portion remained with the States severally, and that the residue was vested in the Union. By Union, I suppose the Senator meant the United States. If such be his meaning—if he intended to affirm that the sovereignty was in the twenty-four States, in whatever light he may view them, our opinions will not disagree; but according to my conception the whole sovereignty is in the several States, while the exercise of sovereign powers is divided—a part being exercised under compact, through this General Government, and the residue through the separate State governments. But if the Senator from Virginia [Mr. Rives] means to assert that the twenty-four States form but one community, with a single sovereign power as to the objects of the Union, it will be but the revival of the old question of whether the Union is a union between States as distinct communities, or a mere aggregate of the American people as a

mass of individuals; and in this light his opinions would lead directly to consolidation.

But to return to the bill. It is said that the bill ought to pass, because the law must be enforced. The law must be enforced! The imperial edict must be executed! It is under such sophistry, couched in general terms, without looking to the limitations which must ever exist in the practical exercise of power, that the most cruel and despotic acts ever have been covered. It was such sophistry as this that cast Daniel into the lions' den, and the three Innocents into the fiery furnace. Under the same sophistry the bloody edicts of Nero and Caligula were executed. The law must be enforced. Yes, the act imposing the "tea-tax must be executed." This was the very argument which impelled Lord North and his administration to that mad career which forever separated us from the British crown. Under a similar sophistry, "that religion must be protected," how many massacres have been perpetrated? and how many martyrs have been tied to the stake? What! acting on this vague abstraction, are you prepared to enforce a law without considering whether it be just or unjust, constitutional or unconstitutional? Will you collect money when it is acknowledged that it is not wanted? He who earns the money, who digs it from the earth with the sweat of his brow, has a just title to it against the universe. No one has a right to touch it without his consent, except his government, and this only to the extent of its legitimate wants; to take more is robbery, and you propose by this bill to enforce robbery by murder. Yes: to this result you must come by this miserable sophistry, this vague abstraction of enforcing the law, without a regard to the fact whether the law be just or unjust, constitutional or unconstitutional.

In the same spirit we are told that the Union must be preserved, without regard to the means. And how is it proposed to preserve the Union? By force? Does any man in his senses believe that this beautiful structure—this harmonious aggregate of States, produced by the joint consent of all—can be preserved by force? Its very introduction will be certain destruction to this Federal Union. No, no. You cannot keep the States united in their constitutional and federal bonds by force. Force may, indeed, hold the parts together, but such union would be the bond between master and slave—a union of exaction on one side and of unqualified obedience on the other. That obedience which, we

are told by the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. Wilkins], is the Union! Yes, exaction on the side of the master; for this very bill is intended to collect what can be no longer called taxes—the voluntary contribution of a free people—but tribute—tribute to be collected under the mouths of the cannon! Your custom-house is already transferred into a garrison, and that garrison with its batteries turned, not against the enemy of your country, but on subjects (I will not say citizens), on whom you propose to levy contributions. Has reason fled from our borders? Have we ceased to reflect? It is madness to suppose that the Union can be preserved by force. I tell you plainly that the bill, should it pass, cannot be enforced. It will prove only a blot upon your statute book, a reproach to the year, and a disgrace to the American Senate. I repeat, it will not be executed; it will rouse the dormant spirit of the people, and open their eyes to the approach of despotism. The country has sunk into avarice and political corruption, from which nothing can arouse it but some measure on the part of the Government, of folly and madness, such as that now under consideration.

Disguise it as you may, the controversy is one between power and liberty; and I tell the gentlemen who are opposed to me that, as strong as may be the love of power on their side, the love of liberty is still stronger on ours. History furnishes many instances of similar struggles, where the love of liberty has prevailed against power under every disadvantage, and among them few more striking than that of our own Revolution; where, as strong as was the parent country, and feeble as were the colonies, yet, under the impulse of liberty and the blessing of God, they gloriously triumphed in the contest. There are, indeed, many and striking analogies between that and the present controversy. They both originated substantially in the same cause—with this difference—in the present case the power of taxation is converted into that of regulating industry; in the other, the power of regulating industry, by the regulations of commerce, was attempted to be converted into the power of taxation. Were I to trace the analogy further, we should find that the perversion of the taxing power, in the one case, has given precisely the same control to the northern section over the industry of the southern section of the Union, which the power to regulate commerce gave to Great Britain over the industry of the colonies in the other; and that

free trade, and those in which the mother country had a monopoly, are almost identically the same as those in which the Southern States are permitted to have a free trade by the Act of 1832, and in which the Northern States have, by the same Act, secured a monopoly. The only difference is in the means. In the former, the colonies were permitted to have a free trade with all countries south of Cape Finisterre, a cape in the northern part of Spain; while north of that, the trade of the colonies was prohibited, except through the mother country, by means of her commercial regulations. If we compare the products of the country north and south of Cape Finisterre, we shall find them almost identical with the list of the protected and unprotected articles contained in the act of last year. Nor does the analogy terminate here. The very arguments resorted to at the commencement of the American Revolution, and the measures adopted, and the motives assigned to bring on that contest (to enforce the law), are almost identically the same.

But to return from this digression to the consideration of the bill. Whatever difference of opinion may exist upon other points, there is one on which I should suppose there can be none: that this bill rests on principles which, if carried out, will ride over State sovereignties, and that it will be idle for any of its advocates hereafter to talk of State rights. The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Rives] says that he is the advocate of State rights; but he must permit me to tell him that, although he may differ in premises from the other gentlemen with whom he acts on this occasion, yet, in supporting this bill, he obliterates every vestige of distinction between him and them, saving only that, professing the principles of 1798, his example will be more pernicious than that of the most open and bitter opponents of the rights of the States. I will also add, what I am compelled to say, that I must consider him [Mr. Rives] as less consistent than our old opponents, whose conclusions were fairly drawn from their premises, while his premises ought to have led him to opposite conclusions. The gentleman has told us that the new-fangled doctrines, as he chooses to call them, have brought State rights into disrepute. I must tell him, in reply, that what he calls new-fangled are but the doctrines of 1798; and that it is he [Mr. Rives], and others with him, who, professing these doctrines, have degraded them by explaining away their meaning and efficacy. He [Mr. Rives] has disclaimed, in behalf of Virginia, the

authorship of nullification. I will not dispute that point. If Virginia chooses to throw away one of her brightest ornaments, she must not hereafter complain that it has become the property of another. But while I have, as a representative of Carolina, no right to complain of the disavowal of the Senator from Virginia, I must believe that he [Mr. Rives] has done his native State great injustice by declaring on this floor, that when she gravely resolved, in 1798, that "in cases of deliberate and dangerous infractions of the Constitution, the States, as parties to the compact, have the right, and are in duty bound, to interpose to arrest the progress of the evil, and to maintain within their respective limits, the authorities, rights, and liberties, appertaining to them," she meant no more than to proclaim the right to protest and to remonstrate. To suppose that, in putting forth so solemn a declaration, which she afterwards sustained by so able and elaborate an argument, she meant no more than to assert what no one had ever denied, would be to suppose that the State had been guilty of the most egregious trifling that ever was exhibited on so solemn an occasion.

In reviewing the ground over which I have passed, it will be apparent that the question in controversy involves that most deeply important of all political questions, whether ours is a federal or a consolidated government;—a question, on the decision of which depend, as I solemnly believe, the liberty of the people, their happiness, and the place which we are destined to hold in the moral and intellectual scale of nations. Never was there a controversy in which more important consequences were involved; not excepting that between Persia and Greece, decided by the battles of Marathon, Platea, and Salamis—which gave ascendancy to the genius of Europe over that of Asia—and which, in its consequences, has continued to affect the destiny of so large a portion of the world even to this day. There are often close analogies between events apparently very remote, which are strikingly illustrated in this case. In the great contest between Greece and Persia, between European and Asiatic polity and civilization, the very question between the federal and consolidated form of government was involved. The Asiatic governments, from the remotest time, with some exceptions on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean, have been based on the principle of consolidation, which considers the whole community as but a unit, and consolidates its powers in a central point.

The opposite principle has prevailed in Europe—Greece, throughout all her States, was based on a federal system. All were united in one common, but loose, bond, and the governments of the several States partook, for the most part, of a complex organization, which distributed political power among different members of the community. The same principles prevailed in ancient Italy; and, if we turn to the Teutonic race, our great ancestors—the race which occupies the first place in power, civilization, and science, and which possesses the largest and the fairest part of Europe—we shall find that their governments were based on federal organization, as has been clearly illustrated by a recent and able writer on the British constitution [Mr. Palgrave], from whose works I take the following extract:—

“In this manner the first establishment of the Teutonic States was affected. They were assemblages of septs, clans, and tribes; they were confederated hosts and armies, led on by princes, magistrates, and chieftains; each of whom was originally independent, and each of whom lost a portion of his pristine independence in proportion as he and his compeers became united under the supremacy of a sovereign, who was superinduced upon the State, first as a military commander and afterward as a king. Yet, notwithstanding this political connection, each member of the State continued to retain a considerable portion of the rights of sovereignty. Every ancient Teutonic monarchy must be considered as a federation; it is not a unit, of which the smaller bodies politic therein contained are the fractions, but they are the integers, and the State is the multiple which results from them. Dukedoms and counties, burghs and baronies, towns and townships, and shires, form the kingdom; all, in a certain degree, strangers to each other and separate in jurisdiction, though all obedient to the supreme executive authority. This general description, though not always strictly applicable in terms, is always so substantially and in effect; and hence it becomes necessary to discard the language which has been very generally employed in treating on the English constitution. It has been supposed that the kingdom was reduced into a regular and gradual subordination of government, and that the various legal districts of which it is composed, arose from the divisions and subdivisions of the country. But this hypothesis, which tends greatly to perplex our history, cannot be supported by fact; and, instead of viewing the constitution as a whole, and then proceeding to its parts, we must examine it synthetically, and assume that the supreme authorities of the State were created by the concentration of the powers originally belonging to the members and corporations of which it is composed.”

Here Mr. Calhoun gave way for a motion to adjourn, and on the next day resumed:—

I have omitted at the proper place, in the course of my observations yesterday, two or three points, to which I will now advert before I resume the discussion where I left off. I have stated that the ordinance and acts of South Carolina were directed, not against the revenue, but against the system of protection. But it may be asked, if such was her object, how happens it that she has declared the whole system void—revenue as well as protection, without discrimination? It is this question which I propose to answer. Her justification will be found in the necessity of the case; and if there be any blame it cannot attach to her. The two are so blended, throughout the whole, as to make the entire revenue system subordinate to the protective, so as to constitute a complete system of protection, in which it is impossible to discriminate the two elements of which it is composed. South Carolina, at least, could not make the discrimination; and she was reduced to the alternative of acquiescing in a system which she believed to be unconstitutional, and which she felt to be oppressive and ruinous, or to consider the whole as one, equally contaminated through all its parts, by the unconstitutionality of the protective portion, and, as such, to be resisted by the act of the State. I maintain that the State has a right to regard it in the latter character, and that, if a loss of revenue follow, the fault is not hers, but of this Government, which has improperly blended together in a manner not to be separated by the State, two systems wholly dissimilar. If the sincerity of the State be doubted; if it be supposed that her action is against revenue as well as protection, let the two be separated—let so much of the duties as are intended for revenue be put in one bill, and the residue intended for protection be put in another, and I pledge myself that the ordinance and the acts of the State will cease as to the former, and be directed exclusively against the latter.

I also stated, in the course of my remarks yesterday, and I trust that I have conclusively shown, that the Act of 1816, with the exception of a single item, to which I have alluded, was in reality a revenue measure; and that Carolina and the other States, in supporting it, have not incurred the slightest responsibility in relation to the system of protection which has since grown up, and which now so deeply distracts the country. Sir,

I am willing, as one of the representatives of Carolina, and I believe I speak the sentiments of the State, to take that act as the basis of a permanent adjustment of the tariff, simply reducing the duties, in an average proportion, on all the items, to the revenue point. I make that offer now to the advocates of the protective system; but I must, in candor, inform them that such an adjustment would distribute the revenue between the protected and unprotected articles more favorably to the State, and to the South, and less to the manufacturing interest, than an average uniform *ad valorem*, and, accordingly, more so than that now proposed by Carolina through her convention. After such an offer, no man who values his candor will dare accuse the State, or those who have represented her here, with inconsistency in reference to the point under consideration.

I omitted, also, on yesterday, to notice a remark of the Senator from Virginia [Mr. Rives], that the only difficulty in adjusting the tariff grew out of the ordinance and the acts of South Carolina. I must attribute an assertion, so inconsistent with the facts, to an ignorance of the occurrences of the last few years in reference to this subject, occasioned by the absence of the gentleman from the United States, to which he himself has alluded in his remarks. If the Senator will take pains to inform himself, he will find that this protective system advanced with a continued and rapid step, in spite of petitions, remonstrances, and protests, of not only Carolina, but also of Virginia, and of all the Southern States, until 1828, when Carolina, for the first time, changed the character of her resistance, by holding up her reserved rights as the shield of her defense against further encroachment. This attitude alone, unaided by a single State, arrested the further progress of the system, so that the question from that period to this, on the part of the manufacturers, has been, not how to acquire more, but to retain that which they have acquired. I will inform the gentleman that, if this attitude had not been taken on the part of the State, the question would not now be how duties ought to be repealed, but a question as to the protected articles, between prohibition on one side and the duties established by the Act of 1828 on the other. But a single remark will be sufficient in reply to what I must consider the invidious remark of the Senator from Virginia [Mr. Rives]. The Act of 1832 which has not yet gone into operation, and which was passed but a few months since, was declared by the sup-

porters of the system to be a permanent adjustment, and the bill proposed by the Treasury Department, not essentially different from the act itself, was in like manner declared to be intended by the administration as a permanent arrangement. What has occurred since, except this ordinance, and these abused acts of the calumniated State, to produce this mighty revolution in reference to this odious system? Unless the Senator from Virginia can assign some other cause, he is bound, upon every principle of fairness, to retract this unjust aspersion upon the acts of South Carolina.

The Senator from Delaware [Mr. Clayton], as well as others, has relied with great emphasis on the fact that we are citizens of the United States. I do not object to the expression, nor shall I detract from the proud and elevated feelings with which it is associated; but I trust that I may be permitted to raise the inquiry, In what manner are we citizens of the United States? without weakening the patriotic feeling with which, I trust, it will ever be uttered. If by citizen of the United States he means a citizen at large, one whose citizenship extends to the entire geographical limits of the country, without having a local citizenship in some State or territory, a sort of citizen of the world, all I have to say is, that such a citizen would be a perfect nondescript; that not a single individual of this description can be found in the entire mass of our population. Notwithstanding all the pomp and display of eloquence on the occasion, every citizen is a citizen of some State or Territory, and, as such, under an express provision of the Constitution, is entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States; and it is in this, and in no other sense, that we are citizens of the United States. The Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. Dallas], indeed, relies upon that provision in the Constitution which gives Congress the power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization; and the operation of the rule actually established under this authority, to prove that naturalized citizens are citizens at large, without being citizens of any of the States. I do not deem it necessary to examine the law of Congress upon this subject, or to reply to the argument of the Senator, though I cannot doubt that he [Mr. Dallas] has taken an entirely erroneous view of the subject. It is sufficient that the power of Congress extends simply to the establishment of a uniform rule by which foreigners may be naturalized in the several States or territories,

without infringing, in any other respect, in reference to naturalization, the rights of the States as they existed before the adoption of the Constitution.

Having supplied the omissions of yesterday, I now resume the subject at the point where my remarks then terminated. The Senate will remember that I stated, at their close, that the great question at issue is, whether ours is a federal or a consolidated system of government; a system in which the parts, to use the emphatic language of Mr. Palgrave, are the integers, and the whole the multiple, or in which the whole is an unit and the parts the fractions. I stated, that on the decision of this question, I believed, depended not only the liberty and prosperity of this country, but the place which we are destined to hold in the intellectual and moral scale of nations. I stated, also, in my remarks on this point, that there is a striking analogy between this and the great struggle between Persia and Greece, which was decided by the battles of Marathon, Platea, and Salamis, and which immortalized the names of Miltiades and Themistocles. I illustrated this analogy by showing that centralism or consolidation, with the exception of a few nations along the eastern borders of the Mediterranean, has been the pervading principle in the Asiatic governments, while the federal system, or, what is the same in principle, that system which organizes a community in reference to its parts, has prevailed in Europe.

Among the few exceptions in the Asiatic nations, the government of the twelve tribes of Israel, in its early period, is the most striking. Their government, at first, was a mere confederation without any central power, till a military chieftain, with the title of king, was placed at its head, without, however, merging the original organization of the twelve distinct tribes. This was the commencement of that central action among that peculiar people which, in three generations, terminated in a permanent division of their tribes. It is impossible even for a careless reader to peruse the history of that event, without being forcibly struck with the analogy in the causes which led to their separation, and those which now threaten us with a similar calamity. With the establishment of the central power in the king commenced a system of taxation, which, under King Solomon, was greatly increased, to defray the expenses of rearing the temple, of enlarging and embellishing Jerusalem, the seat of the central government, and the other profuse expenditures of his magnificent

reign. Increased taxation was followed by its natural consequences — discontent and complaint, which, before his death, began to excite resistance. On the succession of his son, Rehoboam, the ten tribes, headed by Jeroboam, demanded a reduction of the taxes; the temple being finished, and the embellishment of Jerusalem completed, and the money which had been raised for that purpose being no longer required, or, in other words, the debt being paid, they demanded a reduction of the duties — a repeal of the tariff. The demand was taken under consideration, and after consulting the old men, the counsellors of 1798, who advised a reduction, he then took the opinion of the younger politicians, who had since grown up, and knew not the doctrines of their fathers; he hearkened unto their counsel, and refused to make the reduction, and the secession of the ten tribes under Jeroboam followed. The tribes of Judah and Benjamin, which had received the disbursements, alone remained to the house of David.

But to return to the point immediately under consideration. I know that it is not only the opinion of a large majority of our country, but it may be said to be the opinion of the age, that the very beau ideal of a perfect government is the government of a majority, acting through a representative body, without check or limitation on its power; yet, if we may test this theory by experience and reason, we shall find that, so far from being perfect, the necessary tendency of all governments, based upon the will of an absolute majority, without constitutional check or limitation of power, is to faction, corruption, anarchy, and despotism; and this, whether the will of the majority be expressed directly through an assembly of the people themselves, or by their representatives. I know that, in venturing this assertion, I utter what is unpopular both within and without these walls; but where truth and liberty are concerned, such considerations should not be regarded. I will place the decision of this point on the fact that no government of the kind, among the many attempts which have been made, has ever endured for a single generation, but, on the contrary, has invariably experienced the fate which I have assigned to it. Let a single instance be pointed out, and I will surrender my opinion. But, if we had not the aid of experience to direct our judgment, reason itself would be a certain guide. The view which considers the community as an unit, and all its parts as having a similar interest, is

radically erroneous. However small the community may be, and however homogeneous its interests, the moment that government is put into operation—as soon as it begins to collect taxes and to make appropriations, the different portions of the community must, of necessity, bear different and opposing relations in reference to the action of the government. There must inevitably spring up two interests—a direction and a stockholder interest—an interest profiting by the action of the government, and interested in increasing its powers and action; and another, at whose expense the political machine is kept in motion. I know how difficult it is to communicate distinct ideas on such a subject, through the medium of general propositions, without particular illustration; and in order that I may be distinctly understood, though at the hazard of being tedious, I will illustrate the important principle which I have ventured to advance, by examples.

Let us, then, suppose a small community of five persons, separated from the rest of the world; and, to make the example strong, let us suppose them all to be engaged in the same pursuit, and to be of equal wealth. Let us further suppose that they determine to govern the community by the will of a majority; and, to make the case as strong as possible, let us suppose that the majority, in order to meet the expenses of the government, lay an equal tax, say of one hundred dollars, on each individual of this little community. Their treasury would contain five hundred dollars. Three are a majority; and they, by supposition, have contributed three hundred as their portion, and the other two (the minority), two hundred. The three have the right to make the appropriations as they may think proper. The question is, how would the principle of the absolute and unchecked majority operate, under these circumstances, in this little community? If the three be governed by a sense of justice—if they should appropriate the money to the objects for which it was raised, the common and equal benefit of the five, then the object of the association would be fairly and honestly effected, and each would have a common interest in the government. But, should the majority pursue an opposite course—should they appropriate the money in a manner to benefit their own particular interest, without regard to the interest of the two (and that they will so act, unless there be some efficient check, he who best knows human nature will least doubt), who does not see that the three and the two would have directly opposite

interests in reference to the action of the government? The three who contribute to the common treasury but three hundred dollars, could, in fact, by appropriating the five hundred to their own use, convert the action of the government into the means of making money, and, of consequence, would have a direct interest in increasing the taxes. They put in three hundred and take out five; that is, they take back to themselves all that they put in, and, in addition, that which was put in by their associates; or, in other words, taking taxation and appropriation together, they have gained, and their associates have lost, two hundred dollars by the fiscal action of the government. Opposite interests, in reference to the action of the government, are thus created between them: the one having an interest in favor of, and the other against the taxes; the one to increase, and the other to decrease the taxes; the one to retain the taxes when the money is no longer wanted, and the other to repeal them when the objects for which they were levied have been secured.

Let us now suppose this community of five to be raised to twenty-four individuals, to be governed, in like manner, by the will of a majority: it is obvious that the same principle would divide them into two interests—into a majority and a minority, thirteen against eleven, or in some other proportion; and that all the consequences which I have shown to be applicable to the small community of five would be applicable to the greater, the cause not depending upon the number, but resulting necessarily from the action of the government itself. Let us now suppose that, instead of governing themselves directly in an assembly of the whole, without the intervention of agents, they should adopt the representative principle; and that, instead of being governed by a majority of themselves, they should be governed by a majority of their representatives. It is obvious that the operation of the system would not be affected by the change, the representatives being responsible to those who chose them, would conform to the will of their constituents, and would act as they would do were they present and acting for themselves; and the same conflict of interest, which we have shown would exist in one case, would equally exist in the other. In either case, the inevitable result would be a system of hostile legislation on the part of the majority, or the stronger interest, against the minority, or the weaker interest; the object of which, on the part of the former, would be to exact as much as possible from the

latter, which would necessarily be resisted by all the means in their power. Warfare, by legislation, would thus be commenced between the parties, with the same object, and not less hostile than that which is carried on between distinct and rival nations—the only distinction would be in the instruments and the mode. Enactments, in the one case, would supply what could only be effected by arms in the other; and the inevitable operation would be to engender the most hostile feelings between the parties, which would merge every feeling of patriotism—that feeling which embraces the whole—and substitute in its place the most violent party attachment; and instead of having one common centre of attachment, around which the affections of the community might rally, there would in fact be two—the interests of the majority, to which those who constitute that majority would be more attached than they would be to the whole—and that of the minority, to which they, in like manner, would also be more attached than to the interests of the whole. Faction would thus take the place of patriotism; and, with the loss of patriotism, corruption must necessarily follow, and in its train, anarchy, and, finally, despotism, or the establishment of absolute power in a single individual, as a means of arresting the conflict of hostile interests; on the principle that it is better to submit to the will of a single individual, who, by being made lord and master of the whole community, would have an equal interest in the protection of all the parts.

Let us next suppose that, in order to avert the calamitous train of consequences, this little community should adopt a written constitution, with limitations restricting the will of the majority, in order to protect the minority against the oppression which I have shown would necessarily result without such restrictions. It is obvious that the case would not be in the slightest degree varied, if the majority be left in possession of the right of judging exclusively of the extent of its powers, without any right on the part of the minority to enforce the restrictions imposed by the constitution on the will of the majority. The point is almost too clear for illustration. Nothing can be more certain than that, when a constitution grants power, and imposes limitations on the exercise of that power, whatever interests may obtain possession of the government, will be in favor of extending the power at the expense of the limitation; and that, unless those in whose behalf the limitations were imposed have, in some

form or mode, the right of enforcing them, the power will ultimately supersede the limitation, and the government must operate precisely in the same manner as if the will of the majority governed without constitution or limitation of power.

I have thus presented all possible modes in which a government founded upon the will of an absolute majority will be modified; and have demonstrated that, in all its forms, whether in a majority of the people, as in a mere democracy, or in a majority of their representatives, without a constitution or with a constitution, to be interpreted as the will of the majority, the result will be the same: two hostile interests will inevitably be created by the action of the government, to be followed by hostile legislation, and that by faction, corruption, anarchy, and despotism.

The great and solemn question here presents itself: Is there any remedy for these evils? on the decision of which depends the question, whether the people can govern themselves, which has been so often asked with so much skepticism and doubt. There is a remedy, and but one, the effect of which, whatever may be the form, is to organize society in reference to this conflict of interests, which springs out of the action of government; and which can only be done by giving to each part the right of self-protection; which in a word, instead of considering the community of twenty-four a single community, having a common interest, and to be governed by the single will of an entire majority, shall upon all questions tending to bring the parts into conflict, the thirteen against the eleven, take the will, not of the twenty-four as a unit, but of the thirteen and of the eleven separately—the majority of each governing the parts, and where they concur, governing the whole—and where they disagree, arresting the action of the government. This I will call the concurring, as distinct from the absolute majority. In either way the number would be the same, whether taken as the absolute or as the concurring majority. Thus, the majority of the thirteen is seven, and of the eleven six; and the two together make thirteen, which is the majority of twenty-four. But, though the number is the same, the mode of counting is essentially different: the one representing the strongest interest, and the other, the entire interests of the community. The first mistake is, in supposing that the government of the absolute majority is the government of the people—that beau ideal of a perfect government which has been so enthusiastically entertained in every age

by the generous and patriotic, where civilization and liberty have made the smallest progress. There can be no greater error: the government of the people is the government of the whole community—of the twenty-four—the self-government of all the parts—too perfect to be reduced to practice in the present, or any past stage of human society. The government of the absolute majority, instead of being the government of the people, is but the government of the strongest interests, and, when not efficiently checked, is the most tyrannical and oppressive that can be devised. Between this ideal perfection on the one side, and despotism on the other, no other system can be devised but that which considers society in reference to its parts, as differently affected by the action of the government, and which takes the sense of each part separately, and thereby the sense of the whole, in the manner already illustrated.

These principles, as I have already stated, are not affected by the number of which the community may be composed, but are just as applicable to one of thirteen millions—the number which composes ours—as of the small community of twenty-four, which I have supposed for the purpose of illustration; and are not less applicable to the twenty-four States united in one community, than to the case of the twenty-four individuals. There is, indeed, a distinction between a large and a small community, not affecting the principle, but the violence of the action. In the smaller, the similarity of the interests of all the parts will limit the oppression from the hostile action of the parts, in a great degree, to the fiscal action of the government merely; but in the large community, spreading over a country of great extent, and having a great diversity of interests, with different kinds of labor, capital, and production, the conflict and oppression will extend, not only to a monopoly of the appropriations on the part of the stronger interests, but will end in unequal taxes, and a general conflict between the entire interests of conflicting sections, which, if not arrested by the most powerful checks, will terminate in the most oppressive tyranny that can be conceived, or in the destruction of the community itself.

If we turn our attention from these supposed cases, and direct it to our Government and its actual operation, we shall find a practical confirmation of the truth of what has been stated, not only of the oppressive operation of the system of an absolute majority, but also a striking and beautiful illustration in the forma-

tion of our system, of the principle of the concurring majority, as distinct from the absolute, which I have asserted to be the only means of efficiently checking the abuse of power, and, of course, the only solid foundation of constitutional liberty. That our Government for many years has been gradually verging to consolidation; that the Constitution has gradually become a dead letter; and that all restrictions upon the power of government have been virtually removed, so as practically to convert the General Government into a Government of an absolute majority without check or limitation, cannot be denied by any one who has impartially observed its operation.

It is not necessary to trace the commencement and gradual progress of the causes which have produced this change in our system; it is sufficient to state that the change has taken place within the last few years. What has been the result? Precisely that which might have been anticipated: the growth of faction, corruption, anarchy, and, if not despotism itself, its near approach, as witnessed in the provisions of this bill. And from what have these consequences sprung? We have been involved in no war. We have been at peace with all the world. We have been visited with no national calamity. Our people have been advancing in general intelligence, and, I will add, as great and alarming as has been the advance of political corruption among the mercenary corps who look to government for support, the morals and virtue of the community at large have been advancing in improvement. What, I again repeat, is the cause? No other can be assigned but a departure from the fundamental principles of the Constitution, which has converted the Government into the will of an absolute and irresponsible majority, and which, by the laws that must inevitably govern in all such majorities, has placed in conflict the great interests of the country, by a system of hostile legislation, by an oppressive and unequal imposition of taxes, by unequal and profuse appropriations, and by rendering the entire labor and capital of the weaker interest subordinate to the stronger.

This is the cause, and these the fruits which have converted the Government into a mere instrument of taking money from one portion of the community to be given to another; and which has rallied around it a great, a powerful and mercenary corps of office-holders, office-seekers, and expectants, destitute of principle and patriotism, and who have no standard of morals or politics

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but the will of the Executive—the will of him who has the distribution of the loaves and the fishes. I hold it impossible for any one to look at the theoretical illustration of the principle of the absolute majority in the cases which I have supposed, and not be struck with the practical illustration in the actual operation of our Government. Under every circumstance the absolute majority will ever have its American system (I mean nothing offensive to any Senator); but the real meaning of the American system is, that system of plunder which the strongest interest has ever waged, and will ever wage, against the weaker, where the latter is not armed with some efficient and constitutional check to arrest its action. Nothing but such a check on the part of the weaker interest can arrest it; mere constitutional limitations are wholly insufficient. Whatever interest obtains possession of the Government, will, from the nature of things, be in favor of the powers, and against the limitations imposed by the Constitution, and will resort to every device that can be imagined to remove those restraints. On the contrary, the opposite interest, that which I hear designated as the stockholding interests, the taxpayers, those on whom the system operates, will resist the abuse of powers, and contend for the limitations. And it is on this point, then, that the contest between the delegated and the reserved powers will be waged; but in this contest, as the interests in possession of the Government are organized and armed by all its powers and patronage, the opposite interest, if not in like manner organized and possessed of a power to protect themselves under the provisions of the Constitution, will be as inevitably crushed as would be a band of unorganized militia when opposed by a veteran and trained corps of regulars. Let it never be forgotten that power can only be opposed by power, organization by organization; and on this theory stands our beautiful federal system of Government. No free system was ever further removed from the principle that the absolute majority, without check or limitation, ought to govern. To understand what our Government is, we must look to the Constitution, which is the basis of the system. I do not intend to enter into any minute examination of the origin and the source of its powers: it is sufficient for my purpose to state, as I do fearlessly, that it derived its power from the people of the separate States, each ratifying by itself, each binding itself by its own separate majority, through its separate convention.—the concurrence of the

majorities of the several States forming the Constitution;—thus taking the sense of the whole by that of the several parts, representing the various interests of the entire community. It was this concurring and perfect majority which formed the Constitution, and not that majority which would consider the American people as a single community, and which, instead of representing fairly and fully the interests of the whole, would but represent, as has been stated, the interests of the stronger section. No candid man can dispute that I have given a correct description of the constitution-making power: that power which created and organized the Government, which delegated to it, as a common agent, certain powers, in trust for the common good of all the States, and which imposed strict limitations and checks against abuses and usurpations. In administering the delegated powers, the Constitution provides, very properly, in order to give promptitude and efficiency, that the Government shall be organized upon the principle of the absolute majority, or rather, of two absolute majorities combined: a majority of the States considered as bodies politic, which prevails in this body; and a majority of the people of the States, estimated in federal numbers, in the other House of Congress. A combination of the two prevails in the choice of the President, and, of course, in the appointment of Judges, they being nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. It is thus that the concurring and the absolute majorities are combined in one complex system: the one in forming the Constitution, and the other in making and executing the laws; thus beautifully blending the moderation, justice, and equity of the former, and more perfect majority, with the promptness and energy of the latter, but less perfect.

To maintain the ascendancy of the Constitution over the law-making majority is the great and essential point on which the success of the system must depend. Unless that ascendancy can be preserved, the necessary consequence must be that the laws will supersede the Constitution; and, finally, the will of the Executive, by the influence of his patronage, will supersede the laws—indications of which are already perceptible. This ascendancy can only be preserved through the action of the States as organized bodies having their own separate governments, and possessed of the right, under the structure of our system, of judging of the extent of their separate powers, and of interposing their authority to arrest the unauthorized enactments of the General Government

within their respective limits. I will not enter, at this time, into the discussion of this important point, as it has been ably and fully presented by the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. Bibb], and others who preceded him in this debate, on the same side, whose arguments not only remain unanswered, but are unanswerable. It is only by this power of interposition that the reserved rights of the States can be peacefully and efficiently protected against the encroachments of the General Government—that the limitations imposed upon its authority can be enforced, and its movements confined to the orbit allotted to it by the Constitution.

It has, indeed, been said in debate that this can be effected by the organization of the General Government itself, particularly by the action of this body, which represents the States—and that the States themselves must look to the General Government for the preservation of many of the most important of their reserved rights. I do not underrate the value to be attached to the organic arrangement of the General Government and the wise distribution of its powers between the several departments, and, in particular, the structure and the important functions of this body; but to suppose that the Senate, or any department of this Government, was intended to be the only guardian of the reserved rights is a great and fundamental mistake. The Government, through all its departments, represents the delegated and not the reserved powers; and it is a violation of the fundamental principle of free institutions to suppose that any but the responsible representative of any interest can be its guardian. The distribution of the powers of the General Government and its organization were arranged to prevent the abuse of power in fulfilling the important trusts confided to it, and not, as preposterously supposed, to protect the reserved powers, which are confided wholly to the guardianship of the several States.

Against the view of our system which I have presented, and the right of the States to interpose, it is objected that it would lead to anarchy and dissolution. I consider the objection as without the slightest foundation; and that, so far from tending to weakness or disunion, it is the source of the highest power and of the strongest cement. Nor is its tendency in this respect difficult of explanation. The government of an absolute majority, unchecked by efficient constitutional restraints, though apparently strong is, in reality, an exceedingly feeble government. That tendency to conflict between the parts, which I have shown to be

inevitable in such governments, wastes the powers of the State in the hostile action of contending factions, which leaves very little more power than the excess of the strength of the majority over the minority. But a government based upon the principle of the concurring majority, where each great interest possesses within itself the means of self-protection, which ultimately requires the mutual consent of all the parts, necessarily causes that unanimity in council and ardent attachment of all the parts to the whole which give an irresistible energy to a government so constituted. I might appeal to history for the truth of these remarks, of which the Roman furnishes the most familiar and striking proofs. It is a well-known fact that, from the expulsion of the Tarquins to the time of the establishment of the tribunitian power, the government fell into a state of the greatest disorder and distraction, and, I may add, corruption. How did this happen? The explanation will throw important light on the subject under consideration. The community was divided into two parts—the Patricians and the Plebeians; with the power of the State principally in the hands of the former, without adequate checks to protect the rights of the latter. The result was as might be expected. The patricians converted the powers of the government into the means of making money to enrich themselves and their dependents. They, in a word, had their American system, growing out of the peculiar character of the government and condition of the country. This requires explanation. At that period, according to the laws of nations, when one nation conquered another, the lands of the vanquished belonged to the victor; and, according to the Roman law, the lands thus acquired were divided into two parts—one allotted to the poorer class of the people, and the other assigned to the use of the treasury—of which the patricians had the distribution and administration. The patricians abused their power by withholding from the plebeians that which ought to have been allotted to them, and by converting to their own use that which ought to have gone to the treasury. In a word, they took to themselves the entire spoils of victory, and had thus the most powerful motive to keep the State perpetually involved in war, to the utter impoverishment and oppression of the plebeians. After resisting the abuse of power by all peaceable means, and the oppression becoming intolerable, the plebeians at last withdrew from the city—they, in a word, seceded; and to induce them to reunite, the patricians conceded to them, as the means

of protecting their separate interests, the very power which I contend is necessary to protect the rights of the States, but which is now represented as necessarily leading to disunion. They granted to them the right of choosing three tribunes from among themselves, whose persons should be sacred, and who should have the right of interposing their veto, not only against the passage of laws, but even against their execution—a power which those who take a shallow insight into human nature would pronounce inconsistent with the strength and unity of the State, if not utterly impracticable; yet so far from this being the effect, from that day the genius of Rome became ascendant, and victory followed her steps till she had established an almost universal dominion. How can a result so contrary to all anticipation be explained? The explanation appears to me to be simple. No measure or movement could be adopted without the concurring assent of both the patricians and plebeians, and each thus become dependent on the other; and, of consequence, the desire and objects of neither could be effected without the concurrence of the other. To obtain this concurrence, each was compelled to consult the good-will of the other, and to elevate to office, not those only who might have the confidence of the order to which they belonged, but also that of the other. The result was, that men possessing those qualities which would naturally command confidence—moderation, wisdom, justice, and patriotism—were elevated to office; and the weight of their authority and the prudence of their counsel, combined with that spirit of unanimity necessarily resulting from the concurring assent of the two orders, furnish the real explanation of the power of the Roman State, and of that extraordinary wisdom, moderation, and firmness which in so remarkable a degree characterized her public men. I might illustrate the truth of the position which I have laid down by a reference to the history of all free States, ancient and modern, distinguished for their power and patriotism, and conclusively show, not only that there was not one which had not some contrivance, under some form, by which the concurring assent of the different portions of the community was made necessary in the action of government, but also that the virtue, patriotism, and strength of the State were in direct proportion to the perfection of the means of securing such assent.

In estimating the operation of this principle in our system, which depends, as I have stated, on the right of interposition on

the part of a State, we must not omit to take into consideration the amending power, by which new powers may be granted, or any derangement of the system corrected, by the concurring assent of three-fourths of the States; and thus, in the same degree, strengthening the power of repairing any derangement occasioned by the eccentric action of a State. In fact, the power of interposition, fairly understood, may be considered in the light of an appeal against the usurpations of the General Government, the joint agent of all the States, to the States themselves, to be decided under the amending power, by the voice of three-fourths of the States, as the highest power known under the system. I know the difficulty, in our country, of establishing the truth of the principle for which I contend, though resting upon the clearest reason, and tested by the universal experience of free nations. I know that the governments of the several States, which, for the most part, are constructed on the principle of the absolute majority, will be cited as an argument against the conclusion to which I have arrived; but, in my opinion, the satisfactory answer can be given—that the objects of expenditure which fall within the sphere of a State government are few and inconsiderable, so that, be their action ever so irregular, it can occasion but little derangement. If, instead of being members of this great confederacy, they formed distinct communities, and were compelled to raise armies, and incur other expenses necessary to their defense, the laws which I have laid down as necessarily controlling the action of a State where the will of an absolute and unchecked majority prevailed, would speedily disclose themselves in faction, anarchy, and corruption. Even as the case is, the operation of the causes to which I have referred is perceptible in some of the larger and more populous members of the Union, whose governments have a powerful central action, and which already show a strong moneyed tendency, the invariable forerunner of corruption and convulsion.

But, to return to the General Government. We have now sufficient experience to ascertain that the tendency to conflict in its action is between the southern and other sections. The latter having a decided majority, must habitually be possessed of the powers of the Government, both in this and in the other House; and, being governed by that instinctive love of power so natural to the human breast, they must become the advocates of the power of government, and in the same degree opposed to

the limitations; while the other and weaker section is as necessarily thrown on the side of the limitations. One section is the natural guardian of the delegated powers, and the other of the reserved; and the struggle on the side of the former will be to enlarge the powers, while that on the opposite side will be to restrain them within their constitutional limits. The contest will, in fact, be a contest between power and liberty, and such I consider the present—a contest in which the weaker section, with its peculiar labor, productions, and institutions, has at stake all that can be dear to freemen. Should we be able to maintain in their full vigor our reserved rights, liberty and prosperity will be our portion; but if we yield, and permit the stronger interest to concentrate within itself all the powers of the Government, then will our fate be more wretched than that of the aborigines whom we have expelled. In this great struggle between the delegated and reserved powers, so far from repining that my lot, and that of those whom I represent, is cast on the side of the latter, I rejoice that such is the fact; for, though we participate in but few of the advantages of the Government, we are compensated, and more than compensated, in not being so much exposed to its corruptions. Nor do I repine that the duty, so difficult to be discharged, of defending the reserved powers against apparently such fearful odds, has been assigned to us. To discharge it successfully requires the highest qualities, moral and intellectual; and should we perform it with a zeal and ability proportioned to its magnitude, instead of mere planters, our section will become distinguished for its patriots and statesmen. But, on the other hand, if we prove unworthy of the trust—if we yield to the steady encroachments of power, the severest calamity and most debasing corruption will overspread the land. Every southern man, true to the interests of his section, and faithful to the duties which Providence has allotted him, will be forever excluded from the honors and emoluments of this Government, which will be reserved for those only who have qualified themselves, by political prostitution, for admission into the Magdalen Asylum.

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DENOUNCING ANDREW JACKSON

(Delivered in the United States Senate During the Debate on the Expunging Resolution, January, 1837)

THE gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Rives] says that the argument in favor of this expunging resolution has not been answered. Sir, there are some questions so plain that they cannot be argued. Nothing can make them more plain; and this is one. No one, not blinded by party zeal, can possibly be insensible that the measure proposed is a violation of the Constitution. The Constitution requires the Senate to keep a journal; this resolution goes to expunge the journal. If you may expunge a part, you may expunge the whole; and if it is expunged, how is it kept? The Constitution says the journal shall be kept; this resolution says it shall be destroyed. It does the very thing which the Constitution declares shall not be done. That is the argument, the whole argument. There is none other. Talk of precedents? and precedents drawn from a foreign country? They don't apply. No, sir. This is to be done, not in consequence of argument, but in spite of argument. I understand the case. I know perfectly well the gentlemen have no liberty to vote otherwise. They are coerced by an exterior power. They try, indeed, to comfort their conscience by saying that it is the will of the people, and the voice of the people. It is no such thing. We all know how these legislative returns have been obtained. It is by dictation from the White House. The President himself, with that vast mass of patronage which he wields, and the thousand expectations he is able to hold up, has obtained these votes of the State legislatures; and this, forsooth, is said to be the voice of the people. The voice of the people! Sir, can we forget the scene which was exhibited in this Chamber when that expunging resolution was first introduced here? Have we forgotten the universal giving way of conscience, so that the Senator from Missouri was left alone? I see before me Senators who could not swallow that resolution; and has its nature changed since then? Is it any more constitutional now than it was then? Not at all. But executive power has interposed. Talk to me of the voice of the people! No, sir. It is the combination of patronage and power to coerce this body into a gross and palpable violation of the Constitution. Some individuals, I perceive, think

to escape through the particular form in which this act is to be perpetrated. They tell us that the resolution on your records is not to be expunged, but is only to be endorsed "Expunged." Really, sir, I do not know how to argue against such contemptible sophistry. The occasion is too solemn for an argument of this sort. You are going to violate the Constitution, and you get rid of the infamy by a falsehood. You yourselves say that the resolution is expunged by your order. Yet you say it is not expunged. You put your act in express words. You record it, and then turn round and deny it.

But what is the motive? What is the pretext for this enormity? Why, gentlemen tell us the Senate has two distinct consciences—a legislative conscience, and a judicial conscience. As a legislative body we have decided that the President has violated the Constitution. But gentlemen tell us that this is an impeachable offense; and, as we may be called to try it in our judicial capacity, we have no right to express the opinion. I need not show how inconsistent such a position is with the eternal, imprescriptible right of freedom of speech, and how utterly inconsistent it is with precedents drawn from the history of our British ancestors, where the same liberty of speech has for centuries been enjoyed. There is a shorter and more direct argument in reply. Gentlemen who take that position cannot, according to their own showing, vote for this resolution; for if it is unconstitutional for us to record a resolution of condemnation, because we may afterwards be called to try the case in a judicial capacity, then it is equally unconstitutional for us to record a resolution of acquittal. If it is unconstitutional for the Senate to declare before a trial that the President has violated the Constitution, it is equally unconstitutional to declare before a trial that he has not violated the Constitution. The same principle is involved in both. Yet, in the very face of this principle, gentlemen are here going to condemn their own act.

But why do I waste my breath? I know it is all utterly vain. The day is gone; night approaches, and night is suitable to the dark deed we meditate. There is a sort of destiny in this thing. The act must be performed; and it is an act which will tell on the political history of this country forever. Other preceding violations of the Constitution (and they have been many and great) filled my bosom with indignation, but this fills it only with grief. Others were done in the heat of partisanship. Power

was, as it were, compelled to support itself by seizing upon new instruments of influence and patronage; and there were ambitious and able men to direct the process. Such was the removal of the deposits, which the President seized upon by a new and unprecedented act of arbitrary power; an act which gave him ample means of rewarding friends and punishing enemies. Something may, perhaps, be pardoned to him in this matter, on the old apology of tyrants—the plea of necessity. But here there can be no such apology. Here no necessity can so much as be pretended. This act originates in pure, unmixed, personal idolatry. It is the melancholy evidence of a broken spirit, ready to bow at the feet of power. The former act was such a one as might have been perpetrated in the days of Pompey or Cæsar; but an act like this could never have been consummated by a Roman senate until the times of Caligula and Nero.

REPLYING TO HENRY CLAY

(From the "Independent Treasury" Debate in the United States Senate,
March, 1838)

I who have changed no opinion, abandoned no principle, deserted no party; I, who have stood still and maintained my ground against every difficulty, to be told that it is left to time to disclose my motive! The imputation sinks to the earth with the groundless charge on which it rests. I stamp it with scorn in the dust. I pick up the dart, which fell harmless at my feet. I hurl it back. What the Senator charges on me, unjustly, he has actually done. He went over on a memorable occasion, and did not leave it to time to disclose his motive.

The Senator next tells us that I bore a character for stern fidelity, which he accompanied with remarks implying that I had forfeited it by my course on the present occasion. If he means by stern fidelity a devoted attachment to duty and principle, which nothing can overcome, the character is, indeed, a high one, and, I trust, not entirely unmerited. I have, at least, the authority of the Senator himself for saying that it belonged to me before the present occasion, and it is, of course, incumbent on him to show that I have since forfeited it. He will find the task a Herculean one. It would be by far more easy to show the opposite; that, instead of forfeiting, I have strengthened my title to

the character; instead of abandoning any principles, I have firmly adhered to them, and that, too, under the most appalling difficulties. If I were to select an instance in the whole course of my life on which, above all others, to rest my claim to the character which the Senator attributed to me, it would be this very one which he has selected to prove that I have forfeited it. I acted with the full knowledge of the difficulties I had to encounter and the responsibility I had to incur. I saw a great and powerful party, probably the most powerful in the country, eagerly seizing on the catastrophe which had befallen the currency and the consequent embarrassments that followed, to displace those in power against whom they had been long contending. I saw that to stand between them and their object I must necessarily incur their deep and lasting displeasure. I also saw that to maintain the administration in the position they had taken, to separate the Government from the banks, I would draw down on me, with the exception of some of the Southern banks, the whole weight of that extensive, concentrated, and powerful interest—the most powerful by far of any in the whole community; and thus I would unite against me a combination of political and moneyed influence almost irresistible. . . .

But the Senator did not confine his attacks to my conduct and motives in reference to the present question. In his eagerness to weaken the cause I support, by destroying confidence in me, he made an indiscriminate attack on my intellectual faculties, which he characterized as metaphysical, eccentric, too much of genius, and too little common sense, and of course wanting a sound and practical judgment.

Mr. President, according to my opinion, there is nothing of which those who are endowed with superior mental faculties ought to be more cautious, than to reproach those with their deficiency to whom Providence has been less liberal. The faculties of our mind are the immediate gift of our Creator, for which we are no farther responsible than for their proper cultivation, according to our opportunities, and their proper application to control and regulate our actions. Thus thinking, I trust I shall be the last to assume superiority on my part, or reproach any one with inferiority on his; but those who do not regard the rule, when applied to others, cannot expect it to be observed when applied to themselves. The critic must expect to be criticized, and he who points out the faults of others, to have his own pointed out.

I cannot retort on the Senator the charge of being metaphysical. I cannot accuse him of possessing the powers of analysis and generalization, those higher faculties of the mind (called metaphysical by those who do not possess them), which decompose and resolve into their elements the complex masses of ideas that exist in the world of mind, as chemistry does the bodies that surround us in the material world; and without which those deep and hidden causes which are in constant action, and producing such mighty changes in the condition of society, would operate unseen and undetected. The absence of these higher qualities of the mind is conspicuous throughout the whole course of the Senator's public life. To this it may be traced that he prefers the specious to the solid, and the plausible to the true. To the same cause, combined with an ardent temperament, it is owing that we ever find him mounted on some popular and favorite measure which he whips along, cheered by the shouts of the multitude, and never dismounts till he has ridden it down. Thus, at one time, we find him mounted on the protective system, which he rode down; at another, on internal improvement; and now he is mounted on a bank, which will surely share the same fate, unless those who are immediately interested shall stop him in his headlong career. It is the fault of his mind to seize on a few prominent and striking advantages, and to pursue them eagerly without looking to consequences. Thus, in the case of the protective system, he was struck with the advantages of manufactures; and, believing that high duties was the proper mode of protecting them, he pushed forward the system without seeing that he was enriching one portion of the country at the expense of the other; corrupting the one and alienating the other; and, finally, dividing the community into two great hostile interests, which terminated in the overthrow of the system itself. So, now, he looks only to a uniform currency, and a bank as the means of securing it, without once reflecting how far the banking system has progressed, and the difficulties that impede its further progress; that banking and politics are running together to their mutual destruction; and that the only possible mode of saving his favorite system is to separate it from the Government.

To the defects of understanding, which the Senator attributes to me, I make no reply. It is for others, and not me, to determine the portion of understanding which it has pleased the Author of my being to bestow on me. It is, however, fortunate

for me, that the standard by which I shall be judged is not the false, prejudiced, and, as I have shown, unfounded opinion which the Senator has expressed, but my acts. They furnish materials, neither few nor scant, to form a just estimate of my mental faculties. I have now been more than twenty-six years continuously in the service of this Government, in various stations, and have taken part in almost all the great questions which have agitated this country during this long and important period. Throughout the whole I have never followed events, but have taken my stand in advance, openly and freely avowing my opinions on all questions, and leaving it to time and experience to condemn or approve my course.

SELF-GOVERNMENT AND CIVILIZATION

WE MAKE a great mistake in supposing all people capable of self-government. Acting under that impression, many are anxious to force free governments on all the people of this continent, and over the world, if they had the power. It has been lately urged, in a very respectable quarter, that it is the mission of this country to spread civil and religious liberty over all the globe, and especially over this continent, even by force, if necessary. It is a sad delusion. None but a people advanced to a high state of moral and intellectual excellence are capable, in a civilized condition, of forming and maintaining free governments; and, among those who are so far advanced, very few, indeed, have had the good fortune to form constitutions capable of endurance. It is a remarkable fact in the political history of man, that there is scarcely an instance of a free constitutional government which has been the work exclusively of foresight and wisdom. They have all been the result of a fortunate combination of circumstances. It is a very difficult task to make a constitution worthy of being called so. This admirable Federal Constitution of ours is the result of such a combination. It is superior to the wisdom of any or of all the men by whose agency it was made. The force of circumstances, and not foresight or wisdom, induced them to adopt many of its wisest provisions.

But of the few nations who have been so fortunate as to adopt a wise constitution, still fewer have had the wisdom long to preserve one. It is harder to preserve than to obtain liberty.

After years of prosperity, the tenure by which it is held is but too often forgotten; and I fear, Senators, that such is the case with us. There is no solicitude now for liberty. Who talks of liberty when any great question comes up? Here is a question of the first magnitude as to the conduct of this war; do you hear anybody talk about its effects upon our liberties and our free institutions? No, sir. That was not the case formerly. In the early stages of our Government, the great anxiety was, how to preserve liberty. The great anxiety now is for the attainment of mere military glory. In the one we are forgetting the other. The maxim of former times was, that power is always stealing from the many to give to the few; the price of liberty was perpetual vigilance. They were constantly looking out and watching for danger. Not so now. Is it because there has been any decay of liberty among the people? Not at all. I believe the love of liberty was never more ardent; but they have forgotten the tenure of liberty, by which alone it is preserved.

We think we may now indulge in everything with impunity, as if we held our charter by "right divine"—from heaven itself. Under these impressions we plunge into war, we contract heavy debts, we increase the patronage of the Executive, and we talk of a crusade to force our institutions of liberty upon all people. There is no species of extravagance which our people imagine will endanger their liberty in any degree. Sir, the hour is approaching, the day of retribution will come. It will come as certainly as I am now addressing the Senate; and, when it does come, awful will be the reckoning, heavy the responsibility somewhere.

INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY

(From a Speech Delivered in 1848)

SOCIETY can no more exist without government, in one form or another, than man without society. It is the political, then, which includes the social, that is his natural state. It is the one for which his Creator formed him, into which he is impelled irresistibly, and in which only his race can exist, and all his faculties be fully developed. Such being the case, it follows that any, the worst form of government is better than anarchy, and that individual liberty or freedom must be subordinate to whatever power may be necessary to protect society against anarchy

within or destruction from without; for the safety and well being of society are as paramount to individual liberty as the safety and well being of the race are to that of individuals; and, in the same proportion, the power necessary for the safety of society is paramount to individual liberty. On the contrary, government has no right to control individual liberty beyond what is necessary to the safety and well being of society. Such is the boundary which separates the power of government and the liberty of the citizen or subject in the political state, which, as I have shown, is the natural state of man, the only one in which his race can exist, and the one in which he is born, lives, and dies.

It follows from all this that the quantum of power on the part of the government, and of liberty on that of individuals, instead of being equal in all cases, must necessarily be very unequal among different people, according to their different conditions. For just in proportion as a people are ignorant, stupid, debased, corrupt, exposed to violence within and danger without, the power necessary for government to possess, in order to preserve society against anarchy and destruction, becomes greater and greater, and individual liberty less and less, until the lowest condition is reached, when absolute and despotic power becomes necessary on the part of the government, and individual liberty extinct. So, on the contrary, just as a people rise in the scale of intelligence, virtue, and patriotism, and the more perfectly they become acquainted with the nature of government, the ends for which it was ordered, and how it ought to be administered, and the less the tendency to violence and disorder within and danger from abroad, the power necessary for government becomes less and less, and individual liberty greater and greater. Instead, then, of all men having the same right to liberty and equality, as is claimed by those who hold that they are all born free and equal, liberty is the noblest and highest reward bestowed on mental and moral development, combined with favorable circumstances. Instead, then, of liberty and equality being born with man,—instead of all men, and all classes and descriptions, being equally entitled to them,—they are high prizes to be won; and are, in their most perfect state, not only the highest reward that can be bestowed on our race, but the most difficult to be won, and, when won, the most difficult to be preserved.

JOHN CALVIN

(1509-1564)

BEZA writes that Calvin "taught the truth not with affected eloquence but with such solid gravity of style, that there was not a man who could hear him without being ravished with admiration." One of his modern admirers says that he "preached *ex tempore* and that his style is like his character—plain, unartificial, transparent, and practical, verifying the remark of his biographer that the greatest genius is always the most simple."

He was born at Noyon in Picardy, July 10th, 1509, from a family whose real name was "Cauvin," which, after the fashion of his time, he Latinized into "Calvinus." He was educated at the College de la Marché at Paris and at the College Montaign, showing an extraordinary capacity for knowledge of all kinds with a special bent towards metaphysics, or, as it was then called, "philosophy." He studied law as well as theology, but his sympathy for the movement inaugurated by Luther determined his choice and the law lost a student whose eminently severe thinking and habits of persistence might have made him one of the most profound lawyers who ever lived. He settled in Geneva in 1536, engaging thereafter in one great controversy after another during the remainder of his life. The greatest of these was with Servetus, against whom, on his trial for heresy at Geneva in 1553, he appeared as accuser. Coleridge says, however, that the death of Servetus at the stake "was not Calvin's guilt especially, but the common opprobrium of all European Christendom" at a time when burning at the stake was a matter of course in the regulation of opinion.

Calvin's discourse "On the Necessity of Enduring Persecution" was delivered extemporaneously but was published by him at Geneva, and the argument here given from it on "The Necessity for Courage" may be accepted as representing him as nearly as the difference between English and the French in which it was delivered will allow. Beza, in whose arms he died May 27th, 1564, summed up his character in the words: "I have been a witness of him for sixteen years and I think I am fully entitled to say that in this man there was exhibited to all an example of the life and death of the Christian such as it will not be easy to depreciate, such as it will be difficult to emulate."

THE NECESSITY FOR COURAGE

(From a Discourse on Enduring Persecution, Geneva, 1552)

WHAT shall be done in order to inspire our breasts with true courage? We have, in the first place, to consider how precious the confession of our faith is in the sight of God. We little know how much God prizes it, if our life, which is nothing, is valued by us more highly. When it is so, we manifest a marvelous degree of stupidity. We cannot save our life at the expense of our confession, without acknowledging that we hold it in higher estimation than the honor of God and the salvation of our souls.

A heathen could say that "It was a miserable thing to save life by giving up the only things which made life desirable!" And yet he and others like him never knew for what end men are placed in the world, and why they live in it. It is true they knew enough to say that men ought to follow virtue, to conduct themselves honestly and without reproach; but all their virtues were mere paint and smoke. We know far better what the chief aim of life should be; namely, to glorify God, in order that he may be our glory. When this is not done, woe to us! And we cannot continue to live for a single moment upon the earth without heaping additional curses on our heads. Still we are not ashamed to purchase some few days to languish here below, renouncing the eternal kingdom by separating ourselves from him by whose energy we are sustained in life.

Were we to ask the most ignorant, not to say the most brutish persons in the world, Why they live? they would not venture to answer simply, that it is to eat, and drink, and sleep; for all know that they have been created for a higher and holier end. And what end can we find if it be not to honor God, and allow ourselves to be governed by him, like children by a good parent; so that after we have finished the journey of this corruptible life, we may be received into his eternal inheritance? Such is the principal, indeed the sole end. When we do not take it into account, and are intent on a brutish life, which is worse than a thousand deaths, what can we allege for our excuse? To live and not know why, is unnatural. To reject the causes for which we live, under the influence of a foolish longing for a respite of some few days, during which we are to live in the world, while

separated from God—I know not how to name such infatuation and madness! . . .

It were easy, indeed, for God to crown us at once without requiring us to sustain any combats; but as it is his pleasure that until the end of the world Christ shall reign in the midst of his enemies, so it is also his pleasure that we, being placed in the midst of them, shall suffer their oppression and violence till he deliver us. I know, indeed, that the flesh kicks when it is to be brought to this point, but still the will of God must have the mastery. If we feel some repugnance in ourselves, it need not surprise us; for it is only too natural for us to shun the cross. Still let us not fail to surmount it, knowing that God accepts our obedience, provided we bring all our feelings and wishes into captivity, and make them subject to him.

When the Prophets and Apostles went to death, it was not without feeling within some inclination to recoil. "They will lead thee whither thou wouldst not," said our Lord Jesus Christ to Peter. When such fears of death arise within us, let us gain the mastery over them, or rather let God gain it; and meanwhile, let us feel assured that we offer him a pleasing sacrifice when we resist and do violence to our inclinations for the purpose of placing ourselves entirely under his command: This is the principal war in which God would have his people to be engaged. He would have them strive to suppress every rebellious thought and feeling which would turn them aside from the path to which he points. And the consolations are so ample, that it may well be said, we are more than cowards if we give way!

In ancient times vast numbers of people, to obtain a simple crown of leaves, refused no toil, no pain, no trouble; nay, it even cost them nothing to die, and yet every one of them fought for a peradventure, not knowing whether he was to gain or lose the prize. God holds forth to us the immortal crown by which we may become partakers of his glory: he does not mean us to fight at haphazard, but all of us have a promise of the prize for which we strive. Have we any cause then to decline the struggle? Do we think it has been said in vain, "If we die with Jesus Christ we shall also live with him?" Our triumph is prepared, and yet we do all we can to shun the combat.

PIERRE JOSEPH CAMBON

(1754-1820)



CAMBON has been called the greatest financier of the French Revolutionary period. Although he was practically responsible for the receipts and expenditures of the Republic during its stormiest times, the confidence of the Legislative Assembly, and of the Convention afterwards, in his honesty, was never shaken, not even during the Reign of Terror. From the first he was the ruling spirit and mouthpiece of the Financial Committee of both bodies. His expositions of the public situation to both are models of luminous and exhaustive statement.

Born into a wealthy bourgeois family in Montpellier, he was engaged in the grocery business in his native city when the beginning of the Revolution sent him to represent the *tiers état* in the States General at Versailles in 1789. In 1791, after being elected first deputy for the department of Herault in the Legislative Assembly, he was placed at the head of its financial committee, where he soon became such an authority on financial matters that he was made the last President of the Assembly, elected first deputy for Herault to the Convention in 1792, and placed at the head of its financial committee also. He was made a member of the first Committee of Public Safety in 1793, but was left out of the second on account of his moderation. Although he co-operated in the overthrow of Robespierre, he was made one of the victims of the feeling against the first committee to such an extent that he was forced to return, a poorer man, to his business in Montpellier.

Here he was permitted to remain unmolested until the Bourbons, in 1815, included him with other alleged "regicides" in a decree of banishment. He died in exile at Brussels in 1820.

THE CRISIS OF 1793

(From an Address in Convention July 11th, 1793, Reporting on the Condition of the Republic)

THE Committee of Public Safety having charged me to apprise you of the actual condition of the Republic, and of the operations it has conducted, I shall try to acquit myself of the duty.

You will recollect that, at the period of the establishment of the committee, the Republic was betrayed; Dumouriez had disorganized the armies of the North and the Ardennes, and there remained but about two thousand five hundred men in the garrisons of that whole frontier. The strongholds lacked provisions and munitions to sustain a siege, and this general, after having delivered to the Austrians the stores and arms for a considerable sum, would also have delivered up the fortifications without defense. You know that this general abandoned at Liege ten thousand guns and twenty-five thousand uniforms, which he placed in store for the benefit of our enemies, while the soldiers of the Republic were in need, and to deceive them as to his bent, he made this hall echo with his hypocritical plaints of the nakedness of the army, to the end to throw the blame upon this convention. The armies of the Rhine and the Moselle have been obliged to retreat and to abandon the environs of Mayence. They have sought frontier points and find themselves in a condition of disorganization which is the inevitable result of a forced retreat. The armies of the Alps and of Italy are tranquil since the snow in the mountains has separated them from the enemy. The Spaniards have attacked us in the direction of Bayonne and Perpignan. The armies of the Eastern and Western Pyrenees, of which we have heard much spoken, which were, it was frequently said, always on the point of organizing, are totally destitute. They need general officers, they have no cannon to take the field, hardly any ordnance for their siege guns, but little food stores, and few soldiers. The commissioners, Isnard, Aubry, and Despinassy, whom you sent to Perpignan, made you a reassuring report on the condition of that frontier; nevertheless the representatives of the people, who were there at the first invasion of the Spaniards, write you that it was totally abandoned; that the

forts were nearly all dismantled; that most of the cannon found in the works lacked cartridges; that there were few if any stores, and that they were without food. As to our situation in the interior, fanatics having raised armies in La Vendee and adjoining departments, several strong cities came under the power of the rebels. It is hoped, however, that the courage of the Republicans will stifle this rebellion in its birth; and since it is impossible to send disciplined troops there, the object may be attained by the levies made by requisition on the spot and some small bodies of veteran troops. Unfortunately, as you know, intrigues have weakened the public spirit in part of the departments; the citizens fail to show the energy necessary to combat the fanatics, who have their own form of energy; the bravery of the soldiers was not seconded or else was paralyzed by the perfidy of their chiefs; we lost arms, cannon, and stores, which were used against us. Orders were then given to bring up battalions of the army; they were halted in their march; the committee ordered arms and supplies; the administration checked these in their passage; thenceforward there seemed to be no union in any operations; it might even be said that each administrator seemed occupied only in the defense of his own position; formed his own little army, and named his general, so that it was impossible that any comprehensive system of defense could be followed. At the same time we had to defend the ports of Brest and Cherbourg. There were but a few scattered troops in these garrisons. On the coasts of Brittany, where a revolt had broken out, there were hardly five thousand troops, a number not sufficient even to equip the ships of the line.

The coasts and seaports of the Republic did not present conditions reassuring those who hoped for their defense: everywhere cannon were being asked for, and calls were made for ammunition and men to man the redoubts. But little activity was displayed in fitting out the fleets of the Republic. The ports of Brest, Rochefort, and Lorient had but six vessels of the line fit to put to sea, and the Mediterranean fleet was being repaired at Toulon.

You had one hundred and seventy representatives of the people in the departments to excite the patriotism of the citizens for the enlistment of three hundred thousand men, or on diverse missions of recruiting; but one of the subterfuges of the enemy was to calumniate and discredit them. To check the success of

their operations, nothing was left undone to decry them, to asperse their authority, and to create enemies for them. Everywhere a word was hurled at them which has since become the title of a party, they were called "Maratists"—a name invented by our enemies to decry the most energetic of our patriots. It was said that "Maratists" were assassins, the partisans of the Agrarian laws and of royalty for the Duke of Orleans. Very soon a portion of this assembly bore the same reproach. In spite of all these obstacles, the recruiting of three hundred thousand men was a success, but your commissioners had to have recourse to a few revolutionary acts necessitated by the resistance made by the aristocrats and moderates, in the endeavor to paralyze their efforts. Nevertheless I can say to France, without the mission of these commissioners, in place of the three hundred thousand men needed to defend France, you would hardly have had twenty thousand. Such was the condition of the Republic when the Committee of Public Safety was organized.

What has your committee done? It commenced by having from the Executive Council a full statement of the means they had adopted to save the public. But the Executive Council itself was paralyzed. The Minister of War had just been arrested, there was no force in the government, several of the ministers lacked the confidence of the public. The administrations were nullities, inapt and careless; everywhere were wanting men, arms, clothing, munitions of war, and food. At last demands came from all sections. Our political relations abroad felt the torpor into which our government had fallen.

Your committee felt they must take decided measures. They recognized that at such a critical moment, where all could not be foreseen or united at the centre, the power should be disseminated; that commissioners were needed to save the Republic, excite the zeal of the citizens, improvise armies, survey their equipment, and prevent treason.

They found that the one hundred and seventy commissioners sent into the departments depleted the convention too much. They proposed to you the recall of those whose missions were fulfilled, or whose duties were not essentially important.

The powers of your commissioners were unlimited, and frequently their purposes and operations crossed each other. The committee thought well to organize a surveillance; they proposed instructions which would definitely determine the power of the

representatives of the people. Here the malevolence which pursued all your decrees again sought to check the work of your new commissioners. Everywhere they were held up as disorganizers, "Maratists," "proconsuls," "dictators." Nevertheless, this surveillance, which you created by the law of the thirtieth of April last, has saved the Republic; it has provisioned the army and the forts; it has given activity even to the generals. Over three thousand deliberations have been held by these commissioners—not to commit arbitrary acts, but to organize, arm and equip the armies, which, without their aid, would still be in the most extreme disorder. Since this organization, complaints and demands for food, clothing, and forage have diminished; for the representatives of the people on the spot have neglected nothing to supply really pressing demands. Our enemies have felt this power, and, not wishing us to succeed in our defense, have, with the word "Marat," sought to stifle the energy of the patriots. Your committee thought also to excite the zeal of the administrators to co-operate for the common defense. When arms were wanting efforts were made, by letter and instruction, to create or perfect establishments for the manufacture of new and the repair of old guns; to equip fowling pieces with bayonets, and to use superfluous bells for the casting of field pieces. They superintended the manufacture of gunpowder and the casting of bullets, and urged on all to second in every way the representatives of the people in clothing and equipping the armies, in surveying the defenses of the seaports, forts, and coasts, and to prepare, as far as possible, for the formation of corps of cavalry, by the employment of the horses used in carriages and for pleasure.

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ALEXANDER CAMPBELL

(1788-1866)



FROM about 1825 until the end of his active life, Alexander Campbell was one of the celebrities of the West as an orator, educator, and religious teacher. Crowded audiences attended wherever he spoke, and bulky volumes of his debates with the champions of doctrines other than his own were published. Besides being the organizer of "The Disciples of Christ," he was the founder and head of Bethany College, West Virginia, and he delivered many lectures and addresses on topics not involving religious controversy. He was a man of great intellectual force and a most impressive speaker. Born of Scottish ancestry in the County of Antrim, Ireland, September 12th, 1788, he came to America in 1809 and began in 1823 the publication of the Christian Baptist, which was merged into the Millennial Harbinger in 1830. He died at Bethany, West Virginia, March 4th, 1866.

MIND THE MASTER FORCE

(From an Address Delivered at Miami University in 1844)

AS THERE is not one lawless atom in the material universe, so there is not one irresponsible agent in the social system.

The order of material nature is, indeed, the outward symbol of the order of spiritual nature, and that is the order of obedient dependence. We shall, then, enter the holy place of moral obligation by passing leisurely through the outer court of physical obligation:

In the material universe all the inferior masses are under law to the superior. One of the sublime designs of the Creator is, that all the central masses of the universe shall not only be the largest masses in their respective systems, but also radiating centres to their systems. Thus he has constituted the great masses perennial fountains of beneficence to all the subordinate masses that move round them. Our own bright orb, representative of all the suns of creation, is an unwasting fountain of life

to its own glorious system. No sooner does he show his radiant face than floods of life teem from his bosom upon some thirty attendant planets, which, in sublime majesty and in expressive silence, ceaseless move around him. Light, heat, life, and joy emanate from him. These are the sensible demonstrations of his bounty to his waiting retinue of worlds. What other emanations of goodness he vouchsafes to those who obey him are yet unknown, and perhaps unknowable to us while confined to this our native planet. In the purer and more elevated regions of ether he may perhaps generate and mature the ultimate and more recondite elements of the vital principle, which, combining with our atmosphere, quicken it with all the rudimental principles of animal existence.

In the realms of matter, so far as fact, observation, and analogy authenticate any conclusion, the law is universal; *viz.*, that the minors must be subject to the majors; that the inferior masses shall depend on the superior for all that gives them life and comfort. But that the satellites of all systems and of all ranks requite their suns in some way by receiving from them their beneficence, and thereby maintaining, through their respective gravities, their central positions and perpetual quiescence, while they all move forward in one grand concert around the throne of the Eternal, in awful grandeur musing his praise, is not to be questioned or doubted by any one conversant with God's grand system of designs. On these sublime though simple principles are suspended the order, beauty, and felicity of the universe. Destroy this, and a scene of disorder, confusion, and destruction would instantly ensue, that would not leave an atom of the universe unscathed.

Such is also the order of the intellectual system. One great mind, nature's spiritual and eternal sun, constitutes the mighty centre around which, in their respective orbits, all pure minds, primary or secondary—angelic or human—revolve. In this system the great minds as certainly govern the inferior as in material nature the large masses govern the less. Now, as the power of mind consists of intelligence, educated mind must as certainly govern uneducated mind, and the more vigorous and talented the less favored, as the great material masses govern the inferior.

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The beauty as well as the happiness of the universe requires inequality. Equal lines, smooth surfaces, and eternal plains have

no beauty. We must have hill and dale, mountain and valley, sea and land, suns of all magnitudes, worlds of all sizes, minds of all dimensions, and persons and faces of divers casts and colors, to constitute a beautiful and happy world. We must have sexes, conditions, and circumstances—empires, nations, and families—diversities in person, mind, manners, in order to the communication and reception of happiness. Hence, our numerous and various wants are not only incentives to action, but sources of pleasure, both simple and complex—physical, intellectual, and moral.

Hence the foundation and the philosophy of unequal minds—unequal in power, in capacity, and in taste—unequal in intelligence, activity, and energy. The inequalities of mind are numerous and various as the inequalities of matter. One mind sports with worlds—another with atoms. One man perches himself on Mount Chimborazo and communes with the stars; another delves into the earth in search of hidden treasures, and buries himself in mines and minerals. One man moves along with the tardiness of the ox in the drudgery of life; another ascends in a balloon and soars above the clouds. Here we find a Newton measuring the comet's path, a Franklin stealing fire from heaven, a Columbus in search of a new world; and there a sportsman with his hounds in quest of a fox. One delights in his revelling and song, in riotous living and the giddy dance; another, in locking up his golden pelf in an iron chest. Talk we, then, of minds equally endowed by nature or improved by art! No such minds ever composed any community. Varieties, all manner of varieties, are essential to society. The world needs the rich and the poor, the young and the aged, the learned and the unlearned, the healthy and the infirm, the cheerful and the melancholic. These call forth all our energies, open channels for all the social virtues, lay the basis of our various responsibilities, and constitute much of the happiness of this life. They furnish opportunities for communicating and receiving benefits. . . .

To serve a society faithfully, whether as a scavenger of Rome or as a king of the French, is an honor to any man. But to serve society in any capacity promotive of its moral advancement is the highest style and dignity of man. True, indeed, that in the great category of moral improvement there are numerous departments, and consequently many offices. There are authors, teachers of all schools, ministers of all grades, missionaries of all

mercies, ambassadors of all ranks, employed as conservators, redeemers, and benefactors of men. These, in the tendencies and bearings of their respective functions, sweep the largest circles in human affairs. They extend not only to the individual first benefited, not only to those temporarily benefited by him, in a long series of generations, but breaking through the confines of time and space, those benefits reach into eternity and spread themselves over fields of blessings, waving with eternal harvests of felicity to multitudes of participants which the arithmetic of time wholly fails to compute, either in number or in magnitude. The whole vista of time is but the shaft of a grand telescope through which to see, at the proper angle, the teeming harvests of eternal blessedness flowing into the bosoms of the great moral benefactors of human kind. To choose a calling of this sort is superlatively incumbent on men of genius. As Wesley said of good music, so say we of good talents. The devil, said the reformer, shall not have all the good tunes; and we add, nor the law, nor politics, nor the stage, all the good talents.

If men are held responsible, not only for all the evil they have done, but also for all the good they might have done—as undoubtedly they will be; and if they are to be rewarded, not for having genius and talent, but for having *used* them in accordance with the Divine will and the dictates of conscience, then what immense and overwhelming interests are merged in the question, To what calling should men of great parts and of good education devote themselves? Taste, inclination, and talent are altogether, and always, to be taken into account in a matter of such thrilling interest. But we are speaking of men of genius in general, and not of a particular class. The historic painter may, like our great West, give us Bible characters and Bible scenes. We may as well have the patriarchal scenes, tabernacle and temple scenes, official personages and festivals upon the walls of our rooms and museums, as the island of Calypso, or the ruins of the Capitol, or the Pantheon, or the panorama of Mexico, Paris, or Waterloo. The poet may sing of Zion, and Siloam, of Jerusalem and its King, as well as of the wrath of Achilles, the siege of Troy, or the adventures of Æneas. An orator may as well plead for God as for man, for eternity as for time, for heaven as for earth; he may as well plead for man's salvation as for his political rights and immunities; and the same learning and eloquence that gain for a client a good inheritance

or a fair reputation might also have gained for him an unfading crown and an enduring inheritance. It depends upon the taste of the man of genius of any peculiar kind to what cause he may supremely devote it. It is his duty, however, to bring it to the best market and to consecrate it to the noblest and most exalted good.

But, finally, it is not only incumbent on men of genius that they cultivate their talents to the greatest perfection, and that they select the noblest and most useful calling, but that they also prosecute them with the greatest vigor, and devote themselves to them with the most persevering assiduity. "It is not he that enters upon any career, or starts in any race, but he that runs well, and perseveringly, that gains the plaudits of others, or the approval of his own conscience."

Life is a great struggle. It is one splendid campaign, a race, a contest for interests, honors, and pleasures of the highest character and of the most enduring importance. Happy the man of genius who cultivates all his powers with a reference thereunto, who chooses the most noble calling, and who prosecutes it with all his might. Such a one, ultimately, secures to himself the admiration of all the great, the wise, the good. Such a one will always enjoy the approbation of his own judgment and conscience, and, better still, the approbation of his God and Redeemer. How pleasing to him who has run the glorious race, to survey from the lofty summit of his eternal fame the cumulative results of an active life, developed in the light of eternity! How transporting to contemplate the proximate and the remote, the direct and the indirect beatific fruits of his labors reflected from the bright countenances of enraptured myriads, beaming with grateful emotion to him as the honored instrument of having inducted them into those paths of righteousness which led them into the fruition of riches, honors, and pleasures boundless as the universe and enduring as the ages of eternity!

GEORGE CANNING

(1770-1827)



CANNING followed Pitt in protesting against the radical ideas of Revolutionary France, but he made a deliberate and often successful attempt to check himself and those he could influence in the tendency to go to the other extreme. He intended that his policies should represent the progress which at any given time is practicable, in spite of difficulties created by idealists, who insist on too much, and reactionists, who strive to take away what has already been gained. Outside of England he is apt to be remembered most gratefully for what he did to force the recognition and the independence of the Spanish-American republics, though in England itself he is chiefly regarded for his work in checking Napoleon. He was born in London, April 11th, 1770. After leaving the University, he entered public life under the patronage of Pitt. Elected to Parliament in 1794, he made the great reputation as an orator which still survives him, and is justified by many of his speeches even now, when the events which inspired them are no longer of living interest. He was Secretary for Foreign Affairs from 1807 to 1809; President of the Board of Control from 1816 to 1820; again Secretary for Foreign Affairs from 1822 to 1827, and Premier in 1827. He died in August 1827, not long after taking his place at the head of the cabinet.

The most admired of his orations—that delivered at Plymouth in 1823—owes its reputation and its vitality to the single passage in which England in repose is compared to the fleet of men-of-war lying off Plymouth, seemingly inert, but representing at that time the greatest condensation of merely physical force in the politics of the world. Another celebrated speech on the affairs of Portugal is now obsolete. Canning believed that parliamentary eloquence ought to represent the conversational rather than the oratorical style, and where he seems to act consciously on his theory his speeches are often so matter of fact that their interest is merely historical. Often, however, he is moved by a strong idea to a forgetfulness of theory, and he then illustrates the strength of his intellect and the power of the genuine orator. He is often witty, and there are times when he comes dangerously near displaying the fatal gift of humor. It has been said of him, indeed, that he was capable of editing a comic paper or of directing the destinies of the greatest empire of the world. He could



write verse with facility, but it is doubtful, if he ever seriously attempted to achieve genuine poetry under metrical forms. His most poetical passages are to be found in his orations rather than in his verse.

ENGLAND IN REPOSE

(A Speech Delivered at Plymouth, in 1823, on Being Presented with the Freedom of the Town)

Mr. Mayor and Gentlemen:—

I ACCEPT with thankfulness, and with greater satisfaction than I can express, this flattering testimony of your good opinion and good-will. I must add, that the value of the gift itself has been greatly enhanced by the manner in which your worthy and honorable Recorder has developed the motives which suggested it, and the sentiments which it is intended to convey.

Gentlemen, your Recorder has said very truly, that whoever, in this free and enlightened State, aims at political eminence, and discharges political duties, must expect to have his conduct scrutinized, and every action of his public life sifted with no ordinary jealousy, and with no sparing criticism; and such may have been my lot as much as that of other public men. But, gentlemen, unmerited obloquy seldom fails of an adequate, though perhaps tardy, compensation. I must think myself, as my honorable friend has said, eminently fortunate, if such compensation as he describes has fallen to me at an earlier period than to many others; if I dare flatter myself (as his partiality has flattered me) that the sentiments that you are kind enough to entertain for me are in unison with those of the country; if, in addition to the justice done me by my friends, I may, as he has assured me, rely upon a candid construction, even from political opponents.

But, gentlemen, the secret of such a result does not lie deep. It consists only in an honest and undeviating pursuit of what one conscientiously believes to be one's public duty—a pursuit which, steadily continued, will, however detached and separate parts of a man's conduct may be viewed under the influence of partialities or prejudices, obtain for it, when considered as a whole, the approbation of all honest and honorable minds. Any man may occasionally be mistaken as to the means most conducive to the end which he has in view; but if the end be just

and praiseworthy, it is by that he will be ultimately judged, either by his contemporaries or by posterity.

Gentlemen, the end which I confess I have always had in view, and which appears to me the legitimate object of pursuit to a British statesman, I can describe in one word. The language of modern philosophy is wisely and diffusely benevolent; it professes the perfection of our species, and the amelioration of the lot of all mankind. Gentlemen, I hope that my heart beats as high for the general interest of humanity—I hope that I have as friendly a disposition towards other nations of the earth as any one who vaunts his philanthropy most highly; but I am contented to confess that in the conduct of political affairs the grand object of my contemplation is the interest of England.

Not, gentlemen, that the interest of England is an interest which stands isolated and alone. The situation which she holds forbids an exclusive selfishness; her prosperity must contribute to the prosperity of other nations, and her stability to the safety of the world. But, intimately connected as we are with the system of Europe, it does not follow that we are therefore called upon to mix ourselves on every occasion with a restless and meddling activity, in the concerns of the nations which surround us. It is upon a just balance of conflicting duties, and of rival, but sometimes incompatible advantages, that a government must judge when to put forth its strength, and when to husband it for occasions yet to come.

Our ultimate object must be the peace of the world. That object may sometimes be best attained by prompt exertions—sometimes by abstinence from interposition in contests which we cannot prevent. It is upon these principles that, as has been most truly observed by my worthy friend, it did not appear to the government of this country to be necessary that Great Britain should mingle in the recent contest between France and Spain.

Your worthy Recorder has accurately classed the persons who would have driven us into that contest. There were undoubtedly among them those who desired to plunge this country into the difficulties of war, partly from the hope that those difficulties would overwhelm the administration; but it would be most unjust not to admit that there were others who were actuated by nobler principles and more generous feelings, who would have rushed forward at once from the sense of indignation at aggres-

sion, and who deemed that no act of injustice could be perpetrated from one end of the universe to the other, but that the sword of Great Britain should leap from its scabbard to avenge it. But as it is the province of law to control the excess even of laudable passions and propensities in individuals, so it is the duty of government to restrain within due bounds the ebullition of national sentiment and to regulate the course and direction of impulses which it cannot blame. Is there any one among the latter class of persons described by my honorable friend (for to the former I have nothing to say), who continues to doubt whether the Government did wisely in declining to obey the precipitate enthusiasm which prevailed at the commencement of the contest in Spain? Is there anybody who does not now think that it was the office of the Government to examine more closely all the various bearings of so complicated a question, to consider whether they were called upon to assist a united nation, or to plunge themselves into the internal feuds by which that nation was divided—to aid in repelling a foreign invader, or to take part in a civil war. Is there any man who does not now see what would have been the extent of burdens that would have been cast upon this country? Is there any one who does not acknowledge that under such circumstances the enterprise would have been one to be characterized only by a term borrowed from that part of the Spanish literature with which we are most familiar—*Quixotic*; an enterprise, romantic in its origin, and thankless in the end?

But while we thus control even our feelings by our duty, let it not be said that we cultivate peace, either because we fear, or because we are unprepared for, war; on the contrary, if eight months ago the Government did not hesitate to proclaim that the country was prepared for war, if war should be unfortunately necessary, every month of peace that has since passed has but made us so much the more capable of exertion. The resources created by peace are means of war. In cherishing those resources, we but accumulate those means. Our present repose is no more a proof of inability to act than the state of inertness and inactivity in which I have seen those mighty masses that float in the waters above your town is a proof that they are devoid of strength and incapable of being fitted out for action. You well know, gentlemen, how soon one of those stupendous masses, now reposing on their shadows in perfect stillness,—how

soon, upon any call of patriotism, or of necessity, it would assume the likeness of an animated thing, instinct with life and motion,—how soon it would ruffle, as it were, its swelling plumage,—how quickly it would put forth all its beauty and its bravery, collect its scattered elements of strength, and awaken its dormant thunder. Such as is one of these magnificent machines when springing from inaction into a display of its might—such is England herself, while apparently passive and motionless she silently concentrates the power to be put forth on an adequate occasion. But God forbid that that occasion should arise! After a war sustained for nearly a quarter of a century—sometimes single-handed, and with all Europe arranged at times against her or at her side, England needs a period of tranquillity, and may enjoy it without fear of misconstruction. Long may we be enabled, gentlemen, to improve the blessings of our present situation, to cultivate the arts of peace, to give to commerce, now reviving, greater extension and new spheres of employment, and to confirm the prosperity now generally diffused throughout this island. Of the blessing of peace, gentlemen, I trust that this borough, with which I have now the honor and happiness of being associated, will receive an ample share. I trust the time is not far distant when that noble structure of which, as I learn from your Recorder, the box with which you have honored me, through his hands, formed a part, that gigantic barrier against the fury of the waves that roll into your harbor will protect a commercial marine not less considerable in its kind than the warlike marine of which your port has been long so distinguished an asylum, when the town of Plymouth will participate in the commercial prosperity as largely as it has hitherto done in the naval glories of England.

CHRISTIANITY AND OPPRESSION

(From a Speech in Parliament, May 19th, 1826)

I HAVE before said, that theoretically true as it may be, that the spirit of slavery is repugnant to the spirit of the British Constitution, yet this country, blessed though she has been with a free Constitution herself, has encouraged in her colonies the practice of slavery, however alien to her own domestic institutions; and this, too, be it remembered, at a time when her coun-

cils were guided by men, the acknowledged and boasted friends of liberty. I will not stop to enter into a disquisition whether, at the time to which I refer, the duties of governments, and the rights of man, as man, were as fully understood as in the age in which we have the happiness to live; whether the freedom of England had then attained that moral maturity which it now exhibits. Be that as it may, the simple fact is, that this country, notwithstanding her free Constitution, did found and maintain, nay, more, did foster and prescribe a system, of which, not only was slavery an ingredient, but which required an annual influx of the black Stygian stream of slavery for its nutriment and sustentation.

But there was another part of the proposition put forth by the honorable Member for Weymouth, on the occasion to which the learned civilian has alluded, *viz.*, that the state of slavery is repugnant to the principles of the Christian religion. To this, sir, I objected, not, certainly, meaning thereby to degrade the Christian religion by the imputation that it was tolerant of slavery, but meaning to free this country from the necessity which would result from the adoption of the honorable gentleman's doctrine—the necessity of proceeding, without pause or hesitation, not merely to the immediate modification and gradual abolition of slavery in the colonies, but to its instant and total extirpation. What I meant to deny in the honorable Member's proposition was that the Christian religion and slavery could not be in existence together. I said that the reverse is the fact—that they have co-existed from the very dawn of Christianity up to the present day. Neither, therefore, am I forced to admit that it is a principle of the Christian religion to sanction slavery. The course of the Christian religion has always been to adapt itself to the circumstances of the place and time in which it was seeking to make a progress; to accommodate itself to all stations of life, to all varieties of acting or of suffering; restraining the high, exalting the lowly, by precepts applicable to all diversities of situation; and alike contributing to the happiness of man, and providing for his welfare, whether connected with his highest destinies, or descending with him to his lowest degradation,—whether mounting the throne of the Cæsars, or comforting the captive in his cell.

But while Christianity has thus blessed and improved mankind, its operation has not been direct, precipitate, or violent. It has invaded no existing rights or relations, it has disturbed no

established modes of government or law. It has rendered and recommended obedience to temporal power, even where that power was exercised with no light hand, and administered through no mild or uncorrupted institutions. While the doctrines of Christianity were preaching in the streets of Rome,—*servi cruciantur* continued to be the ordinary form of process in the Forum, not for the punishment of the slave who had been convicted of a crime, but for extracting evidence from one produced as a witness.

Then, sir, it is not true that the Christian religion prescribes the extinction of slavery, with unsparing, uncompromising, indiscriminating haste. It is not true that Christianity ordains the extirpation of this great moral evil by other means than those which are consonant with the just spirit of the British Constitution,—means of equity and good faith, as well as of well-understood humanity; measures moderate in their character, and progressive in their operation.

Is there anything, then, sir, in what I have laid down to inculpate the spirit of Christianity or the principles of the British Constitution? If the British Government and the British Parliament have for a long series of years fostered that system upon which we all now look with abhorrence, what is the fair inference? Is it that we are to continue to foster and cherish it still? No, sir; that is not what I maintain: but I do maintain that we, having all concurred in the guilt of rearing and fostering the evil, are not to turn round upon the planters, and say, "You alone shall suffer all the penalty;—we determine to get rid of this moral pestilence, which infects our character as much as yours, which we have as much contributed to propagate as you; but you, as spotted lepers, shall be banished from our society and cast to utter ruin, to expiate our common crime."

HATE IN POLITICS

(From a Speech on Unlawful Societies in Ireland.—February 15th, 1825)

IN THE next place, are we prepared to say that these and other acts of the Catholic Association have no tendency to excite and inflame animosities? I affirm, without hesitation, that they have directly that tendency; and in support of this affirmation I must beg leave to recur, however solemnly warned against

the recurrence, to an expression which I was the first to bring to the notice of the House, but which has been since the subject of repeated animadversion; I mean the adjuration "by the hate you bear to Orangemen," which was used by the association in its address to the Catholics of Ireland.

Various and not unamusing have been the attempts of gentlemen who take the part of the association, to get rid of this most unlucky phrase, or at least to dilute and attenuate its obvious and undeniable meaning. It is said to be unfair to select one insulated expression as indicating the general spirit of the proceedings of any public body. Granted;—if the expression had escaped in the heat of debate, if it had been struck out by the collision of argument, if it had been thrown forth in haste, and had been upon reflection recalled: but if the words are found in a document which was prepared with care and considered with deliberation,—if it is notorious that they were pointed out as objectionable when they were first proposed by the framers of the address, but were nevertheless upon argument retained,—surely we are not only justified in receiving them as an indication at least of the *animus* of those who used them, but we should be rejecting the best evidence of that *animus*, if we passed over so well-weighed a manifestation of it.

Were not this felt by honorable gentlemen on the other side to be true, we should not have seen them so anxious to put forced and fanciful constructions on a phrase which is as plain in its meaning as any which the hand of man ever wrote or the eye of man ever saw. The first defense of this phrase was by an honorable Member from Ireland, who told us that the words do not convey the same meaning in the Irish language, which we in England naturally attach to them. I do not pretend to be conversant with the Irish language, and must therefore leave that apology to stand, for what it may be worth, on the honorable gentleman's erudition and authority. I will not follow every other gentleman who has strained his faculties to explain away this unfortunate expression, but will come at once to my honorable and learned friend [Sir James Mackintosh], the Member for Knaresborough, to whom the palm in this contest of ingenuity must be conceded by all his competitors. My honorable friend has expended abundant research and subtilty upon this inquiry, and having resolved the phrase into its elements in the crucible of his philosophical mind, has produced it to us purified and refined to a degree that must command the admiration of all who

take delight in metaphysical alchemy. My honorable and learned friend began by telling us, that, after all, *hatred* is no bad thing in itself. "I hate a Tory," says my honorable friend—"and another man hates a cat; but it does not follow that he would hunt down the cat, or I the Tory." Nay, so far from it, hatred, if it be properly managed, is, according to my honorable friend's theory, no bad preface to a rational esteem and affection. It prepares its votaries for a reconciliation of differences—for lying down with their most inveterate enemies, like the leopard and the kid, in the vision of the prophet.

This dogma is a little startling, but it is not altogether without precedent. It is borrowed from a character in a play which is, I dare say, as great a favorite with my learned friend as it is with me—I mean the comedy of 'The Rivals,' in which Mrs. Malaprop, giving a lecture on the subject of marriage to her niece (who is unreasonable enough to talk of liking as a necessary preliminary to such a union), says, "What have you to do with your likings and your preferences, child? Depend upon it, it is safest to begin with a little aversion. I am sure I hated your poor dear uncle like a blackamoor before we were married; and yet you know, my dear, what a good wife I made him." Such is my learned friend's argument to a hair.


But finding that this doctrine did not appear to go down with the house so glibly as he had expected, my honorable and learned friend presently changed his tack, and put forward a theory, which, whether for novelty or for beauty, I pronounce to be incomparable; and, in short, as wanting nothing to recommend it but a slight foundation in truth. "True philosophy," says my honorable friend, "will always contrive to lead men to virtue by the instrumentality of their conflicting vices. The virtues, where more than one exist, may live harmoniously together; but the vices bear mortal antipathy to one another, and therefore furnish to the moral engineer the power by which he can make each keep the other under control." Admirable!—but, upon this doctrine, the poor man who has but one single vice must be in a very bad way. No *fulcrum*, no moral power for effecting his cure. Whereas his more fortunate neighbor, who has two or more vices in his composition, is in a fair way of becoming a very virtuous member of society. I wonder how my learned friend would like to have this doctrine introduced into his domestic establishment. For instance, suppose that I discharge a servant because he is addicted to liquor, I could not

venture to recommend him to my honorable and learned friend; it might be the poor man's only fault, and therefore clearly incorrigible, but if I had the good fortune to find out that he was also addicted to stealing, might I not, with a safe conscience, send him to my learned friend with a very strong recommendation, saying, "I send you a man whom I know to be a drunkard, but I am happy to assure you he is also a thief: you cannot do better than employ him: you will make his drunkenness counteract his thievery, and no doubt you will bring him out of the conflict a very moral personage." My honorable and learned friend, however, not content with laying down these new rules for reformation, thought it right to exemplify them in his own person, and, like Pope's *Longinus*, to be "himself the great sublime he drew." My learned friend tells us that Dr. Johnson was what he (Dr. Johnson himself) called a good hater; and that among the qualities which he hated most were two which my honorable friend unites in his own person—that of Whig and that of Scotchman. "So that," says my honorable friend, "if Dr. Johnson were alive, and were to meet me at the club, of which he was a founder, and of which I am now an unworthy member, he would probably break up the meeting rather than sit it out in such society." No, sir, not so. My honorable and learned friend forgets his own theory. If he had been only a Whig, or only a Scotchman, Dr. Johnson might have treated him as he apprehends; but being both, the great moralist would have said to my honorable friend, "Sir, you are too much of a Whig to be a good Scotchman; and, sir, you are too much of a Scotchman to be a good Whig." It is no doubt from the collision of these two vices in my learned friend's person, that he has become what I, and all who have the happiness of meeting him at the club, find him—an entirely faultless character.

For my own part, however, I must say that I cannot see any hope of obtaining the great moral victory which my learned friend has anticipated—of winning men to the practice of virtue by adjurations addressed to their peculiar vices. I believe, after all these ratiocinations and refinements, we must come back to the plain truth, which is felt even while it is denied—that the phrase, "by the hate you bear to Orangemen," is an indefensible phrase; that it is, at least,—what alone I am contending that it is,—incontestable evidence of the allegation that the Catholic Association does excite animosities in Ireland.

THOMAS CARLYLE

(1795-1881)

 HIS election as rector of Edinburgh University, in 1866, Thomas Carlyle delivered, without notes or apparent preparation, an address on *The Choice of Books*. It had no more to do with the subject than, in his characteristic way, he thought necessary, but it gathered force in its progress until its closing passages became worthy of his great intellect. He was perhaps the most eloquent Englishman of the second half of the nineteenth century. His addresses on Heroes were delivered as lectures, but they are really orations in the same sense in which the carefully prepared speeches of Cicero and Demosthenes were orations. Many of his most admired essays, though never delivered from a platform, are really oratorical in form and spirit, and it is not unjust nor discreditable to his 'History of the French Revolution' to call it a series of orations, which come nearer complying with the classical requirements of oratorical composition than almost any English oration which has been prepared for actual delivery.

That in his Edinburgh address, Carlyle, the greatest and most incessant talker of his day, should eulogize silence as better than eloquence, and put the silent Phocion above Demosthenes, is eminently illustrative of his love of self-contradictory paradox. The address is illustrative of his mind in a much more important respect, for it is phosphorescent with ideas. They do not flash out of obscurity and increase the darkness after them, as it sometimes happens with his ideas. They grow steadily more luminous until the close. There Carlyle is at his simplest and best. If he ever equaled it elsewhere, it is hard to see how he or any one else, could have surpassed it.

He was born at Ecclefechan, Dumfriesshire, December 4th, 1795. After receiving a thoroughly Scottish education, consummated by his graduation at Edinburgh University, he began his after education with the study of German literature, which gave his mind its final bent. His style was probably influenced most largely by that of Richter, though Goethe undoubtedly influenced his thought more deeply than he was influenced by any other single writer. He died at Chelsea, London, February 4th, 1881, after a life of almost unparalleled intellectual activity.

THE EDINBURGH ADDRESS

(Delivered to the Students of the University of Edinburgh, April 2d, 1866)

Gentlemen : —

I HAVE accepted the office you have elected me to, and have now the duty to return thanks for the great honor done me.

Your enthusiasm towards me, I admit, is very beautiful in itself, however undesirable it may be in regard to the object of it. It is a feeling honorable to all men, and one well known to myself when I was in a position analogous to your own. I can only hope that it may endure to the end,—that noble desire to honor those whom you think worthy of honor, and come to be more and more select and discriminate in the choice of the object of it; for I can well understand that you will modify your opinions of me and many things else as you go on. [Laughter and cheers.] There are now fifty-six years gone last November since I first entered your city, a boy of not quite fourteen,—fifty-six years ago,—to attend classes here and gain knowledge of all kinds, I know not what, with feelings of wonder and awe-struck expectation; and now, after a long, long course, this is what we have come to. [Cheers.] There is something touching and tragic, and yet at the same time beautiful, to see the third generation, as it were, of my dear old native land, rising up and saying, “Well, you are not altogether an unworthy laborer in the vineyard: you have toiled through a great variety of fortunes, and have had many judges.” As the old proverb says, “He that builds by the wayside has many masters.” We must expect a variety of judges; but the voice of young Scotland, through you, is really of some value to me, and I return you many thanks for it, though I cannot describe my emotions to you, and perhaps they will be much more conceivable if expressed in silence. [Cheers.]

When this office was proposed to me, some of you know that I was not very ambitious to accept it, a first. I was taught to believe that there were more or less certain important duties which would lie in my power. This, I confess, was my chief motive in going into it,—at least, in reconciling the objections felt to such things; for if I can do anything to honor you and my dear old *Alma Mater*, why should I not do so? [Loud cheers.] Well, but on practically looking into the matter when

the office actually came into my hands, I find it grows more and more uncertain and abstruse to me whether there is much real duty that I can do at all. I live four hundred miles away from you, in an entirely different state of things; and my weak health—now for many years accumulating upon me—and a total unacquaintance with such subjects as concern your affairs here,—all this fills me with apprehension that there is nothing worth the least consideration that I can do on that score. You may, however, depend upon it that if any such duty does arise in any form, I will use my most faithful endeavor to do whatever is right and proper, according to the best of my judgment. [Cheers.]

In the meanwhile, the duty I have at present—which might be very pleasant, but which is quite the reverse, as you may fancy—is to address some words to you on subjects more or less cognate to the pursuits you are engaged in. In fact, I had meant to throw out some loose observations,—loose in point of order, I mean,—in such a way as they may occur to me,—the truths I have in me about the business you are engaged in, the race you have started on, what kind of race it is you young gentlemen have begun, and what sort of arena you are likely to find in this world. I ought, I believe, according to custom, to have written all that down on paper, and had it read out. That would have been much handier for me at the present moment [a laugh], but when I attempted to write, I found that I was not accustomed to writing speeches, and that I did not get on very well. So I flung that away, and resolved to trust to the inspiration of the moment,—just to what came uppermost. You will therefore have to accept what is readiest, what comes direct from the heart, and you must just take that in compensation for any good order of arrangement there might have been in it.

I will endeavor to say nothing that is not true, as far as I can manage, and that is pretty much all that I can engage for. [A laugh.]

When the seven free Arts on which the old universities were based came to be modified a little, in order to be convenient for, or to promote the wants of, modern society,—though, perhaps, some of them are obsolete enough even yet for some of us,—there arose a feeling that mere vocality, mere culture of speech, if that is what comes out of a man, though he may be a great speaker, an eloquent orator, yet there is no real substance there,

—if that is what was required and aimed at by the man himself, and by the community that set him upon becoming a learned man. Maidservants, I hear people complaining, are getting instructed in the “ologies,” and so on, and are apparently totally ignorant of brewing, boiling, and baking [laughter]; above all things, not taught what is necessary to be known, from the highest to the lowest,—strict obedience, humility, and correct moral conduct. O, it is a dismal chapter, all that, if one went into it!

What has been done by rushing after fine speech? I have written down some very fierce things about that, perhaps considerably more emphatic than I would wish them to be now; but they are deeply my conviction. [Hear, hear!] There is very great necessity, indeed, of getting a little more silent than we are. It seems to me the finest nations of the world—the English and the American—are going all away into wind and tongue. [Applause and laughter.] But it will appear sufficiently tragical by and by, long after I am away out of it. Silence is the eternal duty of a man. He won’t get to any real understanding of what is complex, and, what is more than any other, pertinent to his interests, without maintaining silence. “Watch the tongue” is a very old precept and a most true one. I do not want to discourage any of you from your Demosthenes, and your studies of the niceties of language, and all that. Believe me, I value that as much as any of you. I consider it a very graceful thing, and a proper thing, for every human creature to know what the implement which he uses in communicating his thoughts is, and how to make the very utmost of it. I want you to study Demosthenes, and know all his excellencies. At the same time, I must say that speech does not seem to me, on the whole, to have turned to any good account.

Why tell me that a man is a fine speaker if it is not the truth that he is speaking? Phocion, who did not speak at all, was a great deal nearer hitting the mark than Demosthenes. [Laughter.] He used to tell the Athenians,—“You can’t fight Philip. You have not the slightest chance with him. He is a man who holds his tongue; he has great disciplined armies; he can brag anybody you like in your cities here; and he is going on steadily with an unvarying aim towards his object; and he will infallibly beat any kind of men such as you, going on raging from shore to shore with all that rampant nonsense.” Demosthenes said to him one day,—“The Athenians will get mad

some day and kill you." "Yes," Phocion says, "When they are mad; and you as soon as they get sane again." [Laughter.]

It is also told about him going to Messina on some deputation that the Athenians wanted on some kind of matter of an intricate and contentious nature, that Phocion went with some story in his mouth to speak about. He was a man of few words,—no unveracity; and after he had gone on telling the story a certain time there was one burst of interruption. One man interrupted with something he tried to answer, and then another; and, finally, the people began bragging and bawling, and no end of debate, till it ended in the want of power in the people to say any more. Phocion drew back altogether, struck dumb, and would not speak another word to any man; and he left it to them to decide in any way they liked.

It appears to me there is a kind of eloquence in that which is equal to anything Demosthenes ever said,—“Take your own way, and let me out altogether.” [Applause.]

All these considerations, and manifold more connected with them,—innumerable considerations, resulting from observation of the world at this moment,—have led many people to doubt of the salutary effect of vocal education altogether. I do not mean to say it should be entirely excluded; but I look to something that will take hold of the matter much more closely, and not allow it to slip out of our fingers and remain worse than it was. For if a good speaker—an eloquent speaker—is not speaking the truth, is there a more horrid kind of object in creation? [Loud cheers.] Of such speech I hear all manner and kind of people say it is excellent; but I care very little about how he said it, provided I understand it, and it be true. Excellent speaker! but what if he is telling me things that are untrue, that are not the facts about it—if he has formed a wrong judgment about it—if he has no judgment in his mind to form a right conclusion in regard to the matter? An excellent speaker of that kind is, as it were, saying—“Ho, every one that wants to be persuaded of the thing that is not true, come hither.” [Great laughter and applause.] I would recommend you to be very chary of that kind of excellent speech. [Renewed laughter.]

Well, all that being the too well-known product of our method of vocal education,—the mouth merely operating on the tongue of the pupil, and teaching him to wag it in a particular way

[laughter], it had made a great many thinking men entertain a very great distrust of this not very salutary way of procedure, and they have longed for some kind of practical way of working out the business. There would be room for a great deal of description about it if I went into it; but I must content myself with saying that the most remarkable piece of reading that you may be recommended to take and try if you can study is a book by Goethe,—one of his last books, which he wrote when he was an old man, about seventy years of age,—I think one of the most beautiful he ever wrote, full of mild wisdom, and which is found to be very touching by those who have eyes to discern and hearts to feel it. It is one of the pieces in 'Wilhelm Meister's Travels.' I read it through many years ago; of course, I had to read into it very hard when I was translating it [applause], and it has always dwelt in my mind as about the most remarkable bit of writing that I have known to be executed in these late centuries. I have often said there are ten pages of that which, if ambition had been my only rule, I would rather have written than have written all the books that have appeared since I came into the world. [Cheers.] Deep, deep is the meaning of what is said there. They turn on the Christian religion and the religious phenomena of Christian life,—altogether sketched out in the most airy, graceful, delicately-wise kind of way, so as to keep himself out of the common controversies of the street and of the forum, yet to indicate what was the result of things he had been long meditating upon. Among others, he introduces, in an ærial, flighty kind of way, here and there a touch which grows into a beautiful picture,—a scheme of entirely mute education, at least with no more speech than is absolutely necessary for what they have to do.

Three of the wisest men that can be got are met to consider what is the function which transcends all others in importance to build up the young generation, which shall be free from all that perilous stuff that has been weighing us down and clogging every step, and which is the only thing we can hope to go on with if we would leave the world a little better, and not the worse, for our having been in it for those who are to follow. The man who is the eldest of the three says to Goethe, "You give by nature to the well-formed children you bring into the world a great many precious gifts, and very frequently these are best of all developed by nature herself, with a very slight assistance,

where assistance is seen to be wise and profitable, and forbearance very often on the part of the overlooker of the process of education; but there is one thing that no child brings into the world with it, and without which all other things are of no use." Wilhelm, who is there beside him, says, "What is that?" "All who enter the world want it," says the eldest; "perhaps you yourself." Wilhelm says, "Well, tell me what it is." "It is," says the eldest, "reverence,—*Ehrfurcht*—Reverence! Honor done to those who are grander and better than you, without fear; distinct from fear." *Ehrfurcht*—"the soul of all religion that ever has been among men, or ever will be." And he goes into practicality. He practically distinguishes the kinds of religion that are in the world, and he makes out three reverences. The boys are all trained to go through certain gesticulations, to lay their hands on their breasts and look up to heaven, and they give their three reverences. The first and simplest is that of reverence for what is above us. It is the soul of all the pagan religions; there is nothing better in man than that. Then there is reverence for what is around us or about us,—reverence for our equals, and to which he attributes an immense power in the culture of man. The third is reverence for what is beneath us,—to learn to recognize in pain, sorrow, and contradiction, even in those things, odious as they are to flesh and blood,—to learn that there lies in these a priceless blessing. And he defines that as being the soul of the Christian religion,—the highest of all religions; a height, as Goethe says,—and that is very true, even to the letter, as I consider,—a height to which the human species was fated and enabled to attain, and from which, having once attained it, it can never retrograde. It cannot descend down below that permanently, Goethe's idea is.

Often one thinks it was good to have a faith of that kind—that always, even in the most degraded, sunken, and unbelieving times, he calculates there will be found some few souls who will recognize what that meant; and that the world, having once received it, there is no fear of its retrograding. He goes on then to tell us the way in which they seek to teach boys, in the sciences particularly, whatever the boy is fit for. Wilhelm left his own boy there, expecting they would make him a Master of Arts, or something of that kind; and when he came back for him he saw a thundering cloud of dust coming over the plain, of which he could make nothing. It turned out to be a tempest of

wild horses, managed by young lads who had a turn for hunting with their grooms. His own son was among them, and he found that the breaking of colts was the thing he was most suited for. [Laughter.] This is what Goethe calls art, which I should not make clear to you by any definition unless it is clear already. [A laugh.] I would not attempt to define it as music, painting, and poetry, and so on; it is in quite a higher sense than the common one, and in which, I am afraid, most of our painters, poets, and music men would not pass muster. [A laugh.] He considers that the highest pitch to which human culture can go; and he watches with great industry how it is to be brought about with men who have a turn for it.

Very wise and beautiful it is. It gives one an idea that something greatly better is possible for man in the world. I confess it seems to me it is a shadow of what will come, unless the world is to come to a conclusion that is perfectly frightful; some kind of scheme of education like that, presided over by the wisest and most sacred men that can be got in the world, and watching from a distance,—a training in practicality at every turn; no speech in it except that speech that is to be followed by action, for that ought to be the rule as nearly as possible among them. For rarely should men speak at all, unless it is to say that thing that is to be done; and let him go and do his part in it, and to say no more about it. I should say there is nothing in the world you can conceive so difficult, *prima facie*, as that of getting a set of men gathered together—rough, rude, and ignorant people—gather them together, promise them a shilling a day, rank them up, give them very severe and sharp drill, and, by bullying and drill,—for the word “drill” seems as if it meant the treatment that would force them to learn,—they learn what it is necessary to learn; and there is the man, a piece of an animated machine, a wonder of wonders to look at. He will go and obey one man, and walk into the cannon’s mouth for him, and do anything whatever that is commanded of him by his general officer. And I believe all manner of things in this way could be done if there were anything like the same attention bestowed. Very many things could be regimented and organized into the mute system of education that Goethe evidently adumbrates there. But I believe, when people look into it, it will be found that they will not be very long in trying to make some efforts in that direction; for the saving of human labor and the avoidance of human

misery would be uncountable if it were set about and begun even in part.

Alas! it is painful to think how very far away it is,—any fulfillment of such things; for I need not hide from you, young gentlemen,—and that is one of the last things I am going to tell you,—that you have got into a very troublous epoch of the world; and I don't think you will find it improve the footing you have, though you have many advantages which we had not. You have careers open to you, by public examinations and so on, which is a thing much to be approved and which we hope to see perfected more and more. All that was entirely unknown in my time, and you have many things to recognize as advantages. But you will find the ways of the world more anarchical than ever, I think. As far as I have noticed, revolution has come upon us. We have got into the age of revolutions. All kinds of things are coming to be subjected to fire, as it were; hotter and hotter the wind rises around everything.

Curious to say, now in Oxford and other places that used to seem to lie at anchor in the stream of time, regardless of all changes, they are getting into the highest humor of mutation, and all sorts of new ideas are getting afloat. It is evident that whatever is not made of asbestos will have to be burnt in this world. It will not stand the heat it is getting exposed to. And in saying that, it is but saying in other words that we are in an epoch of anarchy,—anarchy *plus* the constable. [Laughter.] There is nobody that picks one's pocket without some policeman being ready to take him up. [Renewed laughter.] But in every other thing he is the son, not of Kosmos, but of Chaos. He is a disobedient, and reckless, and altogether a waste kind of object,—a commonplace man in these epochs; and the wiser kind of man—the select of whom I hope you will be part—has more and more a set time to it to look forward, and will require to move with double wisdom; and will find, in short, that the crooked things that he has to pull straight in his own life, or round about, wherever he may be, are manifold, and will task all his strength wherever he may go.

But why should I complain of that either?—for that is a thing a man is born to in all epochs. He is born to expend every particle of strength that God Almighty has given him, in doing the work he finds he is fit for,—to stand it out to the last breath of life, and do his best. We are called upon to do that; and the

reward we all get—which we are perfectly sure of if we have merited it—is that we have got the work done, or, at least, that we have tried to do the work; for that is a great blessing in itself; and I should say there is not very much more reward than that going in this world. If the man gets meat and clothes, what matters it whether he have £10,000, or £10,000,000, or £70 a year. He can get meat and clothes for that; and he will find very little difference intrinsically, if he is a wise man.

I warmly second the advice of the wisest of men,—“Don’t be ambitious; don’t be at all too desirous of success; be loyal and modest.” Cut down the proud towering thoughts that you get into you, or see they be pure as well as high. There is a nobler ambition than the gaining of all California would be, or the getting of all the suffrages that are on the planet just now. [Loud and prolonged cheers.]

Finally, gentlemen, I have one advice to give you, which is practically of very great importance, though a very humble one.

I have no doubt you will have among you people ardently bent to consider life cheap, for the purpose of getting forward in what they are aiming at of high; and you are to consider throughout, much more than is done at present, that health is a thing to be attended to continually,—that you are to regard that as the very highest of all temporal things for you. [Applause.] There is no kind of achievement you could make in the world that is equal to perfect health. What are nuggets and millions? The French financier said, “Alas! why is there no sleep to be sold?” Sleep was not in the market at any quotation. [Laughter and applause.]

It is a curious thing that I remarked long ago, and have often turned in my head, that the old word for “holy” in the German language—*heilig*—also means “healthy.” And so *Heilbronn* means “holy-well,” or “healthy-well.” We have in the Scotch “hale”; and I suppose our English word “whole”—with a “w”—all of one piece, without any hole in it—is the same word. I find that you could not get any better definition of what “holy” really is than “healthy—completely healthy.” *Mens sana in corpore sano.* [Applause.]

A man with his intellect a clear, plain, geometric mirror, brilliantly sensitive of all objects and impressions around it, and imagining all things in their correct proportions,—not twisted up

into convex or concave, and distorting everything, so that he cannot see the truth of the matter without endless groping and manipulation,—healthy, clear, and free, and all round about him. We never can attain that at all. In fact, the operations we have got into are destructive of it. You cannot, if you are going to do any decisive intellectual operation—if you are going to write a book—at least, I never could—without getting decidedly made ill by it, and really you must if it is your business—and you must follow out what you are at—and it sometimes is at the expense of health. Only remember at all times to get back as fast as possible out of it into health, and regard the real equilibrium as the centre of things. You should always look at the *heilig*, which means holy, and holy means healthy.

Well, that old etymology,—what a lesson it is against certain gloomy, austere, ascetic people, that have gone about as if this world were all a dismal prison house! It has, indeed, got all the ugly things in it that I have been alluding to; but there is an eternal sky over it, and the blessed sunshine, verdure of spring, and rich autumn, and all that in it, too. Piety does not mean that a man should make a sour face about things, and refuse to enjoy in moderation what his Maker has given. Neither do you find it to have been so with old Knox. If you look into him you will find a beautiful Scotch humor in him, as well as the grimmest and sternest truth when necessary, and a great deal of laughter. We find really some of the sunniest glimpses of things come out of Knox that I have seen in any man; for instance, in his ‘History of the Reformation,’ which is a book I hope every one of you will read,—a glorious book.

On the whole, I would bid you stand up to your work, whatever it may be, and not be afraid of it,—not in sorrows or contradiction to yield, but pushing on towards the goal. And don’t suppose that people are hostile to you in the world. You will rarely find anybody designedly doing you ill. You may feel often as if the whole world is obstructing you, more or less; but you will find that to be because the world is traveling in a different way from you, and rushing on in its own path. Each man has only an extremely good-will to himself—which he has a right to have—and is moving on towards his object. Keep out of literature as a general rule, I should say also. [Laughter.] If you find many people who are hard and indifferent to you in a world that you consider to be inhospitable and cruel,—as often,

indeed, happens to a tender-hearted, stirring young creature,—you will also find there are noble hearts who will look kindly on you, and their help will be precious to you beyond price. You will get good and evil as you go on, and have the success that has been appointed to you.

I will wind up with a small bit of verse that is from Goethe also, and has often gone through my mind. To me it has the tone of a modern psalm in it in some measure. It is sweet and clear. The clearest of skeptical men had not anything like so clear a mind as that man had,—freer from cant and misdirected notion of any kind than any man in these ages has been. This is what the poet says:—

The future hides in it
Gladness and sorrow:
We press still thorow;
Nought that abides in it
Daunting us,—Onward!

And solemn before us,
Veiled, the dark Portal,
Goal of all mortal.
Stars silent rest o'er us,—
Graves under us, silent.

While earnest thou gazest
Comes boding of terror,
Come phantasm and error
Perplexes the bravest
With doubt and misgiving.

But heard are the voices,
Heard are the sages,
The Worlds and the Ages:
"Choose well: your choice is
Brief, and yet endless."

Here eyes do regard you
In Eternity's stillness;
Here is all fullness,
Ye brave, to reward you.
Work, and despair not.

One last word. *Wir heissen euch hoffen*,—we bid you be of hope. Adieu for this time.

THE HEROIC IN HISTORY

(From the First Lecture on Heroes)

FAITH is loyalty to some inspired Teacher, some spiritual Hero. And what therefore is loyalty proper, the life-breath of all society, but an effluence of Hero-worship, submissive admiration for the truly great? Society is founded on Hero-worship. All dignities of rank, on which human association rests, are what we may call a *Heroarchy* (Government of Heroes),—or a *Hierarchy*, for it is “sacred” enough withal! The Duke means *Dux*, Leader; King is *Kön-ning*, *Kan-ning*, Man that *knows* or *cans*. Society everywhere is some representation, not *insupportably* inaccurate, of a graduated Worship of Heroes;—reverence and obedience done to men really great and wise. Not *insupportably* inaccurate, I say! They are all as bank-notes, these social dignitaries, all representing gold;—and several of them, alas, always are *forged* notes. We can do with some forged false notes; with a good many even; but not with all, or the most of them forged! No: there have to come revolutions then; cries of Democracy, Liberty, and Equality, and I know not what:—the notes being all false, and no gold to be had for *them*, people take to crying in their despair that there is no gold, that there never was any!—“Gold,” Hero-worship, *is* nevertheless, as it was always and everywhere, and cannot cease till man himself ceases.

I am well aware that in these days Hero-worship, the thing I call Hero-worship, professes to have gone out, and finally ceased. This, for reasons which it will be worth while some time to inquire into, is an age that, as it were, denies the existence of great men; denies the desirableness of great men. Show our critics a great man, a Luther for example, they begin to what they call “account” for him; not to worship him, but take the dimensions of him,—and bring him out to be a little kind of man! He was the “creature of the Time,” they say; the Time called him forth, the Time did everything, he nothing—but what we, the little critic, could have done too! This seems to me but melancholy work. The Time call forth? Alas, we have known Times *call* loudly enough for their great man; but not find him when they called! He was not there; Providence had not sent him; the

Time, *calling* its loudest, had to go down to confusion and wreck because he would not come when called.

For if we will think of it, no time need have gone to ruin, could it have found a man great enough, a man wise and good enough: wisdom to discern truly what the time wanted, valor to lead it on the right road thither; these are the salvation of any time. But I liken common languid times, with their unbelief, distress, perplexity, with their languid doubting characters and embarrassed circumstances, impotently crumbling down into ever worse distress towards final ruin;—all this I liken to dry dead fuel, waiting for the lightning out of heaven that shall kindle it. The great man with his free force direct out of God's own hand is the lightning. His word is the wise healing word which all can believe in. All blazes round him now, when he has once struck on it, into fire like his own. The dry mouldering sticks are thought to have called him forth. They did want him greatly; but as to calling him forth—!—Those are critics of small vision, I think, who cry: "See, is it not the sticks that made the fire?" No sadder proof can be given by a man of his own littleness than disbelief in great men. There is no sadder symptom of a generation than such general blindness to the spiritual lightning, with faith only in the heap of barren dead fuel. It is the last consummation of unbelief. In all epochs of the world's history, we shall find the great man to have been the indispensable savior of his epoch;—the lightning, without which the fuel never would have burned. The history of the world, I said already, was the biography of great men.

Such small critics do what they can to promote unbelief and universal spiritual paralysis; but happily they cannot always completely succeed. In all times it is possible for a man to arise great enough to feel that they and their doctrines are chimeras and cobwebs. And what is notable, in no time whatever can they entirely eradicate out of living men's hearts a certain altogether peculiar reverence for great men; genuine admiration, loyalty, adoration, however dim and perverted it may be. Hero-worship endures forever while man endures. Boswell venerates his Johnson right truly even in the eighteenth century. The unbelieving French believe in their Voltaire, and burst out round him into very curious Hero-worship, in that last act of his life when they "stifle him under roses." It has always seemed to me extremely curious, this of Voltaire. Truly, if Christianity be the


highest instance of Hero-worship, then we may find here in Voltairism one of the lowest! He whose life was that of a kind of Antichrist does again on this side exhibit a curious contrast. No people ever were so little prone to admire at all as those French of Voltaire. Persiflage was the character of their whole mind; adoration had nowhere a place in it. Yet see! The old man of Ferney comes up to Paris; an old, tottering, infirm man of eighty-four years. They feel that he, too, is a kind of hero; that he has spent his life in opposing error and injustice, delivering Calases, unmasking hypocrites in high places;—in short that he, too, though in a strange way, has fought like a valiant man. They feel withal that, if persiflage be the great thing, there never was such a persifleur. He is the realized ideal of every one of them; the thing they are all wanting to be; of all Frenchmen the most French. He is properly their god,—such god as they are fit for. Accordingly, all persons, from the Queen Antoinette to the Douanier at the Porte St. Denis, do they not worship him? People of quality disguise themselves as tavern-waiters. The Maître de Poste, with a broad oath, orders his postilion, "*Va bon train; thou art driving M. de Voltaire.*" At Paris his carriage is "the nucleus of a comet, whose train fills whole streets." The ladies pluck a hair or two from his fur, to keep it as a sacred relic. There was nothing highest, most beautiful, noblest in all France, that did not feel this man to be higher, more beautiful, nobler.

Yes, from Norse Odin to English Samuel Johnson, from the divine founder of Christianity to the withered Pontiff of Encyclopedism, in all times and places, the hero has been worshiped. It will ever be so. We all love great men—love, venerate, and bow down submissive before great men: nay, can we honestly bow down to anything else? Ah, does not every true man feel that he is himself made higher by doing reverence to what is really above him? No nobler or more blessed feeling dwells in man's heart. And to me it is very cheering to consider that no skeptical logic, or general triviality, insincerity, and aridity of any time and its influences can destroy this noble inborn loyalty and worship that is in man. In times of unbelief, which soon have to become times of revolution, much down-rushing, sorrowful decay and ruin is visible to everybody. For myself in these days, I seem to see in this indestructibility of Hero-worship the everlasting adamant lower than which the confused wreck of

revolutionary things cannot fall. The confused wreck of things crumbling and even crashing and tumbling all round us in these revolutionary ages will get down so far; no farther. It is an eternal corner stone, from which they can begin to build themselves up again. That man, in some sense or other, worships heroes; that we all of us reverence and must ever reverence great men: this is, to me, the living rock amid all rushings down whatsoever;—the one fixed point in modern revolutionary history, otherwise as if bottomless and shoreless.

LAZARE NICOLAS MARGUERITE CARNOT

(1753-1823)

 THE prominent actors of the French Revolution who survived it, the one whose name is held in the highest honor in the existing Republic was the great organizer of the republican armies which suppressed insurrection at home and victoriously bore the tricolor wherever hostility to the Republic showed itself in Europe. "Carnot organized victory," said Napoleon. All the world stood amazed at the military resources of France as marshaled in battle array by him. He even commanded in person at Wattignies, and won the victory there by leading an infantry charge on foot.

He left to France not only a noble example of honest, unswerving, and patriotic Republicanism, but he left to her a line of descendants whose distinguished services and loyal adherence to his principles have kept alive French reverence for their ancestor. His eldest son, Nicolas Leonard Sadi Carnot, born in 1796, was a distinguished French scientist and author who, before his death from cholera in 1832, founded the modern science of thermodynamics, which revolutionized the study of physics. A younger son, Lazare Hippolyte Carnot, born in 1801, became Minister of Public Instruction in 1848, served in the Corps Legislatif from 1863 to 1867, was made a life Senator in 1875, and before he died in 1888 saw his son, Marie François Sadi Carnot, President of the Republic, after a long course of eminent public service.

The Carnot of the Revolution was born in Burgundy, May 13th, 1753, and after receiving a thorough education in mathematics and physics was placed in the corps of engineers by the influence of the Prince of Condé. He remained a scientist and strategist in the midst of responsibilities as a statesman which he had incurred through his zeal for the overthrow of monarchy and the substitution of popular self-government. Entering the Legislative Assembly in 1791 and the Convention in 1792, he was, in fact, when not always in name, the War Minister from that date till he resigned in disgust when Napoleon was made consul for life, seeing, as he did, behind that act, a monarchy triumphing over the Republic. As a member of the Committee of Public Safety, and of the Directory, he has been blamed for acts done without his advice or consent when his hands were full of other matters. Proscribed in 1797, he had to take refuge for a time in Germany, where he published the *Memoire Justificatif*, in which

he declared himself "the irreconcilable enemy of kings." After the downfall of the Directory, he returned home and resumed the position of War Minister. After resigning that, he remained a member of the Tribunate till it was abolished in 1806, when he retired to private life and devoted himself to science as an active member of the Institute.

After the Russian campaign, seeing that the independence of France depended upon the success of the Emperor, Carnot consented to serve under him again and was made governor of Antwerp which he defended till the abdication in 1814. He was still faithful to the Republic and his 'Memoire au Roi' did powerful service against the restoration of monarchy. During "The Hundred Days," he was Napoleon's Minister of War again. When Europe reimposed Bourbon rule upon France, he retired to Warsaw and subsequently to Magdeburg, where he died August 3d, 1823.

AGAINST IMPERIALISM IN FRANCE

(Delivered Against Making Napoleon Consul for Life in 1802)

Fellow-Citizens :—

AMONG the orators who have preceded me, and who have all touched on the motion of our colleague Curée, several have anticipated the objections that might be made to it, and have responded with as much talent as amenity; they have given an example of a moderation which I shall endeavor to imitate by proposing a few ideas which have apparently escaped them. And as to those whom I oppose, and thus render myself liable to that suspicion that my motives are merely personal, whoever would attribute such to me are ignorant of the character of a man entirely devoted to his country. In reply, I ask them to examine carefully my political conduct since the commencement of the revolution, and all the record of my private life.

I am far from desiring to diminish the praises accorded the First Consul; if we owed him but the code civil, his name would worthily be immortalized to posterity. But whatever the services a citizen has rendered his country, he must expect honors but in the extent of the national recognition of his work. If the citizen has restored public liberty, if he has been a benefactor to his country, would it be a proper recompense to offer him the sacrifice of that liberty? Nay! would it not be an annulment of his own work to convert that country into his private patrimony?

From the very moment it was proposed to the French people to vote to make the consulate an office for life, each easily judged there was a mental reservation, and saw the ulterior purpose and end of the proposal. In effect, there was seen the rapid succession of a series of institutions evidently monarchical; but at each move anxiety was manifested to reassure disturbed and inquiring spirits on the score of liberty, that these new institutions and arrangements were conceived only to procure the highest protection that could be desired for liberty.

To-day is uncovered and developed in the most positive manner the meaning of so many of these preliminary measures. We are asked to declare ourselves upon a formal proposition to re-establish the monarchical system, and to confer an imperial and hereditary dignity on the first consul.

At that time I voted against a life consulate; I shall vote now against any re-establishment of a monarchy, as I believe it my duty to do. But it is done with no desire to evoke partisanship; without personal feeling; without any sentiment save a passion for the public good, which always impels me to the defense of the popular cause.

I always fully submit to existing laws, even when they are most displeasing. More than once have I been a victim to my devotion to law, and I shall not begin to retrograde to-day. I declare, therefore, that while I combat this proposition, from the moment that a new order of things shall have been established, which shall have received the assent of the mass of our citizens, I shall be first to conform my actions; to give to the supreme authority all the marks of deference commanded by the constitutional oligarchy. Can every member of society record a vow as sincere and disinterested as my own?

I shall not force into the discussion my preference for the general merits of any one system of government over another. On these subjects there are numberless volumes written. I shall charge myself with examining in few words, and in the simplest terms, the particular case in which present circumstances place us. All the arguments thus far made for the re-establishment of monarchy in France are reduced to the statement that it is the only method of assuring the stability of the government and the public tranquillity, the only escape from internal disorder, the sole bond of union against external enemies; that the republican system has been vainly essayed in all possible manners; and that

from all these efforts only anarchy has resulted. A prolonged and ceaseless revolution has reawakened a perpetual fear of new disorders, and consequently a deep and universal desire to see re-established the old hereditary government, changing only the dynasty. To this we must make reply.

I remark here that the government of a single person is no assurance of a stable and tranquil government. The duration of the Roman Empire was no longer than that of the Roman Republic. Their internecine troubles were greater, their crimes more multiplied. The pride of republicanism, the heroism, and the masculine virtues were replaced by the most ridiculous vanity, the vilest adulation, the boldest cupidity, the most absolute indifference to the national prosperity. Where was any remedy in the heredity of the throne? Was it not regarded as the legitimate heritage of the house of Augustus? Was a Domitian not the son of Vespasian, a Caligula the son of Germanicus, a Commodus the son of Marcus Aurelius? In France, it is true, the last dynasty maintained itself for eight hundred years, but were the people any the less tormented? What have been the internal dissensions? What the foreign wars undertaken for pretensions and rights of succession, which gave birth to the alliances of this dynasty with foreign nations? From the moment that a nation espouses the particular interest of one family, she is compelled to intervene in a multitude of matters which but for this would be to her of uttermost indifference. We have hardly succeeded in establishing a republic among us, notwithstanding that we have essayed it under various forms, more or less democratic. . . .

After the peace of Amiens, Napoleon had choice between the republican and monarchical systems; he could do as he pleased. He would have met but the lightest opposition. The citadel of Liberty was confided to him; he swore to defend it; and holding his promise, he should have fulfilled the desire of the nation which judged him alone capable of solving the grand problem of public liberty in its vast extent. He might have covered himself with an incomparable glory. Instead of that, what is being done to-day? They propose to make for him an absolute and hereditary property of a great power of which he was made the administrator. Is this the real desire and to the real interest of the first consul himself? I do not believe it.

It is true the State was falling into dissolution, and that absolutism pulled it from the edge of the abyss. But what do we

conclude from that? What all the world knows—that political bodies are subject to affections which can be cured but by violent remedies; that sometimes a dictator is necessary for a moment to save liberty. The Romans, who were so jealous of it, nevertheless recognized the necessity of this supreme power at intervals. But because a violent remedy has saved a patient, must there be a daily administration of violent remedies? Fabius, Cincinnatus, Camillus saved Rome by the exercise of absolute power, but they relinquished this power as soon as practicable; they would have killed Rome had they continued to wield it. Cæsar was the first who desired to keep this power: he became its victim; but liberty was lost for futurity. Thus everything that has ever been said up to this day on absolute government proves only the necessity for temporary dictatorships in crises of the State, but not the establishment of a permanent and irresponsible power.

It is not from the character of their government that great republics have lacked stability; it is because, having been born in the breasts of storms, it is always in a state of exaltation that they are established. One only was the labor of philosophy, organized calmly. That Republic, the United States of America, full of wisdom and of strength, exhibits this phenomenon, and each day their prosperity shows an increase which astonishes other nations. Thus it was reserved for the New World to teach the Old that existence is possible and peaceable under the rule of liberty and equality. Yes, I state this proposition, that when a new order of things can be established without fearing partisan influences, as the first consul has done, principally after the peace of Amiens, and as he can still do, it becomes much easier to form a republic without anarchy than a monarchy without despotism. For how can we conceive a limitation which would not be illusory in a government of which the chief had all the executive power in his hand and all the places to bestow?

They have spoken of institutions to produce all these good effects. But before we propose to establish a monarchy, should we not first assure ourselves and demonstrate to those who are to vote on the question, that these institutions proposed are in the order of possible things, and not metaphysical obstructions, which have been held a reproach to the opposite system? Up to this moment nothing has been successfully invented to curb supreme power but what are called intermediary bodies or privi-

leges. Is it, then, of a new nobility you would speak when you allude to institutions? But such remedies—are they not worse than the disease? For the absolute power of a monarch takes but our liberty, while the institution of privileged classes robs us at the same time of our liberty and our equality. And if even at the commencement dignities and ranks were but personal, we know they would finish always as the fiefs of other times, in becoming hereditary.

To these general principles I shall add a few special observations. I assume that all the French give assent to these proposed changes; but will it be the real free will and wish of Frenchmen which is produced from a register where each is obliged to individually sign his vote? Who does not know what is the influence in similar cases of the presiding authority? From all parties in France, it would be said, springs a universal desire of the citizens for the re-establishment of the hereditary monarchy; but can we not look suspiciously on an opinion, concentrated thus far almost exclusively among public functionaries, when we consider the inconvenience they would have to manifest any contrary opinion; when we know that the liberty of the press is so enfeebled that it is not possible to insert in any journal the most moderate and respectful protests?

Doubtlessly there will be no making any choice of the hereditary chief, if they declare it necessary to have one.

Is it hoped, in raising this new dynasty, to hasten the period of general peace? Will it not rather be a new obstacle? Are we assured that the other great powers of Europe will assent to this new title? And if they do not, do we take up arms to constrain them? Or after having sunk the title of First Consul in that of Emperor, will he be content to remain First Consul to the rest of Europe while he is Emperor only to Frenchmen, or shall we compromise by a vain title the security and the prosperity of the entire nation?

It appears, therefore, infinitely doubtful if the new order of things can give us the stability of the present state. There is for the government one method of consolidation and strength. It is to be just; that no favoritism or bias be of avail to influence its services; that there be a guarantee against robbery and fraud. It is far from me to desire to make any particular application of my language or to criticize the conduct of the government. It is against arbitrary power itself I appeal, and not

against those in whose hands this power may reside. Has liberty then been shown to man that he shall never enjoy it? Shall it always be held to his gaze as a fruit that when he extends the hand to grasp he must be stricken with death? And Nature, which has made liberty such a pressing need to us, does she really desire to betray our confidence? No! I shall never believe this good, so universally preferred to all others,—without which all others are nothing,—is a simple illusion. My heart tells me that liberty is possible, that its régime is easier and more stable than any arbitrary government, than any oligarchy.

MATTHEW HALE CARPENTER

(1824-1881)



GREAT jurist and orator, Judge Jeremiah S. Black, spoke of Carpenter as "the finest constitutional lawyer in the United States," after measuring swords with him in the McArdle case, brought before the United States Supreme Court to test the constitutionality of the Reconstruction Act of March 7, 1867. In many great cases before the courts and in the offhand discussions of measures before the Senate during his ten years of service in that body, as well as in his set speeches, he showed himself profoundly versed in the philosophy of law and republican government, ready and logical in debate, and master of the most pointed and forcible eloquence.

Studying law under Paul Dillingham of Vermont (afterwards governor, and his father-in-law), he spent a year after his admission to the bar in 1847 in the office of Rufus Choate, and then settled in Wisconsin. He gained his first distinction by winning a great land case against such lawyers as James R. Doolittle, Daniel Cady, and Abraham Lincoln, and in a *quo warranto* case for the removal of Governor Barston. His masterly management of the defense secured the acquittal of Secretary Belknap, when the latter was impeached. His first election to the Senate in 1869 was promoted by the influence of President-elect Grant and Secretary Stanton, exerted in gratitude for his services in supporting the Reconstruction Act.

He was a War Democrat who had opposed the Fugitive Slave Law, and as early as 1865 had advocated a strict governmental control of railroads and all semi-public corporations. He died in Washington, February 24th, 1881, two years after the beginning of his last term in the Senate.

REPLYING TO THE GRAND DUKE ALEXIS

(Delivered January 7th, 1872, at a Banquet Given to the Grand Duke Alexis, Younger Son of Alexander II., of Russia, in Response to the Grand Duke's Toast, "To the President of the United States")

Mr. President:—

THE heart of every American citizen responds cordially to every compliment paid to the chief magistrate of our nation. Our people entertain for the great office first filled by Washington habitual respect and reverence; and of the present chief magistrate it is not too much to say that no President for many years has held a firmer or warmer place in popular affection. This occasion, which is eminently one in the interests of peace and national brotherhood, is one in which President Grant would take the liveliest interest. Though educated a soldier, and coming to the chief magistracy upon the reputation he had won as a leader of armies, no President, not even Washington himself, has manifested greater solicitude to manage our national affairs in the interests of peace with all the world.

We meet this evening to pay our respects to a member of the royal family of Russia; and we greet him, not as a prince merely, but as a man; not as an official representative of the Russian government, but as the son of the chief executive and head of a great nation which felt and showed warm sympathy for us in the greatest of our national trials. A mere diplomatic occasion means something or nothing, as the case may be, but this unofficial visit, this social journey of our distinguished guest, is, let us hope, an indication of the continued good feeling existing on the part of Russia toward the people of the United States.

In the situation of Russia and America there is much to draw us into international sympathy. The forms of government are totally different. But mere form of government is not so material as the manner of practical administration. A government which embodies all the elements and attributes of absolute sovereignty may be carried on with a spirit of liberality which will make it a blessing to the people; and free institutions in unworthy hands may be perverted to the worst ends of tyranny and oppression. The progress of liberal sentiments, the emanci-

pation of the serfs, and other great reforms in Russia, have commanded the admiration of the world and covered the present reigning dynasty with immortal renown. Both nations are young and have a future. While England is decaying and France distracted, and revolutions are threatening to wipe away everything established in both countries—and while it yet remains to be seen whether blessing or evil will result from the consolidation of the German States in the iron grasp of Prussia, Russia stands out before the world, full of the strength and resources of youth, and is just entering upon the great destiny Providence seems to have designed for her. In the immediate future the preponderance of Russia in the councils of Europe seems to be certain. Our own country presents, on this continent, much the same aspects. Slavery is abolished; rebellion, which threatened the life of the nation, is crushed; and the future supremacy of our country on this continent is as clear as any fact which rests on the future for its verification can be.

These two great nations—nations rejoicing in the strength and power of youth, with splendid opportunities before them—ought to be friends. In this idea, the friendship of two nations thus situated, how much of blessing for mankind is embodied!

The loves and friendships of individuals partake of the frail character of human life; and are brief and uncertain. The experience of a human life may be shortly summed up: A little loving and a good deal of sorrowing; some bright hopes and many bitter disappointments; some gorgeous Thursdays, when the skies are bright and the heavens blue, when Providence, bending over us in blessings, glads the heart almost to madness; many dismal Fridays, when the smoke of torment beclouds the mind, and undying sorrows gnaw upon the heart; some high ambitions and many Waterloo defeats, until the heart becomes like a charnel house filled with dead affections embalmed in holy but sorrowful memories; and then the chord is loosed, the golden bowl is broken, the individual life—a cloud, a vapor, passes away.

But, speaking relatively, a nation may count upon immortality on earth. Individuals rise and fall, generations come and go; but still the national unity is preserved, and a government constructed wisely with reference to the situation and wants of a nation may exist for centuries. Friendship between two nations may become a deeply cherished and hereditary principle, and two great nations, like America and Russia, may walk hand in

hand through the brilliant career opened before them, and the blessings of brotherhood and peace reach countless generations.

God grant that such may be the relations between these two greatest among the nations forever.

THE LOUISIANA RETURNING BOARD

(From His Speech of February 13th, 1877, Before the Electoral Commission)

IF THE commission please to relieve some anxiety that exists in some parts of the country near my own home as to whom I appear for here, I desire to say in the first place that I do not appear for Samuel J. Tilden. He is a gentleman whose acquaintance I have not the honor of; with whom I have no sympathy; against whom I voted on the seventh of November last; and if this tribunal could order a new trial, I should vote against him again, believing as I do that the accession of the Democratic party to power in this country to-day would be the greatest calamity that could befall the people except one, and that one greater calamity would be to keep him out by fraud and falsehood. I appear here for ten thousand legal voters of Louisiana, who, without accusation or proof, indictment or trial, notice or hearing, have been disfranchised by four villains, incorporated with perpetual session, whose official title is "The Returning Board of Louisiana." I appear here for the next Republican candidate for the presidency, whoever he may be, whether he shall be one of my friends on this commission, or some other man, and insist that this court shall settle a rule here by which, in that campaign, if we carry Wisconsin by ten thousand majority for him, as I hope we shall be able to do, no board of returning officers can, by fraud or falsehood or bribery, be induced or be enabled to throw that State against him and against the voice and will of our people.

I beg your honors to pause a moment and consider the lesson you are to teach to the future politicians of this country by this day's work. This is no ordinary occasion, no ordinary tribunal, no ordinary cause. An emergency has arisen which has induced the two houses of Congress to create a tribunal never before known in this country; a tribunal made up of whatever is most distinguished in this country for integrity, for learning, for judicial and legislative experience, to tide the nation over a great

crisis in its affairs. The decision which you pronounce upon this cause will stand as a landmark in all the future history of this country; and I ask you to pause and consider for a moment what you are asked to do here.

The honorable gentlemen from the House who have appeared here against us do not pretend that by the votes given on the seventh of November Mr. Hayes's electors were elected in Louisiana. No serious pretense of that kind is made. Now, if you are to decide in this case that, no matter how great and appalling were the frauds committed in the canvassing of their votes; that although it be true, as we shall offer to prove by record evidence, that they threw out of their count over ten thousand votes for the Tilden electors,—that nevertheless it is a matter you will not consider, might not every honorable member of this commission as well sit down and write his license to posterity to perpetrate all the frauds that ingenuity and self-interest can suggest?

Since the last election the Democrats have got possession of Florida. Say to them, by this decision to-day, that where clear proof is offered that a canvassing board has acted fraudulently in making up certificates, this high tribunal will take no notice of it, and if this tribunal will not, neither house of Congress ever can; for you have here all the power of each house and of both houses; and if those Democratic canvassers in Florida do not send up another ticket here by ten thousand majority, it will be because they have not improved upon the lesson given them. If it be true that a governor can certify a man as duly appointed elector of a State who has not received a single vote at the polls, and that to open the action of a canvassing board who have been bribed or coerced to throw away all the ballots cast and to certify a falsehood, known to the public mind, known to both houses of Congress from investigations they have carried on through their committees and the examination of witnesses under oath, who is so hopeful as to believe that there will ever be another President elected by anything but fraud? Why go through with all the tremendous labor of a political campaign? Why send your orators upon the stump, and spend thousands of dollars in circulating documents to convince the people that a certain candidate ought to be elected, when you can go with a third of that money and bribe a canvassing board and carry on an election without a vote?

Your honors will see that I am not overstating the case contended for. That would be a fraud a little more enormous, but not different in character from the one which is now before you for your consideration, and (I ought to apologize for saying) for your approval. You are expected to say by the decision to be rendered here to all the politicians of the Southern States and the Northern States and the East and the West, "No matter what frauds you commit, no matter how glaring and damnable, we see nothing." As the German colonel, when he went with a regiment from Illinois into Alabama, said to the boys, "Now, boys, I shuts my eyes; I opens them at three o'clock"; so this tribunal is expected to shut its eyes to all the frauds committed in the canvass of these votes, by which I will show your honors, not by declamation and assertion, but by argument which in any court of justice could not be gainsaid, that before this result was reached disfranchisement was imposed upon ten thousand legal voters by a tribunal which had no jurisdiction to exclude a vote. If these things can be done in the green tree, what may we not expect to see in the dry? If in the centennial year only of the life of our nation such frauds can pass unwhipped of justice, and not only pass unwhipped, but win the prizes, what may we not expect when the degeneracy of this nation shall come, as it has come to all nations, and must be expected some time to come to us?

IN FAVOR OF UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE

(From a Speech in the Senate, March 1870)

Mr. President:—

EVERY candid man acknowledges that it was subjecting our American theory to a severe trial when we admitted the freedmen to citizenship; but there was no choice; we had to apply the principle that every freeman bound by the law was entitled to vote, or we had to say to the monarchists of Europe that their theory of government was right and ours was wrong; that it would not do to permit all men subject to the law to participate in the government; that there must be some limitations and some exclusions, and that the man who could not be trusted was the man who had a black skin. The latter view was so manifestly absurd that we determined to abide by our maxim and give the negro the benefit of it. And no man did

more to carry the public mind to this commendable conclusion than the Senator from Oregon. And now, coming to the Chinese question, I would like to have that Senator show, if he can, how we are to escape the same dilemma. If all freemen subject to the law ought to have a vote, then the Chinaman is entitled to vote. And if he be not entitled to vote, it is because the theory of free government, "of the people, for the people, and by the people," is a delusion. Sir, for one, I propose to stand by our American principle of free government, and, applying it to the case before us, to say that the Chinaman who comes to reside among us, who conforms to our laws, shall be admitted to the rights of a citizen.

But, sir, suppose we were to make this admission to the monarchists of Europe, and confess that the dogma of self-government is a delusion, and that the Chinaman, although residing in our midst, and intelligent, industrious, and virtuous, ought not to have a voice in making the laws by which he is to be governed, by which his property is to be taxed, and by which his life is to be rendered happy or devoted to misery. Is it not certain that the Democrats, taking advantage of this admission, would press you again with their objections to the enfranchisement of the African? And do you clearly see how, after this admission, you could meet their objections? And where are you to stop? Will you enter upon a discussion of the property qualification, the test of intelligence, and all other anti-American standards by which the monarchists seek to measure the right of participation in government? While you stand upon our great principle of self-government, you have a ready answer against all objections. But, that principle surrendered, we are at sea, and nothing determined.

Sir, this American maxim, that all freemen bound by the law ought to have a voice in making the law, is either a truth or a falsehood. If it be a truth, the Chinaman is entitled to vote; if it be a falsehood, then you must call witnesses to prove that you are entitled to vote yourself.

Mr. Thurman—Is the Senator from Wisconsin in favor of woman suffrage?

Mr. Carpenter—I do not see the bearing of that question upon the subject before us, but I am happy to inform the Senator that I am in favor of citizen suffrage without distinction of sex, color, or birthplace.


Mr. Thurman—That is satisfactory. The next question is, Is the Senator in favor of giving to the Indians of Alaska, who owe allegiance to our Government and obedience to our laws, the right of suffrage?

Mr. Carpenter—That is leaving the subject under consideration to deal with matters entirely foreign to it; but I can say to the Senator that if he should offer an amendment to this bill that no man born in Alaska should enjoy civil rights and political privileges, or any kindred amendment, I should vote against it. In other words, I am opposed to limiting principles geographically; I am opposed to saying that all men are created equal within certain parallels of latitude, but that God intended the people born north or south of those lines to be the subjects of despotism. A man is a man, no matter where he was born, no matter what may be the color of his skin, and he is entitled to be treated like a man, and to enjoy the rights, privileges, powers, and immunities of a man, under any government which professes to be founded upon the principle that all men are created equal.

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ALEXANDER CARSON

(1776-1844)

 LONDON critic, explaining the great eminence of Doctor Carson as a public speaker, said: "He possessed the secret of making every subject interesting. There was great variety in all his addresses; but his chief glory was the Gospel theme. Here he shone out in full lustre; here all the powers of his mighty mind found ample scope; his manly eloquence was at home. Strangers who, from report, had formed high expectations, exclaimed: 'The half has not been told us'—such a torrent of magic thought would be poured forth in a style of burning, blazing, volcanic eloquence."

Doctor Carson was born in Tyrone County, Ireland, in 1776, of Scottish ancestry. Educated at Glasgow University, where he took the highest honors, he was ordained a Presbyterian minister at the age of twenty-two. In 1805 he became a Baptist, and thenceforward until his death, August 24th, 1844, he was a pastor in charge of a church in Tubbermore, founded by people who seceded with him from their former connection. He was an author of books on a wide range of subjects, scientific, philological, theological, and practical. His treatise, the 'Plenary Inspiration of the Scriptures,' was used by Doctor Chalmers as a text-book in his theological instructions, and commended in terms of admiration to his students.

THE GLORIES OF IMMORTALITY

WITH respect to the nature of the glory of the heaven of heavens, the Scriptures do not appear to afford much precise and specific information. It would appear in general, from the Book of Revelation, that the chief employments and happiness of the saints consist in the praises of their ever-blessed Redeemer. On earth, though they have not seen him, they love him above all things. But in heaven their happiness is perfect in the perfect love of him.

The representation of the new Jerusalem is evidently figurative, and therefore we are not warranted to say that any of the

specific objects mentioned in this description actually exist. We ought not to conceive heaven as being really a city, with such walls, gates, pavements, etc. This representation has no doubt an important meaning, but this importance would be infinitely diminished by supposing that it is a literal description. A city thus built would be the most glorious that the imagination could conceive to be made of earthly materials, but it is a faint figure of the glory of the true heaven.

Some have thought that the risen body will not possess any powers of sensation. With respect to sight and hearing this is manifestly false. How much of the pleasure of the heavenly inhabitants consists in the sweet and loved songs of praise to God and the Lamb! And for what is all the glory of heaven, if not to gratify the eye? Light is the most glorious object on earth, and the enjoyment of the light of heaven appears to be among the most eminent felicities.

The angels of heaven are called angels of light—as distinguished from the angels that kept not their first love, who are reserved in chains of everlasting darkness to the judgment of the great day. Now, it appears to me that the former are so called from the light in which they dwell, rather than from their knowledge, or from the nature of their works, as Macknight understands the passage. It would be difficult to point out a distinguishing ignorance in the fallen spirits, and angels of light would be a very indefinite and distant expression to denote that they are continually employed in promoting truth and virtue. Believers may be distinguished from the children of this world, as the children of light, because they are enlightened in that great truth of which the others are ignorant.

God is also said to dwell in light—"who only hath immortality, dwelling in the light which no man can approach unto; whom no man hath seen, nor can see." This light is so exceedingly glorious that no man in his present state can approach it. But the time will come when even the eyes of the saints will be able to bear that light, for "they shall see God." "Flesh and blood shall not inherit the kingdom of God," but the glorious spiritual bodies of the saints will enjoy it. What must be the brilliancy of the light of heaven when a glance of it now overpowers any of the human race? "At midday, O king, I saw in the way a light from heaven above the brightness of the sun, shining round about me and then which journeyed with me.

And when we were all fallen to the earth," etc. "And when I could not see for the glory of that light, being led by the hand of them that were with me," etc.


Some have supposed that God will never be visible and that the promise that we shall see God means only that we shall see the light in which he dwells. It is dangerous to advance too far on such a subject. But I am not willing even here to limit Scripture language by views of possibility. That one spirit may have a perception of another corresponding to what we call visible is surely not only possible but certain. If so, why may not our spirits have such a perception of God? And that it is impossible for the glorified eye of the saint to have a perception of God is more than I will say. Let it suffice us that "we shall see God." Let us leave the manner of this to himself. "Take heed," says Christ, "that ye despise not one of these little ones; for I say unto you that in heaven their angels do always behold the face of My Father which is in heaven." And if angels behold the face of God, it will not be impossible for us. To behold his face must imply to view him in his glory; we need not, therefore, confound ourselves by any subtle inquiries about the way of seeing a spirit. God is everywhere: it is possible to make us sensible of his presence, whatever part of space we may at any time occupy. This is an unfathomable subject, but though it represses arrogant inquiries beyond what is written, it opens up a boundless field of expectation to our future state. Having such a God as a father, what may we not expect? . . .

The reward of the saints is frequently exhibited with very animating effect, under the figure of the crowns of the victors in the Grecian games, and of the conquerors who obtain a triumph on their return to their country. In these games the greatest men of the times entered as competitors for the glory of victory, and even kings thought themselves honored by obtaining the prize. The victor was rewarded with a crown of leaves, and was received with unbounded honor by the vast multitudes assembled from all parts of Greece. Now, after all the self-denial of their former lives and unwearied diligence in preparatory exercises; after all the toils, dangers, and sufferings in the arduous struggle, they thought this crown of leaves a high recompense. It raised them upon a pinnacle of glory, to be viewed with admiration by all countries. Yet, as the Apostle says, they had in prospect only a corruptible crown; we have in our view an incorruptible crown.

Their crown was the greatest the world could bestow, but it was fading, and is already withered many a hundred years. The crown of the Christian flourishes on his head with unfading freshness, and will bloom through eternity. Its glory will be witnessed not by the people only of one age, but by all the principalities in heaven.

HAMPTON L. CARSON

(1852-)

AMPTON L. CARSON was born in Philadelphia, February 21st, 1852. His father, Dr. Joseph Carson, was professor of *matéria medica* in the medical department of the University of Pennsylvania, and his family was a noted one in the colonial history of the State. He graduated from the University of Pennsylvania, taking his first degree in 1871, and from the law department of the University in 1874. He was admitted to the Philadelphia bar in 1874, and in 1896 was elected professor of law in the University of Pennsylvania. He is the author of 'The Law of Conspiracy as Shown in American Cases,' 'The History of the Hundredth Anniversary of the Framing of the Constitution of the United States,' and of 'A History of the Supreme Court of the United States.' He has delivered many addresses and orations on public occasions. The oration of July 4th, 1893, was delivered in Chicago on the invitation of that city and of the World's Fair Commission.

AMERICAN LIBERTY

(From the Oration Delivered at the World's Fair, Chicago, July 4th, 1893, on the Liberty Bell)

THE institutions established by our fathers we hold in trust for all mankind. It was the Pilgrim of Massachusetts, the Dutchman of New York, the Quaker of Pennsylvania, the Swede of Delaware, the Catholic of Maryland, the Cavalier of Virginia, and the Edict-of-Nantes man of South Carolina who united in building up the interests and in contributing to the greatness and the unexampled progress of this magnificent country. The blood of England, of Holland, and of France, wrung drop by drop by the agony of three frightful persecutions, was mingled by the hand of Providence in the alembic of America, to be distilled by the fierce fires of the Revolution into the most precious elixir of the ages. It is the glory of this era that we can stand here to-day and exclaim that we are not men of

Massachusetts, nor men of Pennsylvania, nor men of Illinois, but that we are Americans in the broadest, the truest, and the best sense of that word; that we recognize no throne, no union of Church and State, no domination of class or creed.

American liberty is composite in its character and rich in its material. Its sources, like the fountains of our Father of Waters, among the hills, are to be sought among the everlasting truths of mankind. All ages and all countries have contributed to the result. The American Revolution forms but a single chapter in the volume of human fate. From the pure fountains of Greece, before choked with dead leaves from the fallen tree of civilization; from the rude strength poured by barbaric transfusion into the veins of dying Rome; from the Institutes of Gaius and the Pandects of Justinian; from the laws of Alfred and the Magna Charta of King John; from the daring prowls of the Norsemen and the sons of Rollo the Rover; from the precepts of Holy Writ and the teaching of him who was nailed to the cross on Calvary; from the courage of a Genoese and the liberality and religious fervor of a Spanish queen; from the enterprise of Portugal and the devoted labors of the French Jesuits; from the scaffolds of Russell and Sidney, and of Egmont and Horn; from the blood of martyrs and the visions of prophets; from the unexampled struggle of eighty years of the Netherlands for liberty, as well as from the revolution which dethroned a James; from the tongue of Henry, the pen of Jefferson, the sword of Washington, and the sagacity of Franklin; from the discipline of Steuben, the death of Pulaski and De Kalb, and the generous alliance of the French; from the Constitution of the United States; from the bloody sweat of France and the struggles of Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Italy for constitutional monarchy; from the arguments of Webster and the judgments of Marshall; from the throes of civil war and the failure of secession; from the Emancipation Proclamation and the enfranchisement of a dusky race; from the lips of the living in all lands and in all forms of speech; from the bright examples and deathless memories of the dead—from all these, as from ten thousand living streams, the lordly current upon which floats our Ship of State, so richly freighted with the rights of men, broadens as it flows through the centuries, past tombs of kings, and graves of priests, and mounds of buried shackles, and the charred heaps of human auction blocks, and the gray stones of perished institutions, out into the

boundless ocean of the Future. Upon the shores of that illimitable sea stands the Temple of Eternal Truth; not buried in the earth, made hollow by the sepulchres of her witnesses, but rising in the majesty of primeval granite, the dome supported by majestic pillars embedded in the graves of martyrs.

And thou, great bell! cast from the chains of liberators and the copper pennies of the children of our public schools, from sacred relics contributed by pious and patriotic hands, baptized by copious libations poured out upon the altar of a common country by grateful hearts, and consecrated by the prayers of the American people, take up the note of prophecy and of jubilee rung out by your older sister in 1776, and in your journey round the globe proclaim from mountain top and valley, across winding river and expansive sea, those tones which shall make thrones topple and despots tremble in their sleep, until all peoples and all nationalities, from turbaned Turks and Slavic peasants to distant islanders and the children of the Sun, shall join in the swelling chorus, and the darkest regions of the earth shall be illumed by the heaven-born light of Civil and Religious Liberty!

LEWIS CASS

(1782-1866)

LEWIS CASS, of Michigan, was the first Northwestern Democrat nominated for President of the United States. That honor seemed to belong to Virginians and Massachusetts men exclusively, until the election of Andrew Jackson, of Tennessee, in 1828, disclosed the fact that the political centre of gravity had shifted towards the West. Jackson's great popularity enabled him at the end of his second term to make his Vice-President, Martin Van Buren, of New York, his successor, but, as the democratic nominee for a second term in 1840, Van Buren was beaten by William Henry Harrison, of Ohio, the Whig nominee. Then both parties nominated Southwestern men, Clay, of Kentucky, and Polk, of Tennessee, and the success of the latter, the second Democrat elected from the Southwest, gave the party nomination in 1848 to General Cass, of Michigan, at that time the most distinguished Democrat in the Northwest. He was beaten by the Whig nominee, General Zachary Taylor, the hero of the Mexican war and the last representative of the Southwest to be elected President during the nineteenth century. As the first distinctive representative of the Northwest in national politics, Cass has a very important place in history.

Born at Exeter, N. H., October 9th, 1782, he studied law under Governor Meigs at Marietta, Ohio, and as a member of the Ohio legislature drew up its memorial on the Burr movement. It attracted President Jefferson's attention, and he was made United States Marshal for Ohio in 1807, a place he held until he was made Colonel of the Third Ohio Volunteers in 1812. He took part in the battle of the Thames and for his services he was made a brigadier-general. Left at the close of the war in command of Michigan Territory, he was appointed its civil governor. Promoted to General Jackson's cabinet as Secretary of War (1832-36), he was latterly Minister to France (1836-42), and represented Michigan in the United States Senate (1845-57). He then entered Buchanan's cabinet as Secretary of State,—a post he resigned in 1860 on account of the President's refusal to reinforce Fort Sumter. He died in Detroit June 17th, 1866.

AMERICAN PROGRESS AND FOREIGN OPPRESSION

(From the Speech Delivered in the United States Senate, January 4th, 1850,
on the Motion to Suspend Diplomatic Relations with Austria)

Mr. President:—

I do not mistake the true position of my country, nor do I seek to exaggerate her importance. I am perfectly aware that, whatever we may do or say, the immediate march of Austria will be onward in the course of despotism, with a step feebler or firmer, as resistance may appear near or remote, till she is stayed by one of those upheavings of the people, which is as sure to come as that man longs for freedom, and longs to strike the blow which shall make it his.

Pride is blind, and power tenacious; and Austrian pride and power, though they may quail before the signs of the times,—before barricades and fraternization, by which streets are made fortresses and armies revolutionists, new and mighty engines in popular warfare,—will hold out in their citadel till the last extremity. But many old things are passing away; and Austrian despotism will pass away in its turn. Its bulwarks will be shaken by the rushing of mighty winds—by the voice of the world, wherever its indignant expression is not restrained by the kindred sympathies of arbitrary power.

I desire, sir, not to be misunderstood. I do not mean that in all the revolutionary struggles which political contests bring on, it would be expedient for other governments to express their feelings of interest or sympathy. I think they should not; for there are obvious considerations which forbid such action, and the value of this kind of moral interposition would be diminished by its too frequent recurrence. It should be reserved for great events—events marked by great crimes and oppressions on the one side, and great exertions and misfortunes on the other, and under circumstances which carry with them the sympathies of the world, like the partition of Poland and the subjugation of Hungary. We can offer public congratulations, as we have done, to people crowned by success in their struggle for freedom. We can offer our recognition of their independence to others, as we have done, while yet the effort was pending. Have we sympathy only for the fortunate? Or is a cause less sacred or less dear

because it is prostrated in the dust by the foot of power? Let the noble sentiments of Washington, in his spirit-stirring reply to the French minister, answer these questions: "Born, sir, in a land of liberty; having early learned to estimate its value; having, in a word, devoted the best years of my life to its maintenance, I rejoice whensoever in any country I see a nation unfold the banner of freedom. To call your nation brave, were but common praise. Wonderful people! Ages to come will read with astonishment the history of your exploits."

I freely confess that I shall hail the day with pleasure when this Government, reflecting the true sentiments of the people, shall express its sympathy for struggling millions, seeking, in circumstances of peril and oppression, that liberty which was given to them by God, but has been wrested from them by man. I do not see any danger to the true independence of nations by such a course; and indeed I am by no means certain that the free interchange of public views in this solemn manner would not go far towards checking the progress of oppression and the tendency to war. Why, sir, the very discussion in high places and free places—and here is one of them—even when discussion is followed by no act, is itself a great element of retributive justice to punish it when an atrocious deed is done, and a great element of moral power to restrain it when such a deed is contemplated. I claim for our country no exemption from the decrees of these high tribunals; and when we are guilty of a tithe of the oppression and cruelty which have made the Austrian name a name of reproach through the world, I hope we shall receive, as we shall well merit, the opprobrium of mankind.

I anticipate with confidence the cordial support of the distinguished Senator from Kentucky in this effort. I will not doubt it; though I am afraid, from a somewhat playful remark he made the other day, that he is a more zealous disciple of the *stand still* school than he was some years since, when he proved himself the noble advocate of South American and of Grecian freedom. I have just renewed my recollection of what the honorable Senator said and did upon those memorable occasions; though, indeed, both the one and the other were deeply imprinted upon my memory as they are yet upon the hearts of his countrymen. Among the many splendid efforts, both as an orator and statesman, by which he will go down to posterity honored and applauded, there are none higher or holier than these:—

"I have no commiseration for princes," was his characteristic declaration. "My sympathies are reserved for the great mass of mankind." "Self-government is the natural government of man."

"It ought to animate us," he said upon another occasion, "to desire the redemption of the minds and bodies of unborn millions from the brutalizing effects of a system whose tendency is to stifle the faculties of the soul, and to degrade man to the level of beasts."

"Everywhere," he says at another time, "the interest in the Grecian cause is felt with the deepest intensity, expressed in every form, and increases with every new day and passing hour;" and he puts an emphatic question emphatically, which I repeat to him, and to every one, if there is any one who hesitates to keep "on a line," as Mr. Canning said, with the opinions of his countrymen: "And are the representatives of the people alone to be insulated from the common moral atmosphere of the world?" These sentiments have no connection with the recognition of independence, nor is their expression claimed as the right or the consequence of a mere political act. They belong to man, wherever he may be placed.

The honorable Senator describes in burning words the cruelties of Spanish and Turkish warfare; and in Murillo we have the very prototype of Haynau, and recent Austrian enormities may be read in the enormities powerfully portrayed almost thirty years ago; and this apostrophe comes to close the recapitulation: "Are we so mean, so base, so despicable, that we may not attempt to express our horror and our indignation at the most brutal and atrocious war that ever stained the earth or shocked high heaven?"

And I am happy, also, to anticipate the cordial co-operation of the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts, who, upon a recent occasion, expressed his sympathy for down-trodden Hungary, and his abhorrence of despotic sway, in a strain of indignant eloquence, which would have done honor to the elder Pitt, in the brightest days of his intellect. "We have had all our sympathies much interested," he truly said, "in the Hungarian effort for liberty. We have all wept at its failure. We thought we saw a more rational hope of establishing independence in Hungary than in any other part of Europe where the question has been in agitation within the last twelve months; but despotic power from abroad has intervened to suppress it."

And the honorable Senator, in scathing terms, which will touch a chord in the hearts of all his countrymen, rebukes the Russian Emperor for his insolent demand of the fugitives who had sought refuge within the Turkish frontier:—

“Gentlemen (he says), there is something on earth greater than arbitrary or despotic power. The lightning has its power; and the whirlwind has its power; and the earthquake has its power; but there is something among men more capable of shaking despotic power than lightning, whirlwind, or earthquake. That is the threatened indignation of the whole civilized world.

“The whole world will be the tribunal to try him [the Russian Emperor], and he must appear before it, and hold up his hand and plead, and abide its judgment.

“Nor let him, nor let any one imagine, that mere force can subdue the general sentiment of mankind; it is much more likely to extend that sentiment, and to destroy that power which he most desires to establish and secure.

“And now, gentlemen, let us do our part; let us understand the position in which we stand, as the great Republic of the world, at the most interesting era of the world; let us consider the mission and the destiny which Providence seems to have designed us for; and let us take care of our own conduct, that with irreproachable hands and hearts, void of offense, we may stand up, whenever and wherever called upon, and, with a voice not to be disregarded, say: This shall not be done—at least not without our protest.”

These were noble words, and nobly spoken; and he who does not feel his blood course more rapidly through his veins as he reads them, has little in common with the freemen of this broad land. Well was the honorable Senator saluted with “tremendous cheerings,” for he spoke to the hearts of his auditors when he said: “For my part, at this moment, I feel more indignant at recent events connected with Hungary than at all those which have passed in her struggle for liberty. I see that the Emperor of Russia demands of Turkey that the noble Kossuth and his companions shall be given up, and I see that this demand is made in derision of the law of nations.” . . .

Hungary was an independent nation, having no political connection at all with Austria, except in the person of the sovereign who was common to both. The reigning Austrian family was called to the Hungarian throne by election, some three centuries

ago; and we are told by a standard review—a high and neutral authority—that “the pedigree of their immunities, during that long space, continued unimpaired.” The compact between the Hungarian people and their monarch declares that “Hungary is a country free and independent in her entire system of legislation and government; that she is not subject to any other people, or any other State; but that she should have her own separate existence and her own constitution, and should be governed by kings crowned according to her national laws and customs.” This article the Austrian Emperor swore to preserve, as all his predecessors had done; and as late as the eleventh of April, 1848, he solemnly renewed his adhesion to it, with the guarantee of a ministry, responsible to the Diet—that plan, of English origin, by which European liberal politicians seek to reconcile the dogma of the personal independence of the sovereign with the direction of public affairs in conformity with the will of the nation. This was the constitution of Hungary, and thus was it secured. It guaranteed national independence, Hungarian laws and officers, and Hungarian administration of the affairs of the country. In these days of the violation of the most sacred rights, there has been no violation more signal or atrocious than the annihilation of the rights of this high-spirited people, once the bulwark of Christendom. A *charte octroyée*, the work of an Austrian cabinet, struck down their liberties at one stroke, and left them (as a kindred expedient—kindred in its objects though not in its form—left our fathers) no choice but submission or resistance.

These *chartes octroyées* are becoming quite fashionable in the world of arbitrary power, awakened from its long slumber by the thunder of popular indignation, and particularly since the restoration of the Bourbons—that family which was the very impersonation of the doctrine of the divine right of kings; and they mark significantly the utter contempt for the sovereignty of the people, which is engraved upon the hearts of all the lovers of the good old times, when there were but two classes in the world—those born to govern, and those born to be governed. We first heard of them as the foundation of national freedom, when the declaration of rights proposed by the provisional government of France, on the overthrow of Napoleon, was presented to Louis XVIII. for his solemn adhesion. He rejected this act of popular power, holding on to his divine right; but as the restoration would have been placed in hazard without some security for the liberties of

the French people, this plan of a *charte octroyée* was resorted to—a charter granted by the sovereign, emanating from his gracious benevolence, and giving to the nation certain rights, not because it was entitled to claim them, but because he was kindly disposed to limit his own hereditary authority, and to allow his beloved people to be a little less oppressed than they had been in the good old days of arbitrary power. And this is a *charte octroyée*, by which, when the fears of kings prompt them to make concessions to popular movements, their divine right is reserved for future use, and the sovereignty of the people practically rebuked and denied. The lesson was too precious to be lost, and Prussia and other States have followed the example; and human rights are *octroyée*, given, doled out, as the fears or caprice of a single man may dictate.

Well, sir, the Austrian ministry was seized with a passion for political unity; by which, at the sacrifice of all those feelings—prejudices, if you please—the growth of centuries, which separated the various races bound by ties feebler or stronger to the monarchy, they were to become one people, homogeneous in nothing but in an imperial decree. A *charte octroyée* was got up for the occasion, and by a kind of political legerdemain—if not as dexterous, at least as rapid as the feats of the necromancer—all the traits of nationality, cherished by the associated members of the monarchy, were swept away, and they all became Austrians by this act of arbitrary power, as offensive to their pride as it was subversive of their rights. Hungary was to disappear from the map of independent nations, and all its institutions were placed at the mercy of a foreign court; and while the empty form of a kind of representation was given to her, in a jarring assembly, divided by language, races, and interests, all substantial power was reserved to the Emperor and his cabinet.

But Kossuth has himself depicted the condition of his country in words of truth and power, which appeal to every heart:—

“Nothing but the most revolting treachery, the most tyrannical oppression and cruelties unheard of in the words of history—nothing but the infernal doom of annihilation to her national existence, preserved through a thousand years, through adversities so numerous, were able to arouse her to resist the fatal stroke, aimed at her very life, to enable her to repulse the tyrannical assaults of the ungrateful Hapsburgs, or accept the struggle for life, honor, and liberty, forced upon her.”

She did accept it, and the Hungarian people rose as one man to resist these gross aggressions; and their gallant exertions would, in all probability, have been crowned by success, had not the common sympathy of despotism brought a new enemy into the field. The Russian scented the blood from afar, and Hungary fell, like Poland, before the Cossack and the Pandour—an everlasting reproach to the contemners of the laws of God and man, who accomplished these nefarious schemes.

The issue was made known to the Czar by his general, in a dispatch whose brevity Sparta might have envied: "Hungary lies at the feet of your Majesty." Memorable words, and to be remembered in all future time! The foot of one man upon ten millions of people! Imperial arrogance can go no further. He who does not instinctively and indignantly scorn such pretensions would have opposed the Declaration of Independence on this side of the water, and the great charter of King John on the other.

I have presented this brief review of Hungarian rights and wrongs, not as the direct motive for the adoption of this resolution—that I choose to put upon another ground, the ground of atrocious cruelty—but because I desire to take from Austrian advocates (if there are any in this country—I know there are none in this Senate) the last excuse for these violations of the common feelings of our nature, by showing that the attack upon Hungarian independence was as reckless and unjustifiable as were the cruelties inflicted upon the Hungarian people. . . .

This spirit of standing still—conservatism, I believe, is the fashionable name for it in England, and is becoming so here, while both the moral and physical world is giving evidence that change is one of the great laws of nature—little becomes a country like ours, which is advancing in the career of improvement with an accelerated pace unknown in the history of the world.

Standing still! Why, sir, you might as well attempt to follow the example of the Jewish leader, and say to the sun, "Stand thou still upon Gibeon, and thou moon in the valley of Ajalon," and expect to be obeyed, as to expect that this country would yield to this sentiment of immobility, and stand still in that mighty work of improvement, material and intellectual, which it has been doing for generations, and will be called upon to do for generations yet to come.

Let not the timid be alarmed; where there is free inquiry, there is no danger. There is a fund of practical good sense, as well as a deep moral and religious feeling, in the people of this country, which will hold on to our institutions, not with blind tenacity, but with a firm resolution to maintain them; and, while wisely admitting improvement, rejecting impracticable and dangerous projects, often originating in honest though mistaken views. Let us not fear the progress of opinion. The world is probably yet very far from its extreme point of improvement. Before that is reached, many a project will be proposed and rejected; many an experiment tried and failed; and a spirit of investigation will be abroad, dangerous only when met by force, instead of argument.

I am not going to reason with this feeling, which would have enjoined upon our fathers to stand still and suffer, instead of rushing into the danger of a revolution, not only because I am sure it is not a senatorial one, but because it is intrenched behind barriers which reason cannot overcome. To such, not here, but elsewhere, the example of the French Chamber may divest this proposition of half its terrors. The other half may be safely left to time. They will gradually learn that the great political truth of our day is contained in the sentiment recently announced by the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts—"We are in an age of progress."

EMILIO CASTELAR

(1832-1899)

AS PASSIONATE oratory, harnessed to rhyme and lyric measure, characterizes so much of Byron's poetry, so do poetic feeling, imagery, and modes of expression often make us hear a muffled tinkling of the lyre in the flow of Castelar's oratory. Fervid, sentimental, and florid, as his Spanish nativity presupposes, his poetic fancy asserts itself in his discussion of the most prosaic questions. But there is still enough of clear historic vision and grave reasoning to distinguish his statesman's mantle from the robes of the poet. As a Spanish Republican, striving earnestly to divorce his countrymen from monarchy and wed them to democracy, he has led a tempestuous life. More than once he was a fugitive in exile, once, at least, under sentence of death, yet once a cabinet minister, and at last President of a short-lived Spanish Republic.

He was born in Cadiz, September 8th, 1832, and became, when very young, the author of several novels and poems. He first distinguished himself politically by several stirring speeches at the Teatro del Oriente in Madrid against the misgovernment and vices of the court. He was made Professor of History and Philosophy in the University of Madrid in 1856, and by his lectures continued to increase his reputation. In 1864 he was deprived of his professorship on account of his connection with *La Democracia*, a journal established at that time under his direction. His connection with the disturbances of June 22d, 1866, led to the suppression of his journal; he was sentenced to death, and had to remain in exile till the flight of the royal family enabled him to return in 1868 and resume the professorship which was offered to him again. He was one of the few Republicans elected to the Cortes in 1869, and became more celebrated than ever for the part he took in the debates; opposing a regency, opposing monarchy, and in vain advocating a Republican constitution. The monarchy of Amadeus, limited by extreme constitutional restrictions, owed the brevity of its existence largely to Castelar's opposition, and in the provisional Republic which succeeded he became, first, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and next, President of the Executive.

But the Republicans were divided, some advocating a "Unitary Republic" while Castelar and his wing demanded a "Federal Republic," "the United States of Spain" in "the United States of Europe,"

with an end of all wars. Insurrections in the Colonies and anarchy in Spain itself, made a burden too heavy for Castelar's strength; and "between the red demagogy of the Communists and the white demagogy of the Carlists," he found the Cortes against him, and resigned in disgust, January 2d, 1874. For some time he remained the leader of the moderate faction of the Republicans, but in 1875 he resigned his professorship and in 1893 announced his retirement from politics, despairing of the Republican cause in Spain and regretting that he had not supported the limited monarchy of 1869 as the best thing the Spaniards of the present day are capable of appreciating.

Castelar is the author of a great number and variety of published books and of numerous lectures and speeches. He died May 25th, 1899.

A PLEA FOR REPUBLICAN INSTITUTIONS

(From a Speech in the Spanish Assembly, December 18th, 1869)

BEFORE replying to Minister Sagasta's speech of last Saturday, I desire to say that my public life forbids me to defend myself against personal attacks such as the gentleman seems to delight in. The Minister of Government was extremely kind in speaking of my address as a brilliant one and extremely severe when he declared that it was wanting in truth. Neither criticism was just. Gentlemen, I would not have to defend my own speeches if they had the resplendency and the beauty attributed to them by Mr. Sagasta. I would be content to let them shine, confident, with the most eloquent and greatest of ancient philosophers, that "Beauty is the resplendency of Truth." After all, if there is any grand quality in this Assembly it is eloquence, the expressing of grand sentiments and sublime ideas in fervent language. I have heard such speeches come from every side of the Assembly and I would like to hear one, in the language of moderation, from the Government. Discussions carried on in that manner, with eloquence and good judgment, give us hope for the future, for the laws of history do not permit a dictatorship to fasten itself upon a people whose faces are lighted by the fires of eloquence,—a sure sign of grand apostolic work in social life.

I have said this, not being able to proceed without repelling a calumnious imputation directed against me by the Minister of Government. To a question of Mr. Oria relative to an attack

on property, the gentleman replied that it was the work of the Federalists. In what article, in what proclamation, in what program, in what bulletin, in what periodical, in what speech of a Federalist has the gentleman discovered that we attack property? Against the robbers are the courts and the judges, and it is an imposition on the Assembly and a calumny on our social conditions to charge us with such crimes and to seek to spatter this minority with the mud that bespatters all of you. This is not just.

Now, I must answer with calmness another slanderous imputation. The Minister of Government says that the Federal Republican party desired the dismemberment, the dissolution, the breaking up of this country. A party that aspires to a European confederation, a party that desires to see the abominable word "war" abolished, a party that desires to unite disunited people cannot seek the dismemberment of a country bound together by tradition and law. We desire that from Barcelona to Lisbon, from Irun to Cadiz, there shall be but one flag—a flag, however, under whose folds the citizen may have freedom, the municipality autonomy, and the province rights that belong to the whole country.

The accusation of the gentleman reminds me of the one concerning decentralization made by the Moderate party against the Progressive party, and the claim of the Moderates that with decentralization national unity was impossible. Notwithstanding this claim, it is generally believed to-day that people who suffer most in their independence have a centralized government, because it is enough to aim a blow at their head, like the blow aimed by the allied powers in Paris in 1815. The belief is general that those nations that have great internal dissensions are centralized nations, because they have an apoplectic head on a weak, stiff body. And so I say that, as centralization is believed in to-day, federation will be to-morrow—a federation the belief in which will result sooner or later in the organization of the United States of Spain within the United States of Europe.

Mr. Sagasta began to defend the dictatorship, and in defending it he drew an awful picture of our social condition, talking of crimes and criminals, and telling you that our education in the past was very bad, and that the corruption of to-day is very great. And what have the Republicans to see from that? For three centuries, yes, more than three centuries, our Church has been as an enemy to the human conscience. For many centuries

it has been inimical to the national will. Consequently, if there is anything very bad or vicious here to-day, it is owing to institutions with which we have nothing to do. And more, this evil, this viciousness, owe their existence to a lack of respect among the people for the law. And this lack of respect for the law is born of the systematic abuse of power by our arbitrary government. Judges nominated by a party and appointed to revise the electoral lists; schools, so called, for filling convents and military barracks; the jury outlawed; public life closed to the democracy; political corruption extending from above down in all directions—this is the product, and these the products, of the sore and wounded people painted by Mr. Sagasta; people who are the natural offspring of a long heredity of crime and error. It is impossible to cure the people if the system is not changed. . . .

Well, deputies, what form of government has come to Spain since the September revolution? The republican form has come and is still here. It so happens, that you have not been able yet to implant monarchical institution in its place. After having been fifteen days in power you declared yourselves for the monarchy. Did the monarchy come? After the elections you declared yourselves monarchists and us outlaws. Did you create the monarchy in the primaries? When the assembly convened, the monarchy was proposed; there we have had great battles. Has the monarchy been established? The Conservatives, although they have not said so, have, I believe, agreed upon a candidate; the Radicals, more loquacious, have told us theirs; but have you, separated or united, produced a monarchy?

The Conservatives have a candidate who really represents the latest privilege granted the middle classes. Why is it that they do not bring him here? Because they know that this is a democratic monarchy, based, as it is supposably, on universal suffrage, and because the candidate has not, never had, and never will have, the votes, the indorsement, the backing of the people. And you? You want a monarchy to keep up appearances, a monarchy in order that Europe may say, "See how prudent, how God-fearing, how wise, how intelligent are the Spaniards; they have a disguised republic!" After a provisional government and a provisional regency you want a provisional monarchy also. You do not expect or want to be strong in the right, in liberty, in the will of the people or in national sovereignty. All you want is a king who shall represent the predominance and the

egotism of a party. You ought to know that as the candidate of the Conservatives cannot come here without the consent of the people your candidate cannot come without the consent of the Conservatives. Do you believe that your candidate will last if all the Conservative forces do not support him? Notwithstanding all that the Conservatives have declared to their representatives here, not one of them has said that he renounces his dynastic faith. Therefore, deputies, you cannot establish the monarchy.

On Saturday I pictured to you, in colors more or less vivid, the prestige which monarchical institutions have enjoyed in our country, and for this the Minister of State upbraided me without understanding my arguments. I ask you to concentrate your attention for a moment upon the parallel which I am going to present and which may be called a summary of this speech. I said the other afternoon, that to establish monarchical institutions it was necessary to possess monarchical faith and sentiment. One must have the poetry and the traditions of monarchy. I said this because I know that, although the assembly and the official authorities can make laws, they cannot decree ideas or sentiments, those real and solid foundations of institutions. Formerly, in other times, kings were representative of the national dignity, and now from those same benches we have heard that they sold their native soil to a foreigner and even prostrated themselves at his feet, the people in the meantime answering the enemy with the second of May and the siege of Saragossa. Formerly poetry, addressing the throne, exclaimed:—

“Oh! what a profound abyss
Of iniquity and malice
The mighty of the world
Have made of your justice!”

Formerly art sketched the apotheosis of Charles V. with Titian's brush, or the ladies-in-waiting of Philip VI. with the brush of Velasquez; now it sketches the image of the communists, of the victims of Charles V., or the ship in which the Puritans took the republic to the bosom of virgin America. Formerly, the gala days of the people were the birthdays of kings and the anniversaries of the beginning of their reigns. Now, the great days of celebration are the tenth of August, the thirtieth of July, the twenty-fourth of February, and the twenty-

ninth of September, days marking the expulsion of kings. Formerly, when a navigator landed in America, or an explorer went into the interior of a new country, the purest piece of gold, the largest pearl, the clearest diamond was reserved for the king. Now, your Minister of the Treasury claims from the king even the clasp which holds the royal mantle about his shoulders. I will not continue this parallel as the Chamber clearly sees the application.

What does this mean? What does it signify? If the throne has fallen, if the throne is broken, if the throne is dishonored, if the throne cannot be restored, Conservatives, Unionists, Progressists, Democrats, repeat with the poet:—

“Mankind, weep;
All of you laid your hands on him.”

As there is no possibility of establishing the monarchy, as no candidate acceptable to all can be found, it is necessary, it is indispensable to get rid of the suspense, and I say that we should establish a republic. Have you not said that the forms of government are accidental? Gentlemen, you know the republic I want. It is a federal republic. I shall always defend the federal republic. I am a Federal, but, deputies, understand one thing, the republic is a form of government which admits many conditions, and which has many grades. From the republic of Venice to that of Switzerland there is an immense scale. Adjoining Mexico, where Church and State are separated, there is Guatemala, where the clergy have great power. Close to the decentralized and federal Argentine Republic is the Chilian Republic, another decentralized country enjoying great prosperity, its paper money being quoted in all the markets of Europe as high as that of England. Consequently, deputies, amidst this great affliction and this great trouble and this unstable equilibrium, which surrounds you, you can establish a form of government which is of the people and for the people, a form of government in harmony with the institutions you have proclaimed, and with the sentiment which all of you guard in the bottom of your hearts.

Have you not seen in history the inability of an assembly or any power to establish a form of government in conflict with great ideas? Remember the eighteenth century. Never had a monarchy attained more power, never was absolutism so strong, never was the destruction of obstacles in the way of kings more

complete. Philosophy ascended the throne with them, ascended with Charles III. and Aranda and Tombal. It ascended with Joseph I., with Frederick the Great, with Leopold of Tuscany. All seemed to conspire to establish the same idea, the idea of a philosophy and a liberalism. And did they succeed? No, they were the Baptists of the Revolution. They repented late and the philosophy they had thrown at the feet of the thrones came to naught. And what happened? Some were sentenced by the Assembly. The crowns of divine right were melted into cannon balls by the soldiers of the Revolution. What does this signify? That great powers cannot place absolutism above philosophy any more than you can build monarchical institutions on individual rights. Therefore, I beseech you to establish the republic. You are assured of our patriotism, our great interest in the country, our abnegation. Cato committed suicide because he found a Cæsar. Radicals of Spain, do not commit suicide because you cannot find a monarch. I have spoken.

IN THE CAMPO SANTO OF PISA

(An Example of Castelar's Prose Style)

Do you believe that death is the end of our being? I have never thought so. If it be, then the universe is created solely for destruction; and God is a child who has formed the world like a castle of cards, for the pleasure of overturning them.

The vegetable consumes the earth, the ox and the sheep graze upon the vegetable; we eat the ox and the sheep, and invisible agents which we call death or nothingness consume us. In the scale of existence some creatures serve only to destroy other creatures, and the universe is like an enormous polypus with a capacious stomach, or, if you desire a more classic image, a catafalque upon which burns a funeral torch, and is created the statue of fatal law. Some are patient because they have been born lymphatic; many are heroic because they have much blood; others are thinkers because they are bilious; more are poets because their nerves are sensitive; but all die of their own characteristics, and all live while their stomachs endure, while their hearts, their brains, their spines are sound. What we call virtues or vices are tendencies of organism; what we name faith

is but a few drops less blood in the veins, or some irritation of the liver, or some atoms of phosphorus in the bones, and what we term immortality is but an illusion. Death alone is real and certain, and human history is a procession of shadows passing like bats between day and night, all to drop, one behind the other, into that obscure, unfathomable abyss which is called nothing, the unique atmosphere of the universe.

Oh! No! No! I cannot believe it! Human wickedness can never so much affect me as to obscure divine truths in my soul. As I can distinguish good from evil, so can I separate death from immortality. I believe in the Almighty, and in a vision of the Almighty in another and better world.

I leave my body as armor which fatigues me by its weight, to continue my infinite ascension to the heaven of heavens, bathed in light eternal.

It is true that death exists, but true also that there is a soul; against Realism that would enshroud me with its leaden mantle I have the glow and fire of thought; and against Fatalism, that would confine me by its chain, I have the power and force of liberty.

History is a resurrection. Barbarians buried the ancient Grecian statues, but they live again here in this cemetery, producing immortal generations of artists with kisses from their cold lips of marble. Italy was as dead as Juliet. Each generation flung a handful of earth upon her corpse, and placed a flower in her mortuary crown; yet Italy is alive again!

To-day tyrants sing the 'Dies Iræ' on the field where unhappy Poland was divided. Yet soon humanity will approach, collect the bones, picked clean by the vultures of the Neva, and Poland will be reborn, standing like a statue of faith, with the cross in her arms and on her ancient altars.

I have always been impressed with the thought of immortality in cemeteries. But I felt it more than commonly in the Campo Santo of Pisa, filled with so much life; peopled by so many beings that give inspiration and consequently immortality, as the trunks of the trees distill honey when the bees have inhabited them. Insensibly the night falls. The grave-digger finishes his work, the noise of the shovel ceases, and I am asked to retire. But I prayed to remain another hour, in the bosom of night and of the shadows. I wish to submerge myself in the melancholy of nothingness, to anticipate my being in that place of silence

and eternal repose, by long contemplation of the dust of the departed here where so many generations sleep forgotten.


There I remained leaning against a tomb, resting my forehead upon the marble, my eyes fixed on the picture of death and on the monsters of the Universal Judgment, illuminated by the last splendors of the expiring day, awaiting the greater sadness which the darkness of night would bring upon me.

But no! the fresh breeze of the sea comes to awaken me from my melancholy dreams; the sweet flowers of May raised their blossom before drooping; from the heat, a penetrating and intoxicating aroma, full of life and fragrance, diffused itself in the air; the winged glowworms began to hover between the shades of the cloister and the lines of the tombs like wandering stars, while the full moon rose above the horizon, floating majestically in ether, with her pale blue rays lighting up the faces of the funereal statues; and a nightingale, hidden in the thick branches of the highest cypress, chanted his song of love as a serenade to the dead and a supplication to the living.

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CATO UTICENSIS

(95-46 B. C.)

FTER Cæsar had spoken in the Roman Senate, protesting against the death penalty for the accomplices of Catiline, Cato, when called on by the Consul to speak, demanded that they be put to death under the ancient laws of the Republic which had been repealed by later enactments abolishing both the lash and the death penalty for Roman citizens. Sallust, in closing the report of the debate makes this celebrated parallel between Cato and Cæsar:—

“As to extraction, years, and eloquence, they were nearly equal. Both of them had the same greatness of mind, both the same degree of glory, but in different ways. Cæsar was celebrated for his great bounty and generosity; Cato for his unsullied integrity; the former became renowned by his humanity and compassion; an austere severity heightened the dignity of the latter. Cæsar acquired glory by a liberal, compassionate, and forgiving temper; as did Cato by never bestowing anything. In the one the miserable found a sanctuary; in the other the guilty met with certain destruction. Cæsar was admired for an easy, yielding temper; Cato for his immovable firmness. Cæsar, in a word, had formed himself for a laborious, active life; was intent on promoting the interest of his friends, to the neglect of his own; and refused to grant nothing that was worth accepting: what he desired for himself was, to have sovereign command, to be at the head of armies, and engaged in new wars, in order to display his military talents. As for Cato, his only study was moderation, regular conduct, and, above all, rigorous severity. He did not vie with the wealthy in riches, nor in turbulence with the factious; but, taking a nobler aim, he contended in valor with the brave; in modesty with the modest; in integrity with the upright; and was more desirous to be virtuous than appear so: so that the less he courted fame the more it followed him.”

Cato is called “Uticensis” to distinguish him from Cato the Censor. Failing by his virtue to save the liberties of a people already grown essentially servile, he committed suicide at Utica after Cæsar’s victory at Thapsus rather than survive to witness the overthrow of the Republic. Lucan pays him what is, perhaps, the proudest compliment ever paid in history:—

“*Victrix causa deis placuit, sed victa Catoni.*”

“On the victor’s side the gods abide, but with the conquered Cato.”

AGAINST THE ACCOMPLICES OF CATILINE

(Delivered in the Roman Senate, 64 B.C.)

[WHEN Cæsar had concluded, and the rest of the Senators, either by words or signs, approved or disapproved of the several propositions made, Cato, being asked his opinion, delivered it in the following strain:—*Sallust.*]

I AM very differently affected, Conscript Fathers, when I view our present situation and the danger we are in, and then consider the proposals made by some Senators who have spoken before me. They appear to me to have reasoned only about the punishment of those who have entered into a combination to make war on their country, on their parents, on religion, and private property; whereas, our present circumstances warn us rather to guard against them than to consider in what manner we shall punish them. You may take vengeance for other crimes after they are committed; but if you do not prevent the commission of this, when it is once accomplished, in vain will you have recourse to the tribunals. When the city is once taken, no resource remains to the conquered citizens.

Now, I conjure you, by the immortal gods! you who have always valued your splendid palaces, your pictures, your statues, more than the welfare of the State; if you are desirous to preserve these things which, whatever their real value be, you are so fond of; if you would have leisure for pursuing your pleasures; rouse for once out of your lethargy, and take on you the defense of the State. The debate is not about the public revenues, nor the oppression of our allies; no, our liberties, our lives are in danger.

Often, Conscript Fathers, have I spoken in this assembly; often have I complained of the luxury and avarice of our fellow-citizens; on which account I bear the enmity of many: I, who never indulged myself in any vice, nor even cherished the thought of any, could not easily pardon the crimes of others. And though you little regarded my remonstrances, yet the commonwealth remained firm; her native strength supported her even under the negligence of her governors. But the present debate is not about the goodness or depravity of our morals, nor about the greatness or prosperity of the Roman empire: no; it is whether this empire, such as it is, continue our own, or, together with ourselves, fall a prey to the enemy.

And, in such a case, will any one talk of gentleness or mercy? We have long since lost the true names of things. To give away what belongs to others is called generosity; to attempt what is criminal, fortitude; and thence the State is reduced to the brink of ruin. Let them, since such is the fashion of the times, be generous from the spoils of our allies; merciful to the plunderers of the treasury; but let them not be prodigal of our blood, and, by sparing a few bad citizens, destroy all the good.

Caius Cæsar has just now spoken, with great strength and accuracy, concerning life and death; taking for fictions, I doubt not, the vulgar notions of an infernal world, where the bad, separated from the good, are confined to dark, frightful, and melancholy abodes. Accordingly, his proposal is that their estates be confiscated and their persons confined in the corporate towns; from an apprehension, I imagine, that if they were kept at Rome they might be rescued by force, either by their fellow-conspirators or a mercenary mob; as if wicked and profligate persons were only to be found in this city, and not all over Italy; or as if there were not more encouragement to the attempts of the desperate where there is least strength to resist them.

This, then, is an empty proposal, if he fears any danger from them; but if, amid this so great and universal consternation, he alone is void of fear, so much the more does it concern me to be afraid, both for myself and you.

Hence, in determining the fate of Lentulus and the other prisoners, be assured that you likewise determine that of Catiline's army and all the conspirators. The more vigor and resolution you exert, so much the less spirit and courage will they have; but if they observe the least remissness in your proceedings, they will presently fall on you with fury.

Do not think it was by arms our ancestors raised the State from so small beginnings to such grandeur: if so, we should have it in its highest lustre; as having a greater number of allies and citizens, of arms and horses, than they had. But there were other things from which they derived their greatness, such as we are entirely without. They were industrious at home, and exercised an equitable government abroad; their minds were free in council, neither swayed by crimes nor passion. Instead of these virtues, we have luxury and avarice; poverty in the State, and great wealth in the members of it: we admire riches, and abandon

ourselves to idleness; we make no distinction between the virtuous and the wicked; and all the rewards of virtue are possessed by ambition. Nor is it at all strange, while each of you pursues his separate interest; while you abandon yourselves to pleasure at home, and here in the Senate are slaves to money or favor, that attacks are made on the State when thus forsaken. But no more of this.

Romans of the highest quality have conspired to destroy their country, and are endeavoring to engage the Gauls, the sworn enemies of the Roman name, to join them. The commander of the enemy is hovering over us with an army, and yet at this very juncture you delay and hesitate how to proceed against such of the conspirators as are seized within your walls. Would you extend your compassion towards them? Be it so; they are young men only, and have offended through ambition: send them away armed, too; what would be the consequence of this gentleness and mercy? Why this; when they got arms in their hands, it would prove your utter ruin.

Our situation is indeed dangerous; but you are not afraid: yes, you are very much; only from effeminacy and want of spirit, you are in suspense, every one waiting the motions of another; trusting, perhaps, to the immortal gods, who have often saved this commonwealth in the greatest dangers. But assistance is not obtained from the gods by idle vows and supplications, like those of women; it is by vigilance, activity, and wise counsels that all undertakings succeed. If you resign yourselves to sloth and idleness, it will be in vain to implore the assistance of the gods; you will only provoke them to anger, and they will make you feel your unworthiness.

In the days of our ancestors, T. Manlius Torquatus, in a war with the Gauls, ordered his son to be put to death for having engaged the enemy without orders; and thus a young man of great hopes was punished for too much bravery. And do you demur about the doom of the most barbarous parricides?

Their present offense, perhaps, is unsuitable to their former character: show a tender regard then for the dignity of Lentulus, if you find that he himself ever showed any for his own chastity, for his honor, for gods or men; pardon Cethegus, in consideration of his youth, if this is not the second time of his making war on his country: for what need I mention Gabinius, Statilius, Cæparius? who, if they had possessed the least degree of

reflection, would never have embarked in such wicked designs against the State.

Finally, Conscript Fathers, were there any room for a wrong step on this occasion, I should suffer you to be corrected by the consequences, since you disregard my reasonings. But we are surrounded on all sides: Catiline is hovering over our heads with an army; we have enemies within the walls, and in the very heart of the city. No preparations can be made, no measures taken, without their knowledge: hence the greater reason for dispatch.


My opinion then is this: that since by a detestable combination of profligate citizens the State is brought into the greatest danger; since they are convicted, by the evidence of Volturcius, and the deputies of the Allobroges, and their own confession, to have entered into a conspiracy for destroying their fellow-citizens and native country, by slaughter, conflagration, and other unheard-of cruelties; they be put to death, according to the ancient usage, as being condemned by their own mouths.

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CAMILLO BENSO COUNT DI CAVOUR

(1810-1861)

HE unification and redemption of Italy may well be considered a more wonderful achievement than the unification of Germany; and it is far more distinctly the achievement of Cavour than the existing German empire is the work of Bismarck. The latter had behind him the greatest military power in Europe and a mighty people to whom foreign domination had long been merely an ugly dream of the past. Cavour had only the feeble kingdom of Sardinia as a rallying point for heart-broken Italians, inhabiting provinces, which had known for centuries nothing but alien domination, cruel oppression, and savagely suppressed outbreaks. A long record of martyred aspirations for freedom and self-government naturally drove Italian patriotism into an extreme distrust with every monarchic power; into fierce outbreaks for a democracy which contiguous Europe would not tolerate, and into diverse conspiracies, and organizations of Carbonari. How Cavour, in private life, learned to mold all these elements to the uses of national unification; how he mastered the politics and the cabinet secrets of Europe, and with what sagacity and success, from his entrance into the Sardinian Parliament in 1848 until his death in 1861, he controlled the Sardinian King and his people, played the European powers against each other, and from the chaos of Italian revolutionary movements drew forth the Italy of to-day, united under a free representative government, "a free Church in a free State,"—all this is told in books and will be discussed in others without number.

Yet this greatest and noblest political feat of the century was accomplished in a brief public life of twelve years—and by a man whose speeches were said to be "not what is called eloquent," though, judged by their effect, they were the most moving orations men ever heard.

Count Cavour was born in Turin, August 10th, 1810. His family, descended from a Saxon ancestor of the time of Frederick Barbarossa, were known as the Bensì, and had a marquisate and an estate near Cavour, from which the title came. Camillo's father held a position at the court of Turin, and the babe was presented at the baptismal font by the beautiful Pauline Bonaparte, the Princess Borghese.

When made a page at court, Camillo scorned the uniform and menial service, and spoke his mind so freely that he was sent away to learn prudence. His tongue, again in 1831, made his position in the army untenable, and he retired to the family estate, which he successfully managed till his entrance into public life in 1848.

In the meantime he had been an active promoter of agriculture and public improvements, and withal, a close student and observer of politics, keeping himself aloof from conspiracies and revolutionary organizations, but more or less under suspicion of sympathizing with their aims. Entering the Sardinian Parliament in the exciting times of 1848, he became a member of the Cabinet in 1850 and Prime Minister in 1852, a post he held till he resigned in 1859, disgusted with the terms of peace his ally, Louis Napoleon, had conceded to Austria at Villa Franca. But he soon resumed his position, seeing in the Garibaldian movement a means of completing his work, which was practically done when he died—June 6th, 1861. During most of his premiership he was really a dictator, his will being a law alike to king, parliament, and people. Having no children, he left his property to the children of his elder brother.

ROME AND ITALY

(From a Speech on the Necessity of Having Rome for the Capital of United Italy)

ROME should be the capital of Italy. There can be no solution of the Roman question without the acceptance of this premise by Italy and by all Europe. If any one could conceive of a united Italy with any degree of stability, and without Rome for its capital, I would declare the Roman question difficult, if not impossible, of solution. And why have we the right, the duty of insisting that Rome shall be united to Italy? Because without Rome as the capital of Italy, Italy cannot exist.

This truth being felt instinctively by all Italians, being asserted abroad by all who judge Italian affairs impartially, needs no demonstration, but is upheld by the judgment of the nation.

And yet, gentlemen, this truth is susceptible of a very simple proof. Italy has still much to do before it will rest upon a stable basis; much to do in solving the grave problems raised by her unification; much to do in overcoming all the obstacles which time-honored traditions oppose to this great undertaking. And if this end must be compassed, it is essential that there be

no cause of dissidence, of failure. Until the question of the capital of Italy is determined, there will be endless discords among the different provinces.

It is easy to understand how persons of good faith, cultured and talented, are now suggesting, some on historical, some on artistic grounds, and also for many other reasons, the advisability, of establishing the capital in some other city of Italy. Such a discussion is quite comprehensible now, but if Italy already had her capital in Rome, do you think this question would be even possible? Assuredly not. Even those who are now opposed to transferring the capital to Rome, if it were once established there, would not dream of removing it. Therefore it is only by proclaiming Rome the capital of Italy that we can put an end to these dissensions among ourselves.

I am grieved that men of eminence, men of genius, men who have rendered glorious service to the cause of Italian unity, should drag this question into the field of debate, and there discuss it with (dare I say it) puerile arguments. The question of the capital, gentlemen, is not determined by climate, by topography, nor even by strategical considerations. If these things affected the selection, I think I may safely say that London would not be the capital of England, nor, perhaps, Paris of France. The selection of the capital is determined by great moral reasons. It is the will of the people that decides this question touching them so closely.

In Rome, gentlemen, are united all the circumstances, whether historic, intellectual, or moral, that should determine the site of the capital of a great State. Rome is the only city with traditions not purely local. The entire history of Rome from the time of Cæsar to the present day is the history of a city whose importance reaches far beyond her confines; of a city destined to be one of the capitals of the world. Convinced, profoundly convinced, of this truth, I feel constrained to declare it solemnly to you and to the nation, and I feel bound to appeal in this matter to the patriotism of every citizen of Italy, and to the representatives of her most eminent cities that discussions may cease, and that he who represents the nation before other powers may be able to proclaim that the necessity of having Rome as the capital is recognized by all the nation. I think I am justified in making this appeal even to those who, for reasons which I respect, differ with me on this point. Yet more; I can assume no Spartan

indifference in the matter. I say frankly that it will be a deep grief to me to tell my native city that she must renounce resolutely and definitively all hope of being the seat of government.

Yes, gentlemen, as far as I am personally concerned, it is no pleasure to go to Rome. Having little artistic taste, I feel sure that in the midst of the splendid monuments of ancient and modern Rome I will lament the plain and unpoetic streets of my native town. But one thing I can say with confidence; knowing the character of my fellow-citizens; knowing from actual facts how ready they have always been to make the greatest sacrifices for the sacred cause of Italy; knowing their willingness to make sacrifices when their city was invaded by the enemy and their promptness and energy in its defense; knowing all this, I have no fear that they will not uphold me when, in their name and as their deputy, I say that Turin is ready to make this great sacrifice in the interests of united Italy.

I am comforted by the hope—I may even say the certainty—that when Italy shall have established the seat of government in the eternal city, she will not be ungrateful to this land which was the cradle of liberty; to this land in which was sown that germ of independence which, maturing rapidly and branching out, has now reached forth its tendrils from Sicily to the Alps.

I have said and I repeat: Rome, and Rome only, should be the capital of Italy.

. But here begin the difficulties of the problem. We must go to Rome, but there are two conditions: we must go there in concert with France, otherwise the union of Rome with the rest of Italy will be interpreted by the great mass of Catholics, within Italy and without, as the signal of the slavery of the Church. We must go, therefore, to Rome in such a way that the true independence of the Pontiff will not be diminished. We must go to Rome, but the civil power must not extend to spiritual things. These are the two conditions that must be fulfilled if this united Italy is to exist.

As to the first, it would be folly, in the present condition of affairs in Europe, to think of going to Rome in the face of the opposition of France. Yet more: even if, through events which I believe improbable and impossible, France were reduced to a condition which forbade material interference with our actions, we should none the less avoid uniting Rome to the rest of Italy, if, by so doing, we caused loss to our allies.

We have contracted a great debt towards France. I do not claim that the narrow moral code which affects individual actions should be applied *ad literam* to international relations. Still there are certain moral principles which even nations may not violate with impunity.

I know that many diplomats profess contrary views. I remember hearing a famous Austrian statesman applauded a few years ago when he laughingly declared that in a short time Austria would astound Europe by her ingratitude to Russia. As a matter of fact, Austria kept her word; you already know, and if you do not, I can testify to the fact, that at the Congress of Paris no power showed more hostility to Russia nor tried harder to aggravate the conditions of peace than Austria, whose sword had done nothing toward imposing peace upon her old ally. But, gentlemen, the violation of that great moral principle did not go unpunished. After a few years Russia had her revenge, and we should be glad of it, for I do not hesitate to attribute to the unforgotten ingratitude of Austria the facility with which friendly relations were established between Russia and ourselves, relations now unfortunately interrupted, but, I hope, without changing the feelings of Russia for Italy, and without any alteration of the sympathy for us which has always dwelt in the bosom of the Czar.

Gentlemen, we have an even graver motive for co-operating with France. When, in 1859, we invoked French aid, when the Emperor consented to descend into Italy at the head of his legions, he made no secret of his pledges to the court of Rome. We accepted his aid without protest against those pledges. Now, after reaping such advantages from that alliance, we can protest against the pledges only to a certain point. But then, you will object, the solution of the Roman question is impossible!

I answer: if the second of our conditions is fulfilled, the first will offer few obstacles. That is, if we can so act that the reunion of Rome to Italy does not cause alarm to Catholic society. By Catholic society I mean the great mass of people who profess religious belief from conviction and not for political ends, and who are free from vulgar prejudices. If, I say, we can persuade the great mass of Catholics that the uniting of Rome to Italy can be accomplished without sacrificing the liberty of the Church, the problem will, I think, be solved.

We must not deceive ourselves; there are many who, while not prejudiced against Italy nor against liberal ideas, yet fear that if Rome were united to Italy, the seat of Italian government established there and the King seated in the Quirinal, the Pontiff would lose both dignity and independence; they fear that the Pope instead of being the head of Catholicism would be reduced to the rank of grand almoner or head chaplain.

If these fears were well founded, if the fall of the temporal power would really have this consequence, I would not hesitate to say that the union of Rome to the Italian State would be fatal not only to Catholicism but to the existence of Italy itself. Yet, further, I can imagine no greater misfortune for a cultured people than to see in the hands of its rulers not only the civil but also the religious power.

The history of centuries proves to us that wherever this union was consummated, civilization immediately ceased to advance and, therefore, necessarily began to retrograde; the most detestable of despotisms followed, and this, whether a caste of priests usurped the temporal power or a caliph or sultan seized control of things spiritual. Everywhere this fatal union has produced the same result; God forbid that it should ever be so here! . . .

When these doctrines have received the solemn sanction of the national Parliament, when it will be no longer lawful to doubt the feelings of Italians, when it is clear to the world that they are not hostile to the religion of their fathers, but wish to preserve this religion in their country, when it is no longer necessary to show them how to prosper and to develop their resources by combating a power which was an obstacle, not only to the reorganization of Italy but also to the spread of Catholicity, I believe that the greater part of Catholic society will absolve the Italians and will place where it belongs the responsibility of the fatal struggle which the Pope insists upon waging against the country in whose midst he lives.

But God avert this fatal chance! At the risk of being considered Utopian, I believe that when the proclamation of the principles which I have just declared, and when the indorsement of them that you will give are known and considered at Rome and in the Vatican, I believe, I say, that those Italian fibres which the reactionary party has, as yet, been unable to remove

from the heart of Pius IX., will again vibrate, and there will be accomplished the greatest act that any people has yet performed. And so it will be given to the same generation to have restored a nation, and to have done what is yet greater, yet more sublime, an act of which the influence is incalculable, that is, to have reconciled the papacy with the civil power, to have made peace between Church and State, between the spirit of religion and the great principles of liberty. Yes, I hope that it will be given us to compass these two great acts which will most assuredly carry to the most distant posterity the worthiness of the present generation of Italians.

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PAUL AMAND CHALLEMEL-LACOUR

(1827-1896)

AMONG the brilliant leaders under the existing Republic in France, one of the most cultivated and most honored has been Challe mel-Lacour, so long the intimate friend and coadjutor of Gambetta, and latterly "one of the presidential possibilities" frequently considered. His first position after leaving the École Normale was the chair of French Literature at Zurich. But his ardent Republicanism soon drew him back to France and into journalism. In 1868 he joined Gambetta, Brisson, and Allain-Targé in founding the *Revue Politique*; became a member of the Chamber of Deputies in 1872 and a Senator in 1876. While a Senator he again joined Gambetta in founding a public journal, *La République Française*, of which, until appointed Minister Plenipotentiary at Berne, he was one of the principal writers. He was Ambassador to England from 1880 to 1882; became Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1883; was re-elected Senator in 1885, and was made President of the Senate in 1893.

HUMBOLDT AND THE TEUTONIC INTELLECT

(From the Oration on the Character and Work of Humboldt)

IT WOULD be impossible for a scientist to say that two molecules of matter can ever reach an absolute contact. It is almost as impossible that a French and a German spirit should ever, fully and reciprocally understand each other. Whoever will attempt to bring to the full comprehension of his fellows a man who represents the highest Germanic type will be tempted more than once to renounce his task. I do not deny I had several discouragements in studying William von Humboldt. All reasons which could explain and at the same time aggravate this difficulty were united in him. I shall note but two. We love to note the fame of a man by the works which survive him. "The worth of the work is the worth of the man" is a French proverb. If we did not expect to obtain positive results at least in proportion to our efforts, we should look upon all labor as a useless fatigue, which it would be absurd to impose.

When some day a Parisian, fired with literary ambition, passes along the quays meditating the work which shall be his masterpiece; if he realize that it will soon be on its way to that long necropolis which swallows indiscriminately the good and the bad, this is risking the work at once, for it might go up in smoke.

When in a moment of generous exaltation you are tempted to resign yourself to public affairs, a single reflection on all the lives uselessly expended in the public service will dampen your ardor, and you, I know, will repress a smile when you think of the public men confined to their tents after many fruitless conflicts, and after having seen effaced the last traces of their labor.

With these characteristics, it is not easy for us to understand those who, without disdaining success, seem to seek in labor only their own personal satisfaction; a philosopher delighting in his own system; a musician entranced day by day in his closet, as Sebastian Bach was for twenty years, hearing oratorios that no orchestra would ever execute, and masterpieces of harmony that no human ear would ever hear. This temperament can be recognized, unless I am much mistaken, in a more or less pronounced degree, in all Germans. We shall soon see the degree to which it dominated William von Humboldt.

Little is wanting to consign us to the specialization which is the inevitable tendency of modern civilization. Without doubt we touch on all things but as dilettanti; we rarely dare in an assembly to reason on everything, from theology to astronomy, without penetrating science with that light ignorance which seems to be one of the gracious moods of the French spirit. But we seem to decide at a comparatively early date, and with good grace, to be this or to be that; we are ambitious and are more flattered to be something than to be somebody, and when we have made a choice we consecrate ourselves to our part with the determination to succeed. We feel no regret at the sacrifices renounced in other lines, since these are the conditions of success, and consequently of wisdom.

To be frank, we must admit the surprise with which we observe the relative universality of certain Germans, and we explain it by saying there is much darkness in those vast brains over the Rhine, or try to persuade ourselves that this varied science is only superficial. Nevertheless, the desire to corral themselves in a separate corner of the intellectual world seems essentially to belong to the Germanic character. Only as a last

choice does the German lock himself up in a narrow and restricted corner. A German who has passed all four faculties before selecting a definite profession is no great rarity, and these are mastered not in a curious desire to effervesce in studies, but taken in hand seriously as a conscientious undertaking. Hence, in German writings we find the tendency to multiply the aspects of a subject; to follow it, not without some prolixity and confusion, through all its ramifications in the order of thought. Happily, then, sometimes to this desire to embrace the entire intellectual world is added the ardent desire to explore the forces of terrestrial realities.

I know that many Frenchmen, some of the greatest, including the Encyclopedists and Voltaire, have also addressed their minds to all the provinces of science, philosophy, history, and poetry. The writers of the eighteenth century asked no better examples, even if from time to time the Bastille assisted in restoring order or tempering their ardor. But all these men, it must be admitted, were seeking more to increase their influence than obeying a personal universal feeling. Without lacking respect for the genius of Voltaire, it may be said that the poetical and tragic inspiration with him was not very masterful; his poetry seems voluntary and measured, a sort of a popular philosophy. That which he pursued by all the routes of his intelligence was the conquest of minds, the reversal of prejudices, success, glory, revolution.

In the Germans, on the contrary, this aspiration, sometimes immoderate, for knowledge of universal science, is commonly manifested, and in William von Humboldt we recognize, in a pre-eminent degree, this trait of the national organization. Philosopher, translator, historian, publicist, humanitarian, linguist, poet, and statesman, he devoted himself carefully to the simultaneous culture of all his faculties; he permitted the withering of no single branch of his mighty spirit. When at last he had to adopt a specialty, as all must end there, he had become the first linguist in Europe. He made this science the one about which he carefully grouped all the others. His style breathes this tendency to be complete; he would reflect in every sentence all the aspects of the nature of things. It is not always easy to find one's self in the windings of his majestic style, limpid as air, changeable as Proteus, making a model for itself of the complex human brain as if it would reproduce it entirely. These

peculiarities, it were useful to remember, for they explain in a great measure one side of our indifference towards those whom we have been unable to understand, the many intelligent Germans whom we should sincerely endeavor to understand.

It may be asked, Why not consider the fresh, living works instead of making the dead author our sole topic? The reply is that in not separating the man from his works I respectfully conform to what seems to be erected into a law in contemporary criticism. But there is another reply—the abstraction of the man would be a hindrance in effect to the understanding of the works. Singular as the statement may be and whatever the value of the works of William von Humboldt, it was first of all for himself and his own mental enjoyment that he produced them. It is a mistake to study him as if he works exclusively in view of public demand. This would not be just to the author. By its form as well as its quantity the labor of Humboldt is placed beyond the reach of the majority. The special scientists, who do not fail to recognize in him the equal of the greatest, admire his labor but do not unreservedly accept it. Besides, this work has never been made for the mass of readers, for the reason that in its progress it touches regions of which the masses know nothing. To them all knowledge which cannot be resolved into a palpable, common, and permanent utility, seems problematical, or under a shade of mysticism.

It is not altogether false to say that the works of Humboldt appear, in part, of a questionable, or at least a restricted, utility. They reveal a man of mind and thought, worthy of being known rather than one to teach a science, resolve a problem or present in a popular manner a certain number of truths. They testify to a high aspiration for moral advancement; they offer the varied developments, difficult to follow, of a strong intelligence, showing its strength by magnificent essays, rather than by works which could be profitably enjoyed without thought of their author. His pages show the studies of the man, nothing more, because all his works show himself, what he was—a man one would not rate as a politician, although William von Humboldt has been a diplomat and a minister and has taken part in the important movements of his time; nor as a philosopher, though he has agitated the capital questions of the philosopher; nor as a linguist, though he has been placed in the front rank of this science. We would simply credit him with the sustained efforts he made to prevent the

dulling of any of the powers which constituted the man: imagination, sentiment, reason, active energy. From this standpoint, Humboldt appears to me useful to study, for the methods of his work and for the extent to which he has succeeded.

Let me ask that no one attribute to me the desire to make a statue or even a bust. It would need an adept hand to sketch with truth such a moral figure, firmly established within itself, but with no one characteristic salient enough to define the man with a word. The sketch would be false if the details were not blended into each other in such equilibrium as to temper the impression of one by the other, and to impress rather by the general physiognomy than by the dominant effect of this or that accentuated trait.

THOMAS CHALMERS

(1780-1847)



SINCE the union with England, the most distinctive eloquence of Scotland has been that of the platform or pulpit rather than of the forum, and among Scottish pulpit orators Thomas Chalmers holds a first rank. He is hardly less distinguished as an author, for his works on astronomy, moral philosophy, political economy, theology, and other subjects, make over thirty considerable volumes. His discourses in the pulpit, as well as the 'Discourses on Astronomy' he published during his lifetime, achieved an extraordinary popularity. He was born at East Anstruther, Fifeshire, Scotland, March 17th, 1780; educated at St. Andrew's; and licensed as a minister of the Church of Scotland in his nineteenth year. He died at Morningside, near Edinburgh, March 30th, 1847.

WHEN OLD THINGS PASS AWAY

(From a Discourse, 'The Expulsive Power of a New Affection')

CONCEIVE a man to be standing on the margin of this green world, and that, when he looked toward it, he saw abundance smiling upon every field, with all the blessings which earth can afford scattered in profusion throughout every family, with the light of the sun sweetly resting upon all the pleasant habitations, and the joys of human companionship brightening many a happy circle of society—conceive this to be the general character of the scene upon one side of his contemplation, and that on the other, beyond the verge of the goodly planet on which he was situated, he could descry nothing but a dark and fathomless unknown. Think you that he would bid a voluntary adieu to all the brightness and all the beauty that were before him upon earth, and commit himself to the frightful solitude away from it? Would he leave its peopled dwelling-places and become a solitary wanderer through the fields of nonentity? If space offered him nothing but a wilderness, would he for it abandon the home-bred scenes of life and of cheerfulness that lay so near and exerted such a power of urgency to detain him?

Would not he cling to the regions of sense and of life and of society?—and shrinking away from the desolation that was beyond it, would not he be glad to keep his firm footing on the territory of this world and to take shelter under the silver canopy that was stretched over it?

But if, during the time of his contemplation, some happy island of the blest had floated by, and there had burst upon his senses the light of its surpassing glories, and its sounds of sweeter melody, and he clearly saw that there a purer beauty rested upon every field, and a more heartfelt joy spread itself among all the families, and he could discern there a peace and a piety and a benevolence which put a moral gladness into every bosom, and united the whole society in one rejoicing sympathy with each other and with the beneficent Father of them all; could he further see that pain and mortality were there unknown, and, above all, that signals of welcome were hung out, and an avenue of communication was made for him—perceive you not that what was before the wilderness would become the land of invitation, and what now the world would be the wilderness? What unpeopled space could not do can be done by space teeming with beatific scenes and beatific society. And let the existing tendencies of the heart be what they may to the scene that is near and visible around us, still if another stood revealed to the prospect of man, either through the channel of faith, or through the channel of his senses, then, without violence done to the constitution of his moral nature, may he die unto the present world, and live to the lovelier world that stands in the distance away from it.

WAR AND TRUTH

ON EVERY side of me I see causes at work which go to spread a most delusive coloring over war and to remove its shocking barbarities to the background of our contemplations altogether. I see it in the history which tells me of the superb appearance of the troops and the brilliancy of their successive charges. I see it in the poetry which lends the magic of its numbers to the narrative of blood, and transports its many admirers, as by its images and its figures and its nodding plumes, of chivalry it throws its treacherous embellishments over a scene of legalized slaughter. I see it in the music which represents

the progress of the battle, and where, after being inspired by the trumpet-notes of preparation, the whole beauty and tenderness of a drawing-room are seen to bend over the sentimental entertainment; nor do I hear the utterance of a single sigh to interrupt the death-tones of the thickening contest and the moans of the wounded men, as they fade away upon the ear and sink into lifeless silence.

All, all, goes to prove what strange and half-sighted creatures we are. Were it not so, war could never have been seen in any other aspect than that of unmingled hatefulness; and I can look to nothing but to the progress of Christian sentiment upon earth to arrest the strong current of the popular and prevailing partiality for war. Then only will an imperious sense of duty lay the check of severe principle on all the subordinate tastes and faculties of our nature. Then will glory be reduced to its right estimate, and the wakeful benevolence of the Gospel, chasing away every spell, will be turned by the treachery of no delusion whatever from its simple but sublime enterprises for the good of the species. Then the reign of truth and quietness will be ushered into the world, and war—cruel, atrocious, unrelenting war—will be stripped of its many and its bewildering fascinations.

THE USE OF LIVING

THOUSANDS of men breathe, move, and live; pass off the stage of life, and are heard of no more. Why? They did not a particle of good in the world; and none were blest by them, none could point to them as the instrument of their redemption; not a line they wrote, not a word they spoke, could be recalled, and so they perished—their light went out in darkness, and they were not remembered more than the insects of yesterday. Will you thus live and die, O man immortal? Live for something. Do good, and leave behind you a monument of virtue that the storms of time can never destroy. Write your name by kindness, love, and mercy, on the hearts of the thousands you come in contact with year by year, and you will never be forgotten. No, your name, your deeds, will be as legible on the hearts you leave behind as the stars on the brow of evening. Good deeds will shine as bright on the earth as the stars of heaven.

JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN

(1836-)

FOR about fifteen years prior to 1886 Joseph Chamberlain stood next to John Bright as an orator, thinker, and leader of the English Radicals, and it was expected that he would wear Bright's mantle as an undisputed inheritance. But a rupture with Gladstone on the Irish Home Rule question in that year induced Chamberlain to organize the Liberal Unionist party, form a coalition between it and the Conservative party, and thus become a member of a Conservative Ministry and distinguish himself thenceforward rather by "jingoism" than by continuing the labors of John Bright. British Conservatives are no longer disturbed by Mr. Chamberlain's forcible and eloquent speeches advocating schemes akin to State socialism, or urging Church disestablishment, progressive income taxes, and the recovery of the "unearned increment" of land by land taxes. But, no matter which side of a question he takes, his speeches are always eloquent, plausible, and vigorous. He never fails to awaken and interest his hearers. He was born in London in July 1836, and was educated at the University School College. He afterwards became Mayor of Birmingham, Chairman of her School Board, and President of the School of Design. He began in 1876 his long service as a representative of Birmingham in the House of Commons, in which he soon became a power. In a Liberal Ministry he held the position of President of the Board of Trade (1880-85). He was made President of the Local Government Board in 1886, but soon afterwards resigned on account of his opposition to the Ministry's Home Rule measure. When the Salisbury Ministry asked his help he took the place of Colonial Secretary under it.

MANHOOD SUFFRAGE

(From a Speech at the Bright Celebration, in Birmingham, England,
June 13th, 1883)

IN 1858 Mr. Bright told us that one-sixth of the electors returned half the House of Commons. At this moment, in 1883, one-fifth of the electors do the same. A population of 6,000,000 in the United Kingdom in 85 counties returns 136 members, and a similar population of exactly the same number in 217

boroughs returns 290 members, and a third population, also of 6,000,000, but residing in 16 great constituencies, only returns 36 members. The last of these 6,000,000 has only one-eighth of the political power which is conferred upon the 6,000,000 in the other boroughs; it has only about one-fourth of the political power which is conferred upon the 6,000,000 in the counties.

And why is this last population singled out and its representation minimized in this way? You know that it is the most active, the most intelligent part of the whole population of the Kingdom. The people who live in these great centres of the population enjoy an active political life which is not known elsewhere. They manage their own affairs with singular aptitude, discretion, and fairness. Why should not they be allowed to have their proportionate share in managing the affairs of the nation? Well, do you not think that the time has come when we should strive to substitute a real and honest representation of the people for this fraudulent thing which is called representation now? I will give you only one more illustration, and I will sit down—I will not go out of our own county. Warwick is an interesting place. It is generally in rather a dead-alive condition; but, twice a year, when Birmingham and its vast population is at a great expense and inconvenience to carry on its legal business, it awakens into a delusive animation. Warwick has a population of under 12,000 souls, less than the population of any one of the wards of this great borough. Warwick returns two members to Parliament, and if strict proportion were observed there are enough people in this hall to return six members to Parliament. As for Birmingham, our population is 400,000, and the annual increment of that population is so great that every two years we add another Warwick to our number. We return three members, and, lest you should be surfeited with this generous distribution of political power, you are only permitted to give two votes apiece, and so it happens that an elector of Warwick has thirty-four times the political power of every elector of Birmingham.

I have a great respect for the electors of Warwick; they seem to me to be modest and humble-minded men. They appear to feel they cannot lay claim to being six times as good, as virtuous, as intelligent as the electors of Birmingham, and consequently they return one Liberal and one Conservative, and so they deprive themselves of political power. Well, that is very public-spirited, and very self-denying, but why should they be

forced to this alternative, which is very creditable to their good feeling, but very prejudicial to their political interests?

I need not dwell further upon these anomalies. If they were only anomalies I should not much care, but they are real obstacles to the legislation that is required in the interests of the people. Now, just let me sum up the situation. What does our Constitution do for us? First, it excludes from all political rights more than half the adult male population; and remember the class which is excluded is the most numerous class; but it is all one class, and every other class is represented to its last man. Well, then, in the next place, of the remainder four-fifths are out-voted by one-fifth, and so it happens that one-twelfth of what ought to be the whole constituency of the Kingdom returns a majority of the House of Commons. If the one-twelfth really represented the free voice of the people, it would not be of so much consequence; but you know, in many cases at all events, it only represents the influences of some great territorial family, or some local magnate.

Among the numerous discoveries which we owe to science, I was much interested some time ago in reading of one which I think was called the megaphone. Its province was to expand and develop the sounds which were intrusted to it. By its means a whisper becomes a roar. Well, at every general election you hear the roar of the parliamentary representative system, and some people are deceived; they think it the thunderous voice of the people to which they are listening. But if they would only trace it to its source they would find it was the whisper of some few privileged individuals swollen and expanded by the ingenious political megaphones which I have described to you. Do you wonder that in an arrangement like this every vested interest, every time-worn privilege, every ancient abuse, finds its account?

“Now a’nt this a system worth pains in preserving?

“When people finds joints and their friends does the carving.”

I say it is time to make an effort to put the representation of the people upon a purer basis, and safer foundation. How shall we put the dots on the *i's*? What do we want?

We want, in the first place, a suffrage from which no man who is not disqualified by crime, or the receipt of relief, who is expected to fulfill the obligations of a citizen, shall be excluded.


We want equal electoral districts, in order that every vote may have an equal value, and we want, I think, the payment of members, in order that every man who has the capacity to serve his country, who has honesty, intelligence, and who is selected for that purpose by his fellow-countrymen, shall not be excluded for want of means.

That is what we want; what we shall get is another matter. We may have once more to take a composition. But mind, under my new bill, we will not give the debtor his discharge. This is a question in which Birmingham ought to take a foremost part. To Lancashire belongs the glory and the honor of the great struggle which freed the people's bread; from Yorktown came some of the most eloquent and able exponents of the principle of religious equality; to Birmingham it has twice been reserved to sound the trumpet note of parliamentary reform, to lead the van; and if we are faithful to our traditions, if we are true to the principles which we have inherited, we shall never cease, nor turn from the plow until we have completed the task which our forefathers commenced, until we have associated the whole people in the work of the Government, and until we have secured equal rights and equal privileges to every one who obeys the law and who contributes by his industry, his toil, or his intelligence to the true greatness and prosperity of the Empire.

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ZACHARIAH CHANDLER

(1813-1879)

ACHARIAH CHANDLER was a strong partisan, growing more intense as he grew older. Absolutely convinced of his own rectitude, it was not easy for him to be patient with those who combated his views. He was, moreover, one of those strong men who, not tolerating half-way measures, instinctively believe in the most thorough methods of demolishing opposition. It does not follow, and it is not true, that he was deficient in "the milk of human kindness" because he was "a good hater" and never in his life abated his political animosities, but his speeches in their strong expression of partisanship are valuable historically as expressions of the spirit of a period of violent political passion by which he himself was deeply moved.

He was born in Bedford, New Hampshire, December 10th, 1813; settled in Michigan; became a prosperous merchant, and in 1851 Mayor of Detroit; was defeated as the Whig nominee for Governor of Michigan in 1852; was active in the organization of the Republican party in 1854; succeeded Lewis Cass in the Senate in 1857; continued in the Senate until 1875; was Secretary of the Interior (1875-77); was re-elected Senator in 1879, and died in Chicago November 1st of the same year.

ON JEFFERSON DAVIS

(From the Debate in the United States Senate March 3d, 1879, on the Bill to Pension Veterans of the Mexican War)

Mr. President:—

TWENTY-TWO years ago to-morrow, in the old Hall of the Senate, now occupied by the Supreme Court of the United States, I, in company with Mr. Jefferson Davis, stood up and swore before Almighty God that I would support the Constitution of the United States. Mr. Jefferson Davis came from the Cabinet of Franklin Pierce into the Senate of the United States and took the oath with me to be faithful to this Government. During four years I sat in this body with Mr. Jefferson Davis and saw the preparations going on from day to day for


the overthrow of this Government. With treason in his heart and perjury upon his lips he took the oath to sustain the Government that he meant to overthrow.

Sir, there was method in that madness. He, in co-operation with other men from his section and in the Cabinet of Mr. Buchanan, made careful preparation for the event that was to follow. Your armies were scattered over all this broad land, where they could not be used in an emergency; your fleets were scattered wherever the winds blew and water was found to float them, where they could not be used to put down rebellion; your Treasury was depleted until your bonds bearing six per cent., principal and interest payable in coin, were sold for eighty-eight cents on the dollar for current expenses and no buyers. Preparations were carefully made. Your arms were sold under an apparently innocent clause in the Army Bill providing that the Secretary of War might, at his discretion, sell such arms as he deemed it for the interest of the Government to sell.

Sir, eighteen years ago last month I sat in these Halls and listened to Jefferson Davis delivering his farewell address, informing us what our constitutional duties to this Government were, and then he left and entered into the rebellion to overthrow the Government that he had sworn to support! I remained here, sir, during the whole of that terrible rebellion. I saw our brave soldiers by thousands and hundreds of thousands, aye, I might say millions, pass through to the theatre of war, and I saw their shattered ranks return; I saw steamboat after steamboat and railroad train after railroad train arrive with the maimed and the wounded; I was with my friend from Rhode Island [Mr. Burnside] when he commanded the Army of the Potomac, and saw piles of legs and arms that made humanity shudder; I saw the widow and the orphan in their homes, and heard the weeping and wailing of those who had lost their dearest and their best. Mr. President, I little thought at that time that I should live to hear in the Senate of the United States eulogies upon Jefferson Davis, living—a living rebel eulogized on the floor of the Senate of the United States! Sir, I am amazed to hear it; and I can tell the gentlemen on the other side that they little know the spirit of the North when they come here at this day and with bravado on their lips utter eulogies upon a man whom every man, woman, and child in the North believes to have been a double-dyed traitor to his Government.

WILLIAM ELLERY CHANNING

(1780-1842)

FTER he had won the adoration and friendship of "the Lake Poets," by a prolonged visit to them, Doctor Channing was described in 1823, by Samuel Taylor Coleridge, in a letter to Washington Alston, as one who had both "the love of wisdom and the wisdom of love." Born in Newport, Rhode Island, April 7th, 1780, and educated at Harvard, he began preaching in 1802, and became pastor of the Federal Street Church in Boston in 1803. In defining the point of view from which he reasoned, he once said: "I wish to regard myself as belonging not to a sect, but to the community of lovers of truth and followers of Christ. . . . I desire to escape the narrow walls of a particular church and to stand under the open sky in the broad light, looking far and wide, seeing with my own eyes, hearing with my own ears, and following Truth meekly, but resolutely, however arduous or solitary be the path in which she leads." This, indeed, was the chart by which he attempted to direct his whole course as a writer and orator. Always a philanthropist and reformer, discussing all current moral and social questions, he made himself especially prominent as a promoter of the agitation against slavery. He published a book against slavery as early as 1835 and in 1837 protested against the annexation of Texas, openly declaring that he preferred a dissolution of the Union to an extension of slave territory. Advanced and daring schemes for the relief and improvement of the poor were apt to find in him always an earnest and zealous supporter. He died October 2d, 1842, while on a journey at Bennington, Vermont, and a collection of his works published in this country has been republished in London.

THE MAN ABOVE THE STATE

A MAN, by his very nature, as an intelligent, moral creature of God, has claims to aid and kind regard from all other men.

There is a grand law of humanity more comprehensive than all others, and under which every man should find shelter. He has not only a right, but is bound to use freely and improve

the powers which God has given him, and other men, instead of obstructing, are bound to assist their development and exertion. These claims a man does not derive from the family or tribe in which he began his being. They are not the growth of a particular soil; they are not ripened under a peculiar sky; they are not written on a particular complexion; they belong to human nature. The ground on which one man asserts them all men stand on, nor can they be denied to one without being denied to all. We have here a common interest. We must all stand or fall together. We all have claims on our race, claims of kindness and justice, claims grounded on our relation to our common father, and on the inheritance of a common nature.

Because a number of men invade the rights of a fellow-creature and pronounce him destitute of rights, his claims are not a whit touched by this. He is as much a man as before. Not a single gift of God on which his rights rest is taken away. His relations to the rest of his race are in no measure affected. He is as truly their brother as if his tribe had not pronounced him a brute. If, indeed, any change takes place, his claims are enhanced, on the ground that the suffering and injured are entitled to peculiar regard. If any rights should be singularly sacred in our sight, they are those which are denied and trodden in the dust.

It seems to be thought by some that a man derives all his rights from the nation to which he belongs. They are gifts of the State, and the State may take them away if it will. A man, it is thought, has claims on other men, not as a man, but as an Englishman, an American, or a subject of some other State. He must produce his parchment of citizenship before he binds other men to protect him, to respect his free agency, to leave him the use of his powers according to his own will. Local, municipal law is thus made the fountain and measure of rights. The stranger must tell us where he was born, what privileges he enjoyed at home, or no tie links us to one another.

In conformity to these views, it is thought that when one community declares a man to be a slave other communities must respect this decree; that the duties of a foreign nation to an individual are to be determined by a brand set on him on his own shores; that his relations to the whole race may be affected by the local act of a community, no matter how small or how unjust.

This is a terrible doctrine. It strikes a blow at all the rights of human nature. It enables the political body to which we belong, no matter how wicked or weak, to make each of us an out-cast from his race. It makes a man nothing in himself. As a man, he has no significance. He is sacred only as far as some State has taken him under its care. Stripped of his nationality, he is at the mercy of all who may incline to lay hold on him. He may be seized, imprisoned, sent to work in galleys or mines, unless some foreign State spreads its shield over him as one of its citizens.

This doctrine is as false as it is terrible. Man is not the mere creature of the State. Man is older than nations, and he is to survive nations. There is a law of humanity more primitive and divine than the law of the land. He has higher claims than those of a citizen. He has rights which date before all charters and communities; not conventional, not repealable, but as eternal as the powers and laws of his being.

This annihilation of the individual by merging him in the State lies at the foundation of despotism. The nation is too often the grave of the man. This is the more monstrous, because the very end of the State, of the organization of the nation, is to secure the individual in all his rights, and especially to secure the rights of the weak. Here is the fundamental idea of political association. In an unorganized society, with no legislation, no tribunal, no empire, rights have no security. Force predominates over right. This is the grand evil of what is called the state of nature. To repress this, to give right the ascendancy over force, this is the grand idea and end of government, of country, of political constitutions. And yet we are taught that it depends on the law of a man's country, whether he shall have rights, and whether other States shall regard him as a man. When cast on a foreign shore, his country, and not his humanity, is to be inquired into, and the treatment he receives is to be proportioned to what he meets at home. Men worship power, worship great organizations, and overlook the individual; and few things have depraved the moral sentiment of men more, or brought greater woes on the race. The State, or the ruler in whom the State is embodied, continues to be worshiped, notwithstanding the commission of crimes which would inspire horror in the private man. How insignificant are the robberies, murders, piracies, which the law makes capital, in com-

parison with an unjust or unnecessary war, dooming thousands, perhaps millions, of the innocent to the most torturing forms of death, or, with the law of an autocrat or of a public body, depriving millions of all the rights of men! But these, because the acts of the State, escape the execrations of the world.

In consequence of this worship of governments it is thought that their relations to one another are alone important. A government is too great to look at a stranger, except as he is incorporated with some State. It can have nothing to do but with political organizations like itself. But the humble stranger has a claim on it as sacred as another State. Standing alone, he yet has rights, and to violate them is as criminal as to violate the stipulations with a foreign power. In one view it is baser. It is as true of governments as of individuals, that it is base and unmanly to trample on the weak. He who invades the strong shows a courage which does something to redeem his violence; but to tread on the neck of a helpless, friendless fellow-creature is to add meanness to wrong.


If the doctrine be true that the character impressed on a man at home follows him abroad, and that he is to be regarded, not as a man, but as the local laws which he has left regard him, why shall not this apply to the peculiar advantages as well as disadvantages which a man enjoys in his own land? Why shall not he whom the laws invest with a right to universal homage at home receive the same tribute abroad? Why shall not he whose rank exempts him from the ordinary restraints of law on his own shores claim the same lawlessness elsewhere? Abroad these distinctions avail him nothing. The local law which makes him a kind of deity deserts him the moment he takes a step beyond his country's borders; and why shall the disadvantages, the terrible wrongs, which that law inflicts, follow the poor sufferer to the end of the earth?

I repeat it, for the truth deserves reiteration, that all nations are bound to respect the rights of every human being. This is God's law, as old as the world. No local law can touch it.

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EDWIN HUBBELL CHAPIN

(1814-1880)

OCTOR CHAPIN was one of the public men who divided with Beecher, Theodore Parker, and Wendell Phillips, the attention of his generation of Americans on the lecture platform at a time when that platform and the pulpit were doing far more than the politicians to influence the public mind on questions of political and social reform. He was born in Union Village, Washington County, New York, in 1814, and ordained at Utica as a Universalist minister in 1837. After having been tutor in a private family in Richmond, Virginia, and serving as pastor of a church in Charlestown, near Boston, the Second Universalist Church of the latter city made him associate pastor with Doctor Ballou. Here he became widely known as a lecturer on temperance, abolition of slavery, and universal peace. He became, in 1849, pastor of the Fourth Universalist Society in New York. His congregation soon outgrew its place of worship and kept on moving to larger and larger buildings until, in 1866, it occupied an immense edifice on the corner of Fifth Avenue and Forty-fifth Street, New York city. In 1872 he succeeded Doctor Emerson as editor of the *Christian Leader*. The Chapin Home, founded by his congregation, is a memorial of his work. He died December 27th, 1880.

THE SOVEREIGNTY OF IDEAS

IT is sufficient that men have felt and enunciated the sublime doctrine that "knowledge is power;" that, as mind is superior to matter, so are ideas more potent and enduring than prodigies of physical might. Archimedes's thought is stronger than his lever. The mind that planned the pyramids was more powerful than the hands that piled them. The inventors of the mariner's compass and the telescope have outdone the Macedonian, and won new worlds. And the influence of the Cæsars seems mean and narrow beside the imperial dominion of the printing-press. Physical force is sectional, and acts in defined methods. But knowledge defies gravitation, and is not thwarted by space. It is

miraculous in the wonder of its achievements, and in its independence of precedent and routine. "Knowledge is power!" Man gains wider dominion by his intellect than by his right arm. The mustard-seed of thought is a pregnant treasury of vast results. Like the germ in Egyptian tombs, its vitality never perishes, and its fruit will spring up after it has been buried for long ages. To the superficial eye, the plain of modern history is merely an arena of battle and treaty, colonization and revolution. To the student, this modern history, so diversified and mutable, indicates more than this. Luther and Cromwell, Pilgrim Rock and the Declaration of Independence, are the results of an invisible but mighty power—a leveling and exalting power—a power which, with no mere Cyclopean effort, no fitful *Ætna* convulsion, but with silent throbbings, like some great tidal force in nature, is slowly undermining all falsehood, and heaving the mass of humanity upwards. But to dwell upon the power of knowledge, intellect, thought, is to run into trite declamation. The scholar who has wrung this power in toil and sacrifice knows it full well. He sees it, in secret places, distilling as the dew, and dropping as the gentle rain from heaven, and everywhere diffusing its potent spell. He experiences its superiority over nature and brute force. He knows its conquests in the past and in the future.

PEACEFUL INDUSTRY

WHO can adequately describe the triumphs of labor, urged on by the potent spell of money? It has extorted the secrets of the universe and trained its forms into myriads of powers of use and beauty. From the bosom of the old creation it has developed anew the creation of industry and art. It has been its task and its glory to overcome obstacles. Mountains have been leveled and valleys have been exalted before it. It has broken the rocky soil into fertile glades; it has crowned the hill tops with verdure, and bound round the very feet of ocean, ridges of golden corn. Up from the sunless and hoary deeps, up from the shapeless quarry, it drags its spotless marbles and rears its palaces of pomp. It steals the stubborn metals from the bowels of the globe, and makes them ductile to its will. It marches steadily on over the swelling flood and through the

mountain clefts. It fans its way through the winds of ocean, tramples them in its course, surges and mingles them with flakes of fire. Civilization follows in its path. It achieves grander victories, it weaves more durable trophies, it holds wider sway than the conqueror. His name becomes tainted and his monuments crumble; but labor converts his red battlefields into gardens and erects monuments significant of better things. It rides in a chariot driven by the wind. It writes with the lightning. It sits crowned as a queen in a thousand cities, and sends up its roar of triumph from a million wheels. It glistens in the fabric of the loom; it rings and sparkles in the steely hammer; it glories in shapes of beauty; it speaks in words of power; it makes the sinewy arm strong with liberty, the poor man's heart rich with content, crowns the swarthy and sweaty brow with honor, and dignity, and peace.

THE SOURCE OF MODERN PROGRESS

THE great element of reform is not born of human wisdom, it does not draw its life from human organizations. I find it only in Christianity. "Thy kingdom come!" There is a sublime and pregnant burden in this prayer. It is the aspiration of every soul that goes forth in the spirit of reform. For what is the significance of this prayer? It is a petition that all holy influences would penetrate and subdue and dwell in the heart of man, until he shall think, and speak, and do good, from the very necessity of his being. So would the institutions of error and wrong crumble and pass away. So would sin die out from the earth; and the human soul living in harmony with the divine will, this earth would become like heaven. It is too late for the reformers to sneer at Christianity,—it is foolishness for them to reject it. In it are enshrined our faith in human progress,—our confidence in reform. It is indissolubly connected with all that is hopeful, spiritual, capable, in man. That men have misunderstood it, and perverted it, is true. But it is also true that the noblest efforts for human melioration have come out of it,—have been based upon it. Is it not so? Come, ye remembered ones, who sleep the sleep of the Just,—who took your conduct from the line of Christian philosophy,—come from your tombs, and answer!

Come, Howard, from the gloom of the prison and the taint of the lazar house, and show us what philanthropy can do when imbued with the spirit of Jesus. Come, Eliot, from the thick forest where the red man listens to the Word of Life;—come, Penn, from thy sweet counsel and weaponless victory,—and show us what Christian zeal and Christian love can accomplish with the rudest barbarians or the fiercest hearts. Come, Raikes, from thy labors with the ignorant and the poor, and show us with what an eye this faith regards the lowest and least of our race; and how diligently it labors, not for the body, not for the rank, but for the plastic soul that is to course the ages of immortality. And ye, who are a great number,—ye nameless ones,—who have done good in your narrow spheres, content to forego renown on earth, and seeking your record in the Record on High,—come and tell us how kindly a spirit, how lofty a purpose, or how strong a courage the religion ye professed can breathe into the poor, the humble, and the weak. Go forth, then, spirit of Christianity, to thy great work of reform! The past bears witness to thee in the blood of thy martyrs, and the ashes of thy saints and heroes; the present is hopeful because of thee; the future shall acknowledge thy omnipotence.

SCIENTIA LIBERATRIX

NO CAUSE is so bound up with religion as the cause of political liberty and the rights of man. Unless I have read history backwards,—unless Magna Charta is a mistake, and the Bill of Rights a sham, and the Declaration of Independence a contumacious falsehood,—unless the sages and heroes and martyrs, who have fought and bled, were impostors,—unless the sublimest transactions in modern history, on Tower Hill, in the Parliaments of London, on the sea-tossed Mayflower,—unless these are all deceitful, there is no cause so linked with religion as the cause of Democratic liberty.

And, sir, not only are all the moral principles, which we can summon up, on the side of this great cause, but the physical movements of the age attend it and advance it. Nature is Republican. The discoveries of Science are Republican. Sir, what are these new forces, steam and electricity, but powers that are leveling all factitious distinctions, and forcing the world on to a

noble destiny? Have they not already propelled the nineteenth century a thousand years ahead? What are they but the servants of the people, and not of a class? Does not the poor man of to-day ride in a car dragged by forces such as never waited on kings, or drove the wheels of triumphal chariots? Does he not yoke the lightning, and touch the magnetic nerves of the world? The steam-engine is a Democrat. It is the popular heart that throbs in its iron pulses. And the electric telegraph writes upon the walls of Despotism, *Mene, mene, tekel, upharsin!* There is a process going on in the moral and political world,—like that in the physical world,—crumbling the old Saurian forms of past ages, the heritage of the absurd and unjust feudal system, under which serfs labored and gentlemen spent their lives in fighting and feasting. It is time that this opprobrium of toil were done away. Ashamed to toil, art thou? Ashamed of thy dingy workshop and dusty labor-field; of thy hard hand, scarred with service more honorable than that of war; of thy soiled and weather-stained garments, on which mother Nature has embroidered, midst sun and rain, midst fire and steam, her own heraldic honors? Ashamed of these tokens and titles, and envious of the flaunting robes of imbecile idleness and vanity? It is treason to Nature,—it is impiety to Heaven,—it is breaking Heaven's great ordinance. Toil, I repeat—toil, either of the brain, of the heart, or of the hand, is the only true manhood, the only true nobility.


RECTITUDE HIGHER THAN MORALITY

WHEN, from a right motive, with effort and sacrifice, I help a weak and poor man, I enrich my individual and spiritual being. If I bestow from a mere gush of feeling, I receive no permanent spiritual benefit; if from a bad motive, I impoverish my own heart. Acts, then, which appear the same thing in form, differ widely, considered in their religious bearings. There is the morality of impulse, the morality of selfishness, and the morality of principle, or religious morality. The motive of the first named we obey instantaneously, and it may do good, just as we draw our hands from the flame, and thereby obey a law of our physical nature, though we act without any consideration of that law. A great deal of the morality in the world is of this kind. It may do good, but has no reference to

the law of rectitude. It is impulsive, and, therefore, does not indicate a steadfast virtue, or a deep religious life. For the very impulsiveness that leads to the gratification of the sympathies leads to the gratification of the appetites, and thus we often find generous and benevolent characteristics mixed with vicious conduct. Then, as I have said, there is the morality of selfishness. In this instance I may perform many good actions from sheer calculation of material profit. I may be benevolent, because it will increase my reputation for philanthropy. I may be honest, because "honesty is the best policy." But is this the highest, the religious sanction of morality? No; the morality of the religious man is the morality of principle. The motive in his case is not "I will," or "I had better," but "I ought." He recognizes morality as a law, impersonal, overmastering the dictates of mere self, and holding all impulses in subservience to the highest good. The morality of impulse is uncertain. The morality of policy is mean and selfish. The morality of religion is loyal, disinterested, self-sacrificing. It acts from faith in God, and with reference to God.

But another trait separates the religious from the merely formal moralist. It consists in the fact that with him, "morality," as we commonly employ the term, is not all. Piety has its place. His affections not only flow earthward, but turn heavenward. He not only loves his neighbor as himself, but he loves the Lord his God. He not only visits the widows and the fatherless in their affliction, but he keeps himself unspotted from the world. With him toil is prayer, and contentment is thanksgiving, but because he infuses into them a spirit of devotion, which he has cultivated by more solitary and special acts. With him it is a good thing to live honestly, industriously, soberly; but all life is not outward, is not in traffic and labor, and meat and drink. There is an inward world, to which his eyes are often introverted—a world of spiritual experience, of great realities, and everlasting sanctions—a world behind the veil—a holy of holies in his soul, where rests the Shecinah of God's more immediate presence; yea, where he meets God face to face. And it is this that directs his public conduct. The orderly and beautiful method of his life is not the huddled chance work of good impulses, is not the arithmetic of selfishness; but it is a serene and steady plan of being projected from the communion of the oratory, and the meditation of the closet.

Again, I say, let us not depreciate morality. Let us condemn that ostentatious piety which lifts up holy hands to God, but never stretches them out to help man—which anoints its head with the oil of sanctity, but will not defile its robes with the blood of the abused, or the contact of the guilty—which is loud in profession and poor in performance—which makes long prayers, but devours widows' houses. Let us condemn this, but remember that this is not real religion, only its form; as often, the kind deed, the honest method, is not true morality, only its form. Of both these departments of action let it be said: that these we have done, and not left the other undone. Let us recognize the perfect harmony, nay, the identity of religion and morality, in that One who came from the solitary conflict of the desert, to go about doing good, and who descended from the night-prayer on the mountain to walk and calm the troubled waves of the sea.



SALMON P. CHASE

(1808-1873)

WHEN Abraham Lincoln became President in 1861, he gave the treasury portfolio to Salmon Portland Chase, who had been among the foremost in organizing, in 1841, what was called at the time the "Liberal" or anti-slavery party of Ohio. He had also been for twenty years recognized as one of the wisest and most adroit directors, as well as one of the most devoted adherents of the antislavery movement.

Born in Cornish, New Hampshire, January 13th, 1808, and educated at Dartmouth College, he successfully conducted a classical school for boys in Washington, D. C., while he studied law under William Wirt. Beginning the practice of his profession in Ohio his talents and learning soon made him prominent. His antislavery fervor caused him to be known in Kentucky as "the Attorney-General of Runaway Negroes." Representing Ohio in the United States Senate from 1849 to 1855, he utilized every opportunity with his great stores of legal and historical learning to demonstrate that the antislavery sentiment was but a continuation of the sentiment of the Revolution, and that the antislavery movement was but the revival of a movement begun by the Revolutionary fathers of our government from all sections of the Thirteen Colonies. In fact he always claimed to be a disciple of Thomas Jefferson, separated from some other Democrats chiefly by their rejection of Jefferson's antislavery teachings.

His attitude and prominence made him one of the organizers of the Republican party, he having done much to clear the way for it by wrecking the Whig party. As the Republican nominee for Governor of Ohio he was elected in 1855 and re-elected in 1857 by great majorities. His administration of the Treasury during the great crisis from 1861 to 1864 is part of the country's history. He was appointed Chief-Justice of the Supreme Court in 1864 and presided at the impeachment trial of Andrew Johnson in 1868. It has been said that if, in this trial, he had made it impossible for any one to have suspected him of favoring acquittal, he would have been the Republican nominee for President in 1868. His opinions as recorded in the Supreme Court reports are the best monuments of his judicial fairness, integrity, and ability. Ill health forced him to resign in 1871, and he died in New York city, May 7th, 1873.

THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE COLONIAL VIEW OF MANHOOD RIGHTS

(From a Speech in the Senate, March 26th, 1850)

IN SEPTEMBER 1774 the first Congress of the colonies met in Philadelphia. Had the opposition to slavery which had been previously manifested, and the desire for its extinction which had been so generally cherished, now become extinct? A decisive answer to this inquiry may be found in an extract from a singularly able exposition of the Rights of British America, prepared by Mr. Jefferson and laid before the convention of Virginia, which assembled in August 1774, for the purpose of appointing delegates to the proposed Congress. I will read this extract:—

"The abolition of domestic slavery is the greatest object of desire in these colonies, where it was unhappily introduced in their infant state. But, previous to the enfranchisement of the slaves, it is necessary to exclude further importations from Africa. Yet our repeated attempts to effect this by prohibitions, and by imposing duties which might amount to prohibition, have been hitherto defeated by his Majesty's negative; thus preferring the immediate advantage of a few African corsairs to the lasting interests of the American States and the rights of human nature, deeply wounded by this infamous practice." (Am. Archives, 4th series, Vol. i., p. 696.)

The Congress, which soon after assembled, shared these sentiments. Among its first acts was the framing of the celebrated Articles of Association which composed the Nonimportation, Nonexportation, and Nonconsumption Agreement. I will read the second of those articles:—

"That we will neither import nor purchase any slave imported after the first day of December next, after which time we will wholly discontinue the slave trade, and will neither be concerned in it ourselves, nor will we hire our vessels, or sell our commodities or manufactures to those who are concerned in it." (Am. Archives, 4th series, Vol. i., p. 914.)

There was another article in this agreement, which I will read:—

"Article 14. And we do further agree and resolve that we will have no trade, commerce, dealings, or intercourse whatever with any colony or province in North America which shall not accede to, or which

shall hereafter violate, this association, but will hold them as unworthy of the rights of free men and as inimical to the liberties of this country." (Am. Archives, 4th series, Vol. i., p. 915.)

Well, sir, this solemn covenant, thus pledging every colony and every citizen to an entire abandonment and suppression of the slave trade, was signed by every delegate in Congress, Southern and Northern. Public sentiment on this subject was then unanimous, or next to unanimous, throughout the country. Among these signers we find the names of Rodney, McKean, and Read, of Delaware; Chase and Paca, of Maryland; Richard Henry Lee, of Virginia; Hooper and Hewes, of North Carolina; and Middleton, Rutledge, and Lynch, of South Carolina; all of whom subsequently subscribed the Declaration of Independence. We also find the names of George Washington and Patrick Henry.

Now, Mr. President, let it be remembered that these Articles of Association, entered into as a measure for obtaining a redress of grievances from the people and government of Great Britain, and to the faithful observance of which, in all their stipulations, the delegates of the colonies pledged themselves and their constituencies, "under the sacred ties of virtue, honor, and love of country"; let it be remembered, I say, that these articles constituted the first bond of American Union. The union thus constituted was, to be sure, imperfect, partial, incomplete; but it was still a union, a union of the colonies and of the people, for the great objects set forth in the articles. And let it be remembered also that, prominent in the list of measures agreed on in these articles, was the discontinuance of the slave trade, with a view to the ultimate extinction of slavery itself.

I say with a view to the ultimate extinction of slavery, and I have authority for saying so. I ask attention to an extract from the proceedings of a town meeting at Danbury, Connecticut, held on the twelfth of December, 1774:—

"It is with singular pleasure we notice the second article of the association, in which it is agreed to import no more negro slaves, as we cannot but think it a palpable absurdity so loudly to complain of attempts to enslave us while we are actually enslaving others." (Am. Archives, 4th series, Vol. i., p. 1038.)

This was the Northern view. What was the Southern? We find it upon record in the proceedings of the Congress of the

Representatives of Darien, in the colony of Georgia. Acceding to the association, they declared their views in these words:—

“We, the representatives of the extensive district of Darien, in the colony of Georgia, being now assembled in Congress, by the authority and free choice of the inhabitants of said district, now freed from their fetters, do resolve.”

Then follow several resolutions setting forth the grounds of complaint against the oppressions of Great Britain, closing with the emphatic declaration which I will now read:—

“To show to the world that we are not influenced by any contracted or interested motives, but by a general philanthropy for all mankind, of whatever climate, language, or complexion, we hereby declare our disapprobation and abhorrence of the unnatural practice of slavery in America (however the uncultivated state of our country or other specious arguments may plead for it)—a practice founded in injustice and cruelty, and highly dangerous to our liberties as well as lives, debasing part of our fellow-creatures below men, and corrupting the virtue and morals of the rest, and laying the basis of that liberty we contend for and which we pray the Almighty to continue to the latest posterity upon a very wrong foundation. We, therefore, resolve, at all times, to use our utmost endeavors for the manumission of our slaves in this colony upon the most safe and equitable footing for the masters and themselves.” (Am. Archives, 4th series, Vol. i., p. 1135.)

That, sir, was the Southern view. At least it was the view of a large and intelligent and influential body of Southern men. And, with this understanding of their effects and tendency, the Articles of Association were adopted by colonial conventions, county meetings, and lesser assemblages throughout the country, and became the law of America—the fundamental constitution, so to speak, of the first American Union. It is needless to cite many resolutions of these meetings. They can be found in the American Archives by those who desire to investigate the subject. I will quote but two.

The first is a resolution of the convention of Maryland, held in November 1774, readopted by a subsequent convention, more fully attended, in December of the same year:—

“*Resolved*, That every member of this meeting will, and every person in the province should, strictly and inviolably observe and carry into execution the association agreed on by the Continental Congress.”

The other is the declaration adopted by a general meeting of the freeholders of James City County, Virginia, in November 1774, in these words:—

“The association entered into by Congress being publicly read, the freeholders and other inhabitants of the county, that they might testify to the world their concurrence and hearty approbation of the measures adopted by that respectable body, very cordially acceded thereto, and did bind and oblige themselves, by the sacred ties of virtue, honor, and love to their country, strictly and inviolably to observe and keep the same in every particular.”

These, sir, are specimens of the formal and solemn declarations and engagements of public bodies. To show the sentiment which pervaded the masses of the people, I will read an extract from an eloquent paper, entitled “Observations Addressed to the People of America,” printed at Philadelphia in November 1774:—

“The least deviation from the resolves of Congress will be treason; such treason as few villains have ever had an opportunity of committing. It will be treason against the present inhabitants of the colonies, against the millions of unborn generations who are to exist hereafter in America, against the only liberty and happiness which remain to mankind, against the last hopes of the wretched in every corner of the world; in a word, it will be treason against God. . . . We are now laying the foundations of an American constitution. Let us, therefore, hold up everything we do to the eye of posterity. They will most probably measure their liberties and happiness by the most careless of our footsteps. Let no unhallowed hand touch the precious seed of liberty. Let us form the glorious tree in such a manner, and impregnate it with such principles of life, that it shall last forever. . . . I almost wish to live to hear the triumphs of the jubilee in the year 1874; to see the medals, pictures, fragments of writings that shall be displayed to revive the memory of the proceedings of the Congress of 1774. If any adventitious circumstance shall give precedence on that day, it shall be to inherit the blood, or even to possess the name, of a member of that glorious assembly.” (Am. Archives, 4th series, Vol. i., p. 976.)

In these various resolves and declarations, Mr. President, we have the first expressions of the public sentiment and will of the American people upon this subject of slavery. The earliest action of the associated colonies was antislavery action. The Union which they then formed was indeed, as I have said, incomplete; but it was complete enough to warrant the Congress

which represented it in declaring independence, in waging war, in contracting debts; in assuming, in short, many of the functions of nationality and sovereignty.

Well, sir, nearly two years passed by, and the grievances of the colonies remained unredressed. The war of the Revolution had begun, and the Declaration of Independence was promulgated. That instrument breathed the same spirit as the Articles of Association. The original draught, as it came from the hands of Jefferson, contained a clause reprobating in the strongest terms the traffic in men. I will read it:—

“He has waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating its most sacred rights of life and liberty in the persons of a distant people who never offended him; captivating and carrying them into slavery in another hemisphere, or to incur a miserable death in their transportation thither. This piratical warfare, the opprobrium of infidel powers, is the warfare of the Christian king of Great Britain. Determined to keep open a market where men should be bought and sold, he has prostituted his negative for suppressing every legislative attempt to prohibit or restrain this execrable commerce.”

This clause was indeed omitted from the Declaration, not because it did not express the sentiments of the majority of Congress, but, as Mr. Jefferson informs us, in compliance to South Carolina and Georgia. He intimates also that some tenderness under these censures was manifested by Northern gentlemen, whose constituents had been somewhat largely engaged in the slave trade. But still the great fundamental truth, which constitutes the basis of all just government, and which condemns equally every form of oppression, was retained in the Declaration, and announced to the world as self-evident: the truth that “all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights governments were instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.”

Thus we see that, in this second great act of the American people, the fundamental truth upon which the Articles of Association were based was reiterated; not as a “rhetorical flourish,” not as an abstraction incapable of practical application in human affairs, but as a living principle, not to be disregarded, without fatal consequences, in the structure or the administration of gov-

ernment. That such was the view actually taken of the Declaration at that time is further evident from the language of the dispatches transmitting it to the authorities of the different colonies, and to the commander-in-chief of the army. I will quote a paragraph from the letter of the President of Congress, John Hancock, to the Convention of New Jersey.

"I do myself the honor to inclose, in obedience to the commands of Congress, a copy of the Declaration of Independence, which you will please to have proclaimed in your colony in such way and manner as you judge best. The important consequences resulting to the American States from this Declaration of Independence, considered as the ground and foundation of a future Government, will naturally suggest the propriety of proclaiming it in such a mode as that the people may be universally informed of it." (Am. Archives, 5th series, Vol. i., p. 11.)

Such were the principles, Mr. President, of the Government and the people during the struggle for independence. They were reiterated at the close of it. Very shortly after the treaty of peace was ratified in 1783, Congress issued an address to the States, drawn up by Mr. Madison, the main purpose of which was to persuade to the provision of a fund for the discharge of the public engagements. That address contains the clause which I will now read:—

"Let it be remembered, finally, that it has ever been the pride and boast of America that the rights for which she contended were the rights of human nature. By the blessing of the Author of these rights on the means exerted for their defense, they have prevailed against all opposition, and form the basis of thirteen independent States. No instance has heretofore occurred, nor can any instance be expected hereafter to occur, in which the unadulterated forms of republican government can pretend to so fair an opportunity of justifying themselves by their fruits. In this view, the citizens of the United States are responsible for the greatest trust ever confided to a political society." (Madison Papers, Appen. 11.)

This, sir, was the acknowledgment of 1783. That the War of the Revolution was waged, not to vindicate privileges, but rights; not the rights of any part or class of the people, but the rights of all men—"the rights of human nature."

It was not long before an occasion arose to test the sincerity of Congress in these various declarations; to determine whether or not Congress was prepared to carry the principles so solemnly

recognized into practical application, without respect to persons or sections. Nor was Congress wanting to the occasion.

On the first of March, 1784, Virginia ceded to the United States all her claim to the territory northwest of the Ohio. Much praise has been awarded to Virginia for this cession. I desire to detract nothing from it. Virginia, doubtless, confided fully in the validity of her title to the territory which she ceded. It is true that, acting under her authority, and in anticipation of an expedition ordered by Congress, the gallant George Rogers Clarke, at the head of a handful of brave Kentuckians, dispossessed the British authorities of that portion of the territory which they had occupied on the Wabash and Mississippi. But it is right to say, and I am bound to say, that the validity of the Virginia title was never recognized, was always contested, by Congress. Other States claimed interests in the same territory. New York claimed the whole; Connecticut claimed a part, and Massachusetts also advanced a claim. Against all these demands, Congress asserted a right, in behalf of the United States, to the entire trans-Alleghanian region, as Crown Lands, acquired from Great Britain by the common blood and treasure of all the States, and appealed to the claimant States to relinquish their pretensions. New York was the first to respond to this appeal, and her cession was accepted by Congress in 1782. Virginia had previously proposed to cede all her claim northwest of the Ohio on certain conditions; but, the conditions not being admitted, the cession was not accepted. Subsequently the contest was terminated by a satisfactory cession, made by Virginia and accepted by Congress. It was an arrangement, in fact, which involved concessions on both sides. Virginia yielded to the United States all her claims to territory northwest of the Ohio, and the United States tacitly surrendered to Virginia all claim to the territory southeast of that river, alleged to be within her chartered limits. I have thought it my duty to make these observations, as a Senator of a State whose rights and interests, as well as the rights and interests of her sister States of Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Illinois, are affected, to some extent, by the claim of exclusive title to the Western country which has been advanced in behalf of Virginia.

Whatever the title of Virginia may have been, however, it is certain that upon her cession, made, as I have said, on the first of March, 1784, the United States came into the undisputed ownership and sovereignty of the vast region northwest of the Ohio.

To dispose of the soil and to determine the political institutions of the Territory now became the duty of Congress; and the duty was promptly performed. On the very day of the cession, before the sun went down, Thomas Jefferson, in behalf of a committee, consisting of himself, Mr. Howell, of Rhode Island, and Mr. Chase, of Maryland, reported a plan for the government of the western territory—not that lying north of the Ohio merely, but of all, from the north line of Florida to the north line of the United States. This, sir, is a memorable document of our early history, and I propose to read portions of it to the Senate:—

“The territory ceded, or to be ceded, by the individual States to the United States, . . . shall be formed into distinct States. . . . The settlers . . . shall, either on their own petition or on the order of Congress, receive authority, with appointments of time and place, for their free males, of full age, to meet together for the purpose of establishing a temporary government. . . . Such temporary governments shall only continue in force, in any State, until it shall have acquired twenty thousand inhabitants; when, giving due proof thereof to Congress, they shall receive from them authority, with appointments of time and place, to call a convention of representatives to establish a permanent constitution and government for themselves: Provided, That both the temporary and permanent governments be established upon these principles as their basis.”

Here follow sundry provisions, the last of which is as follows:

“That after the year 1800 of the Christian era there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in any of the said States, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted to have been personally guilty.” (Journals Cong. Confed., Vol. iv., p. 374.)

This, sir, was the plan and proviso of Jefferson. It met the approbation of the American people. It proved that the declaration of 1776 was not an empty profession, but a true faith. It proved that the spirit of the covenant of 1774 yet animated the heart of the nation. According to this grand and comprehensive scheme, the commencement of the nineteenth century was to witness the inauguration of freedom as the fundamental and perpetual law of the transmontane half of the American Republic.

Had this plan and proviso been adopted, we should not now be discussing the questions which embarrass us. The extension

of slavery would have been limited by the Alleghanies. No slave could ever have trodden a foot of the soil beyond. Unhappily, however, the proviso was not adopted; and, as I have already said that it met the approval of the people, I ask attention to the proceedings which resulted in its rejection. On the nineteenth of April, Mr. Spaight, of North Carolina, moved that the proviso be stricken out. Under the Articles of Confederation, which governed the proceedings of Congress, a majority of the thirteen States was necessary to an affirmative decision of any question; and the vote of no State could be counted, unless represented by at least two delegates.

The question upon Mr. Spaight's motion was put in this form:—

“Shall the words moved to be struck out stand?”

The vote stood—

For the proviso, six States, *viz.*: New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, and Pennsylvania.

Against the proviso, three States, *viz.*: Virginia, Maryland, and South Carolina.

Delaware and Georgia were not represented. New Jersey, by Mr. Dick, voted aye, but her vote, only one delegate being present, could not be counted. The vote of North Carolina was divided—Mr. Williamson voting aye; Mr. Spaight, no. The vote of Virginia stood—Mr. Jefferson, aye; Messrs. Hardy and Mercer, no. Of the twenty-three delegates present and voting, sixteen voted for, and seven against, the proviso. Thus was the proviso defeated by a minority vote. The people were for it, the States were for it; but it failed in consequence of a provision which enabled the minority to control the majority. It so happened that Mr. Beatty, the colleague of Mr. Dick, had left Congress a day or two before and returned a day or two after. Had he been present, or had one of Mr. Jefferson's colleagues voted with him, the result would have been changed. How vast the consequences which, in this instance, depended on a single vote.

Well, sir, the Ordinance of 1784, thus maimed and otherwise mutilated, became the law of the land on the twenty-third of April following. In 1785 Mr. Jefferson went abroad as minister to France, and was out of the country until after the adoption of the Constitution. The agitation of the proviso, however, did not cease in consequence of his absence. In that same year (1785)

Mr. King, of Massachusetts, again moved the proviso in Congress, in a slightly modified form, as follows:—

“That there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in any of the States described in the resolves of Congress of the twenty-third of April, 1784, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been personally guilty; and that this regulation shall be an article of compact, and remain a fundamental principle of the constitutions between the thirteen original States and each of the States described in the said resolve of the twenty-third of April, 1784.” (Journals Cong. Confed., Vol. iv., p. 481.)

The resolution was ordered to be committed by the votes of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Maryland—eight; against the votes of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia—four. Delaware was not represented. The vote of Maryland was determined by two ayes against one no, while that of Virginia was determined by two noes against one aye. The decided favor shown to this resolution by the vote for its commitment was the more remarkable, inasmuch as it proposed the immediate prohibition of slavery, instead of prohibition after 1800, in all territory acquired and to be acquired.

No further action was had at this time; but in a little more than two years afterwards, the subject was brought for the third time before Congress, in connection, as before, with the government of the western territory. The Ordinance of 1784, from causes into which it is not material to inquire, had never been carried into practical operation. Settlements were about to commence in the Northwest, and the settlers needed protection and government. Congress, therefore, in 1787, resumed the consideration of the subject of western territory. These deliberations resulted in the celebrated Ordinance of 1787, the last great act, and among the greatest acts of the Congress of the Confederation; an act which received the unanimous votes of the States; and, with a single exception from New York, of all the delegates. This ordinance, in its sixth article of compact, expressly prohibited slavery and involuntary servitude, except for crime, throughout the Territory. It abolished existing slavery, and it forbade future slavery. It covered with this prohibition every inch of territory then belonging to the United States. It expressly declared the national policy which this prohibition and

kindred provisions contained in the articles of compact were meant to indicate and establish. This is its language:—

“For extending the fundamental principles of civil and religious liberty, whereon these republics, their laws and constitutions, are erected; to fix and establish those principles as the basis of all laws, constitutions, and governments, which forever hereafter shall be formed in the said territory: . . . Be it ordained and declared, etc.”

To guard against possible future departure from this policy, it was ordained that these articles should “forever remain unalterable,” unless altered by the “common consent of the original States, and the people and States in the Territory.”

It is hardly possible to conceive of a more explicit declaration of governmental policy than this. The state of public sentiment in regard to slavery, which resulted in this positive and unanimous exclusion of it from national territory, is well described in a letter of Mr. Jefferson to Dr. Price, who published about that time a book in favor of emancipation. The letter bears date Paris, August 7th, 1785. I will read an extract:—

“Southward of the Chesapeake, it will find but few readers concurring with it [Dr. Price’s book] in sentiment on the subject of slavery. From the mouth to the head of the Chesapeake, the bulk of the people will approve it in theory, and it will find a respectable minority ready to adopt it in practice; a minority which, for weight and worth of character, preponderates against the greater number who have not the courage to divest their families of a property which, however, keeps their conscience uneasy. Northward of the Chesapeake, you may find here and there an opponent to your doctrine, as you may find here and there a robber or a murderer; but in no greater number. In that part of America, there being but few slaves, they can easily disencumber themselves of them; and emancipation is put into such a train that in a few years there will be no slaves northward of Maryland. In Maryland I do not find such a disposition to begin the redress of the enormity as in Virginia. This is the next State to which we may turn our eye for the interesting spectacle of justice in conflict with avarice and oppression; a conflict wherein the sacred side is gaining daily recruits from the influx into office of young men, grown and growing up.”

The general state of opinion is also well expressed by Mr. Jefferson in his ‘Notes on Virginia,’ where he says:—

“I think a change already perceptible since the origin of our present revolution. The spirit of the master is abating; that of the

slave is rising from the dust, his condition mollifying, and the way, I hope, preparing, under the auspices of heaven, for a total emancipation."

In another place, declaring his own sentiments, he said:—

"Nobody wishes more ardently than I to see an abolition not only of the trade, but of the condition of slavery; and certainly nobody will be more willing to encounter any sacrifice for that object."

Mr. President, I do not know that any monument has been erected over the grave of Jefferson, in Virginia.

Mr. Mason—There is—a granite obelisk.

Mr. Chase—I am glad to hear it. No monumental marble bears a nobler name.

Mr. Seward—The inscription is: "Here was buried Thomas Jefferson, Author of the Declaration of American Independence, of the Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom, and Father of the University of Virginia."

Mr. Chase—It is an appropriate inscription, and worthily commemorates distinguished services. But, Mr. President, if a stranger from some foreign land should ask me for the monument of Jefferson, I would not take him to Virginia and bid him look on a granite obelisk, however admirable in its proportions or its inscriptions. I would ask him to accompany me beyond the Alleghanies, into the midst of the broad Northwest, and would say to him:—

"Si monumentum quæris, circumspice!"

Behold, on every side, his monument. These thronged cities, these flourishing villages, these cultivated fields; these million happy homes of prosperous freemen; these churches, these schools; these asylums for the unfortunate and the helpless; these institutions of education, religion, and humanity; these great States, great in their present resources, but greater far in the mighty energies by which the resources of the future are to be developed; these, these are the monument of Jefferson. His memorial is over all our Western land—

*"Our meanest rill, our mightiest river,
Rolls mingling with his fame forever."*

THREE GREAT ERAS

(From a Speech in the Senate, February 3d, 1854)

Mr. President:—

THREE great eras have marked the history of this country in respect to slavery. The first may be characterized as the Era of Enfranchisement. It commenced with the earliest struggles for national independence. The spirit which inspired it animated the hearts and prompted the efforts of Washington, of Jefferson, of Patrick Henry, of Wythe, of Adams, of Jay, of Hamilton, of Morris—in short, of all the great men of our early history. All these hoped for, all these labored for, all these believed in, the final deliverance of the country from the curse of slavery. That spirit burned in the Declaration of Independence, and inspired the provisions of the Constitution and the Ordinance of 1787. Under its influence, when in full vigor, State after State provided for the emancipation of the slaves within their limits, prior to the adoption of the Constitution. Under its feebleness at a later period, and during the administration of Mr. Jefferson, the importation of slaves was prohibited into Mississippi and Louisiana, in the faint hope that those Territories might finally become free States. Gradually that spirit ceased to influence our public councils, and lost its control over the American heart and the American policy. Another era succeeded, but by such imperceptible gradations that the lines which separate the two cannot be traced with absolute precision. The facts of the two eras meet and mingle as the currents of confluent streams mix, so imperceptibly that the observer cannot fix the spot where the meeting waters blend.

This second era was the Era of Conservatism. Its great maxim was to preserve the existing condition. Men said: Let things remain as they are; let slavery stand where it is; exclude it where it is not; refrain from disturbing the public quiet by agitation; adjust all difficulties that arise, not by the application of principles, but by compromises.

It was during this period that the Senator tells us that slavery was maintained in Illinois, both while a Territory and after it became a State, in despite of the provisions of the ordinance. It is true, sir, that the slaves held in the Illinois country, under the French law, were not regarded as absolutely emancipated by

the provisions of the ordinance. But full effect was given to the ordinance in excluding the introduction of slaves, and thus the Territory was preserved from eventually becoming a slave State. The few slaveholders in the Territory of Indiana, which then included Illinois, succeeded in obtaining such an ascendancy in its affairs, that repeated applications were made, not merely by conventions of delegates, but by the Territorial legislature itself, for a suspension of the clause in the ordinance prohibiting slavery. These applications were reported upon by John Randolph, of Virginia, in the House, and by Mr. Franklin in the Senate. Both the reports were against suspension. The grounds stated by Randolph are specially worthy of being considered now. They are thus stated in the report:—

“That the committee deem it highly dangerous and inexpedient to impair a provision wisely calculated to promote the happiness and prosperity of the Northwestern country and to give strength and security to that extensive frontier. In the salutary operation of this sagacious and benevolent restraint, it is believed that the inhabitants of Indiana will, at no very distant day, find ample remuneration for a temporary privation of labor and of emigration.”

Sir, these reports, made in 1803 and 1807, and the action of Congress upon them, in conformity with their recommendation, saved Illinois, and perhaps Indiana, from becoming slave States. When the people of Illinois formed their State constitution, they incorporated into it a section providing that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall hereafter be introduced into this State. The constitution made provision for the continued service of the few persons who were originally held as slaves, and then bound to service under the Territorial laws, and for the freedom of their children, and thus secured the final extinction of slavery. The Senator thinks that this result is not attributable to the ordinance. I differ from him. But for the ordinance, I have no doubt slavery would have been introduced into Indiana, Illinois, and Ohio. It is something to the credit of the Era of Conservatism, uniting its influences with those of the expiring Era of Enfranchisement, that it maintained the Ordinance of 1787 in the Northwest.

The Era of Conservatism passed, also by imperceptible gradations, into the Era of Slavery Propagandism. Under the influences of this new spirit we opened the whole territory acquired

from Mexico, except California, to the ingress of slavery. Every foot of it was covered by a Mexican prohibition; and yet, by the legislation of 1850, we consented to expose it to the introduction of slaves. Some, I believe, have actually been carried into Utah and New Mexico. They may be few, perhaps, but a few are enough to affect materially the probable character of their future governments. Under the evil influences of the same spirit, we are now called upon to reverse the original policy of the Republic; to support even a solemn compact of the conservative period, and open Nebraska to slavery.

Sir, I believe that we are upon the verge of another era. That era will be the Era of Reaction. The introduction of this question here, and its discussion, will greatly hasten its advent. We, who insist upon the denationalization of slavery, and upon the absolute divorce of the General Government from all connection with it, will stand with the men who favored the compromise acts, and who yet wish to adhere to them, in their letter and in their spirit, against the repeal of the Missouri prohibition. But you may pass it here. You may send it to the other House. It may become a law. But its effect will be to satisfy all thinking men that no compromises with slavery will endure, except so long as they serve the interests of slavery, and that there is no safe and honorable ground for nonslaveholders to stand upon except that of restricting slavery within State limits, and excluding it absolutely from the whole sphere of Federal jurisdiction. The old questions between political parties are at rest. No great question so thoroughly possesses the public mind as that of slavery. This discussion will hasten the inevitable reorganization of parties upon the new issues which our circumstances suggest. It will light a fire in the country which may perhaps consume those who kindle it. . . .

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CHÂTEAUBRIAND

(1768-1848)



FRANÇOIS RENÉ AUGUSTE, VISCOUNT DE CHÂTEAUBRIAND, immortal in literature as the author of 'Atala,' 'René,' and 'The Genius of Christianity,' represents in political oratory the first strong reaction of "Bourbonism" against the ideas of the French Revolution. In 1823-24 he was Minister of Foreign Affairs under Louis XVIII., and helped to force what has been called a most unjustifiable war on Spain. In doing so he made the speech on Intervention, probably the most effective of his orations. In defining the causes of the assault on Spain, Lamartine, in his 'History of the Restoration of Monarchy in France,' says that "Spain was verging on a Republic and that a Republic proclaimed on the other side of the Pyrenees would sweep away the throne of the Bourbons in France."

From the reaction represented by this speech of Châteaubriand may be traced the great reactionary movement which gained such force in Europe during the last quarter of the century.

He was born at St. Malo, September 4th, 1768. In his youth a follower of Voltaire and the Encyclopedists, he changed his opinions and published his 'Genius of Christianity,' the work which has done most to give him an enduring reputation. His 'René,' 'Atala,' and 'Essay on Revolutions,' are of scarcely less celebrity than the 'Genius of Christianity,' though perhaps they are not so widely read outside of France. His appointment to the Cabinet under Louis XVIII. was due to a pamphlet, 'Bonaparte and the Bourbons,' which Louis said was worth a hundred thousand men to him. After his retirement from the ministry he was Ambassador to Rome under the Martignac administration. Resigning, he continued for a time in politics, representing under Louis Philippe "the principle of legitimacy." His residence in England strengthened his taste for English literature, and his translations of Milton, made after his retirement from politics, are among the last notable works of his later life. He died in 1848. His critics admire his brilliancy, but accuse him of overweening egotism. Richard Garnett calls him a "great rhetorician rather than a great poet, a great writer rather than a great man." Lamartine, who gives him credit for sincerity and earnestness, says, on the other hand, that "he saw far and saw correctly, going astray, when he erred at all, through passion and not from intellectual error."

HAS ONE GOVERNMENT THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE IN THE
INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF ANOTHER?

(Delivered in the French Chamber of Deputies in 1823 on the Question of
Intervening Forcibly in the Affairs of Spain)

Gentlemen :—

I SHALL at once set aside the personal objections, for private feelings must have no place here. I have no reply to make to mutilated pieces, printed by means unknown to me in foreign gazettes. I commenced my ministerial career with the honorable Member who spoke last, during the hundred days, when we each had a portfolio *ad interim*, he at Paris and I at Ghent. I was then writing a romance, he was employed on history; I still adhere to romance.

I am about to examine the series of objections presented at this tribune. These are numerous and diversified; but that I may not go astray in so vast a field, I shall arrange them under different heads.

Let us first examine the question of intervention. Has one government a right to intervene in the internal affairs of another government? This great question of public right has been resolved in opposite ways; those who have connected it with natural law, as Bacon, Puffendorf, Grotius, and all the ancients, are of opinion that it is permitted to take up arms, in the name of human society, against a people who violate the principles upon which general order is based, in the same manner as in private life we punish common disturbers of the peace. Those who look upon the question as a point of civil law maintain, on the contrary, that one government has no right to intervene in the affairs of another government. Thus, the former place the right of intervention in our duties, and the latter in our interests.

Gentlemen, I adopt the principle laid down by the civil law; I take the side of modern politicians, and I say with them, no government has a right to intervene in the internal affairs of another government. In fact, if this principle were not admitted, and especially by peoples who enjoy a free constitution, no nation could be free on its own soil; for the corruption of a minister, or the ambition of a king, would be sufficient to occasion an attack upon any State which should endeavor to improve its condition. To the various causes of war, already too numerous, you

would thereby add a perpetual principle of hostility, a principle of which every man in possession of power would be the judge, because he would always have the right of saying to his neighbors: "Your institutions displease me; change them, or I shall declare war against you."

I hope my honorable opponents will acknowledge that I explain myself frankly. But in presenting myself in this tribune to maintain the justice of our intervention in the affairs of Spain, how am I to escape from the principle which I myself have enounced? You shall see, gentlemen.

When modern politicians had rejected the right of intervention, by quitting the natural, to place themselves within the civil law, they found themselves very much embarrassed. Cases occurred in which it was impossible to abstain from intervention without putting the State in danger. At the commencement of the Revolution it was said: "Let the colonies perish rather than a principle!" and the colonies accordingly perished. Was it right to say also: "Let social order perish rather than a principle"? That they might not be wrecked against the very rule they had established, they had recourse to an exception, by means of which they returned to the natural law, and said: "No government has a right to intervene in the internal affairs of a nation, unless in such a case as may compromise the immediate safety and essential interests of that government." I shall presently quote the authority from which I borrow these words.

The exception, gentlemen, does not appear to me more questionable than the rule; no State can allow its essential interests to perish, under the penalty of perishing itself as a State. Having reached this point of the question, the whole face of it is changed,—we find ourselves altogether upon different ground. I am no longer bound to contest the rule, but to prove that the case of exception has occurred for France.

Before I adduce the motives which justify your intervention in the affairs of Spain, I ought first, gentlemen, to support my statement on the authority of examples. I shall frequently have occasion in the course of my speech to speak of England, since my honorable opponents quote it every moment against us, in their extempore, as well as in their written and printed speeches. It was Great Britain alone who defended these principles at Verona, and it is she alone who now rises against the right of intervention; it is she who is ready to take up arms for the

cause of a free people; it is she that reproves an impious war, hostile to the rights of man,—a war which a little bigoted and servile faction wishes to undertake, to return on its conclusion to burn the French charter, after having rent to pieces the Spanish constitution. Is not that it, gentlemen? We shall return to all these points; but first let us speak of the intervention.

I fear that my honorable opponents have made a bad choice of their authority. England, say they, has set us a great example by protecting the independence of nations. Let England, safe amidst her waves, and defended by ancient institutions,—let England—which has not suffered either the disasters of two invasions or the disorders of a thirty years' revolution—think that she has nothing to fear from Spain, and feel averse to intervene in her affairs, nothing certainly can be more natural; but does it follow that France enjoys the same security, and is in the same position? When, under other circumstances, the essential interests of Great Britain have been compromised, did she not for her own safety, and very justly without doubt, derogate from the principles which are now invoked in her name?

England, on going to war with France, promulgated, in the month of November 1793 the famous declaration of Whitehall. Permit me, gentlemen, to read a passage of it for you. The document commences by recalling the calamities of the Revolution, and then adds:—

“The intentions set forth of reforming the abuses of the French government, of establishing upon a solid basis personal liberty and the rights of property, of securing to a numerous people a wise legislation, an administration, and just and moderate laws,—all these salutary views have unhappily disappeared; they have given place to a system destructive of all public order, maintained by proscriptions, by banishment, by confiscations without number, by arbitrary imprisonment and by massacres, the memory of which is frightful. The inhabitants of this unhappy country, so long deceived by promises of happiness, always renewed at the epoch of every fresh crime, have been plunged into an abyss of calamities without example.

“This state of affairs cannot subsist in France, without implicating in one common danger all the neighboring powers, without giving them the right, without imposing upon them the duty of arresting the progress of an evil which only exists by the successive violation of all laws and every sense of propriety, and by the subversion of the fundamental principles which unite men, by the ties of social life. His Majesty certainly does not mean to dispute with France

the right of reforming its laws; he would never wish to influence by external force the mode of government of an independent State: nor does he desire it now, but in so far as this object has become essential to the peace and security of other powers. Under these circumstances he demands of France, and his demand is based upon a just title, the termination at length of a system of anarchy which is only powerful in doing wrong, incapable of fulfilling towards the French people the first duty of government, to repress the disturbances and to punish the crimes which daily multiply in the interior of the country; but, on the contrary, disposing in an arbitrary manner of their lives and property, to disturb the peace of other nations, and to make all Europe the theatre of similar crimes and like calamities. He demands of France the establishment of a stable and legitimate government, founded on the recognized principles of universal justice, and calculated to maintain with other nations the customary relations of union and of peace. The King, on his part, promises beforehand a suspension of hostilities; friendship in so far as he may be permitted by events which are not at the disposal of the human will; and safety and protection to all those who, declaring themselves for a monarchical government, shall withdraw themselves from the despotism of an anarchy which has broken all the most sacred ties of society, rent asunder all the relations of civil life, violated all rights, confounded all duties; availing itself of the name of liberty to exercise the most cruel tyranny, to annihilate all property, to seize upon all estates, founding its power on the pretended consent of the people, and ruining whole provinces with fire and sword, for having reclaimed their laws, their religion, and their legitimate sovereign!"

Well, gentlemen, what think you of this declaration? Did you not imagine that you were listening to the very speech pronounced by the King at the opening of the present session; but that speech developed, explained, and commented upon with equal force and eloquence? England says she acts in concert with her allies, and we should be thought criminal in also having allies! England promises assistance to French royalists, and it would be taken ill if we were to protect Spanish royalists! England maintains that she has the right of intervening to save herself and Europe from the evils that are desolating France, and we are to be interdicted from defending ourselves from the Spanish contagion! England rejects the pretended consent of the French people; she imposes upon France, as the price of peace, the condition of establishing a government founded on

the principles of justice, and calculated to maintain the customary relations with other States, and we are to be compelled to recognize the pretended sovereignty of the people, the legality of a constitution established by a military revolt, and we are not to have the right of demanding from Spain, for our security, institutions legalized by the freedom of Ferdinand!

We must, however, be just: when England published this famous declaration, Marie Antoinette and Louis XVI. were no more. I acknowledge that Marie Josephine is, as yet, only a captive, and that nothing has yet been shed but her tears; Ferdinand, also, is at present only a prisoner in his palace, as Louis XVI. was in his, before he went to the Temple and thence to the scaffold. I do not wish to calumniate the Spaniards, but neither do I wish to estimate them more highly than my own countrymen. Revolutionary France produced a Convention, and why should not revolutionary Spain produce one also? Shall I be told that by accelerating the movement of intervention we shall make the position of the monarch more perilous? But did England save Louis XVI. by refusing to declare herself? Is not the intervention which prevents the evil more useful than that by which it is avenged? Spain had a diplomatic agent at Paris at the period of the celebrated catastrophe, and his prayers could obtain nothing. What was this family witness doing there? He was certainly not required to authenticate a death that was known to earth and heaven. Gentlemen, the trials of Charles I. and of Louis XVI. are already too much for the world, but another judicial murder would establish, on the authority of precedents, a sort of criminal right and a body of jurisprudence for the use of subjects against their kings.

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LORD CHATHAM

(WILLIAM, VISCOUNT PITT AND EARL OF CHATHAM)

(1708-1778)

THE words with which the elder Pitt closed his reply to Lord Mansfield in arguing the Wilkes case in the House of Lords are at once the secret of his power as an orator and the explanation of his success as a statesman. "Where law ends, tyranny begins," he said as the final word of that great plea for the English constitution. It is for this idea that he stands in the history of England and of English-speaking people. "The higher law" to which appeal is made when impatience of wrong will not wait on prescription for reforms, he did not recognize,—or if he recognized it, combated it as a part of the tyranny which begins where prescription ends. What he dreaded most and opposed most strenuously for England was the arbitrary power, which in its own right of assumed superiority undertakes to decide the present without regard to the past, without the previously given consent of those who are affected, and without regard to those precedents and rules of procedure, which, whether or not they have been enacted as legislation, have the force of law because they stand for regularity, for order, for "due process," for the sanity, the reasonable consideration which every man in or out of power owes to every other. "We all know what the constitution is," said Chatham in the Wilkes case. "We all know that the first principle of it is that the subject shall not be governed by the *arbitrium* of any one man or body of men less than the whole legislature, but by certain laws to which he has virtually given his consent, which are open to him to examine and are not beyond his ability to understand."

That the weak, the "subject," the defenseless shall "not be governed by the *arbitrium* of any man," but only by the due and orderly processes of the justice which is necessary for their liberties and their defense—to hold that idea as Chatham held it, and to dare as much for it as he dared, would make any man great. Undoubtedly he was one of the greatest men of England. "I have sometimes seen eloquence without wisdom and often wisdom without eloquence," said Franklin in speaking of him, "but in him I have seen them united in the highest possible degree." No one who reads his speech in the Wilkes case in 1770 and after it the noble protest against the

attempt to subjugate America made by him in his speech on the address to the throne in November 1777 is likely to dissent from this verdict. He attacked the arbitrary action of the King as fearlessly as he had attacked that of Parliament. If the constitution was in danger, he did not stop to consider the rank, the dignity, the power of those who threatened it. He threatened them on his side in the name of that which he recognized as the greatest force in human affairs,—of the law, the love of order, the “due process,” the justice and liberty which depend on due process under prescribed constitutional forms. If we wonder sometimes how the makers of the American constitution could have gained so much of that wisdom which comes from the hatred of disorderly power, we have only to read the speeches of Chatham, made in the face of the patriotic sentiment of England, in defiance of the royal prerogative, in contempt of all public opinion which supported arbitrary power, to understand that American love of liberty is an inheritance from the generations whose spirit inspired him, when in the House of Lords he said: “I rejoice that America has resisted. . . . I hope some dreadful calamity will befall this country which will open the eyes of the King.”

He was not inconsistent in opposing American independence as he did in his last speech, delivered with what was almost literally his dying breath. He looked on Americans as Englishmen entitled to all their rights under the English constitution, and he was glad to see them fight for them if they could enforce them in no other way. But that as Englishmen they should join with France to free themselves from the constitution and laws he regarded with such reverence; that in doing so they should seek to “dismember the British Empire,” seemed to him monstrous. Of the rights of humanity he seems to have had no governing conception. The rights of Englishmen were very dear to him, but it does not seem to have occurred to him that there was any compelling reason for respecting the rights of Frenchmen, of Spaniards, of Hindoos, or other foreigners whose interests seemed to antagonize those of the British Empire. It is possible, but by no means certain, that he could have warmed as Burke did to the strongest indignation against British oppression in India, but it is for British liberty under English law, not for human liberty under the laws of Nature or of God, that he stands distinctively. Yet taking him with all his limitations and weaknesses, with the pomposity which sometimes made him seem ridiculous, and the vehemence which often made him unreasonable, he is still one of the noblest figures in the history of modern England.

He was born at Westminster, November 15th, 1708. After studying at Oxford and serving in the army as a cornet of horse, he entered

Parliament in 1735, attracting immediate attention and winning the distinguished success of drawing the fire of Walpole, who complimented him by procuring his dismissal from the army because of his attacks on the administration. From this time until he was raised to the peerage in 1766, Pitt increased steadily in popular favor. He was called the "Great Commoner," and was in fact the first great popular parliamentary leader in English history. The most celebrated of his earlier speeches are only reported in fragments, but as a Commoner he could hardly have exceeded the fire of his denunciations of arbitrary power, when in the House of Lords he asserted the spirit of English liberty against the Tory policy towards America. He died May 11th, 1778, at Hayes, where he was removed after his collapse in the House of Lords, April 7th of the same year.

W. V. B.

THE ATTEMPT TO SUBJUGATE AMERICA

(On an Address to the Throne, in the House of Lords, November 18th, 1777)

I RISE, my lords, to declare my sentiments on this most solemn and serious subject. It has imposed a load upon my mind, which, I fear, nothing can remove; but which impels me to endeavor its alleviation, by a free and unreserved communication of my sentiments.

In the first part of the address, I have the honor of heartily concurring with the noble earl who moved it. No man feels sincerer joy than I do; none can offer more genuine congratulation on every accession of strength to the Protestant succession. I therefore join in every congratulation on the birth of another princess and the happy recovery of her Majesty. But I must stop here. My courtly complaisance will carry me no further. I will not join in congratulation on misfortune and disgrace. I cannot concur in a blind and servile address, which approves and endeavors to sanctify the monstrous measures which have heaped disgrace and misfortune upon us. This, my lords, is a perilous and tremendous moment! It is not a time for adulation. The smoothness of flattery cannot now avail; cannot save us in this rugged and awful crisis. It is now necessary to instruct the throne in the language of truth. We must dispel the delusion and the darkness which envelop it; and display, in its full danger and true colors, the ruin that is brought to our doors.

This, my lords, is our duty. It is the proper function of this noble assemblage, sitting, as we do, upon our honors in this house, the hereditary council of the crown. Who is the minister—where is the minister, that has dared to suggest to the throne the contrary, unconstitutional language this day delivered from it? The accustomed language from the throne has been application to Parliament for advice, and a reliance on its constitutional advice and assistance. As it is the right of Parliament to give, so it is the duty of the crown to ask it. But on this day, and in this extreme momentous exigency, no reliance is reposed on our constitutional counsels! no advice is asked from the sober and enlightened care of Parliament! but the crown, from itself and by itself, declares an unalterable determination to pursue measures—and what measures, my lords?—The measures that have produced the imminent perils that threaten us; the measures that have brought ruin to our doors.

Can the minister of the day now presume to expect a continuance of support, in this ruinous infatuation? Can Parliament be so dead to its dignity and its duty, as to be thus deluded into the loss of the one and the violation of the other?—To give an unlimited credit and support for the steady perseverance in measures not proposed for our parliamentary advice, but dictated and forced upon us—in measures, I say, my lords, which have reduced this late flourishing empire to ruin and contempt! —“But yesterday, and England might have stood against the world: now none so poor to do her reverence.” I use the words of a poet; but, though it be poetry, it is no fiction. It is a shameful truth, that not only the power and strength of this country are wasting away and expiring; but her well-earned glories, her true honor, and substantial dignity are sacrificed. France, my lords, has insulted you; she has encouraged and sustained America; and whether America be wrong or right, the dignity of this country ought to spurn at the officious insult of French interference. The ministers and ambassadors of those who are called rebels and enemies are in Paris; in Paris they transact the reciprocal interests of America and France. Can there be a more mortifying insult? Can even our ministers sustain a more humiliating disgrace? Do they dare to resent it? Do they presume even to hint a vindication of their honor and the dignity of the State by requiring the dismissal of the plenipotentiaries of America? Such is the degradation to which they

have reduced the glories of England! The people whom they affect to call contemptible rebels, but whose growing power has at last obtained the name of enemies; the people with whom they have engaged this country in war, and against whom they now command our implicit support in every measure of desperate hostility: this people, despised as rebels, or acknowledged as enemies, are abetted against you, supplied with every military store, their interests consulted, and their ambassadors entertained, by your inveterate enemy! and our ministers dare not interpose with dignity or effect. Is this the honor of a great kingdom? Is this the indignant spirit of England, who, "but yesterday," gave law to the house of Bourbon? My lords, the dignity of nations demands a decisive conduct in a situation like this. Even when the greatest prince that perhaps this country ever saw filled our throne, the requisition of a Spanish general on a similar subject was attended to and complied with. For, on the spirited remonstrance of the Duke of Alva, Elizabeth found herself obliged to deny the Flemish exiles all countenance, support, or even entrance into her dominions; and the Count le Marque, with his few desperate followers, were expelled the kingdom. Happening to arrive at the Brille, and finding it weak in defense, they made themselves masters of the place: and this was the foundation of the United Provinces.

My lords, this ruinous and ignominious situation, where we cannot act with success, nor suffer with honor, calls upon us to remonstrate in the strongest and loudest language of truth, to rescue the ear of majesty from the delusions which surround it. The desperate state of our arms abroad is in part known: no man thinks more highly of them than I do. I love and honor the English troops. I know their virtues and their valor. I know they can achieve anything except impossibilities; and I know that the conquest of English America is an impossibility. You cannot, I venture to say it, you cannot conquer America. Your armies in the last war effected everything that could be effected; and what was it? It cost a numerous army, under the command of a most able general, now a noble lord in this house, a long and laborious campaign, to expel five thousand Frenchmen from French America. My lords, you cannot conquer America. What is your present situation there? We do not know the worst; but we know that in three campaigns we have done nothing and suffered much. Besides the sufferings, perhaps total

loss, of the Northern force, the best appointed army that ever took the field, commanded by Sir William Howe, has retired from the American lines. He was obliged to relinquish his attempt, and, with great delay and danger, to adopt a new and distant plan of operations. We shall soon know, and in any event have reason to lament, what may have happened since. As to conquest, therefore, my lords, I repeat, it is impossible. You may swell every expense and every effort still more extravagantly; pile and accumulate every assistance you can buy or borrow; traffic and barter with every little pitiful German prince that sells and sends his subjects to the shambles of a foreign prince; your efforts are forever vain and impotent: doubly so from this mercenary aid on which you rely. For it irritates, to an incurable resentment, the minds of your enemies—to overrun them with the mercenary sons of rapine and plunder; devoting them and their possessions to the rapacity of hireling cruelty! If I were an American, as I am an Englishman, while a foreign troop was landed in my country, I never would lay down my arms—never—never—never!

Your own army is infected with the contagion of these illiberal allies. The spirit of plunder and of rapine is gone forth among them. I know it, and notwithstanding what the noble earl, who moved the address, has given as his opinion of our American army, I know from authentic information, and the most experienced officers, that our discipline is deeply wounded. Whilst this is notoriously our sinking situation, America grows and flourishes; whilst our strength and discipline are lowered, hers are rising and improving.

But, my lords, who is the man that in addition to these disgraces and mischiefs of our army has dared to authorize and associate to our arms the tomahawk and scalping knife of the savage? To call into civilized alliance the wild and inhuman savage of the woods; to delegate to the merciless Indian the defense of disputed rights, and to wage the horrors of his barbarous war against our brethren? My lords, these enormities cry aloud for redress and punishment. Unless thoroughly done away, it will be a stain on the national character. It is a violation of the constitution. I believe it is against law. It is not the least of our national misfortunes, that the strength and character of our army are thus impaired. Infected with the mercenary spirit of robbery and rapine; familiarized to the horrid scenes of savage

cruelty, it can no longer boast of the noble and generous principles which dignify a soldier; no longer sympathize with the dignity of the royal banner, nor feel the pride, pomp, and circumstance of glorious war, "that make ambition virtue!" What makes ambition virtue?—the sense of honor. But is the sense of honor consistent with a spirit of plunder or the practice of murder? Can it flow from mercenary motives, or can it prompt to cruel deeds? Besides these murderers and plunderers, let me ask our ministers, What other allies have they acquired? What other powers have they associated to their cause? Have they entered into alliance with the king of the gipsies? Nothing, my lords, is too low or too ludicrous to be consistent with their counsels.

The independent views of America have been stated and asserted as the foundation of this address. My lords, no man wishes for the due dependence of America on this country more than I do. To preserve it, and not confirm that state of independence into which your measures hitherto have driven them, is the object which we ought to unite in attaining. The Americans, contending for their rights against arbitrary exactions, I love and admire. It is the struggle of free and virtuous patriots; but contending for independency and total disconnection from England, as an Englishman, I cannot wish them success. For, in a due constitutional dependency, including the ancient supremacy of this country in regulating their commerce and navigation, consists the mutual happiness and prosperity both of England and America. She derived assistance and protection from us; and we reaped from her the most important advantages. She was, indeed, the fountain of our wealth, the nerve of our strength, the nursery and basis of our naval power. It is our duty, therefore, my lords, if we wish to save our country, most seriously to endeavor the recovery of these most beneficial subjects; and in this perilous crisis, perhaps the present moment may be the only one in which we can hope for success. For in their negotiations with France they have, or think they have, reason to complain: though it be notorious that they have received from that power important supplies and assistance of various kinds, yet it is certain they expected it in a more decisive and immediate degree. America is in ill humor with France on some points that have not entirely answered her expectations. Let us wisely take advantage of every possible moment of reconciliation. Besides, the natural disposition of

America herself still leans towards England; to the old habits of connection and mutual interest that united both countries. This was the established sentiment of all the continent; and still, my lords, in the great and principal part, the sound part of America, this wise and affectionate disposition prevails; and there is a very considerable part of America yet sound—the middle and the southern provinces. Some parts may be factious and blind to their true interests; but if we express a wise and benevolent disposition to communicate with them those immutable rights of nature, and those constitutional liberties, to which they are equally entitled with ourselves; by a conduct so just and humane, we shall confirm the favorable and conciliate the adverse. I say, my lords, the rights and liberties to which they are equally entitled with ourselves, but no more. I would participate to them every enjoyment and freedom which the colonizing subjects of a free State can possess, or wish to possess; and I do not see why they should not enjoy every fundamental right in their property, and every original substantial liberty, which Devonshire or Surrey, or the county I live in, or any other county in England, can claim; reserving always, as the sacred right of the mother country, the due constitutional dependency of the colonies. The inherent supremacy of the State in regulating and protecting the navigation and commerce of all her subjects is necessary for the mutual benefit and preservation of every part, to constitute and preserve the prosperous arrangement of the whole empire.

The sound parts of America, of which I have spoken, must be sensible of these great truths and of their real interests. America is not in that state of desperate and contemptible rebellion which this country has been deluded to believe. It is not a wild and lawless banditti, who, having nothing to lose, might hope to snatch something from public convulsions. Many of their leaders and great men have a great stake in this great contest. The gentleman who conducts their armies, I am told, has an estate of four or five thousand pounds a year, and when I consider these things I cannot but lament the inconsiderate violence of our penal acts, our declarations of treason and rebellion, with all the fatal effects of attainder and confiscation.

As to the disposition of foreign powers, which is asserted to be pacific and friendly, let us judge, my lords, rather by their actions and the nature of things, than by interested assertions. The uniform assistance supplied to America by France suggests

a different conclusion. The most important interests of France, in aggrandizing and enriching herself with what she most wants, supplies of every naval store from America, must inspire her with different sentiments. The extraordinary preparations of the house of Bourbon, by land and by sea, from Dunkirk to the Straits, equally ready and willing to overwhelm these defenseless islands, should rouse us to a sense of their real disposition, and our own danger. Not five thousand troops in England!—hardly three thousand in Ireland! What can we oppose to the combined force of our enemies? Scarcely twenty ships of the line fully or sufficiently manned, that any admiral's reputation would permit him to take the command of. The river of Lisbon in the possession of our enemies! The seas swept by American privateers! Our channel trade torn to pieces by them! In this complicated crisis of danger, weakness at home and calamity abroad, terrified and insulted by the neighboring powers, unable to act in America, or acting only to be destroyed, where is the man with the forehead to promise or hope for success in such a situation? or, from perseverance in the measures that have driven us to it? Who has the forehead to do so? Where is that man? I should be glad to see his face.

You cannot conciliate America by your present measures. You cannot subdue her by your present, or by any measures. What, then, can you do? You cannot conquer; you cannot gain; but you can address; you can lull the fears and anxieties of the moment into an ignorance of the danger that should produce them. But, my lords, the time demands the language of truth. We must not now apply the flattering unction of servile compliance or blind complaisance. In a just and necessary war to maintain the rights or honor of my country, I would strip the shirt from my back to support it. But in such a war as this, unjust in its principle, impracticable in its means, and ruinous in its consequences, I would not contribute a single effort, nor a single shilling. I do not call for vengeance on the heads of those who have been guilty; I only recommend to them to make their retreat. Let them walk off; and let them make haste, or they may be assured that speedy and condign punishment will overtake them.

My lords, I have submitted to you, with the freedom and truth which I think my duty, my sentiments on your present awful situation. I have laid before you the ruin of your power,

the disgrace of your reputation, the pollution of your discipline, the contamination of your morals, the complication of calamities, foreign and domestic, that overwhelm your sinking country. Your dearest interests, your own liberties, the constitution itself, totters to the foundation. All this disgraceful danger, this multitude of misery, is the monstrous offspring of this unnatural war. We have been deceived and deluded too long. Let us now stop short. This is the crisis—the only crisis of time and situation, to give us a possibility of escape from the fatal effects of our delusions. But if, in an obstinate and infatuated perseverance in folly, we slavishly echo the peremptory words this day presented to us, nothing can save this devoted country from complete and final ruin. We madly rush into multiplied miseries and “confusion worse confounded.”

Is it possible, can it be believed, that ministers are yet blind to this impending destruction? I did hope that instead of this false and empty vanity, this overweening pride, engendering high conceits and presumptuous imaginations, that ministers would have humbled themselves in their errors, would have confessed and retracted them, and by an active, though a late repentance, have endeavored to redeem them. But, my lords, since they had neither sagacity to foresee, nor justice nor humanity to shun, these oppressive calamities; since not even severe experience can make them feel, nor the imminent ruin of their country awaken them from their stupefaction, the guardian care of Parliament must interpose. I shall, therefore, my lords, propose to you an amendment to the address to his Majesty, to be inserted immediately after the first two paragraphs of congratulation on the birth of a princess, to recommend an immediate cessation of hostilities and the commencement of a treaty to restore peace and liberty to America, strength and happiness to England, security and permanent prosperity to both countries. This, my lords, is yet in our power; and let not the wisdom and justice of your lordships neglect the happy, and, perhaps, the only opportunity. By the establishment of irrevocable law, founded on mutual rights, and ascertained by treaty, these glorious enjoyments may be firmly perpetuated. And let me repeat to your lordships, that the strong bias of America, at least of the wise and sounder parts of it, naturally inclines to this happy and constitutional reconnection with you. Notwithstanding the temporary intrigues with France, we may still be assured of their

ancient and confirmed partiality to us. America and France cannot be congenial. There is something decisive and confirmed in the honest American that will not assimilate to the futility and levity of Frenchmen.

My lords, to encourage and confirm that innate inclination to this country, founded on every principle of affection, as well as consideration of interest; to restore that favorable disposition into a permanent and powerful reunion with this country; to revive the mutual strength of the empire; again to awe the house of Bourbon, instead of meanly truckling, as our present calamities compel us, to every insult of French caprice and Spanish punctilio; to re-establish our commerce; to reassert our rights and our honor; to confirm our interests, and renew our glories forever, a consummation most devoutly to be endeavored! and which, I trust, may yet arise from reconciliation with America; I have the honor of submitting to you the following amendment, which I move to be inserted after the first two paragraphs of the address:—

“And that this house does most humbly advise and supplicate his Majesty, to be pleased to cause the most speedy and effectual measures to be taken, for restoring peace in America: and that no time may be lost in proposing an immediate cessation of hostilities there, in order to the opening of a treaty for the final settlement of the tranquillity of these invaluable provinces, by a removal of the unhappy causes of this ruinous civil war; and by a just and adequate security against the return of the like calamities in times to come. And this house desires to offer the most dutiful assurances to his Majesty, that it will, in due time, cheerfully co-operate with the magnanimity and tender goodness of his Majesty, for the preservation of his people, by such explicit and most solemn declarations, and provisions of fundamental and revocable laws, as may be judged necessary for the ascertaining and fixing forever the respective rights of Great Britain and her colonies.”

[Lord Suffolk, having defended the employment of the Indians in war, as “a means that *God and nature put into our hands!*” Lord Chatham resumed:]—

I am astonished! shocked! to hear such principles confessed—to hear them avowed in this house, or in this country: principles equally unconstitutional, inhuman, and unchristian!

My lords, I did not intend to have encroached again upon your attention; but I cannot repress my indignation. I feel myself impelled by every duty. My lords, we are called upon as members of this house, as men, as Christian men, to protest against such notions standing near the throne, polluting the ear of majesty. "That God and nature put into our hand!" I know not what ideas that lord may entertain of God and nature; but I know that such abominable principles are equally abhorrent to religion and humanity. What! to attribute the sacred sanction of God and nature to the massacres of the Indian scalping knife—to the cannibal savage torturing, murdering, roasting, and eating; literally, my lords, eating the mangled victims of his barbarous battles! Such horrible notions shock every precept of religion, divine or natural, and every generous feeling of humanity. And, my lords, they shock every sentiment of honor; they shock me as a lover of honorable war and a detester of murderous barbarity.

These abominable principles, and this more abominable avowal of them, demand the most decisive indignation. I call upon that right reverend bench, those holy ministers of the Gospel and pious pastors of our church; I conjure them to join in the holy work, and vindicate the religion of their God. I appeal to the wisdom and the law of this learned bench, to defend and support the justice of their country. I call upon the bishops to interpose the unsullied sanctity of their lawn; upon the learned judges to interpose the purity of their ermine, to save us from this pollution. I call upon the honor of your lordships to reverence the dignity of your ancestors and to maintain your own. I call upon the spirit and humanity of my country to vindicate the national character. I invoke the genius of the constitution. From the tapestry that adorns these walls, the immortal ancestor of this noble lord frowns with indignation at the disgrace of his country. In vain he led your victorious fleets against the boasted Armada of Spain; in vain he defended and established the honor, the liberties, the religion, the Protestant religion, of this country, against the arbitrary cruelties of Popery and the Inquisition, if these more than popish cruelties and inquisitorial practices are let loose among us; to turn forth into our settlements, among our ancient connections, friends, and relations, the merciless cannibal, thirsting for the blood of man, woman, and child! to send forth the infidel savage—against

whom? against your Protestant brethren; to lay waste their country, to desolate their dwellings, and extirpate their race and name, with these horrible hell-hounds of savage war!—hell-hounds, I say, of savage war. Spain armed herself with blood-hounds to extirpate the wretched natives of America; and we improve on the inhuman example even of Spanish cruelty; we turn loose these savage hell-hounds against our brethren and countrymen in America, of the same language, laws, liberties, and religion; endeared to us by every tie that should sanctify humanity.

My lords, this awful subject, so important to our honor, constitution, and our religion, demands the most solemn and effectual inquiry. And I again call upon your lordships, and the united powers of the State, to examine it thoroughly and decisively and to stamp upon it an indelible stigma of the public abhorrence. And I again implore those holy prelates of our religion to do away these iniquities from among us. Let them perform a lustration; let them purify this house and this country from this sin.

My lords, I am old and weak, and at present unable to say more; but my feelings and indignation were too strong to have said less. I could not have slept this night in my bed, nor reposed my head on my pillow, without giving this vent to my eternal abhorrence of such preposterous and enormous principles.

THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION

(A Speech Delivered in the House of Lords in Reply to Lord Mansfield in the Case of Wilkes, January 9th, 1770)

My Lords:—

THERE is one plain maxim, to which I have invariably adhered through life; that in every question in which my liberty or my property were concerned, I should consult and be determined by the dictates of common sense. I confess, my lords, that I am prone to distrust the refinements of learning, because I have seen the ablest and most learned men equally liable to deceive themselves and to mislead others. The condition of human nature would be lamentable indeed, if nothing less than the greatest learning and talents, which fall to the share of so small a number of men, were sufficient to direct our judgment and our conduct. But Providence has taken better care of our

happiness, and given us, in the simplicity of common sense, a rule for our direction, by which we can never be misled. I confess, my lords, I had no other guide in drawing up the amendment which I submitted to your consideration; and, before I heard the opinion of the noble lord who spoke last, I did not conceive that it was even within the limits of possibility for the greatest human genius, the most subtle understanding, or the acutest wit, so strangely to misrepresent my meaning, and to give it an interpretation so entirely foreign from what I intended to express, and from that sense which the very terms of the amendment plainly and distinctly carry with them. If there be the smallest foundation for the censure thrown upon me by that noble lord, if, either expressly, or by the most distant implication, I have said or insinuated any part of what the noble lord has charged me with, discard my opinions forever, discard the motion with contempt.

My lords, I must beg the indulgence of the House. Neither will my health permit me, nor do I pretend to be qualified to follow that learned lord minutely through the whole of his argument. No man is better acquainted with his abilities and learning, nor has a greater respect for them than I have. I have had the pleasure of sitting with him in the other House, and always listened to him with attention. I have not now lost a word of what he said, nor did I ever. Upon the present question I meet him without fear. The evidence which truth carries with it is superior to all argument; it neither wants the support nor dreads the opposition of the greatest abilities. If there be a single word in the amendment to justify the interpretation which the noble lord has been pleased to give it, I am ready to renounce the whole. Let it be read, my lords; let it speak for itself. [The amendment was read.] In what instance does it interfere with the privileges of the House of Commons? In what respect does it question their jurisdiction, or suppose an authority in this House to arraign the justice of their sentence? I am sure that every lord who hears me will bear me witness, that I said not one word touching the merits of the Middlesex election. So far from conveying any opinion upon that matter in the amendment, I did not even in discourse deliver my own sentiments upon it. I did not say that the House of Commons had done either right or wrong; but, when his Majesty was pleased to recommend it to us to cultivate unanimity among ourselves, I

thought it the duty of this House, as the great hereditary council of the Crown, to state to his Majesty the distracted condition of his dominions, together with the events which had destroyed unanimity among his subjects. But, my lords, I stated events merely as facts, without the smallest addition either of censure or of opinion. They are facts, my lords, which I am not only convinced are true, but which I know are indisputably true. For example, my lords, will any man deny that discontents prevail in many parts of his Majesty's dominions? or that those discontents arise from the proceedings of the House of Commons touching the declared incapacity of Mr. Wilkes? It is impossible. No man can deny a truth so notorious. Or will any man deny that those proceedings refused, by a resolution of one branch of the Legislature only, to the subject his common right? Is it not indisputably true, my lords, that Mr. Wilkes had a common right, and that he lost it in no other way but by a resolution of the House of Commons? My lords, I have been tender of misrepresenting the House of Commons. I have consulted their journals, and have taken the very words of their own resolution. Do they not tell us in so many words, that Mr. Wilkes, having been expelled, was thereby rendered incapable of serving in that Parliament? And is it not in their resolution alone which refuses to the subject his common right? The amendment says further, that the electors of Middlesex are deprived of their free choice of a representative. Is this a false fact, my lords? Or have I given an unfair representation of it? Will any man presume to affirm that Colonel Luttrell is the free choice of the electors of Middlesex? We all know the contrary. We all know that Mr. Wilkes (whom I mention without either praise or censure) was the favorite of the county, and chosen by a very great and acknowledged majority to represent them in Parliament. If the noble lord dislikes the manner in which these facts are stated, I shall think myself happy in being advised by him how to alter it. I am very little anxious about terms, provided the substance be preserved; and these are facts, my lords, which I am sure will always retain their weight and importance, in whatever form of language they are described.

Now, my lords, since I have been forced to enter into the explanation of an amendment, in which nothing less than the genius of penetration could have discovered an obscurity, and having, as I hope, redeemed myself in the opinion of the House,

having redeemed my motion from the severe representation given of it by the noble lord, I must a little longer entreat your lordships' indulgence. The Constitution of this country has been openly invaded in fact; and I have heard, with horror and astonishment, that very invasion defended upon principle. What is this mysterious power, undefined by law, unknown to the subject, which we must not approach without awe, nor speak of without reverence—which no man may question, and to which all men must submit? My lords, I thought the slavish doctrine of passive obedience had long since exploded; and, when our Kings were obliged to confess that their title to the Crown, and the rule of their government, had no other foundation than the known laws of the land, I never expected to hear a divine right, or a divine infallibility, attributed to any other branch of the Legislature. My lords, I beg to be understood. No man respects the House of Commons more than I do, or would contend more strenuously than I would to preserve to them their just and legal authority. Within the bounds prescribed by the Constitution, that authority is necessary to the well-being of the people. Beyond that line, every exertion of power is arbitrary, is illegal; it threatens tyranny to the people, and destruction to the State. Power without right is the most odious and detestable object that can be offered to the human imagination. It is not only pernicious to those who are subject to it, but tends to its own destruction. It is what my noble friend [Lord Lyttleton] has truly described it, *Res detestabilis et caduca*. My lords, I acknowledge the just power, and reverence the Constitution of the House of Commons. It is for their own sakes that I would prevent their assuming a power which the Constitution has denied them, lest, by grasping at an authority they have no right to, they should forfeit that which they legally possess. My lords, I affirm that they have betrayed their constituents, and violated the Constitution. Under pretense of declaring the law, they have made a law, and united in the same persons the office of legislator and judge!

I shall endeavor to adhere strictly to the noble lord's doctrine, which is, indeed, impossible to mistake, so far as my memory will permit me to preserve his expressions. He seems fond of the word jurisdiction; and I confess, with the force and effect which he has given it, it is a word of copious meaning and wonderful extent. If his lordship's doctrine be well founded, we

must renounce all those political maxims by which our understandings have hitherto been directed, and even the first elements of learning taught in our schools when we were schoolboys. My lords, we knew that jurisdiction was nothing more than *jus dicere*. We knew that *legem facere* and *legem dicere* (to make law and to declare it) were powers clearly distinguished from each other in the nature of things, and wisely separated from each other by the wisdom of the English Constitution. But now, it seems, we must adopt a new system of thinking! The House of Commons, we are told, have a supreme jurisdiction, and there is no appeal from their sentence; and that, wherever they are competent judges, their decision must be received and submitted to as, *ipso facto*, the law of the land. My lords, I am a plain man, and have been brought up in a religious reverence for the original simplicity of the laws of England. By what sophistry they have been perverted, by what artifices they have been involved in obscurity, is not for me to explain. The principles, however, of the English laws are still sufficiently clear; they are founded in reason, and are the masterpieces of human understanding; but it is in the text that I would look for a direction to my judgment, not in the commentaries of modern professors. The noble lord assures us that he knows not in what code the law of Parliament is to be found; that the House of Commons, when they act as judges, have no law to direct them but their own wisdom; that their decision is law; and if they determine wrong, the subject has no appeal but to heaven. What then, my lords? Are all the generous efforts of our ancestors, are all those glorious contentions by which they meant to secure to themselves, and to transmit to their posterity, a known law, a certain rule of living, reduced to this conclusion, that, instead of the arbitrary power of a King, we must submit to the arbitrary power of a House of Commons? If this be true, what benefit do we derive from the exchange? Tyranny, my lords, is detestable in every shape, but in none so formidable as when it is assumed and exercised by a number of tyrants. But, my lords, this is not the fact; this is not the Constitution. We have a law of Parliament. We have a code in which every honest man may find it. We have Magna Charta. We have the Statute Book, and the Bill of Rights.

If a case should arise unknown to these great authorities, we have still that plain English reason left, which is the foundation

of all our English jurisprudence. That reason tells us that every judicial court and every political society must be invested with those powers and privileges which are necessary for performing the office to which they are appointed. It tells us, also, that no court of justice can have a power inconsistent with, or paramount to, the known laws of the land; that the people, when they choose their representatives, never mean to convey to them a power of invading the rights, or trampling on the liberties of those whom they represent. What security would they have for their rights, if once they admitted that a court of judicature might determine every question that came before it, not by any known positive law, but by the vague, indeterminate, arbitrary rule of what the noble lord is pleased to call the wisdom of the court? With respect to the decision of the courts of justice, I am far from denying them their due weight and authority; yet, placing them in the most respectable view, I still consider them, not as law, but as an evidence of the law. And before they can arrive even at that degree of authority, it must appear that they are founded in and confirmed by reason; that they are supported by precedents taken from good and moderate times; that they do not contradict any positive law; that they are submitted to without reluctance by the people; that they are unquestioned by the Legislature (which is equivalent to a tacit confirmation); and what, in my judgment, is by far the most important, that they do not violate the spirit of the Constitution. My lords, this is not a vague or loose expression. We all know what the Constitution is. We all know that the first principle of it is that the subject shall not be governed by the *arbitrium* of any one man or body of men (less than the whole Legislature), but by certain laws, to which he has virtually given his consent, which are open to him to examine, which are not beyond his ability to understand. Now, my lords, I affirm, and am ready to maintain, that the late decision of the House of Commons upon the Middlesex election is destitute of every one of those properties and conditions which I hold to be essential to the legality of such a decision. It is not founded in reason; for it carries with it a contradiction, that the representative should perform the office of the constituent body. It is not supported by a single precedent; for the case of Sir Robert Walpole is but a half precedent, and even that half is imperfect. Incapacity was indeed declared, but his crimes are stated as the ground of the resolution, and his oppo-

ment was declared to be not duly elected, even after his incapacity was established. It contradicts Magna Charta and the Bill of Rights, by which it is provided that no subject shall be deprived of his freehold, unless by the judgment of his peers or, the law of the land; and that elections of members to serve in Parliament shall be free. So far is this decision from being submitted to the people, that they have taken the strongest measures, and adopted the most positive language to express their discontent. Whether it will be questioned by the Legislature will depend upon your lordships' resolution; but that it violates the spirit of the Constitution, will, I think, be disputed by no man who has heard this day's debate, and who wished well to the freedom of his country. Yet, if we are to believe the noble lord, this great grievance, this manifest violation of the first principles of the Constitution, will not admit of a remedy. It is not even capable of redress, unless we appeal at once to heaven! My lords, I have better hopes of the Constitution, and a firmer confidence in the wisdom and constitutional authority of this house. It is to your ancestors, my lords, it is to the English barons, that we are indebted for the laws and Constitution we possess. Their virtues were rude and uncultivated, but they were great and sincere. Their understandings were as little polished as their manners, but they had hearts to distinguish right from wrong; they had heads to distinguish truth from falsehood; they understood the rights of humanity, and they had the spirit to maintain them.

My lords, I think that history has not done justice to their conduct, when they obtained from their sovereign that great acknowledgment of national rights contained in Magna Charta; they did not confine it to themselves alone, but delivered it as a common blessing to the whole people. They did not say, these are the rights of the great barons, or these are the rights of the great prelates. No, my lords, they said, in the simple Latin of the times, *nullus liber homo* (no free man), and provided as carefully for the meanest subject as for the greatest. These are uncouth words, and sound but poorly in the ears of scholars; neither are they addressed to the criticism of scholars, but to the hearts of free men. These three words, *nullus liber homo*, have meaning which interests us all. They deserve to be remembered—they deserve to be inculcated in our minds—they are worth all the classics. Let us not, then, degenerate from the glorious example of our ancestors. Those iron barons

(for so I may call them when compared with the silken barons of modern days) were the guardians of the people; yet their virtues, my lords, were never engaged in a question of such importance as the present. A breach has been made in the Constitution—the battlements are dismantled—the citadel is open to the first invader—the walls totter—the Constitution is not tenable. What remains, then, but for us to stand foremost in the breach, and repair it, or perish in it?

Great pains have been taken to alarm us with the consequences of a difference between the two houses of Parliament; that the House of Commons will resent our presuming to take notice of their proceedings; that they will resent our daring to advise the Crown, and never forgive us for attempting to save the State. My lords, I am sensible of the importance and difficulty of this great crisis; at a moment such as this, we are called upon to do our duty, without dreading the resentment of any man. But if apprehensions of this kind are to affect us, let us consider which we ought to respect the most, the representative or the collective body of the people. My lords, five hundred gentlemen are not ten millions; and if we must have a contention, let us take care to have the English nation on our side. If this question be given up, the freeholders of England are reduced to a condition baser than the peasantry of Poland. If they desert their own cause, they deserve to be slaves! My lords, this is not merely the cold opinion of my understanding, but the glowing expression of what I feel. It is my heart that speaks. I know I speak warmly, my lords; but this warmth shall neither betray my argument nor my temper. The kingdom is in a flame. As mediators between a King and people, is it not our duty to represent to him the true condition and temper of his subjects? It is a duty which no particular respects should hinder us from performing; and whenever his Majesty shall demand our advice, it will then be our duty to inquire more minutely into the cause of the present discontents. Whenever that inquiry shall come on, I pledge myself to the house to prove that, since the first institution of the House of Commons, not a single precedent can be produced to justify their late proceedings. My noble and learned friend [the Lord Chancellor Camden] has pledged himself to the house that he will support that assertion.

My lords, the character and circumstances of Mr. Wilkes have been very improperly introduced into this question, not only

here, but in that court of judicature where his cause was tried—I mean the House of Commons. With one party he was a patriot of the first magnitude; with the other, the vilest incendiary. For my own part, I consider him merely and indifferently as an English subject, possessed of certain rights which the laws have given him, and which the laws alone can take from him. I am neither moved by his private vices nor by his public merits. In his person, though he were the worst of men, I contend for the safety and security of the best. God forbid, my lords, that there should be a power in this country of measuring the civil rights of the subject by his moral character, or by any other rule but the fixed laws of the land! I believe, my lords, I shall not be suspected of any personal partiality to this unhappy man. I am not very conversant in pamphlets and newspapers; but from what I have heard, and from the little I have read, I may venture to affirm that I have had my share in the compliments which have come from that quarter. As for motives of ambition (for I must take to myself a part of the noble Duke's insinuation), I believe, my lords, there have been times in which I have had the honor of standing in such favor in the closet, that there must have been something extravagantly unreasonable in my wishes if they might not all have been gratified. After neglecting those opportunities I am now suspected of coming forward, in the decline of life, in the anxious pursuit of wealth and power which it is impossible for me to enjoy. Be it so! There is one ambition at least, which I ever will acknowledge, which I will not renounce but with my life. It is the ambition of delivering to my posterity those rights of freedom which I have received from my ancestors. I am not now pleading the cause of the individual, but of every freeholder in England. In what manner this house may constitutionally interpose in their defense, and what kind of redress this case will require and admit of, is not at present the subject of our consideration. The amendment, if agreed to, will naturally lead us to such an inquiry. That inquiry may, perhaps, point out the necessity of an act of the Legislature, or it may lead us, perhaps, to desire a conference with the other house; which one noble lord affirms is the only parliamentary way of proceeding, and which another noble lord assures us the House of Commons would either not come to, or would break off with indignation. Leaving their lordships to reconcile that matter between themselves, I shall

only say that, before we have inquired, we cannot be provided with materials; consequently, we are not at present prepared for a conference.

It is not impossible, my lords, that the inquiry I speak of may lead us to advise his Majesty to dissolve the present Parliament; nor have I any doubt of our right to give that advice, if we should think it necessary. His Majesty will then determine whether he will yield to the united petitions of the people of England, or maintain the House of Commons in the exercise of a legislative power which heretofore abolished the House of Lords and overturned the monarchy. I willingly acquit the present House of Commons of having actually formed so detestable a design; but they cannot themselves foresee to what excesses they may be carried hereafter; and, for my own part, I should be sorry to trust to their future moderation. Unlimited power is apt to corrupt the minds of those who possess it; and this I know, my lords, that where law ends, tyranny begins!

CHATHAM'S LAST SPEECH

(From Harsha, after Goodrich)

[On the seventh of April, 1778, Lord Chatham made his appearance, for the last time, in the House of Lords. It is a day memorable for the occurrence of one of the most affecting scenes ever witnessed in Parliament—a day when the great master of modern oratory was overwhelmed by the effort of his own powerful eloquence.

Lord Chatham was ignorant of the real state of feeling in America. He imagined that the colonies might be brought back to their former allegiance to the British Government. He did not wish to see the extensive dominion of old England rent in twain and the independence of America recognized. He could not endure these thoughts. He therefore heard "with unspeakable concern" that the Duke of Richmond intended, on the seventh of April, to move an address to the king, advising him to effect a conciliation with America, involving her independence. Such a measure he thought was disastrous and ruinous to the prosperity and happiness of England. He determined to take a bold stand against it, and, accordingly, was carried to the House of Lords, to raise his voice against the dismemberment of the empire. "He was led into the House of Peers by his son, the Honorable William Pitt, and his son-in-law, Lord Mahon. He was dressed in a rich suit of black velvet, and covered up to the knees in flannel. Within his large wig, little more of his countenance was seen than his aquiline nose and his penetrating eye, which retained all its native fire. He looked like a dying man, yet never was seen a figure of more dignity. He appeared like a being of a superior

species. The lords stood up and made a lane for him to pass to his seat, while, with a gracefulness of deportment for which he was so eminently distinguished, he bowed to them as he proceeded. Having taken his seat, he listened with profound attention to the Duke of Richmond's speech." When Lord Weymouth had finished his reply in behalf of the ministry, Lord Chatham rose with slowness and great difficulty, and delivered the following speech. "Supported by his two relations, he lifted his hand from the crutch on which he leaned, raised it up, and, casting his eyes toward heaven, commenced as follows:"]

I THANK God that I have been enabled to come here to-day to perform my duty, and speak on a subject which is so deeply impressed on my mind. I am old and infirm. I have one foot—more than one foot—in the grave. I have risen from my bed to stand up in the cause of my country—perhaps never again to speak in this house.

["The reverence, the attention, the stillness of the house," said an eyewitness, "were here most affecting: had any one dropped a handkerchief, the noise would have been heard."]

As he proceeded, Lord Chatham spoke at first in a low tone, with all the weakness of one who is laboring under a severe indisposition. Gradually, however, as he warmed with the subject, his voice became louder and more distinct, his intonations grew more commanding, and his whole manner was solemn and impressive in the highest degree.]

"My lords," he exclaimed, "I rejoice that the grave has not closed upon me; that I am still alive, to lift up my voice against the dismemberment of this ancient and most noble monarchy! Pressed down as I am by the hand of infirmity, I am little able to assist my country in this most perilous conjuncture; but, my lords, while I have sense and memory, I will never consent to deprive the offspring of the royal house of Brunswick, the heirs of the Princess Sophia, of their fairest inheritance. Shall we tarnish the lustre of this nation by an ignominious surrender of its rights and fairest possessions? Shall this great nation, that has survived, whole and entire, the Danish depredations, the Scottish inroads, the Norman Conquest—that has stood the threatened invasion of the Spanish Armada, now fall prostrate before the house of Bourbon? Surely, my lords, this nation is no longer what it was! Shall a people that seventeen years ago were the terror of the world now stoop so low as to tell their ancient inveterate enemy, Take all we have, only give us peace? It is impossible.

"In God's name, if it is absolutely necessary to declare either for peace or war, and the former cannot be preserved with honor, why is not the latter commenced without delay? I am not, I confess, well-informed as to the resources of this kingdom, but I trust it has still sufficient to maintain its just rights, though I know them not. But, my lords, any state is better than despair. . Let us at least make one effort, and, if we must fall, let us fall like men!"

[When Lord Chatham had taken his seat Lord Temple said to him, "You have forgotten to mention what we have been talking about. Shall I get up?" "No," replied Lord Chatham, "I will do it by and by."

After the Duke of Richmond had concluded his speech, Lord Chatham made a strenuous attempt to rise, but after repeated efforts to regain an erect position, he suddenly pressed his hand to his heart and fell down in convulsions. The Duke of Cumberland, Lord Temple, Lord Stanford, and other peers caught him in their arms; and his son, the celebrated William Pitt, then a youth of seventeen, sprang forward to support him. The debate was immediately adjourned. Lord Chatham was conveyed in a state of insensibility from the house to his country residence at Hayes, where he lingered a few days, and expired on the eleventh of May, 1778, aged seventy years.]

DR. CHARLES CHAUNCY

(1705-1787)



DISCOURSE of thanksgiving for the repeal of the Stamp Act must, from its historic associations, be interesting to Americans, and particularly so when some parts of it are found to be strikingly suggestive of passages in the speech delivered by Edmund Burke in the House of Commons three years later, showing that the utterances of the colonial clergymen in "the times that tried men's souls" were not without effect in England. Doctor Chauncy's remarks about the Stamp Act seem to have been in the mind of Burke when he made the speech referred to. In this discourse the reader will also find a clear and true statement of the aims of the Colonies up to the last moment when they were forced, in self-defense, to strike for independence. Till then they had no thought of anything but their inherited rights as Englishmen, and aimed at nothing more than some such system of local self-government as Canada now enjoys.

Doctor Chauncy's style is studiously plain, simple, and direct. The only ornamental expressions he allowed himself were apt quotations from the Bible. He was strongly opposed on principle to emotional or exciting oratory, and especially to such preaching as that of Whitefield with the attending religious excitement. He is even said to have expressed a wish that "somebody would translate Milton's 'Paradise Lost' into English," so that he could read it.

He was a descendant of the Charles Chauncy who was the second president of Harvard College. Born in Boston, January 1st, 1705, he was graduated from Harvard in 1721. Ordained soon afterwards, he became pastor of the First Church, Boston, and remained in charge of it until his death, February 10th, 1787.

GOOD NEWS FROM A FAR COUNTRY

(From a "Discourse Delivered on the Occasion of the Repeal of the Stamp Act on a Day of Thanksgiving Appointed by His Excellency the Governor of Massachusetts Bay in New England")

WHAT I have in view is to take occasion to call your attention to some of the important articles contained in the good news we have heard, which so powerfully fit it to excite a pungent sense of pleasure in the breasts of all that inhabit these American lands. The way will then be prepared to point out to you the wisest and best use we can make of these glad tidings "from a far country." . . .

In fine, this news is refreshing to us, "as cold waters to a thirsty soul," as it has affected an alteration in the state of things among us unspeakably to our advantage. There is no way in which we can so strikingly be made sensible of this as by contrasting the state we were lately in, and the much worse one we should soon have been in had the Stamp Act been enforced, with that happy one we are put into by its repeal.

Upon its being made certain to the colonies that the Stamp Act had passed both houses of Parliament and received the king's fiat, a general spirit of uneasiness at once took place, which, gradually increasing, soon discovered itself by the wiser sons of liberty in laudable endeavors to obtain relief; though by others in murmurings and complaints, in anger and clamor, in bitterness, wrath, and strife; and by some evil-minded persons, taking occasion herefor from the general ferment of men's minds, in those violent outrages upon the property of others, which, by being represented in an undue light, may have reflected dishonor upon a country which has an abhorrence of such injurious conduct. The colonies were never before in a state of such discontent, anxiety, and perplexing solicitude; some despairing of a redress, some hoping for it, and all fearing what would be the event. And, had it been the determination of the King and Parliament to have carried the Stamp Act into effect by ships of war and an embarkation of troops, their conditions, however unhappy before, would have been inconceivably more so. They must either have submitted to what they thought an insupportable burden, and have parted with their property without any will of their own, or have stood upon their defense; in either of

which cases their situation must have been deplorably sad. So far as I am able to judge from that firmness of mind and resolution of spirit which appeared among all sorts of persons, as grounded upon this principle, deeply rooted in their minds, that they had a constitutional right to grant their own moneys and to be tried by their peers, 'tis more than probable they would not have submitted unless they had been obliged to do it by superior power. Not that they had a thought in their hearts, as may have been represented, of being an independent people. They esteemed it both their happiness and their glory to be, in common with the inhabitants of England, Scotland, and Ireland, the subjects of King George III., whom they heartily love and honor, and in defense of whose person and crown they would cheerfully expend their treasure and lose even their blood. But it was a sentiment they had imbibed, that they should be wanting neither in loyalty to their King, or a due regard to the British Parliament, if they should not defend those rights which they imagined were inalienable, upon the footing of justice, by any power on earth. And had they, upon this principle, whether ill or well founded, stood upon their defense, what must have been the effect? There would have been opened on this American continent a most doleful scene of outrage, violence, desolation, slaughter, and, in a word, all those terrible evils that may be expected as the attendants on a state of civil war. No language can describe the distresses, in all their various kinds and degrees, which would have made us miserable. God only knows how long they might have continued, and whether they would have ended in anything short of our total ruin. Nor would the mother country, whatever some might imagine, have been untouched with what was doing in the colonies. Those millions that were due from this continent to Great Britain could not have been paid; a stop, a total stop, would have been put to the importation of those manufactures which are the support of thousands at home, often repeated. And would the British merchants and manufacturers have sat easy in such a state of things? There would, it may be, have been as much clamor, wrath, and strife in the very bowels of the nation as in these distant lands; nor could our destruction have been unconnected with consequences at home infinitely to be dreaded.

But the longed-for repeal has scattered our fears, removed our difficulties, enlivened our hearts, and laid the foundation of

future prosperity, equal to the adverse state we should have been in had the act been continued and enforced.

We may now be easy in our minds—contented with our condition. We may be at peace and quiet among ourselves, every one minding his own business. All ground of complaint that we are “sold for bondmen and bondwomen” is removed away, and, instead of being slaves to those who treat us with rigor, we are indulged the full exercise of those liberties which have been transmitted to us as the richest inheritance from our forefathers. We have now greater reason than ever to love, honor, and obey our gracious king, and pay all becoming reverence and respect to his two houses of Parliament; and may with entire confidence rely on their wisdom, lenity, kindness, and power to promote our welfare. We have now, in a word, nothing to “make us afraid,” but may “sit every man under his vine and under his fig-tree,” in the full enjoyment of the many good things we are favored with in the providence of God.

Upon such a change in the state of our circumstances, we should be lost to all sense of duty and gratitude, and act as though we had no understanding, if our hearts did not expand with joy. And, in truth, the danger is lest we should exceed in the expression of it. It may be said of these colonies, as of the Jewish people, upon the repeal of the decree of Ahasuerus, which devoted them to destruction, they “had light and gladness, joy and honor; and in every province, and in every city, whithersoever the king’s commandment and his decree came, they had joy and gladness, a feast day, and a good day”; saying within themselves, “the Lord hath done great things for us, whereof we are glad.” May the remembrance of this memorable repeal be preserved and handed down to future generations, in every province, in every city, and in every family, so as never to be forgotten.

We now proceed—the way being thus prepared for it—to point out the proper use we should make of this “good news from a far country,” which is grateful to us “as cold waters to a thirsty soul.”

We have already had our rejoicings, in the civil sense, upon the “glad tidings” from our mother country; and ’tis to our honor that they were carried on so universally within the bounds of a decent, warrantable regularity. There was never, among us, such a collection of all sorts of people upon any public occasion.

Nor were the methods in which they signified their joy ever so beautifully varied and multiplied; and yet, none had reason to complain of disorderly conduct. The show was seasonably ended, and we had afterwards a perfectly quiet night. There has, indeed, been no public disturbance since the outrage at Lieutenant-Governor Hutchinson's house. That was so detested by town and country, and such a spirit at once so generally stirred up, particularly among the people, to oppose such villainous conduct, as has preserved us ever since in a state of as great freedom from mobbish actions as has been known in the country. Our friends at home, it should seem, have entertained fears lest upon the lenity and condescension of the king and Parliament we should prove ourselves a factious, turbulent people; and our enemies hope we shall. But 'tis not easy to conceive on what the fears of the one or the hopes of the other should be grounded, unless they have received injurious representations of the spirit that lately prevailed in this as well as the other colonies, which was not a spirit to raise needless disturbances, or to commit outrages upon the persons or property of any, though some of those sons of wickedness which are to be found in all places might take occasion from the stand that was made for liberty, to commit violence with a high hand. There has not been, since the repeal, the appearance of a spirit tending to public disorder, nor is there any danger such a spirit should be encouraged or discovered, unless the people should be needlessly and unreasonably irritated by those, who, to serve themselves, might be willing we should gratify such as are our enemies, and make those so who have been our good friends. But, to leave this digression:

Though our civil joy has been expressed in a decent, orderly way, it would be but a poor, pitiful thing should we rest here, and not make our religious, grateful acknowledgments to the Supreme Ruler of the world, to whose superintending providence it is principally to be ascribed that we have had "given us so great deliverance." Whatever were the means or instruments in order to do this, that glorious being, whose throne is in the heavens, and whose kingdom ruleth over all, had the chief hand therein. He sat at the helm, and so governed all things relative to it as to bring it to this happy issue. It was under his allwise, overruling influence that a spirit was raised in all the colonies nobly to assert their freedom as men and English-born subjects—a spirit which, in the course of its operation, was highly serv-

iceable, not by any irregularities it might be the occasion of (in this imperfect state they will, more or less, mix themselves with everything great and good), but by its manly efforts setting forth the reasons they had for complaint in a fair, just, and strongly convincing light, hereby awakening the attention of Great Britain, opening the eyes of the merchants and manufacturers there, and engaging them, for their own interest as well as that of America, to exert themselves in all reasonable ways to help us. It was under the same all-governing influence that the late ministry, full of projections tending to the hurt of these colonies, was so seasonably changed into the present patriotic one, which is happily disposed, in all the methods of wisdom, to promote our welfare. It was under the same influence still that so many friends of eminent character were raised up and spirited to appear advocates in our behalf, and plead our cause with irresistible force. It was under the same influence, also, that the heart of our king and the British Parliament were so turned in favor to us as to reverse that decree which, had it been established, would have thrown this whole continent, if not the nation itself, into a state of the utmost confusion. In short, it was ultimately owing to this influence of the God of heaven that the thoughts, the views, the purposes, the speeches, the writings, and the whole conduct of all who were engaged in this great affair were so overruled as to bring into effect the desired happy event.

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LORD CHESTERFIELD

(PHILIP DORMER STANHOPE, FOURTH EARL OF
CHESTERFIELD)

(1694-1773)

THAT history repeats itself, even in the matter of political agitations, is very plainly manifested in the speech on the Gin Act, delivered by Lord Chesterfield in the House of Lords in 1743. In it we find the arguments which have been made so familiar to the voters of America since the Prohibition movement began to figure in our politics more than fifty years ago. Lord Chesterfield on this occasion may have been more intent on harassing the ministry than on abolishing the liquor traffic, but no one has greatly improved upon his argument. He was a cultivated and trained statesman, a diplomat and man of affairs, as well as a man of fashion. He became Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland in 1744. Through his famous 'Letters to His Son,' which for more than a hundred years have been put into the hands of young persons going into society, his name has long been "a household word" in England and America, and all the world has read the famous letter written by him to Doctor Johnson. He was born in London, September 22d, 1694, and died March 24th, 1773.

AGAINST REVENUES FROM DRUNKENNESS AND VICE

(From the Speech on the Gin Act Delivered in the House of Lords,
February 21st, 1743)

TO PRETEND, my lords, that the design of this bill is to prevent or diminish the use of spirits is to trample on common sense and to violate the rules of decency as well as of reason. For when did any man hear that a commodity was prohibited by licensing its sale, or that to offer and refuse is the same action?

It is indeed pleaded that it will be made dearer by the tax which is proposed, and that the increase of the price will diminish the number of the purchasers; but it is at the same time expected that this tax shall supply the expense of a war on the

Continent. It is asserted, therefore, that the consumption of spirits will be hindered; and yet that it will be such as may be expected to furnish, from a very small tax, a revenue sufficient for the support of armies, or the re-establishment of the Austrian family, and the repressing of the attempts of France.

Surely, my lords, these expectations are not very consistent; nor can it be imagined that they are both formed in the same head, though they may be expressed by the same mouth. It is, however, some recommendation of a statesman, when, of his assertions, one can be found reasonable or true; and in this, praise cannot be denied to our present ministers. For though it is undoubtedly false that this tax will lessen the consumption of spirits, it is certainly true that it will produce a very large revenue—a revenue that will not fail but with the people from whose debaucheries it arises.

Our ministers will therefore have the same honor with their predecessors, of having given rise to a new fund; not indeed for the payment of our debts, but for much more valuable purposes; for the cheering of our hearts under oppression, and for the ready support of those debts which we have lost all hopes of paying. They are resolved, my lords, that the nation which no endeavors can make wise, shall, while they are at its head, at least be very merry; and, since public happiness is the end of government, they seem to imagine that they shall deserve applause by an expedient which will enable every man to lay his cares to sleep, to drown sorrow, and lose in the delights of drunkenness both the public miseries and his own.

Luxury, my lords, is to be taxed, but vice prohibited, let the difficulties in executing the law be what they will. Would you lay a tax on the breach of the ten commandments? Would not such a tax be wicked and scandalous; because it would imply an indulgence to all those who could pay the tax? Is not this a reproach most justly thrown by the Protestants upon the Church of Rome? Was it not the chief cause of the Reformation? And will you follow a precedent which brought reproach and ruin upon those that introduced it? This is the very case now before you. You are going to lay a tax, and consequently to indulge a sort of drunkenness, which almost necessarily produces a breach of every one of the ten commandments. Can you expect the reverend bench will approve of this. I am convinced they will not; and therefore I wish I had seen it full upon this occasion.

I am sure I have seen it much fuller upon other occasions, in which religion had no such deep concern.

We have already, my lords, several sorts of funds in this nation, so many that a man must have a good deal of learning to be master of them. Thanks to his Majesty, we have now among us the most learned man of the nation in this way. I wish he would rise up and tell us what name we are to give this new fund. We have already the Civil List Fund, the Sinking Fund, the Aggregate Fund, the South Sea Fund, and God knows how many others. What name we are to give this new fund I know not, unless we are to call it the Drinking Fund. It may, perhaps, enable the people of a certain foreign territory [Hanover] to drink claret, but it will disable the people of this kingdom from drinking anything else but gin; for when a man has, by gin drinking, rendered himself unfit for labor or business, he can purchase nothing else; and then the best thing for him to do is to drink on till he dies.

Surely, my lords, men of such unbounded benevolence as our present ministers deserve such honors as were never paid before; they deserve to bstride a butt upon every signpost in the city, or to have their figures exhibited as tokens where this liquor is to be sold by the license which they have procured. They must be at least remembered to future ages as the "happy politicians" who, after all expedients for raising taxes had been employed, discovered a new method of draining the last relics of the public wealth, and added a new revenue to the Government. Nor will those who shall hereafter enumerate the several funds now established among us, forget, among the benefactors to their country, the illustrious authors of the Drinking Fund.

May I be allowed, my lords, to congratulate my countrymen and fellow-subjects upon the happy times which are now approaching, in which no man will be disqualified from the privilege of being drunk; when all discontent and disloyalty shall be forgotten, and the people, though now considered by the ministry as enemies, shall acknowledge the leniency of that government under which all restraints are taken away?

But, to a bill for such desirable purposes, it would be proper, my lords, to prefix a preamble, in which the kindness of our intentions should be more fully explained, that the nation may not mistake our indulgence for cruelty, not consider their benefactors as their persecutors. If, therefore, this bill be considered and

amended (for why else should it be considered?) in a committee, I shall humbly propose that it shall be introduced in this manner: "Whereas the designs of the present ministry, whatever they are, cannot be executed without a great number of mercenaries, which mercenaries cannot be hired without money; and whereas the present disposition of this nation to drunkenness inclines us to believe that they will pay more cheerfully for the undisturbed enjoyment of distilled liquors than for any other concession that can be made by the Government; be it enacted by the King's most excellent Majesty, that no man shall hereafter be denied the right of being drunk on the following conditions."

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The specious pretense on which this bill is founded, and, indeed, the only pretense that deserves to be termed specious, is the propriety of taxing vice; but this maxim of government has, on this occasion, been either mistaken or perverted. Vice, my lords, is not properly to be taxed, but suppressed; and heavy taxes are sometimes the only means by which that suppression can be attained. Luxury, my lords, or the excess of that which is pernicious only by excess, may very properly be taxed, that such excess, though not strictly unlawful, may be made more difficult. But the use of those things which are simply hurtful, hurtful in their own nature, and in every degree, is to be prohibited. None, my lords, ever heard, in any nation, of a tax upon theft or adultery, because a tax implies a license granted for the use of that which is taxed to all who shall be willing to pay it.

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The noble lord has been pleased kindly to inform us that the trade of distilling is very extensive; that it employs great numbers; and that they have arrived at an exquisite skill, and therefore—note well the consequence—the trade of distilling is not to be discouraged.

Once more, my lords, allow me to wonder at the different conceptions of different understandings. It appears to me that since the spirits which the distillers produce are allowed to enfeeble the limbs and vitiate the blood, to pervert the heart and obscure the intellects, that the number of distillers should be no argument in their favor; for I never heard that a law against theft was repealed or delayed because thieves were numerous. It appears to me, my lords, that if so formidable a body are confederated against the virtue or the lives of their fellow-citizens, it is time

to put an end to the havoc, and to interpose while it is yet in our power to stop the destruction.

So little, my lords, am I afflicted with the merit of this wonderful skill which the distillers are said to have attained, that it is, in my opinion, no faculty of great use to mankind to prepare palatable poison; nor shall I ever contribute my interest for the reprieve of a murderer, because he has, by long practice, obtained great dexterity in his trade.

If their liquors are so delicious that the people are tempted to their own destruction, let us at length, my lords, secure them from these fatal draughts, by bursting the vials that contain them. Let us crush at once these artists in slaughter, who have reconciled their countrymen to sickness and to ruin, and spread over the pitfalls of debauchery such baits as cannot be resisted.

The noble lord has, indeed, admitted that this bill may not be found sufficiently coercive, but gives us hopes that it may be improved and enforced another year, and persuades us to endeavor a reformation of drunkenness by degrees, and, above all, to beware at present of hurting the manufacture.

I am very far, my lords, from thinking that there are, this year, any peculiar reasons for tolerating murder; nor can I conceive why the manufacture should be held sacred now, if it be to be destroyed hereafter. We are, indeed, desired to try how far this law will operate, that we may be more able to proceed with due regard to this valuable manufacture.

With regard to the operation of the law, it appears to me that it will only enrich the government without reforming the people; and I believe there are not many of a different opinion. If any diminution of the sale of spirits be expected from it, it is to be considered that this diminution will, or will not, be such as is desired for the reformation of the people. If it be sufficient, the manufacture is at an end, and all the reasons against the higher duties are of equal force against this; but if it be not sufficient, we have, at least, omitted part of our duty, and have neglected the health and virtue of the people. . . .

When I consider, my lords, the tendency of this bill, I find it calculated only for the propagation of diseases, the suppression of industry, and the destruction of mankind. I find it the most fatal engine that ever was pointed at a people; an engine by which those who are not killed will be disabled, and those who preserve their limbs will be deprived of their senses.

This bill, therefore, appears to be designed only to thin the ranks of mankind, and to disburden the world of the multitudes that inhabit it; and is perhaps the strongest proof of political sagacity that our new ministers have yet exhibited. They well know, my lords, that they are universally detested, and that, whenever a Briton is destroyed, they are freed from an enemy; they have therefore opened the flood gates of gin upon the nation that, when it is less numerous, it may be more easily governed.

Other ministers, my lords, who had not attained to so great a knowledge in the art of making war upon their country, when they found their enemies clamorous and bold, used to awe them with prosecutions and penalties, or destroy them like burglars, with prisons and with gibbets. But every age, my lords, produces some improvement; and every nation, however degenerate, gives birth, at some happy period of time, to men of great and enterprising genius. It is our fortune to be witnesses of a new discovery in politics. We may congratulate ourselves upon being contemporaries with those men who have shown that hangmen and halters are unnecessary in a State and that ministers may escape the reproach of destroying their enemies by inciting them to destroy themselves.

This new method may, indeed, have upon different constitutions a different operation; it may destroy the lives of some and the senses of others; but either of these effects will answer the purposes of the ministry, to whom it is indifferent, provided the nation becomes insensible, whether pestilence or lunacy prevails among them. Either mad or dead the greatest part of the people must quickly be, or there is no hope of the continuance of the present ministry.

For this purpose, my lords, what could have been invented more efficacious than an establishment of a certain number of shops at which poison may be vended—poison so prepared as to please the palate, while it wastes the strength, and only kills by intoxication? From the first instant that any of the enemies of the ministry shall grow clamorous and turbulent, a crafty hireling may lead him to the ministerial slaughterhouse and ply him with their wonder-working liquor till he is no longer able to speak or think, and, my lords, no man can be more agreeable to our ministers that he can neither speak nor think, except those who speak without thinking.

LANGDON CHEVES

(1776-1857)

WHAT we call "self-made" or "self-educated" men in America are very often the best-educated men of their generation. Such was Langdon Cheves, as were Benjamin Franklin, Horace Greeley, Abraham Lincoln, and so many others. A clerk in a mercantile house, he began to study law with very little education and very little encouragement from his friends. Nevertheless, in 1808, before he had been eleven years at the bar, his income from his practice exceeded twenty thousand dollars a year, a very remarkable achievement for a lawyer in South Carolina at that time. His manner of speaking must have been very impressive. After hearing him deliver a learned and eloquent speech in Congress in 1811, Washington Irving said it gave him, for the first time, a distinct idea of the manner in which the great Greek and Roman orators must have spoken.

He served in Congress as a "War Democrat" from 1811 to 1816, and was elected Speaker over Felix Grundy, January 19th, 1814, when Henry Clay was sent as a peace commissioner to Ghent. As Speaker he defeated Dallas's scheme to recharter the United States Bank. In 1819 when the bank had been ruined by mismanagement, Mr. Cheves became its president, restored its credit in three years, and resigned his position in 1822. Thenceforward until his death in 1857 he lived in retirement on his South Carolina plantation.

IN FAVOR OF A STRONGER NAVY

(From a Speech in Congress, January 1812)

IT HAS been said, by a strong and lively figure of rhetoric, that this country is a great land animal, which should not venture into the water. But if you look at its broad high back, the Alleghanies, and its great sides swelling to the east and to the west, where do you find its immense limbs terminate? Not on some great plain which has been formed for their reception, but in two great oceans, the Pacific on the one side and the Atlantic

on the other. The figure explains the true interests of the country, in the inseparable union and necessary dependence of agriculture and commerce. The God of Nature did not give to the United States a coast of two thousand miles in extent, not to be used. No; it was intended by this bounty to make us a great commercial people; and shall we ungratefully reject the enjoyment of his unexampled beneficence? No; it has not and will not be neglected. A great portion of our people exists but upon the ocean and its fruits. It has been eloquently, and not less truly than eloquently, said, that "the ocean is their farm," and it must and will be protected. But how is this protection to be afforded? I will endeavor to prove that it can be done, and done most cheaply and effectually by a naval force; and if I succeed in this, I shall hope for the concurrence of the committee. No proposition appears to me more true or more obvious than that it is only by a naval force that our commerce and our neutral rights on the ocean can be protected. We are now going to war for the protection of these rights; but in what way, and under what circumstances? The mode is altogether accidental, and not founded on the permanent relations or means of the country. It is not my intention to condemn the course which has been taken. It has had my hearty concurrence, and my zealous, though feeble, support. I hope it may be altogether effectual; and I believe it will inflict a wound which will be felt with poignancy. But it is, notwithstanding, partial and accidental; for, if Great Britain had not the Canadas on our borders, how could we attack or resist her, armed as we are? If we possess ourselves of the Canadas, and this we shall certainly do in the event of war, how and where shall we then continue the war without a naval force? We shall suffer the evils of war, without inflicting any of them on the enemy. We cannot send our regulars or our volunteers on the ocean. Does it not then result, inevitably, as the dictate of common prudence, that we should, as soon as possible, commence our naval preparations? The Naval Establishment of the United States has been heretofore so much neglected that it is at present in a state of lamentable depression; and the question now is, whether we will suffer it to go down entirely, or attempt to raise it up to some degree of respectability. Some gentlemen say, "If you had asked for no more than the reparation of the frigates in ordinary, we might have granted your request." But, for myself, I would not

thank any gentleman for this concession. The select committee conceived it to be their duty to bring the question fully before the House in the shape in which they have exposed it. Not to ask merely what it would do to assist by naval co-operation, in the first efforts of the contemplated struggle, but principally what it would do towards establishing and perpetuating a respectable naval force for the protection of those important rights of the people, which are, and must continue, exposed upon the ocean. Their determination was plainly, candidly, and boldly to speak to the House, and through it to the nation, on this great question, and leave its fate to the wisdom of the one and the good sense of the other.

That a respectable naval establishment affords the only effectual means of causing our commercial rights to be respected, will, as a general proposition, be denied by few persons, if any. But its adoption by us is deemed improper by those who oppose it, on the grounds of the enormous expense which, it is said, the establishment will necessitate, and the inability of the nation, by any force which it can provide, to resist with effect the immense naval power of Great Britain. Is it not surprising that so much prejudice should exist against this establishment on account of its expensiveness when it is ascertained that, during the whole eighteen years of its existence, from 1794 to 1811, inclusive, it has cost the Government only \$27,175,695? I am afraid I shall be tedious, because the only way in which I hope to bring conviction home to the minds of the House is by entering, with minuteness and precision, into a dry detail of figures and statements; but the necessity of the case must be my apology for the course which I shall take. If the House shall have full confidence in my statements, much will be gained to the argument; for it will be difficult, if not impossible, for the hearer to follow me through an examination of these details as the argument proceeds. For this confidence, therefore, I will venture to hope. I believe the statements on which I rely to be accurate, as far as accuracy is material to the discussion. I will state them with candor, and, when I have concluded, I will put them into the hands of gentlemen who may wish to examine them for their own satisfaction, or to refute them. The average annual expense of this establishment, so much censured for its wasteful and improvident management, has but little exceeded \$1,500,000, which is not much more than twice the amount of the usual annual

appropriation for our economical Civil List. It has been generally supposed that it has been much more expensive than the military establishment, but I will show that this is not really the case. The expense of the military establishment from 1791 to 1811, inclusive, has been \$37,541,669, giving an annual average of \$1,700,000 or \$200,000 per annum more than that of the Navy. It thus appears that in the gross amount, as well as in the annual expenditure, the Army has been more expensive than the Navy. Compare, too, the services of the Army with those of the Navy, and it will be found that those of the latter have been most useful and most honorable to the nation. I know of no service of this character which the Army has performed, except the defeat of the Indians by General Wayne, and the late gallant affair on the Wabash. The Navy, in the contest with France in 1798, was victorious wherever it encountered the enemy, and probably laid the foundation of the subsequent accommodation with that nation. In the Mediterranean its exploits gave a name to the country throughout Europe; humbled, in an unexampled manner, the piratical and barbarous foe, and crowned itself with a reputation for intrepidity and heroism which had not been exceeded by the exploits of any nation and which must go down to a distant posterity. I mean not by this comparison to say anything injurious to the Army, but only to declare that preference to which I think the naval services of the country are entitled. Admitting, if it be desired, that the Navy has heretofore occasioned an expense not warranted by its force or its services,—and I cannot deny but that from a variety of causes the expense may have been unnecessarily great,—an argument cannot thence be fairly drawn against its future use—the contrary is the fair conclusion. Past errors lay the foundation of future improvement. It was thus the greatest orator and one of the greatest statesmen of antiquity reasoned. The great Athenian orator, when rousing his countrymen, by his impetuous eloquence, to resist the ambition of Philip, declared that it was on their past misconduct that he built his highest hopes; for, said he, “were we thus distressed, in spite of every vigorous effort which the honor of our State demanded, there were then no hopes of recovery.” So may we reason in this case; for had these extraordinary expenses been the result of good economy, then, indeed, would their diminution be hopeless; but, as they have proceeded from a wasteful or unskillful expenditure, the remedy will be found in a reform of

the abuse; to effect this reform is the duty of Congress. But it has not only been less expensive than the Army, but it may be proved, as the committee have declared in their report, that "a naval force within due limits and under proper regulations, will constitute the cheapest defense of the nation." This will be partly proved by a comparison between the expense of the permanent fortifications of our maritime frontier and that of an adequate naval defense. The experience of modern naval warfare has proved that no fortifications can prevent the passage of ships of war. The present fortifications of our maritime frontier, though they are more numerous and better than they have been at any other period in our history, cannot prevent an inconsiderable naval force from laying many of our towns in ashes. Indeed, it is believed that no fortifications which can be erected will afford a complete protection against such attacks, while their expense would be oppressive to the nation. The city of New York alone, if completely fortified, would require a further expenditure of three millions of dollars, and a garrison of ten thousand men, and then might be laid in ashes by four or five seventy-fours. But we have a coast of two thousand miles to protect, the expense of which could not be borne by the nation. A better defense would be furnished by such a naval force as would give you a mastery in the American seas, and at home much less expense. . . .

But, while it is contended by some that it will not be in the power of the nation to establish an effective naval force, there are others who are opposed to it, lest we become too great a naval power. They fear that our fleets will cover the ocean, and, seeking victory on all the opposite shores of the Atlantic, involve the nation in oppressive expenses and in wanton and habitual wars. Such objects are certainly not contemplated by the report of the committee, nor can such events possibly happen as long as we remain a free people. The committee have recommended such a Navy as will give to the United States an ascendancy in the American seas and protect their ports and harbors. The people will never bear the establishment of a greater force than these objects require. The reasons which forbid Great Britain, or any other European power, to station large fleets on our seas will equally forbid us to cross the Atlantic or go into distant seas for the purpose of frequent or habitual wars.

WILLIAM CHILLINGWORTH

(1602-1644)



PROBABLY the most famous preacher and author in the Church of England during the reign of Charles I. was William Chillingworth, pronounced by Tillotson "the glory of his age and nation," by Lord Mansfield "a perfect model of argumentation," and by Locke "a model of perspicuity and right reasoning." A native of Oxford, he was graduated in 1620, and obtained a Trinity College fellowship. The most famous of his works 'The Religion of Protestants a Safe Way to Salvation,' published in 1637, passed through two editions in less than five months, and brought him a succession of preferments the following year. His ardent loyalty carried him into the Royalist army at the beginning of the civil war. He was made a prisoner by Waller at Arundel Castle in December 1643, and died during the following January.

FALSE PRETENSES

LET a book that treats of the philosopher's stone promise never so many mountains of gold, and even the restoring of the Golden Age again, yet were it no marvel if few should study it; and the reason is, because few would believe it. But if there were a book extant, and ordinary to be had, as the Bible is, which men did generally believe to contain a plain and easy way for all men to become rich, and to live in health and pleasure, and this world's happiness, can any man imagine that this book would be unstudied by any man? And why, then, should I not believe that if the Scripture were firmly and heartily believed to be the certain and only way to happiness which is perfect and eternal, it would be studied by all men with all diligence? Seeing, therefore, most Christians are so cold and negligent in the study of it, prefer all other business, all other pleasures before it, is there not great reason to fear that many who pretend to believe it firmly believe it not at all, or very weakly and faintly? If the general of an army, or an ambassador to some prince or state, were assured by the king, his master, that the transgressing

any point of his commission should cost him his life, and the exact performance of it be recompensed with as high a reward as were in the king's power to bestow upon him, can it be imagined that any man who believes this, and is in his right mind, can be so supinely and stupidly negligent of this charge, which so much imports him, as to oversee, through want of care, any one necessary article or part of his commission, especially if it be delivered to him in writing, and at his pleasure to peruse it every day? Certainly this absurd negligence is a thing without example, and such as peradventure will never happen to any sober man to the world's end; and, by the same reason, if we were firmly persuaded that this book doth indeed contain that charge and commission which infinitely more concerns us, it were not in reason possible but that to such a persuasion our care and diligence about it should be in some measure answerable. Seeing, therefore, most of us are so strangely careless, so grossly negligent of it, is there not great reason to fear that though we have professors and protesters in abundance, yet the faithful, the truly and sincerely faithful, are, in a manner, failed from the children of men? What but this can be the cause that men are so commonly ignorant of so many articles and particular mandates of it, which yet are as manifest in it as if they were written with the beams of the sun? For example, how few of our ladies and gentlewomen do or will understand that a voluptuous life is damnable and prohibited to them? Yet St. Paul saith so very plainly, "She that liveth in pleasure is dead while she liveth." I believe that this case directly regards not the sex: he would say he, as well as she, if there had been occasion. How few of the gallants of our time do or will understand that it is not lawful for them to be as expensive and costly in apparel as their means, or perhaps their credit, will extend unto? Which is to sacrifice unto vanity that which by the law of Christ is due unto charity; and yet the same St. Paul forbids plainly this excess, even to women—"Also let women (he would have said it much rather to men) array themselves in comely apparel, with shamefacedness and modesty, not with embroidered hair, or gold, or pearls, or costly apparel." And, to make our ignorance the more inexcusable, the very same rule is delivered by St. Peter also.

How few rich men are or will be persuaded that the law of Christ permits them not to heap up riches forever, nor perpetually to add house to house, and land to land, though by lawful

means; but requires of them thus much charity at least, that ever, while they are providing for their wives and children, they should, out of the increase wherewith God hath blessed their industry, allot the poor a just and free proportion? And when they have provided for them in a convenient manner (such as they themselves shall judge sufficient and convenient in others), that then they should give over making purchase after purchase; but with the surplusage of their revenue beyond their expense, procure, as much as lies in them, that no Christian remain miserably poor. Few rich men, I fear, are or will be thus persuaded, and their daily actions show as much; yet, undoubtedly, either our Savior's general command, of loving our neighbors as ourselves, which can hardly consist with our keeping vainly, or spending vainly, what he wants for his ordinary subsistence, lays upon us a necessity of this high liberality: or his special command concerning this matter; *Quod superest date pauperibus*, "That which remains give to the poor:" or that which St. John saith reacheth home unto it: "Whosoever hath this world's good, and seeth his brother have need, and shutteth up the bowels of his compassion from him, how dwelleth the love of God in him?" Which is, in effect, as if he had said, He that keepeth from any brother in Christ that which his brother wants, and he wants not, doth but vainly think that he loves God; and therefore vainly hopes that God loves him.

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JOSEPH HODGES CHOATE

(1832-)

WHEN an American acquires such a national reputation as an orator and publicist as to be chosen Ambassador to the Court of St. James, pending a war between the United States and Spain, the natural presumption is that he has made his reputation in Congress or in some other direct official connection with public affairs. But Joseph H. Choate had shunned office. It is the speeches he has made as a patriotic orator, and in famous cases at the bar, that have placed him in the front rank of our living speakers and public counselors. His style is clear and chaste but pregnant and pointed, characterized always by tact and good taste, and often by sallies of brilliant wit.

He was born at Salem, Massachusetts, January 24th, 1832. Graduated from Harvard in 1852, and at law in 1854, he has practiced his profession in New York since 1856. His connection with cases that attracted the attention of the whole country, and the New York habit of pressing his oratory into the public service on all great occasions, has made him President of the New England Society, President of the Union League Club, and at last Ambassador to London. His eulogy of the heroic record and traditions of our navy in the Farragut oration has been vindicated by more recent achievements of our squadrons.

FARRAGUT

(An Address Made at the Request of the Farragut Monument Association at the Unveiling of the Saint-Gaudens Statue, May 25th, 1881)

THE fame of naval heroes has always captivated and charmed the imaginations of men. The romance of the sea that hangs about them, their picturesque and dramatic achievements, the deadly perils that surround them, their loyalty to the flag that floats over them, their triumphs snatched from the jaws of defeat, and death in the hour of victory, inspire a warmer enthusiasm and a livelier sympathy than is awarded to equal deeds on land. Who can read with dry eyes the story of Nelson, in the supreme moment of victory at Trafalgar, dying in the cockpit of his flagship, embracing his beloved comrade with, "Kiss

me, Hardy! Thank God I have done my duty," on his fainting lips, bidding the world good-night, and turning over like a tired child to sleep and wake no more? What American heart has not been touched by that kindred picture of Lawrence, expiring in the cabin of the beaten Chesapeake, with "Don't give up the ship" on his dying lips? What schoolboy has not treasured up in his memory the bloody fight of Paul Jones with the *Serapis*, the gallant exploits of Perry on Lake Erie, of McDonough on Lake Champlain, and the other bright deeds which have illuminated the brief annals of the American Navy.

We come together to-day to recall the memory and to crown the statue of one of the dearest of these idols of mankind—of one who has done more for us than all of them combined—of one whose name will ever stir, like a trumpet, the hearts of his grateful countrymen.

In the first year of the century,—at the very time when the great English admiral was wearing fresh laurels for winning in defiance of orders the once lost battle of the Baltic, the bloodiest picture in the book of naval warfare,—there was born on a humble farm in the unexplored wilderness of Tennessee a child who was sixty years afterwards to do for Americans what England's idol had just then done for her, to rescue her in an hour of supreme peril, and to win a renown which should not fade or be dim in comparison with that of the most famous of the sea kings of the old world. For though there were many great admirals before Farragut, it will be hard to find one whose life and fortunes combine more of those elements which command the enduring admiration and approval of his fellow-men. He was as good as he was great; as game as he was mild, and as mild as he was game; as skillful as he was successful; as full of human sympathy and kindness as he was of manly wisdom, and as unselfish as he was patriotic. So long as the Republic which he served and helped to save shall endure, his memory must be dear to every lover of his country; and so long as this great city continues to be the gateway of the nation and the centre of its commerce, it must preserve and honor his statue, which to-day we dedicate to the coming generations.

To trace the career of Farragut is to go back to the very infancy of the nation. His father, a brave soldier of the Revolution, was not of the Anglo-Saxon race for which we are wont to assert a monopoly of the manly virtues, but of that

Spanish race, which in all times has produced good fighters on sea and land. His mother must have been a woman fit to bear and suckle heroes, for his earliest recollection of her was upon the occasion when, ax in hand, in the absence of her husband, she defended her cottage and her helpless brood of little ones against an attack of marauding Indians who were seeking their scalps. Like all heroes then, he was born brave, and got his courage from his father's loins and his mother's milk. The death of the mother and the removal of the father to New Orleans, where he was placed by the Government in command of the naval station, introduced the boy to the very scenes where, more than half a century afterwards, some of the highest of his proud laurels were to be won, and led him, by a singular providence, to the final choice of his profession at an age when children generally are just beginning their schooling. The father of the renowned Commodore David Porter happened to fall ill and die under the roof of Farragut's father, and his illustrious son, whose heart o'erflowed with gratitude for the hospitable kindness which had welcomed his dying father, announced his intention to adopt a child of that house and to train him up in his own profession.

That happy conjunction of great merit with good fortune which attended the future admiral through his whole life was nowhere more signally marked than in the circumstance which thus threw together the veteran naval commander, already famous and soon to win a world-wide fame for skill and daring and enterprise and the boy who in his own last years was destined to eclipse the glory of his patron and to enchant the world with still more brilliant exploits.

The influence of such a spirit and character as Porter's on that of a dutiful, ardent, and ambitious boy like Farragut, cannot be overestimated. It was not a mere nominal adoption. Porter took him from his home and became his second father, and with him the boy lived and studied and cruised and fought. Having ever before him an example worthy of himself, no wonder that he aspired to place himself, at last, at the head of the profession into which his introduction had been under such auspices. Behold him, then, at the tender age of nine years the happy recipient of a midshipman's warrant in the United States navy, bearing date December 17th, 1810; and two years later, at the breaking out of the war with Great Britain, making his first cruise with his noble patron, who, as Captain Porter, now took

command of the Essex, whose name he was to render immortal by his achievements under her flag. It was in this severe school of active and important service that Midshipman Farragut learned almost in infancy those first lessons in seamanship and war which he afterwards turned to practical account in wider fields and more dangerous enterprises. His faithful study of all the details of his profession, guided and inspired by that ever-present sense of duty, which was the most marked characteristic of his life, prepared him step by step for any service in the line of that profession which time or chance might happen to bring, and when at last in March 1814 the gallant little frigate met her fate in that spirited and bloody encounter with the British frigate Phebe and the ship of war Cherub, off the port of Valparaiso (a contest which brought new fame to the American navy as well as to all who bore a part in it), the boy of twelve, receiving an actual baptism of fire and blood, was found equal to the work of a man. He seems never to have known what fear was. If nerve makes the man, he was already as good as made. He thus describes this first of his great fights in his modest journal:—

“During the action, I was like Paddy in the Catharpins. A man on occasions, I performed the duties of captain’s aid, quarter gunner, powder boy, and in fact did everything required of me. I shall never forget the horrid impression made upon me at the sight of the first man I had ever seen killed. It staggered and sickened me at first, but they soon began to fall around me so fast, that it all appeared like a dream, and produced no effect on my nerves. I can remember well, while I was standing near the captain just abaft the mainmast, a shot came through the waterways and glanced upwards, killing four men who were standing by the side of the gun, taking the last one in the head and scattering his brains on both of us. But this awful sight did not affect me half as much as the death of the first poor fellow. I neither thought of nor noticed anything but the working of the guns.”

He never was in battle again until forty-eight years afterwards, when he astounded the world by the capture of New Orleans; but who can doubt that that memorable day in the Essex, when her plucky commander fought her against hopeless odds, only lowering his colors when she was already sinking, with all but one of her officers and more than half of her crew on the list of killed and wounded, was a life-long inspiration to his

courage and loyalty; that it planted forever in the heart of the boy that starry flag, which as an old man he was to bear, at last, through bloodier conflicts still to final victory. . . .

The traditions of the little American navy of that early day were proud and glorious ones, and well calculated to fire a youthful heart with generous enthusiasm. It had carried off the honors of the war, and on the lakes and on the ocean, in skill, pluck, and endurance; had coped successfully with the proud flag of England—the undisputed mistress of the seas—arrogant with the prestige of centuries, and fresh from the conquest of her ancient rivals. Its successful commanders were recognized as heroes alike by their grateful countrymen and by a generous foe, and furnished examples fit to be followed and imitated by the young and unknown midshipman, whose renown was one day to cast all theirs in the shade. It was neither by lucky accident nor political favor, nor simply by growing old in the service, that Farragut came in time to be the recognized head of his profession. From the first he studied seamanship and the laws of naval warfare as a science, and put his conscience into his work, as well in the least details as in the great principles of the business. So as he rose in rank he grew in power too, and never once was found unequal to any task imposed upon him. Self-reliance appears to have been the great staple of his character. Thrown upon his own exertions from the beginning, buoyed up by no fortune, advanced by no favor, he worked his way to the quarter-deck, and by the single-hearted pursuit of his profession was master of all its resources and ready to perform great deeds, if a day for the great deeds should ever come. Had that protracted and inglorious era of peace and compromise, which began with his early manhood and ended with the election of Lincoln, been continued for another decade, he would have passed into history without fame, but without reproach, as a brave and competent officer, but undistinguished in that bright catalogue of manly virtue and of stainless honor, which forms the muster roll of the American navy. But when treason reared its ugly head and by the guns of Fort Sumter roused from its long slumber the sleeping courage of the nation to avenge that insulted flag—that flag which from childhood to old age he had borne in honor over every sea and into the ports of every nation—his country found him ready and with his armor on, and found among all her champions no younger heart, no cooler

head, no steadier nerve, than in the veteran captain, who brought to her services a natural genius for fighting and a mind well stored with the rich experience of a well-spent life. And then, at last, all of that half century of patient waiting and of faithful study bore its glorious fruit.

Much as the country owes to Farragut for the matchless services which his brain and courage rendered in the day of her peril, she is still more indebted to him for the unconditional loyalty of his large and generous heart. Born, bred, and married in the South, with no friends and hardly an acquaintance except in the South, his sympathy must all have been with her. "God forbid," he said, "that I should have ever to raise my hand against the South." The approaching outbreak of hostilities found him on waiting orders at his home at Norfolk, surrounded by every influence that could put his loyalty to the test, in the midst of officers of the army and the navy all sworn, like him, to uphold the flag of the Republic, but almost to a man meditating treason against it. Could there have been a peaceful separation, could those erring sisters have been permitted, as at least one great Northern patriot then insisted they should, to depart in peace, he would doubtless have gone with his State, but with a heart broken by the rupture of his country. But when the manifest destiny of America forbade that folly, there was but one course for Farragut, and there is no evidence that his loyalty ever for a moment faltered. . . . At ten o'clock in the morning of the eighteenth of April, 1861, news came to Norfolk that the ordinance of secession had passed—and Farragut's mind was made up; he announced to his faithful wife that for his part, come what might, he was going to stick to the flag; and at five o'clock in the afternoon he had packed their carpetbags and taken the first steamboat for the North. That "Stick to the Flag" should be carved on his tombstone and on the pedestals of all his statues as it was stamped upon his soul. "Stick to the Flag" shall be his password to posterity, to the latest generations, for he stuck to it when all about him abandoned it. He was

"Faithful found

Among the faithless—faithful only he."

Never was a nation less prepared for a naval war than the United States in April 1861. Forty-two old vessels, many of

them unseaworthy, the remains only of a decrepit peace arrangement, constituted our entire navy: and all at once we had three thousand miles of exposed seacoast to blockade and defend, our own great seaports to protect, rebel cruisers to pursue, and American commerce to maintain, if possible. The last was utterly impossible, the merchant service took refuge under other flags and our own almost vanished from the seas, where it had so long, so proudly floated. But the same irresistible spirit of loyalty, the same indomitable will to preserve the imperiled union, which brought great armies into the field all equipped, soon created a fleet also, that commanded the respect of the world and placed the United States once more in the front rank of naval powers. The active services of such a man as Farragut could not long be spared, and when that great naval enterprise, the opening of the Mississippi, was planned,—an enterprise the like of which had never been attempted before,—he was chosen by the Government to lead it, by the advice of his superiors in rank and with the universal approval of the people, on the principle of choosing the best man for the service of the greatest danger; and he accepted it on his favorite maxim that the greatest exposure was the penalty of the highest rank. His experience was vast, but there was no experience that would of itself qualify any man for such a service. . . .

The sun would set upon us, if we were to undertake to tell this afternoon the story of the capture of New Orleans. The world knows it by heart, how when Farragut gave the signal at two o'clock in the morning the brave Bailey in the Cayuga led the way and how the great admiral in the Hartford in two short hours carried his wooden fleet in triumph through that storm of lightning from the forts, and scattered and destroyed the whole fleet of rebel gunboats and ironclads, and how it pleased Almighty God, as he wrote at sunrise to his wife, to preserve his life through a fire such as the world had scarcely known. Thus in a single night a great revolution in maritime warfare was accomplished, and a blow struck at the vitals of the Confederacy which made it reel to its centre. New Orleans, the key of the Mississippi, the queen city of the South, was taken never to be lost again, and the opening was made for all those great triumphs which soon crowned our arms in the West. But victory found our brave captain as modest and merciful as the conflict had proved him terrible, and history may be searched in vain for greater

clemency shown to a hostile city, captured after such a struggle, than that with which the Federal commander, under circumstances of the utmost aggravation and insult, treated New Orleans. . . .

"You know my creed," he says on the day after his gallant passage of the terrible batteries at Port Hudson. "I never send others in advance where there is a doubt, and being one on whom the country has bestowed its greatest honors, I thought I ought to take the risks which belong to them, and so I took the lead. I knew the enemy would try to destroy the old flagship, and I determined the best way to prevent that result was to try and hurt them the most." . . .

The battle at Mobile Bay has long since become a favorite topic of history and song. Had not Farragut himself set an example for it at New Orleans, this greatest of all his achievements would have been pronounced impossible by the military world, and its perfect success brought all mankind to his feet in admiration and homage. As a signal instance of one man's intrepid courage and quick resolve converting disaster and threatened defeat into overwhelming victory, it had no precedent since Nelson at Copenhagen, defying the orders of his superior officer and refusing to obey the signal to retreat, won a triumph that placed his name among the immortals.

When Nelson's lieutenant on the Elephant pointed out to him the signal of recall on the Commander-in-Chief, the battered hero of the Nile clapped his spyglass with his only hand to his blind eye and exclaimed: "I really do not see any signal. Keep mine for closer battle flying. That's the way to answer such signals. Nail mine to the mast!" and so he went on and won the great day.

When the Brooklyn hesitated among the fatal torpedoes in the terrible jaws of Fort Morgan, at the sight of the Tecumseh exploding and sinking with the brave Craven and his ill-fated hundred in her path, it was one of those critical moments on which the destinies of battle hang.

Napoleon said it was always the quarters of an hour that decided the fate of a battle; but here a single minute was to win or lose the day, for when the Brooklyn began to back, the whole line of Federal ships were giving signs of confusion, while they were in the very mouth of hell itself, the batteries of Fort Morgan making the whole of Mobile Point a living flame. It was the


supreme moment of Farragut's life. If he faltered all was lost. If he went on in the torpedo-strewn path of the *Tecumseh* he might be sailing to his death. It seemed as though Nelson himself were in the maintop of the *Hartford*. "What's the trouble?" was shouted from the flagship to the Brooklyn. "Torpedoes!" was the reply. "Damn the torpedoes," said Farragut. "Four bells, Captain Drayton; go ahead full speed." And so he led his fleet to victory. . . .

Van Tromp sailed up and down the British Channel in sight of the coast with a broom at his masthead, in token of his purpose to sweep his hated rivals from the seas. The greatest of English admirals, in his last fight, as he was bearing down upon the enemy, hoisted on his flagship a signal which bore these memorable words: "England expects every man to do his duty"—words which have inspired the courage of Englishmen from that day to this, but it was reserved for Farragut as he was bearing down upon the death-dealing batteries of the rebels to hoist nothing less than himself into the rigging of his flagship, as the living signal of duty done, that the world might see that what England had only expected America had fully realized, and that every man, from the rear-admiral down, was faithful.

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The golden days of peace have come at last, as we hope, for many generations. The great armies of the Republic have long since been disbanded. Our peerless navy, which at the close of the war might have challenged the combined squadrons of the world, has almost ceased to exist. But still we are safe from attack from within and from without. The memory of the heroes is "the cheap defense of the nation, the nurse of manly sentiment and heroic enterprises forever." Our frigates may rot in the harbor. Our ironclads may rust at the dock, but if ever again the flag is in peril, invincible armies will swarm upon the land, and steel-clad squadrons leap forth upon the sea to maintain it. If we only teach our children patriotism as the first duty, and loyalty as the first virtue, America will be safe in the future as in the past. When the War of 1812 broke out she had only six little frigates for her navy, but the valor of her sons eked out her scanty fleet and won for her the freedom of the seas. In all the single engagements of that little war, with one exception, the Americans were victors, and at its close the stars

and stripes were saluted with honor in every quarter of the globe. So, when this War of the Rebellion came suddenly upon us, we had a few ancient frigates, a few unseaworthy gunboats; but when it ended our proud and triumphant navy counted seven hundred and sixty vessels of war, of which seventy were ironclads. We can always be sure then of fleets and armies enough. But shall we always have a Grant to lead the one and a Farragut to inspire the other? Will our future soldiers and sailors share, as theirs almost to the last man shared, their devotion, their courage, and their faith? Yes, on this one condition; that every American child learn from his cradle, as Farragut learned from his, that his first and last duty is to his country, that to live for her is honor, and to die for her is glory.



1942-1943, by J. C. Dole, Kansas City.

RUFUS CHOATE

(1799-1859)

AT THE unveiling of a statue of Rufus Choate in Boston, his kinsman and former pupil, Joseph H. Choate, said: "Many of his characteristic utterances have become proverbial, and the flashing of his wit, the play of his fancy, and the gorgeous pictures of his imagination are the constant themes of reminiscence wherever American lawyers assemble for social converse. . . . His arguments, so far as they have been preserved, are text-books in the profession. . . . His splendid and blazing intellect, fed and enriched by constant study of the best thoughts of the great minds of the race, his all-persuasive eloquence, his teeming and radiant imagination, whisking his hearers along with it and sometimes overpowering himself, his brilliant and sportive fancy, lighting up the most arid subjects with the glow of sunrise, his prodigious and never-failing memory, and his playful wit, always bursting forth with irresistible impulse, have been the subjects of scores of essays and criticisms, all struggling with the vain effort to describe and crystallize the magical charm of his speech and his influence." Evidently he modeled his eloquence on that of Burke, of whom he wrote in a letter to Charles Sumner: "Mind that Burke is the fourth Englishman—Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Burke;" and then, with a characteristic outburst of playful exaggeration, he added, "Out of Burke may be cut 50 Mackintoshes, 175 Macaulays, 40 Jeffreys, and 250 Sir Robert Peels, and leave him greater than Pitt and Fox together."

Rufus Choate was born at Essex, Massachusetts, October 1st, 1799; graduated from Dartmouth in 1819; admitted to the bar in 1823; elected to Congress in 1830. Re-elected in 1832, he resigned before the end of his term in 1834. While always ready to take an active part in public affairs and to speak his mind freely, he shunned political promotion, and it was probably his desire to support his friend, Daniel Webster, that induced him to take Webster's place in the Senate from 1841 to 1845 while the latter was serving as Secretary of State, for he resigned and Webster was re-elected to the Senate in 1845. To the day of his own death he was a staunch defender of Webster's memory. In 1856, when the newly organized Republican party was making its first campaign, he protested against the "sixteen-starred flag" then sometimes seen in meetings addressed by orators who openly expressed a desire for the separation

of the free from the slave States. Speaking for the remnant of Webster Whigs, he uttered a sentence that rang throughout the Union and has since been heard a thousand times in every hamlet of the land—"We join ourselves to no party that does not carry the flag and keep step to the music of the Union."

He died at Halifax, Nova Scotia, July 13th, 1859, while on a voyage to Europe for the recovery of his health.

In him Burke had no unworthy pupil. His address of July 3d, 1845, before the Cambridge Law School, would give any man a sufficient title to immortality if he had no other claim upon it. Every paragraph of it shows lifelong habits of incessant intellectual activity. No one can read it and mistake the fact that greatness of mind is the first essential of greatness in oratory.

BOOKS AND CIVILIZATION IN AMERICA

(From a Speech on the Smithsonian Institute Delivered in the United States Senate)

IT is easy to waste this money; it is easy to squander it in jobs, salaries, quackeries; it is easy, even under the forms of utility, to disperse and dissipate it in little rills and drops, imperceptible to all human sense, carrying it off by an insensible and ineffectual evaporation. But, sir, I take it that we all earnestly desire—I am sure the Senator from Ohio does desire—so to disperse it as to make it tell. I am sure we all desire to see it, instead of being carried off invisibly and wastefully, embody itself as an exponent of civilization, permanent, palpable, conspicuous, useful. And to this end it has seemed to me, upon the most mature reflection, that we cannot do a safer, surer, more unexceptional thing with the income, or with a portion of the income, perhaps twenty thousand dollars a year for a few years, than to expend it in accumulating a grand and noble public library—one which for variety, extent, and wealth, shall be, and be confessed to be, equal to any now in the world.

I say for a few years. Twenty thousand dollars a year, for twenty-five years, are five hundred thousand dollars; and five hundred thousand dollars discreetly expended, not by a bibliomaniac, but by a man of sense and reading thoroughly instructed in bibliography, would go far, very far, towards the purchase of nearly as good a library as Europe can boast. I mean a

library of printed books, as distinct from manuscripts. Of course, such a sum would not purchase the number of books which some old libraries are reported to contain. It would not buy the 700,000 of the Royal Library at Paris, the largest in the world; nor the 500,000 or 600,000 of that of Munich, the largest in Germany; nor the 300,000 or 400,000 or 500,000 of those of Vienna and St. Petersburg, and the Vatican at Rome, and Copenhagen, and the Bodleian at Oxford. But mere numbers of volumes afford a very imperfect criterion of value. Those old libraries have been so long in collecting; accident and donation, which could not be rejected, have contributed so much to them; a general and indiscriminate system of accumulation gathers up, necessarily, so much trash; there are so many duplicates and quadruplicates, and so many books and editions, which become superseded, that mere bulk and mere original cost must not terrify us. *Ponderantur, non numerantur*. Accordingly the Library of the University at Göttingen, consisting perhaps of two hundred and fifty thousand or three hundred thousand volumes, but well chosen, selected, for the most part, within a century, and to a considerable extent by a single great scholar, Heyne, is perhaps to-day as valuable a collection of printed books as any in the world. Towards the accumulation of such a library, the expenditure of two-thirds of this income for a quarter of a century would make, let me say, a magnificent advance. And such a step taken, we should never have the work unfinished; yet when it should be finished, and your library should rival anything which civilization has ever had to show, there would still be the whole principal of your fund unexpended, yielding its income forever, for new and varying applications for increasing and diffusing knowledge in the world.

I hesitate, from an apprehension of being accused of entering too far into a kind of dissertation unsuited to this assembly of men of business, to suggest and press one-half the considerations which satisfy my mind of the propriety of this mode of expenditure. Nobody can doubt, I think, that it comes within the terms and spirit of the trust. That directs us to "increase and diffuse knowledge among men." And do not the judgments of all the wise; does not the experience of all enlightened states; does not the whole history of civilization, concur to declare that a various and ample library is one of the surest, most constant, most permanent, and most economical instrumentalities to increase and

diffuse knowledge? There it would be—durable as liberty, durable as the Union; a vast storehouse, a vast treasury of all the facts which make up the history of man and of nature, so far as that history has been written; of all the truths which the inquiries and experiences of all the races and ages have found out; of all the opinions that have been promulgated; of all the emotions, images, sentiments, examples from all the richest and most instructive literatures; the whole past speaking to the present and the future; a silent, yet wise and eloquent teacher; dead, yet speaking—not dead! for Milton has told us that a “good book is not absolutely a dead thing—the precious lifeblood rather of a master spirit; a seasoned life of man embalmed and treasured up on purpose to a life beyond life.” Is not that an admirable instrumentality to increase and diffuse knowledge among men? It would place within the reach of our mind, of our thinkers, and investigators, and scholars, all, or the chief intellectual and literary materials, and food and instruments, now within the reach of the cultivated foreign mind, and the effect would be to increase the amount of individual acquisition, and multiply the number of the learned. It would raise the standard of our scholarship, improve our style of investigation, and communicate an impulse to our educated and to the general mind. There is no library now in this country, I suppose, containing over fifty thousand volumes. Many there are containing less. But, from the nature of the case, all have the same works; so that I do not know, that of all the printed books in the world we have in this country more than fifty thousand different works. The consequence has been felt and lamented by all our authors and all our scholars. It has been often said that Gibbon’s ‘History’ could not have been written here for want of books. I suppose that Hallam’s ‘Middle Ages,’ and his ‘Introduction to the Literature of Europe,’ could not. Irving’s ‘Columbus’ was written in Spain; Wheaton’s ‘Northmen’ prepared to be written in Copenhagen. See how this inadequate supply operates. An American mind kindles with a subject; it enters on an investigation with a spirit and with an ability worthy of the most splendid achievement; goes a little way, finds that a dozen books—one book, perhaps—are indispensable, which cannot be found this side of Göttingen or Oxford; it tires of the pursuit, or abandons it altogether, or substitutes some shallow conjecture for a deep and accurate research. And there is the end!

Now there are very many among us, and every day we shall have more, who would feelingly adopt this language. Place within their reach the helps that guide the genius and labors of Germany and England, and let the genius and labors of Germany and England look to themselves! Our learned men would grow more learned and more able; our studies deeper and wider; our mind itself exercised and sharpened; the whole culture of the community raised and enriched. This is, indeed, to increase and diffuse knowledge among men.

If the terms of the trust, then, authorize this expenditure, why not make it? Not among the principal, nor yet the least of reasons for doing so, is, that all the while you are laying out your money, and when you have laid it out, you have the money's worth, the value received, the property purchased, on hand, to show for itself and to speak for itself. Suppose the professors provided for in the bill should gather a little circle of pupils, each of whom should carry off with him some small quotient of navigation or horticulture, or rural economy, and the fund should thus glide away and evaporate in such insensible, inappreciable appropriations, how little there would be to testify of it! Whereas here, all the while, are the books; here is the value; here is the visible property; here is the oil, and here is the light. There is something to point to, if you should be asked to account for it unexpectedly; and something to point to, if a traveler should taunt you with the collections which he has seen abroad, and which gild and recommend the absolutisms of Vienna or St. Petersburg.

Another reason, not of the strongest, to be sure, for this mode of expenditure, is that it creates so few jobs and sinecures, so little salaried laziness. There is no room for abuses in it. All that you need is a plain, spacious, fireproof building, a librarian and assistants, an agent to buy your books, and a fire to sit by. For all the rest, he who wants to read goes and ministers to himself. It is an application of money that almost excludes the chances of abuses altogether.

But the decisive argument is, after all, that it is an application the most exactly adapted to the actual literary and scientific wants of the States and the country. I have said that another college is not needed here, because there are enough now, and another might do harm as much as good. But that which is wanted for every college, for the whole country, for

every studious person, is a well-chosen library, somewhere among us, of three or four hundred thousand books. Where is such a one to be collected? How is it to be done? Who is to do it? Of the hundred and fifty colleges, more or less, distributed over the country, one has a library of perhaps fifty thousand volumes; others have good ones, though less; others smaller and smaller, down to scarcely anything. With one voice they unite, teacher and pupil, with every scholar and thinker, in proclaiming the want of more. But where are they to come from? No State is likely to lay a tax to create a college library, or a city library. No deathbed gift of the rich can be expected to do it. How, then, is this one grand want of learning to be relieved? It can be done by you and by you only. By a providential occurrence, it is not only placed within your constitutional power, but it has become your duty; you have pledged your faith; you have engaged to the dead and living that, without the charge of one dollar on the people, you will meet the universal and urgent demand by the precise and adequate supply. By such a library as you can collect here, something will be done, much will be done, to help every college, every school, every studious man, every writer and thinker in the country to just what is wanted most. Inquirers after truth may come here and search for it. It will do them no harm at all to pass a few studious weeks among these scenes. Having pushed their investigations as far as they may at home, and ascertained just what, and how much more, of helps they require, let them come hither and find it. Let them replenish themselves, and then go back and make distribution among the people! Let it be so that—

“Hither as to their fountains other stars
Repairing, in their golden urns, draw light.”

I have no objection at all—I should rejoice rather—to see the literary representatives of an instructed people come hither, not merely for the larger legislation and jurisprudence, but for the rarer and higher knowledge. I am quite willing, not only that our “Amphyctionic council” should sit here, but that it should find itself among some such scenes and influences as surrounded that old renowned assembly; the fountain of purer waters than those of Castalia; the temple and the oracle of our Apollo! It will do good to have your educated men come to Washington

for what has heretofore cost voyages to Germany. They will be of all parts of the country. They will become acquainted with each other. They will contract friendships and mutual regards. They will go away not only better scholars, but better Unionists. Some one has said that a great library molds all minds into one Republic. It might, in a sense of which he little dreamed, help to keep ours together.

I have intimated, Mr. President, a doubt whether a college or university of any description, even the highest, should be at present established here. But let it be considered by the enlightened friends of that object, if such there are, that even if your single purpose were to create such a university, you could possibly begin in no way so judiciously as by collecting a great library. Useful in the other modes which I have indicated, to a university it is everything. It is as needful as the soul to the body. While you are doubting, then, what to do, what you will have, you can do nothing so properly as to begin to be accumulating the books which you will require on whatever permanent plan of application you at last determine.

I do not expect to hear it said in this assembly that this expenditure for a library will benefit a few only, not the mass; that it is exclusive, and of the nature of monopoly. It is to be remembered that this fund is a gift; that we take it just as it is given; and that by its terms it must be disbursed here. Any possible administration of it, therefore, is exposed to the cavil that all cannot directly, and literally, and equally partake of it. How many and of what classes of youth from Louisiana, or Illinois, or New England, for example, can attend the lectures of your professor of astronomy? But I say it is a positive and important argument for the mode of application which I urge, that it is so diffusive. Think of the large absolute numbers of those who, in the succession of years, will come and partake directly of these stores of truth and knowledge! Think of the numbers without number who, through them, who by them indirectly, will partake of the same stores! Studious men will come to learn to speak and write to and for the growing millions of a generally educated community. They will learn that they may communicate. They cannot hoard if they would, and they would not if they could. They take in trust to distribute; and every motive of ambition, of interest, of duty, will compel them to distribute.

They buy in gross, to sell by retail. The lights which they kindle here will not be set under a bushel, but will burn on a thousand hills. No, sir; a rich and public library is no anti-republican monopoly. Who was the old Egyptian king who inscribed on his library the words, "The dispensary of the soul"? You might quite as well inscribe on it, "Armory and light and fountain of liberty!"

It may possibly be inquired what account I make of the library of Congress. I answer, that I think it already quite good and improving, but that its existence constitutes no sort of argument against the formation of such a one as I recommend. In the theory of it, that library is merely to furnish Congress and the Government with the means of doing their official business. In its theory it must be, in some sort, a professional library, and the expenditure we now make—five thousand dollars in a year, or, as last year, two thousand and five hundred—can never carry it up to the rank and enable it to fulfill the functions of a truly great and general public library of science, literature, and art. The value of books which could be added under the appropriations of the last year cannot greatly exceed twenty-one hundred dollars. Doubtless, however, in the course of forming the two, it would be expedient and inevitable to procure to a great extent different books for each.

I do not think, Mr. President, that I am more inclined than another to covet enviously anything which the older civilization of Europe possesses which we do not. I do not suppose that I desire, any more than you, or than any of you, to introduce here those vast inequalities of fortune, that elaborate luxury, that fantastic and extreme refinement. But I acknowledge a pang of envy and grief that there should be one drop or one morsel more of the bread of intellectual life tasted by the European than by the American mind. Why should not the soul of this country eat as good food and as much of it as the soul of Europe? Why should a German or an Englishman sit down to a repast of five hundred thousand books, and an American scholar who loves truth as well as he be put on something less than half allowance? Can we not trust ourselves with so much of so good a thing? Will our digestion be impaired by it? Are we afraid that the stimulated and fervid faculties of this young nation will be oppressed and overlaid? Because we have liberty

which other nations have not, shall we reject the knowledge which they have, and which we have not? Or will you not rather say, that, because we are free, therefore will we add to our freedom that deep learning and that diffused culture which are its grace and its defense?

THE NECESSITY OF COMPROMISES IN AMERICAN POLITICS

(On Friday, July 2d, 1841, the Senate Having Under Consideration the Amendment Proposed by Mr. Rives of Virginia to the Fiscal Bank Bill, Mr. Choate Spoke on the Necessity for Compromises Illustrating the Governing Theory of the First Half Century of National Politics. The Argument on the Bill Itself Is Here Omitted).

YOU see, sir, the nature and the effect of the proposed amendment. If it is adopted, instead of arming the corporation with the power of setting up branches all over the States, each possessing and exercising all the functions of a perfect bank, you empower it to do so only with the assent of the States. In the meantime, however, independently of, and prior to, any such assent, and even against their expressed dissent, if dissent they should happen to express, you empower it, by means of agencies distributed throughout the country, to perform everywhere all the business which a bank can perform, except to discount. That business, the loaning of money on local paper, itself in great measure a local and domestic one, and of inferior policy, it may not perform but with the consent of the States, within whose limits, for the benefit of whose inhabitants, and side by side with whose local banks, it is to be carried on. This is the whole of the amendment. The bill of the committee authorizes the bank to engross the local discount business of the States without their consent; the bill as amended authorizes it to do all things else which a bank can do: to deal in exchange; to issue a currency of its own notes; and to do all things else without their consent; but this one single power it permits to be exerted only on their application. It simply restores in this important feature the project furnished on our call by the Secretary of the Treasury, and which comes to us as an administration measure.

Now, sir, I do not vote for it from any doubt on the constitutional power of Congress to establish branches all over the

States, possessing the discounting function, directly and adversely against their united dissent. I differ in this particular wholly with the Senator who moves the amendment. I have no more doubt of your power to make such a bank and such branches anywhere than of your power to build a post office or a custom-house anywhere. This question, for me, is settled, and settled rightly. I have the honor and happiness to concur on it with all, or almost all, our greatest names: with our national judicial tribunal and with both the two great original political parties; with Washington, Hamilton, Marshall, Story, Madison, Monroe, Crawford, and with the entire Republican administration and organization of 1816 and 1817.

But it does not follow, because we possess this or any other power, that it is wise or needful, in a given case, to attempt to exert it. We may find ourselves so situated that we cannot do it if we would, for want of the concurrence of other judgments; and therefore a struggle might be as unavailing as it would be mischievous and unseemly. We may find ourselves so situated that we ought not to do it if we could. All things which are lawful are not convenient, are not practicable, are not wise, are not safe, are not kind. A sound and healing discretion, therefore, the moral coercion of irresistible circumstances, may fitly temper, and even wholly restrain, the exercise of the clearest power ever belonging to human government. Is not this your actual situation? . . .

Now I think the people ought not to be made to wait for the relief they have a right to demand. They ought not to be made to suffer while we argue one another out of the recorded and inveterate opinions of our whole lives. I say, therefore, for myself, that, anxious to afford them all the relief which they require, regretting that the state of opinion around me puts it out of my power to afford that relief in the form I might prefer, I accommodate myself to my position, and make haste to do all that I can by the shortest way that I can. Consider how much better it is to relieve them to some substantial extent by this means, at once, than not to relieve at all, than not to initiate a system or measure of relief at all, and then go home at the end of this session of Congress, weak and weary, and spend the autumn in trying to persuade them that it was the fault of some of our own friends that nothing was done. How

poor a compensation for wrongs to the people will be the victories over our friends!

I am going now to give another reason for my vote, which you may say is scarcely suitable to the dignity of this place, on which I do not mean to dwell for a moment, but which the manliness of Senators will excuse my suggesting; and that is, that the adoption of the amendment will not only soonest effect the grand object of public relief, but will preserve the harmony and unity of the ascendant political party. Do not suppose I shall dwell for a moment on such a topic. I owe you, I owe especially the wakeful and powerful minority by which we are observed here, an apology for speaking of it. I address myself to the majority. You acknowledge the importance of united counsels and action. Subordinately to the larger offices of patriotism, or, rather, as the mode of fulfilling those offices, you acknowledge your duty to the party of relief and reform. Sir, in the language of the great philosophic orator on whose immortal and universal wisdom the Senator from Virginia drew so instructively yesterday, "in the way which men call party, worship we the Constitution of our country." Now, without entering in detail on the grounds of my opinion, I think we shall hold that party together longer; we shall do more good, and hinder more evil; we shall effect more relief and more reform; we shall carry out more of our great measures; we shall insure a longer succession of our great men by adopting than by rejecting the amendment. It was due to frankness and to honor to say so much. Decorum and custom forbid me to say more. See, however, if the keen and vigilant Opposition on this floor, who mark their objects and pursue them with the eyes of eagles, do not vote against the amendment in sufficient numbers to defeat it if we divide on it among ourselves. I speak not of motives, and I know nothing of actual intentions, but I reason from the obvious nature of the case, and I believe that, if they see that nothing else will, their party tactics will defeat it.

For my part I own that I wish the new administration to have the honor and the felicity of carrying successfully through this its first measure of relief. I wish it to relieve the country, and also to preserve itself. I wish to disappoint their prophecies who told us so often, during the late canvass, that our materials are discordant, that no common principles bind us together, and that our first attempt at a measure of government

would dissolve and dissipate us. I will not, if I can help it, have a hand in fulfilling such prophecies. But then, if we would hinder their inevitable fulfillment, remember that we must administer the power we have acquired with the same wise tolerance of the opinions of the widespread members of our party by which we acquired it. If you took up the candidate on one set of tests of political orthodoxy, will you try to destroy—will you destroy the incumbent by the application of different and stricter tests?

And, Mr. President, in a larger view of this matter, is it not in a high degree desirable to make such a charter that, while it secures to the people all that such kind of instrumentality as a bank can secure, we may still, in the mode and details of the thing, respect the scruples and spare the feelings of those who, just as meritoriously, usefully, and conspicuously as yourselves, are members of our political association, but who differ with you on the question of constitutional power? If I can improve the local currency, diffuse a sound and uniform national one, facilitate, cheapen, and systematize the exchanges, secure the safe-keeping and transmission of the public money, promote commerce, and deepen and multiply the springs of a healthful credit by a bank, and can at the same time so do it as to retain the cordial, constant co-operation, and prolong the public usefulness of friends who hold a different theory of the Constitution, is it not just so much clear gain?

I was struck, in listening to the Senator from Virginia yesterday, with the thought how idle, how senseless, it is to spend time in deploring or being peevish about the inveterate constitutional opinions of the community he so ably represents. There the opinions are. What will you do with them? You cannot change them; you cannot stride over or disregard them. There they are; what will you do with them? Compromise the matter. Adjust it, if you can, in such sort that they shall neither yield their opinions nor you yield yours. Give to the people all the practical good which a bank can give, and let the constitutional question whether Congress can make a bank by its own powers or not stand over for argument on the last day of the Greek kalends, when the disputants may have the world all to themselves to wrangle it out in! Yes, sir, compromise it. Our whole history is but a history of compromises. You have compromised in larger things; do it in less; do it in this. You have done it

for the sake of the Union; do it for the sake of the party which is doing it for the sake of the Union. You never made one which was received with wider and sincerer joy than this would be. Do it, then. Do as your fathers did when they came together, delegates from the slave States and delegates from the free, representatives of planters, of mechanics, of manufacturers, and the owners of ships, the cool and slow New England men, and the mercurial children of the sun, and sat down side by side in the presence of Washington, to frame this more perfect Union. Administer the Constitution in the temper that created it. Do as you have yourselves done in more than one great crisis of your affairs, when questions of power and of administration have shaken these halls and this whole country, and an enlarged and commanding spirit, not yet passed away from our counsels, assisted you to rule the uproar and to pour seasonable oil on the rising sea. Happy, thrice happy for us all, if the Senator from Kentucky would allow himself to-day to win another victory of reconciliation!

Do not say that this is a mere question of power or no power, and that conciliatory adjustment is inapplicable and inadmissible. Do not say that we who believe that the General Government may establish a bank with branches in the States possessing the local discount function without their assent, do, by voting for this amendment, surrender our opinions, or strike out a particle of power from the Constitution. No, sir, we do neither. What we say and do, and all we say and do, is exactly this. We assert that the full power is in the Constitution. There we leave it, unabridged, unimpaired. We declared that, when, in our judgment, it is expedient to exert it, we will concur in exerting it in its whole measure, ourselves uncommitted, unembarrassed by the forbearance which we now advise and practice. But we say that all power is to be exercised with sound discretion in view of the time and circumstances; that contested constitutional power is pre-eminently so to be exercised; that it does not follow, because we possess a giant's strength, that we are therefore to put it all forth, with the blind and undistinguishing impulse of a giant; that, in this instance, deferring to temporary and yet embarrassing circumstances, to opinions, for the sake of harmonious and permanent administration, for the sake of conciliating and saving friends, for the sake of immediate relief to the vast, various, and sensitive business

interests of a great people, we do not think it needful or discreet to exercise the whole power over this subject which we find, assert, and cherish in the Constitution. We content ourselves with declaring that it is there, and that there we mean it shall remain. But perceiving that we can secure to the country all the practical good which it was introduced to secure without resorting to it; perceiving that, in the actual condition of things, we cannot now exert it if we would; perceiving that we can reconcile opinions, spare feelings, and insure a general harmony of useful administrative action, by abstaining from the use of it, we abstain from the use of it. Thus the Senator from Virginia understands this act, and thus do we. No broader, no other effect can be ascribed to it. If you inspect the bill itself, after it shall have received this amendment, you will find that it in truth assumes and asserts the constitutional power of the National Legislature to create a corporation which has authority to transact in every one of the States all the business of a bank except that of discounting. So much power it necessarily assumes and asserts. And then as to the business of making discounts, it neither asserts nor denies that you have the power to authorize it without the assent of the States; it just authorizes the corporation to do it with their assent, and there it leaves the matter. Both classes of expounders of the Constitution, certainly that to which I belong, may vote for such a bill without yielding any opinion, or changing in the least the sacred and awful text of the great Charter itself.

Let me say, sir, that to administer the contested powers of the Constitution is, for those of you who believe that they exist, at all times a trust of difficulty and delicacy. I do not know that I should not venture to suggest this general direction for the performance of that grave duty. Steadily and strongly assert their existence; do not surrender them; retain them with a provident forecast; for the time may come when you will need to enforce them by the whole moral and physical strength of the Union; but do not exert them at all so long as you can by other less offensive expedients of wisdom effectually secure to the people all the practical benefits which you believe they were inserted into the Constitution to secure. Thus will the Union last longest and do most good. To exercise a contested power without necessity on a notion of keeping up the tone of government is not much better than tyranny, and very improvident and

impolitic tyranny, too. It is turning "extreme medicine into daily bread." It forgets that the final end of government is not to exert restraint, but to do good.

Within this general view of the true mode of administering contested powers, I think the measure we propose is as wise as it is conciliatory; wise because it is conciliatory; wise because it reconciles a sound and a strong theory of the Constitution with a discreet and kind administration of it. I desire to give the country a bank. Well, here is a mode in which I can do it. Shall I refuse to do it in that mode, because I cannot at the same time, and by the same operation, gain a victory over the settled constitutional opinions, and show my contempt for the ancient and unappeasable jealousy and prejudices of not far less than half of the American people? Shall I refuse to do it in that mode, because I cannot at the same time, and by the same operation, win a triumph of constitutional law over political associates, who agree with me on nine in ten of all the questions which divide the parties of the country; whose energies and eloquence, under many an October and many an August sun, have contributed so much to the transcendent reformation which has brought you into power? Shall I refuse to the people their rights, until and unless, by the mode of conferring those rights, I can also plant a wound in the side of one who has stood shoulder to shoulder with me in the great civil contest of the last ten years? Do you really desire that the same cloud of summer which pauses to pour out its treasures, long withheld, on the parched and dreary land, should send down a thunderbolt on the head of a noble and conspicuous friend? Certainly nobody here can cherish such a thought for a moment.

There is one consideration more which has had some influence in determining my vote. I confess that I think that a bank established in the manner contemplated by this amendment stands, in the actual circumstances of our time, a chance to lead a quieter and more secure life, so to speak, than a bank established by the bill. I think it worth our while to try to make, what never yet was seen, a popular National Bank. Judging from the past and the present, from the last years of the last bank, and the manner in which its existence was terminated; from the tone of the debate and of the press, and the general indications of public opinion, I acknowledge an apprehension that such an institution, created by a direct exertion of your power,

throwing off its branches without regard to the wishes or wants of the States, as judged of by themselves, and without any attempt to engage their auxiliary co-operation, diminishing the business and reducing the profits of the local banks, and exempted from their burdens—I confess that such an institution may not find so quiet and safe a field of operation as is desirable for usefulness and profit. I do not wish to see it standing like a fortified post on a foreign border—never wholly at peace, always assailed, always belligerent, not falling perhaps, but never safe, the nurse and the prize of implacable hostility. No, sir. Even such an institution, under conceivable circumstances, it might be our duty to establish and maintain in the face of all opposition and to the last gasp. But so much evil attends such a state of things, so much insecurity, so much excitement; it would be exposed to the pelting of such a pitiless storm of the press and of public speech; so many demagogues would get good livings by railing at it; so many honest men would really regard it as unconstitutional, and as dangerous to business and to liberty, that it is worth an exertion to avoid it. Why, sir, notice has been formally given us by the eloquent Senator from Ohio, that on the day you grant this charter he lays a resolution on your table to repeal it. Sir, I desire to see the Bank of the United States become a cherished domestic institution, reposing in the bosom of our law and of our attachments. Established by the concurrent action or on the application of the States, such might be its character. There will be a struggle on the question of admitting the discount power into the States; much good sense and much nonsense will be spoken and written; but such a struggle will be harmless and brief, and when that is over, all is over. The States which exclude it will hardly exasperate themselves further about it. Those which admit it will soothe themselves with the consideration that the act is their own, and that the existence of this power of the branch is a perpetual recognition of their sovereignty. Thus might it sooner cease to wear the alien, aggressive, and privileged aspect which has rendered it offensive, and become sooner blended with the mass of domestic interests, cherished by the same regards, protected by the same and by a higher law.

THE HEROISM OF THE EARLY COLONISTS

IF ONE were called on to select the most glittering of the instances of military heroism to which the admiration of the world has been most constantly attracted, he would make choice, I imagine, of the instance of that desperate valor, in which, in obedience to the laws, Leonidas and his three hundred Spartans cast themselves headlong, at the passes of Greece, on the myriads of their Persian invaders. From the simple page of Herodotus, longer than from the Amphyctionic monument, or the games of the commemoration, that act speaks still to the tears and praise of all the world.

Judge if, that night, as they watched the dawn of the last morning their eyes could ever see; as they heard with every passing hour the stilly hum of the invading host, its dusky lines stretched out without end, and now almost encircling them round; as they remembered their unprofaned home, city of heroes and the mother of heroes,—judge if, watching there, in the gateway of Greece, this sentiment did not grow to the nature of madness, if it did not run in torrents of literal fire to and from the laboring heart; and when morning came and passed, and they had dressed their long locks for battle, and when, at a little after noon, the countless invading throng was seen at last to move, was it not with a rapture, as if all the joy, all the sensation of life, was in that one moment, that they cast themselves, with the fierce gladness of mountain torrents, headlong in that brief revelry of glory?

I acknowledge the splendor of that transaction in all its aspects. I admit its morality too, and its useful influence on every Grecian heart, in that greatest crisis of Greece.

And yet, do you not think that whoso could, by adequate description, bring before you that winter of the Pilgrims,—its brief sunshine; the nights of storm, slow waning; the damp and icy breath, felt to the pillow of the dying; its destitutions, its contrasts with all their former experience in life, its utter insulation and loneliness, its deathbeds and burials, its memories, its apprehensions, its hopes; the consultations of the prudent; the prayers of the pious; the occasional cheerful hymn, in which the strong heart threw off its burden, and, asserting its unvanquished nature, went up, like a bird of dawn, to the skies;—do ye not think

that whoso could describe them calmly waiting in that defile, lonelier and darker than Thermopylæ, for a morning that might never dawn, or might show them, when it did, a mightier arm than the Persian raised as in act to strike, would he not sketch a scene of more difficult and rarer heroism? A scene, as Wordsworth has said, "melancholy, yea, dismal, yet consolatory and full of joy;" a scene even better fitted to succor, to exalt, to lead the forlorn hopes of all great causes, till time shall be no more!

I have said that I deemed it a great thing for a nation, in all the periods of its fortunes, to be able to look back to a race of founders, and a principle of institution, in which it might rationally admire the realized idea of true heroism. That felicity, that pride, that help, is ours. Our past, with its great eras, that of settlement, that of independence, should announce, should compel, should spontaneously evolve as from a germ, a wise, moral, and glowing future. Those heroic men and women should not look down on a dwindled posterity. That broad foundation, sunk below frost or earthquake, should bear up something more permanent than an encampment of tents, pitched at random, and struck when the trumpet of march sounds at next daybreak. It should bear up, as by a natural growth, a structure in which generations may come, one after another, to the great gift of the social life.



SAINT JOHN CHRYSOSTOM

(347-407)

JOHAN OF THE GOLDEN MOUTH" came to be the designation of the celebrated Father of the Greek Church, whose eloquence, pure life, and irrepressible fearlessness in the line of duty made him famous and raised him to an official eminence which he avoided as long as he could. As a preacher and prelate at Antioch, the capital of Syria, the fame of his piety and oratory led to his appointment as Archbishop of Constantinople under the Emperor Arcadius. He escaped the undesired promotion the first time by a stratagem, knowing, perhaps, that his conscience and sense of duty would sooner or later bring him under the ban of the court. On the archiepiscopal throne he persevered in his plain, abstemious mode of life, diligently applying to the support of hospitals the revenues his predecessors had consumed in pomp and luxury. The people of the city learned to love him, but the zeal and eloquence with which he opposed abuses in the Church and sin in high places arrayed against him many powerful enemies, both in court and Church, among them the notorious Empress Eudoxia. A synod packed with his enemies condemned him, on the grounds of contumacy, because he refused to appear before it to answer charges of heresy, and he was arrested and sent to Nicæa, in Bithynia. An uprising of the people so alarmed Eudoxia that he was recalled amid great popular rejoicings. He continued his assaults on the vices of the court, and after the city had been sufficiently garrisoned with barbarian legions to overawe the people, he was accused of insulting the Empress in a sermon with the words: "Herodias is again furious, Herodias again dances; she once more demands the head of John," and, though the accusation was false, it sealed his fate. He was sent a prisoner, first to a little village among the ridges of Mount Taurus, where it was hoped he would fall a victim to the hatred of the monasteries he had rebuked. But his influence still remaining formidable, an order was issued for his removal to the extreme desert of Pityus, and his guards so managed that he died at Comana in Pontus on the journey, September 4th, 407.

THE BLESSING OF DEATH

BELIEVE me, I am ashamed and blush to see unbecoming groups of women pass along the mart, tearing their hair, cutting their arms and cheeks—and all this under the eyes of the Greeks. For what will they not say? What will they not utter concerning us? Are these the men who philosophize about a resurrection? Indeed! How poorly their actions agree with their opinions! In words, they philosophize about a resurrection: but they act just like those who do not acknowledge a resurrection. If they fully believed in a resurrection, they would not act thus; if they had really persuaded themselves that a deceased friend had departed to a better state, they would not thus mourn. These things, and more than these, the unbelievers say when they hear those lamentations. Let us then be ashamed, and be more moderate, and not occasion so much harm to ourselves and to those who are looking on us.

For on what account, tell me, do you thus weep for one departed? Because he was a bad man? You ought on that very account to be thankful, since the occasions of wickedness are now cut off. Because he was good and kind? If so, you ought to rejoice; since he has been soon removed, before wickedness had corrupted him: and he has gone away to a world where he stands ever secure, and there is no room even to mistrust a change. Because he was a youth? For that, too, praise him who has taken him, because he has speedily called him to a better lot. Because he was an aged man? On this account, also, give thanks and glorify him that has taken him. Be ashamed of your manner of burial. The singing of psalms, the prayers, the assembling of the [spiritual] fathers and brethren—all this is not that you may weep and lament and afflict yourselves, but that you may render thanks to him who has taken the departed. For as when men are called to some high office, multitudes with praises on their lips assemble to escort them at their departure to their stations, so do all with abundant praise join to send forward, as to greater honor, those of the pious who have departed. Death is rest, a deliverance from the exhausting labors and cares of this world. When, then, thou seest a relative departing, yield not to despondency; give thyself to reflection; examine thy conscience; cherish the thought that after a

little while this end awaits thee also. Be more considerate; let another's death excite thee to salutary fear; shake off all indolence; examine your past deeds; quit your sins, and commence a happy change.

We differ from unbelievers in our estimate of things. The unbeliever surveys the heavens and worships it, because he thinks it a divinity; he looks to the earth and makes himself a servant to it, and longs for the things of sense. But not so with us. We survey the heaven, and admire him that made it; for we believe it not to be a god, but a work of God. I look on the whole creation, and am led by it to the Creator. He looks on wealth, and longs for it with earnest desire; I look on wealth, and condemn it. He sees poverty, and laments; I see poverty, and rejoice. I see things in one light; he in another. Just so in regard to death. He sees a corpse, and thinks of it as a corpse; I see a corpse, and behold sleep rather than death. And as in regard to books, both learned persons and unlearned see them with the same eyes, but not with the same understanding—for to the unlearned the mere shapes of letters appear, while the learned discover the sense that lies within those letters; so in respect to affairs in general, we all see what takes place with the same eyes, but not with the same understanding and judgment. Since, therefore, in all other things we differ from them, shall we agree with them in our sentiments respecting death?

Consider to whom the departed has gone, and take comfort. He has gone where Paul is, and Peter, and the whole company of the saints. Consider how he shall arise, with what glory and splendor.

THE HEROES OF FAITH

WHAT great labors did Plato endure, and his followers, discursing to us about a line, and an angle, and a point, and about numbers even and odd, and equal unto one another and unequal, and such-like spiderwebs (for, indeed, those webs are not more useless to man's life, than were these subjects): and without doing good to any one great or small by their means, so he made an end of his life. How greatly did he labor, endeavoring to show that the soul is immortal! and even as he came he went away, having spoken nothing with certainty, nor persuaded any hearer. But the Cross wrought persuasion

by means of unlearned men; yea, it persuaded even the whole world: and not about common things, but in discourse of God and the godliness which is according to truth, and the evangelical way of life, and the judgment of the things to come. And of all men it made philosophers: the very rustics, the utterly unlearned. Behold how "the foolishness of God is wiser than men," and "the weakness stronger"! How, stronger? Because it overran the whole world, and took all by main force, and while men were endeavoring by ten thousands to quench the name of the Crucified, the contrary came to pass: that flourished and increased more and more, but they perished and wasted away; and the living, in war with the dead, had no power. So that when the Greek calls me foolish, he shows himself exceedingly above measure foolish: since I who am esteemed by him a fool evidently appear wiser than the wise. When he calleth me weak, then he showeth himself to be weaker. For the noble things which publicans and fishermen were able to effect by the grace of God, these, philosophers and rhetoricians and tyrants, and in short the whole world, running ten thousand ways here and there, could not even form a notion of. For what did not the Cross introduce? The doctrine concerning the Immortality of the Soul; that concerning the Resurrection of the Body; that concerning the contempt of things present; that concerning the desire of things future. Yea, Angels it hath made of men, and all, everywhere, practice self-denial, and show forth all kinds of fortitude.

But among them also, it will be said, many have been found contemnners of death. Tell me who. Was it he who drank the hemlock? But if thou wilt, I can bring forward ten thousand such from within the Church. For had it been lawful when persecution befell them to drink hemlock and depart, all had become more famous than he. And besides, he drank when he was not at liberty to drink or not to drink; but willing or against his will he must have undergone it: no effect surely of fortitude, but of necessity, and nothing more. For even robbers and man-slayers, having fallen under the condemnation of their judges, have suffered things more grievous. But with us it is all quite the contrary. For not against their will did the martyrs endure, but of their will, and being at liberty not to suffer; showing forth fortitude harder than all adamant. This, then, you see is no great wonder, that he whom I was mentioning drank

hemlock, it being no longer in his power not to drink, and also when he had arrived at a very great age. For when he despised life he stated himself to be seventy years old; if this can be called despising. For I for my part could not affirm it: nor, what is more, can any one else. But show me some one enduring firm in torments for godliness's sake, as I show thee ten thousand everywhere in the world. Who, while his nails were tearing out, nobly endured? Who, while his joints were wrenching asunder? Who, while his body was enduring spoil, member by member? or his head? Who, while his bones were being heaved out by levers? Who, while placed without intermission upon frying-pans? Who, when thrown into a caldron? Show me these instances. For to die by hemlock is all as one with a sleeping man's continuing in a state of sleep. Nay, even sweeter than sleep is this sort of death, if report say true. But if certain of them did endure torments, yet of these too the praise is gone to nothing. For on some disgraceful occasion they perished; some for revealing mysteries; some for aspiring to dominion; others detected in the foulest crimes; others again at random, and fruitlessly and ignorantly, there being no reason for it, made away with themselves. But not so with us. Wherefore of their deeds nothing is said; but these flourish and daily increase. Which Paul having in mind said, "The weakness of God is stronger than all men."

AVARICE AND USURY

THERE is nothing more cruel, nothing more infamous, than the usury so common amongst men.

The usurer traffics on the misfortunes of others; he enriches himself on their poverty, and then he demands his usury, as if they were under a great obligation to him.

He is heartless to his creditor, but is afraid of appearing so; when he pretends that he has every inclination to oblige, he crushes him the more and reduces him to the last extremity. He offers one hand, and with the other pushes him down the precipice.

He offers to assist the shipwrecked, and instead of guiding them safely into port he steers them among the reefs and rocks. Where your treasure is, there is your heart, says our Savior.

Perhaps you may have avoided many evils arising from avarice; but still, if you cherish an attachment to this odious vice, it will be of little use, for you will still be a slave, free as you fancy yourself to be; and you will fall from the height of heaven to that spot wherein your gold is hidden, and your thoughts will still complacently dwell on money, gains, usury, and dishonest commerce.

What is more miserable than such a state?


There is not a sadder tyranny than that of a man who is a willing subject to this furious tyrant, destroying all that is good in him, namely, the nobility of the soul.

So long as you have a heart basely attached to gains and riches, whatsoever truths may be told you, or whatsoever advice may be given to you, to secure your salvation—all will be useless.

Avarice is an incurable malady, an ever-burning fire, a tyranny which extends far and wide; for he who in this life is the slave of money is loaded with heavy chains and destined to carry far heavier chains in the life to come.

RANDOLPH HENRY SPENCER CHURCHILL

(1849-1895)

 THREE HUNDRED MILLIONS of people, of diverse races, tongues, religions, and civilizations, occupying parts of all the continents and many remote islands, with not a single representative in the British House of Commons, yet ruled by that body which is itself ruled by the five million voters of the small United Kingdom—such is the picture of modern British imperialism portrayed by a Conservative leader and Minister, Lord Randolph Churchill, in his speech to an assemblage of Conservatives of the University Carlton Club at Oxford in June 1885. He says: "It is not difficult to understand that five millions of people may govern themselves with more or less success; but to what extent will these five millions be able to control and direct the destinies of the three hundred millions whom they have in their power?" This, he adds, "is a problem totally new"; but he faces it "with a firm belief in the ascertained and much-tried common sense which is the peculiarity of the English people." And he says: "That is the faith of the Tory democracy in which I shall ever abide."

In this speech we have a very lifelike political portrait of Lord Randolph Churchill, drawn by himself, and very distinctly differentiating the English Conservatives of to-day from those of even the preceding generation. Although a scion of a ducal house and a self-proclaimed "Tory," he was, as a party man, inclined to unruly and outspoken independence. He was withal a man of so much ability, so much alive to his own times, and so popular as an orator that a strong ministry could not be formed without including him while he remained active in politics.

He was born in London, February 13th, 1849, the second son of the Duke of Marlborough. He married Miss Jerome, of New York, in 1874, and entered Parliament the same year as Member for Woodstock, which he continued to represent till 1885, when he began to represent South Paddington. He was Secretary for India in Salisbury's first ministry, and in the second Salisbury ministry was Chancellor of the Exchequer and leader in the House. His health breaking down, he began to travel in Africa and Asia, but was never again well enough to resume active life. He died in London, January 24th, 1895.

THE AGE OF ACTION

(From an Address on Political Life and Thought in England. Delivered Before the University Carlton Club, at Cambridge, June 6th, 1885)

THIS is essentially an age of action. It does not appear to me to be an age of thought. I doubt very much whether, if Adam Smith, or even Mr. John Stuart Mill, had lived in these days, they would have been able to produce the works which they did produce. Railways and telegraphs, the steam printing machine, and shorthand writing have done their best to kill political thought. It is essentially an age of action, but action based rather on instinct than on logic, or reason, or experience. Look how very suddenly things occur, how very little anything is foreseen, and how very rapidly everything is forgotten. Take even such instances as the death of General Gordon, or the battle of Penj-deh, or even the vote of credit, and Mr. Gladstone's great war speech. These are events which caused intense and immeasurable excitement at the moment. That excitement lasted for about twenty-four hours; everybody chattered to everybody about that particular subject for that space of time, and then it was decently interred, for all practical political purposes, in the political cemetery of utter oblivion. Now, I do not think this at all an exaggerated or untrue picture of the manner in which we conduct our government and our political affairs; it is a very serious consideration. Yet, strange to say, I suppose there never was a time in the history of England when profound political thought and prolonged political study were more essential to the interests of England. The process of government has never approached even the nature of an exact science. It has always been purely empirical, and still continues to be so; and yet the difficulties of government now grow greater and greater every day, and experience seems to become less useful. I suppose there is not a man in England more experienced in the public service—I doubt whether there has ever been a man of greater experience in the public service—than Mr. Gladstone; and yet look at the extraordinary ill luck, to put it in the mildest way, which has attended his government every single day. Now, there are a great many people—I dare say there are people in this university—who will tell you that, if you want to be able to judge the present, and forecast the future, you must study

history. Well, I apprehend that the study of history in our present case is almost useless. The study of history to the Russian politician is very useful because it will tell him what must be the inevitable and speedy end of a grinding and cruel despotism. The study of history to the German may be useful, because it will tell him that a military oligarchy, acting under the semblance of a constitutional form, is a political system of ephemeral duration. The study of history to the Frenchman is useful, because it will tell him that the transition from a Republic to absolute and irrepressible power in one man is alike easy and regular. But, in our case, the study of history to an English politician affords very little guide whatever, because the state of things you have to deal with in England, at the present moment, is unparalleled in history.

What are the duties of the English government at the present moment? They have to provide for the security and, as best they can, to minister to the happiness of three hundred millions or more of human beings, and these three hundred millions are scattered over every quarter of the world, and they comprise every imaginable variety of the human race, of custom, of religion, of language and dialect. And what is the nature of the government which has to discharge these extraordinary and unparalleled duties? You have an hereditary monarchy, exercising an immense influence indirectly, but hardly any influence directly—almost precisely the reverse of what was the nature of hereditary monarchy two hundred years ago. You have an hereditary chamber possessing executive and legislative powers; and you have a representative chamber controlling these two forces and seeking to acquire, and gradually acquiring, into its own hands almost all executive and legislative authority. All these three institutions are institutions of extremely ancient origin, and they are all institutions intensely conservative in their constitution and their procedure. Because, mind you, if the House of Commons were to be elected in November, and were to be composed almost entirely of the Radical party, still, you may take it for certain, the spirit and the procedure of that House would be intensely conservative. Now, what is the foundation of this very curious and ancient structure? The foundation is totally new, purely modern, absolutely untried. You have changed the old foundation. You have gone to a new foundation. Your new foundation is a great seething and swaying mass of some five

million electors, who have it in their power, if they should so please, by the mere heave of the shoulders, if they only act with moderate unanimity, to sweep away entirely the three ancient institutions which I have described, and put anything they like in their place, and to profoundly alter, and perhaps for a time altogether ruin, the interests of three hundred million beings who are committed to their charge. That is, I say, a state of things unparalleled in history. And how do you think it will all end? Are we being swept along a turbulent and irresistible torrent which is bearing us towards some political Niagara, in which every mortal thing we now know will be twisted and smashed beyond all recognition? Or are we, on the other hand, gliding passively along a quiet river of human progress that will lead us to some undiscovered ocean of almost superhuman development? Who can tell? Is it not, gentlemen, an age—is not this a moment—when political thought is necessary? To what extent do you think these five million electors will be controlled or influenced, by law or custom, by religion or by reason? I can understand—it is not difficult to understand—that five million people may govern themselves with more or less success; but to what extent will these five million people be able to control and direct the destinies—and in what manner will they do so—of the three hundred millions whom they have in their power? and to what extent will the five million electors be exempt from the ordinary human influences of passion and caprice? This is a problem totally new. It is a problem upon which history throws no light whatever, and moreover it is a problem which comes at a time when the persons chiefly responsible for the government of our country are precluded by the very circumstances of their life from giving it the deep attention which it absolutely requires.

I believe that a club like yours can give much assistance in this direction. You are not yet drawn into that political machine which kills thought and stifles reflection. I dare say many of those whom I see before me soon will be, but some of you perhaps may not. At any rate, all I would say to you, filling the honorable position of president to which you have so kindly elected me, is to give time while you have time to political thought, and to the present consideration of these questions, and questions analogous to those, which I have tried to set before you. Discuss them and write about them, and endeavor in your

respective spheres to stimulate also political thought among the masses of your fellow-countrymen. But you can do more than this, because, by able summaries of statistical information, by precise investigation into sharply opposing arguments, and by original conclusions, all put together in an agreeable and attractive literary form, you may be able to do much to restrain politicians from acting hastily and heedlessly at critical moments and upon important subjects. In all probability you possess enormous advantages for this task. You represent the most perfect centre of higher education, practical and theoretical, which any country can show. You possess mental powers at the present moment in their highest degree of energetic efficiency. Because, depend upon it that the mental powers of a man at twenty-one for getting at the bottom of any very difficult question, or for arriving at the truth on any much-contested subject, are worth double and treble the mental powers of a man of thirty-five or forty, who, harassed and exhausted by ten or fifteen years of active political life, and by the circumstances of that life, is precluded from giving to the subject the concentrated attention you can do. Do you suppose that a man at thirty-five or forty could go in for the higher mathematics of this university with any chance of success? Why, he would be mad; every undergraduate in the schools would beat him hollow. And yet the difficulties of the extraordinary problems of higher mathematics are as nothing compared with the mystery, darkness, and confusion that surround some of our great political questions at the present day. I am quite certain that it is impossible for any one of you to overestimate the benefits you can confer upon society, and your country generally, by devoting and applying your best energies to the development and popularization of high and deep political thought.

I have shown—very cursorily indeed, but in a manner which your own intellects will fill up—the extraordinary, unparalleled, and complicated nature of the political problems with which political parties in England have to deal; and I have asked you, on my own behalf and on behalf of other politicians busily engaged, for your assistance. At the same time, gentlemen, I do not wish you to suppose for a moment that I am alarmed as to the future. My state of mind when these great problems come across me—which is very rarely—is one of wonder, or perhaps I should rather say of admiration and of hope, because the alter-

native state of mind would be one of terror and despair. And I am guarded from that latter state of mind by a firm belief in the essential goodness of life, and in the evolution, by some process or other which I do not exactly know and cannot determine, of a higher and nobler humanity. But, above all, my especial safeguard against such a state of mental annihilation and mental despair is my firm belief in the ascertained and much-tried common sense which is the peculiarity of the English people. That is the faith which, I think, ought to animate and protect you in your political future; that is the faith of the Tory democracy in which I shall ever abide; that is the faith which your club can, and I hope will, widely and wisely propagate; and that is the faith which, dominating our minds and influencing our actions on all occasions, no matter how dark and gloomy the horizon may appear to be, will contribute to preserve and adapt the institutions of our country and to guarantee and to consolidate the spreading dominions of the Queen.

GLADSTONE'S EGYPTIAN INCONSISTENCIES

(From an Address Delivered at Edinburgh Music Hall, December 18th, 1883)

THE other day the poor Egyptians were very near effecting a successful revolution; they were very near throwing off their suffocating bonds; but, unfortunately for us, Mr. Gladstone, the prime minister of Great Britain—Mr. Gladstone, the leader, the idol, the demigod of the Liberal party—Mr. Gladstone, the Member for Midlothian, came upon them with his armies and fleets, destroyed their towns, devastated their country, slaughtered their thousands, and flung back these struggling wretches into the morass of oppression, back into the toils of their taskmasters. The revolution of Arabi was the movement of a nation; like all revolutions, it had its good side and its bad; you must never, for purposes of practical politics, criticize too minutely the origin, the authors, or the course of revolutions. Would you undo, if you could, the Revolution of 1688, which drove the Stuarts from the throne, because of the intrigues of the nobles and of the clergy? Would you undo the French Revolution because of the Reign of Terror? Would you undo the Revolution of Naples because Garibaldi might not be altogether a man of your mind? You know you would not; you know that

those revolutions were justified by atrocious governments. I tell you, add together the misery of the French under the Bourbons, the terror this country labored under in the last year of James II., the atrocities committed by the ministry of Bomba, and you will arrive at an approximate estimate of what drove the Egyptians to the standard of Arabi Pasha. Since the Reform Bill of 1832, when first the people were admitted to a share in the government of this country, we have always been on the side of freedom against oppression; of constitutional government against arbitrary rule. Mr. Gladstone's gravest charge against the policy of the late government at the Congress of Berlin was that during those debates their influence had leaned to the side of despotism rather than to the side of freedom, which, he said, caused him the deepest shame and the bitterest regret. The charge could not be sustained by facts; but that made no matter. Mr. Gladstone knew that even the insinuation of it from him would gravely injure the government in the minds of the liberty-loving English and Scotch. Never was any man so caught in his own toils; never was retribution so prompt or so terrible. Within three years of his making that accusation he himself had to decide between an Oriental despotism on the one hand, and a struggling people on the other; he had to decide which he would favor; the lot was in his hands, his power was absolute, the whole responsibility was with him. Without a moment's hesitation, and for the wretched motive of concluding a commercial treaty with France, he joined hands with that country, and cast the whole weight and power of Britain against the struggling people, and on the side of, perhaps, the very worst ruler whom even centuries of Oriental abominations could produce, as I shall presently show you. A greater crime was never committed; a greater departure from our modern foreign policy cannot be conceived; a more detestable return to the evil foreign policy which preceded the great Reform Bill cannot be recorded. But I may be told, "In thus accusing Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues, you are in reality accusing us, the people of this great country, who allowed, and who may even be said to have approved, his policy."

I am not sure that the people have approved his policy. As far as by-elections can be said to go, they disapprove it. Manchester could not find a candidate to support it. York rejected it. The people of this country have not yet had an opportunity of giving judgment. Parliament may be said to have approved

the government policy, if you consider only the Liberal majority of the House of Commons. But is the approval of the Liberal majority of the House of Commons so very valuable or so very conclusive? If Mr. Gladstone were to stand on his head in Hyde Park, the Liberal majority would be ready to go into the lobby to record their opinion that it was the most marvelous feat of gymnastics ever performed; if Mr. Gladstone were to declare that black was white, which he very often does, the Liberal majority in the House of Commons would at once exclaim, "It is the voice of a god, not of a man." But in spite of these little weaknesses of the Liberal party, I will say this, that even if the approval of the Liberal majority were conclusive, even if the British people had sanctioned the entire Egyptian policy, the Liberal majority or the British people could not be held to be responsible if they were in error. For from first to last you have been systematically furnished with false information. You were told that Arabi was a military adventurer, and that his movement was a military rebellion. This was the first fabrication; no one will now deny that he was the leader of a nation, the exponent of a nation's woes, and that the military rebellion was the desperate struggle of a race. You were told that the British fleet was in danger from the forts of Alexandria; this was the second fabrication. In the first place, the British fleet might have sailed away, for there was hardly a European left who required protection. All the money-lending bloodsuckers and harpies, with their hordes of hangers-on, had fled panic-stricken before the wrath of an awakened and an aroused people. Some people would think—Mr. Gladstone most certainly would have thought when he was in Midlothian in 1880—that the departure of the British fleet would have been preferable to the destruction of a great, ancient, and wealthy city; but the overwhelming proof that the British fleet was never in danger lies in the fact that, during an engagement of seven or eight hours, when the forts did all they knew, these terrible forts were unable to kill even half a dozen British seamen or to knock a hole in any one of your ironclad ships. You were told that the Suez Canal was in danger; this was fabrication number three. The Suez Canal was never in danger at any time except from the desperate genius of Lord Wolseley and M. de Lesseps. During the whole Egyptian difficulty commerce traversed the Suez Canal, with the exception of a period of forty-eight hours, when Lord Wolseley himself arrested it. You

were told that the Khedive Tewfik was an enlightened, constitutional, amiable prince. This was a most daring stretch of the imagination. I have proved him before the House of Commons to be one of the most despicable wretches who ever occupied an Eastern throne. At Mr. Gladstone's request—did I say request?—at his entreaty—I should say, in answer to his passionate challenge—I furnished him with documents, founded on the statements of irrefutable witnesses, and supported by official records, proving that the Khedive Tewfik was the author of the massacres of Alexandria when many British subjects were slaughtered, that he plotted those massacres for the purpose of ruining Arabi and of precipitating European intervention. He betrayed his country and his people to the foreigner, and verily he shall have his reward. Mr. Gladstone pledged himself most solemnly to examine those documents which I furnished him with, and to refute them if he could; his pledges, renewed twice and thrice, are recorded in black and white; but from the day in June when he received the papers, to this day, this eighteenth of December, no answer has he made, and no answer will he ever make—no answer can he make.

You will admit that, after all that has passed, if Mr. Gladstone and his Foreign Secretary could have crushed me—if they could have shown the public that I had been imposed upon, that I had made false accusations—they would not have spared me. Would they? No consideration for what might befall me in public estimation would have prevented them, if they could have done so, from whitewashing their miserable puppet Tewfik. But, instead of bringing about that happy event, they have preserved a blank silence; and you will not wonder at their silence when I tell you that one of my witnesses was Arabi Pasha himself, and that my official records were their own Blue-Books. Now, whatever may be said of Arabi Pasha, his bitterest enemies will not accuse him of being either a liar, a robber, or a murderer. From first to last all will admit that he has ever spoke candidly what was in his mind, that though for months he exercised supreme power in Egypt, a country whose records are dark with crime and assassination, though he was surrounded by violent opponents and desperate conspirators, he never took a human life, and that, though he could have made himself rich, as the expression goes, "beyond the dreams of avarice," he left Egypt with his family, an exile, without one single farthing. I say with confidence that

that man's evidence would be taken in any court of law against the statements of the Khedive Tewfik, who dethroned his own father, who robbed his own family, who banished from his native land his younger brother; who, although he professes to be anxious to suppress the slave trade, is himself a dealer and an owner of slaves; who practices magic and sorcery and every kind of the most debased superstition; whose most intimate friend will not believe a word he utters; who intrigued against his sovereign the Sultan, against his friends the British, against his friends the French, taking them up and betraying them one after another in turn; who plotted with Arabi against Riaz, with Sherif against Arabi, with that incomparable desperado, Omar Lutfi, against the European inhabitants of Alexandria; who ordered Arabi to fire on the British fleet which lay in the harbor for his protection, and who dared to proclaim Arabi a rebel and a traitor because he did not resist with fire and sword and carnage the occupation of Alexandria by the sailors of Lord Alcester. All this is written in Blue-Books; all this marvelous mass of wickedness and lying and plotting and conspiracy is as notorious in the East and as familiar to every Egyptian—aye, and to every English official—aye, and to Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues—as the incidents of the Midlothian campaign are to you.

This is the man—did I say man?—he is not a man; this is the being whom your army and navy supported against Arabi Pasha and the Egyptian people; this is the being to gratify whose frightful instincts Alexandria was bombarded and Tel-el-Kebir was fought; this is the being in whose name, and by whose power, Mr. Gladstone intends to give Egypt a fair start. I have not yet done with this Khedive Tewfik. But you may say to me, What is your object in bringing these accusations? What is the Khedive Tewfik to us, or he to me? I quite admit that he would be nothing either to you or me if the British army was not keeping him on his throne, and the British people responsible for all his acts. This is my object—to show you, the people, so that if you believe me you may intervene, that Great Britain, under the guidance of the stupendous genius of him whom the Liberals call the greatest man she ever produced, has gone astray, has commenced a hopeless task, and has entered upon a fatal course.

And this brings me to the last and greatest of all the fabrications which have been diligently crammed into your minds.

The Prime Minister has stated over and over again that we went to Egypt with no selfish aim or object, but only in the interests of Europe and for the benefit of the Egyptian people. Certainly Mr. Gladstone has a curious way of promoting the interests of Europe and of benefiting the people of Egypt. As the original inventor of the concert of Europe, he summoned Europe to Constantinople to deliberate upon Egyptian affairs; but no sooner had the Powers entered into conference than Mr. Gladstone seized upon Egypt with horse, foot, artillery, and dragoons, and the various powers, feeling extremely foolish, abandoned their deliberations in disgust. I do not think he will find it easy to collect them again. I do not think he will find it easy to appeal again to that concert of Europe to which, by so many pledges, he bound himself when he preached to you in Midlothian three years ago. He first struck a desperate blow at the commerce between Europe and the East by laying the city of Alexandria in ashes. He struck a second desperate blow at the same interests when he laid violent hands on the Suez Canal, which, since its construction, had been preserved sacred from the operations of war. He struck a third desperate blow at Eastern commerce when, for a period of three months and more, he put a stop to all commercial transactions over the whole land of Egypt; and the result of these three blows is that he has created a hatred of Europeans in general, and of the British in particular among the Egyptians, so bitter, so unappeasable, that for years to come the commercial interests of Europe in Egypt will hang upon a thread. The recent events in the Soudan are a fair indication of the feelings of Egypt for Europe. Turkey is only waiting for a chance of getting her finger in the pie; France is intriguing against us at Cairo with unceasing malignity; Germany and Austria are looking on with contemptuous ill-will; and Russia, whenever opportunity offers, stirs up the sparks of strife and jealousy among the powers. So much for the interests of Europe as promoted by Mr. Gladstone—so much for the attitude of the European concert, for which Mr. Gladstone took out his own special patent.

But now let us look at the Egyptian people, to whom Mr. Gladstone declares he only wished to do good. I will say no more about Alexandria. I will say nothing about the thousands of Egyptians who were slaughtered by his humane efforts; I will say nothing about the hundreds whom Mr. Gladstone's judges


have either hung or condemned to penal servitude or sentenced to a living death in the regions of the White Nile. All this I say nothing about, though the poor Egyptians might like to say something about it if you gave them the chance. I content myself with this, and I defy contradiction. We were sent to Egypt by the bondholders in the month of July 1882; we dispatched ships from Portsmouth and from Plymouth; we brought troops from Madras and from Bombay; we spent four millions of our own money; we sacrificed, one way and another, many British lives; we made two brand-new viscounts, and gave them each what was elegantly and eloquently called a "lump sum" for all the dangers they had so courageously encountered, and for all the glories they had so gloriously won. We distributed decorations and rewards so profusely that every man almost of that famous army is signalized forever. And what did we do to the Egyptians? Well, first we took them the cattle plague, which more than decimated the herds which were the wealth of the Delta of the Nile. The cattle plague, in consequence of the admirable sanitary laws which we taught the people, produced the cholera, and the cholera carried off fifty thousand lives; for wherever the cholera broke out we drew what was called a military cordon round the locality, which prevented a single soul from getting out or a single doctor from getting in. Then, when every Egyptian who had to die was dead, we made the country a handsome present of a dozen doctors, who arrived in time to assist at a great many funerals, when doctors are always so useful and so welcome. But we did a great deal more than this; we held elections for the Egyptian Parliament, which were so eagerly taken up by the people that hundreds of them fled to the officials begging and praying and bribing, in order that they might be excused the dignity and privilege of voting. But we did more; we had made the country a present of a dozen doctors; we now gave them in addition a dozen Dutch judges, who, at the present moment, are all on leave, endeavoring to learn the language from an elementary Arabic conversation-book, wandering about Europe, and waiting for their law courts to be built. We did not stop here; we created a Council of State, on which we placed Turks, French, Russians, Germans, and Greeks. More than this; having either slaughtered or frightened to death the old Egyptian army, we considered it our duty to form a magnificent new Egyptian army, the recruits for which are col-

lected by the bastinado and brought into barracks heavily chained—an army which is now brought to such an admirable degree of efficiency that they are made to do police duty at Cairo while the police are sent to fight the False Prophet, and who are warranted by those who know them best to cut the throats of Sir Evelyn Wood and other British officers whom we liberally quartered on Egypt, the moment the backs of the British troops were turned. In addition to all this largesse, this princely munificence, quite unprecedented in history from one nation to another, we generously added six millions to the Egyptian national debt; and to crown this splendid edifice, which is forever to be the grandest of the grand achievements of a “grand old man,” we placed at the head the Khedive Tewfik, the conspirator against his father, the robber of his family, the banisher of his brother, the dealer in human flesh and blood, the betrayer of his allies, of his ministers, and of his country, the man of magic and of sorcery.

Now—so says Mr. Gladstone at the Guildhall—we, the Liberal Government, if only the False Prophet will keep quiet for a moment, are going to scuttle out of this pandemonium as soon as we can, and to all our former fabrications and imaginations we shall add by far the grossest and most audacious of all, for we shall tell Parliament, we shall tell the country, we shall tell Europe, that Egypt is pacified, and that the Egyptians are happy and free, although we know all the time, beyond the possibility of a doubt, that greater misery by far prevails in that country than before the battle of Tel-el-Kebir; that life and property are more insecure; that the people are more hopelessly burdened with debt; that justice is more frightfully corrupt than Scotchmen or Englishmen can well conceive; and that not one single real reform of any sort or kind has been set on foot, much less carried into effect. Plenty of shams, plenty of impostures, but genuine beneficial reform absolutely none. Such has been our work in Egypt; and for all this woe and misery that your government has wrought shall we expect the blessing of God upon our country? Shall we not rather, if we sanction such a work, if we do not without delay repair, as far as we can, so many errors, so many crimes—shall we not rather fear that retribution which sooner or later has never failed to overtake those who oppress the human race?

CICERO ARRAIGNING CATILINE.

Photogravure after the Original Painting by C. Maratti.

HE photogravure shows Cicero opening the great speech which resulted in driving Catiline from the city and saving it from destruction. The artist has shown a more than ordinary genius in putting the solitary figure of Catiline in the immediate foreground—a position a man of inferior talent might have devoted to Cicero himself.



MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO

(106-43 B. C.)



IN ORATORY and all forms of prose composition Cicero was for seventeen centuries the acknowledged master of the civilized world. So long as Latin remained the "vulgar tongue" of learning in Europe, every one who aspired to be heard beyond his own province studied and imitated the style of Cicero. As first the French and afterwards the English language began to be used in literature; as the great writers of Northern Europe, encouraged by the example of Dante, dared to employ the vernacular of the despised common people of their own countries, the style of Cicero passed from the Latin of the learned into literature which appealed to a wider circle of readers. In England, Bacon presents in his 'Essays' the first model of the later English prose which in the essays of Addison reasserts the right of the English language to be governed by its own laws rather than by those of any Latin, however elegant. In the main, however, the style of educated writers of English prose is Ciceronian, in spite of Addison, for Macaulay in the earlier years of the nineteenth century and, towards its close, the great Frenchman Taine, have strongly swayed the minds of English prose writers away from Saxon towards Ciceronian constructions.

If Cicero's influence over prose literature has been thus universal in English and other Teutonic tongues which have a "time" radically different from Latin and an accentuation which creates a sense of musical values in language greatly unlike that which made Latin intelligible as a spoken tongue,—if in spite of all differences of speech and of "ear" he has thus swayed the prose writing of Northern Europe, Teutonic as well as Latin, for so many centuries, we would naturally expect him to be the supreme arbiter of oratorical style. And this expectation has been fully realized. The Ciceronian construction of clauses, balancing each other in musical "time," and arranged to make possible the greatest cumulative force of idea, governs modern oratory still as it did that of the Middle Ages. During the last twenty-five years, we have seen a tendency to break away from it, towards a simpler construction, but it is far from its full realization. Whenever we say that this or that piece of prose is "oratorical" in its style, we mean simply that it approximates more or less the syntax

of Cicero. If from the standpoint of the student of English who loves its mastering simplicity and admires its natural syntax because it tends to force the plain truth to be told, this seems unfortunate, there must have been a supreme and sufficient reason for it, or it could not have existed as it has done, the central fact in the oratory and the prose writing of so many centuries among so many people of diverse languages and habits of thought. Without doubt, this supreme reason is to be sought in the nice sense of time in language which Cicero has perhaps in a greater degree than any one else who ever wrote Latin prose. Unless an orator or a prose writer can develop this sense so that it will govern his composition as surely and as unconsciously as the feet of a skillful dancer are governed by the music of a waltz, his sentences must always be ragged and uneven, repellent to all whose intellects are sufficiently developed to give them an idea of order and a love of harmony. As this idea of order, this love of harmony, is the normal rule of the intellect, the speaker who offends through a defective ear for the time of the language in which he expresses himself must necessarily create an unfavorable impression. If, on the contrary, he has the sense of time as a governing factor in his constructions, if, when he adds a clause, his ear immediately impels him to give it its due balance with the next; if every period harmonizes and balances the time of every other; and if to this he adds such harmonies of tone as are illustrated in the Latin vowel successions of Cicero as they are in the English of Burke, he has a mode of expression worthy of the highest thought, and when used for the purpose of expressing great ideas, sure to compel permanent attention to them. This is the conclusion which every one must draw who studies the careful art of Cicero's constructions and considers in connection with it the permanent force it has given his ideas.

The art of oratory, as Cicero understood it, approximates in its technique the technical art of modern versification. Except that the time of balancing clauses must not be so exactly identical as to set them tripping, the oratory of Cicero makes demands on the ear for antithetical time in the government of its constructions almost if not quite as severe as does modern English blank verse of average regularity. Occasionally in classical oratory, the rhythms of poetry were allowed; it was not considered a fault but rather a beauty that an orator, moved by his subject and speaking in cadenced periods, should occasionally break into a perfect hexameter, but as a rule the exactly identical time-balances of verse were avoided or disguised. The Greeks and Romans had a nice ear for time in language and were often conscious of it. Of course every one who speaks a modern language as a vernacular acquires, in learning to talk, the "natural" ear

for its time, but as a rule we never become conscious of the operations of this "ear" and so are ignorant of the first essentials of such art as governed Cicero's prose, as in its more nearly perfect measure it governed the verse of Horace and of Virgil.

To develop a consciousness of this sense of time without becoming self-conscious because of it is to have the A B C of Cicero's art as an orator. It has been said with truth that it was as nearly an exact art as poetry or sculpture, and for those who in seeking the artistic can avoid the always present and always imminent danger of the artificial it is likely to be not less a source of power in speaking than a knowledge of musical time is in the composition of verse.

In the politics of Rome, Cicero stands for the virtue of ancient aristocracy against the later imperialism through which one strong and masterful man after another sought supreme power by appealing to the fighting instincts of the lowest masses of the people. The later Roman republic was essentially an aristocratic and oligarchical institution, modified by mob law. It ended as aristocracies always end, in imperialism. In mediæval Europe, we have first the governing oligarchy of feudal barons with the king as their chief—*primus inter pares*. Next we have the struggle for supremacy between the one man and the oligarchy in which, by appealing to the previously unconsidered multitude, the one masterful man gets the better of the hundred who seek to master him and the masses. Thus in France we see established the absolutism which preceded the Revolution. Again after the Revolution, Napoleon followed the example of Marius and Cæsar in Rome, and of Cromwell in England, evoking the latent power of the many who are weak to overcome the few who are strong. Whenever an aristocracy or an oligarchy reaches a certain stage of corruption, this process becomes a part of the inevitable logic of events. First an oligarchy which has assumed to rule in the name and by the right of the people oppresses and defrauds them. Then some strong man appeals to the people as their champion and, winning their confidence, grasps the supreme power which first Catiline and then Cæsar strove for at Rome in the time of Cicero.

In his speeches against Verres, the plunderer of Sicily; in denouncing Catiline; in defending Milo for killing Clodius; in his Philippics against Antony, and in every public act to which he was impelled by his natural instincts, Cicero resists with all the strength of his great intellect the tendency of a corrupt Republic to surrender its last remnant of liberty to any and every desperate adventurer bold enough to grasp supremacy in the name of the people and use it for his own purposes of absolving himself from all restraint. When Cicero's head was sent to Rome; when Fulvia, the widow of Clodius and the wife of Antony, pierced with her needle the tongue

which had done more than any other for the perpetuation of all the good there was in Roman civilization, she paid him the highest compliment he ever received and illustrated in doing so the causes of his failure. He demanded disinterestedness from an oligarchy no longer capable of anything except the most extreme and immoral selfishness. Necessarily, he defeated himself, but he won in defeat a greater victory than that of any other man of his day—greater even than that of Cato, for out of his mental stress, the keen excitements of his struggles for the perpetuation of the republic, were born the Ciceronian oratory and literature of Rome and of all succeeding centuries until our own times.

He was born at Arpinum, January 3d, 106 B. C. A *novus homo*, a "new man," born from a family of plebeian origin, he forced his way to the first offices of the Republic. As Consul at the time of the conspiracy of Catiline, he saved Rome only to lose it, after Cæsar, suspected as an accomplice of Catiline, had been assassinated for his usurpation, by men who were mere antiquarians instead of the leaders they thought themselves. An antiquarian himself, Cicero had too great a reverence for antique virtue to win against the thorough-going scoundrelism of the triumvirate. Augustus, after encouraging him at least tacitly against Antony, consented at least tacitly to Antony's determination to have him assassinated. So on December 7th, 43 B. C., after Cicero's throat had been cut at the door of his Formian villa by a representative of the new order of things, his head and hands were sent to the triumvirs in witness that there was no longer a single living and formidable tongue to plead for the antique virtue, the ancient liberty, the republican glories of Rome.

W. V. B.

THE FIRST ORATION AGAINST CATILINE

(Delivered in the Roman Senate)

WHEN, O Catiline, do you mean to cease abusing our patience? How long is that madness of yours still to mock us? When is there to be an end of that unbridled audacity of yours, swaggering about as it does now? Do not the nightly guards placed on the Palatine Hill—do not the watches posted throughout the city—does not the alarm of the people, and the union of all good men—does not the precaution taken of assembling the Senate in this most defensible place—do not the looks and countenances of this venerable body here present have any effect upon you? Do you not feel that your plans are detected?

Do you not see that your conspiracy is already arrested and rendered powerless by the knowledge which every one here possesses of it? What is there that you did last night, what the night before—where is it that you were—who was there that you summoned to meet you—what design was there which was adopted by you, with which you think that any one of us is unacquainted?

Shame on the age and on its principles! The Senate is aware of these things; the consul sees them; and yet this man lives. Lives! aye, he comes even into the Senate. He takes a part in the public deliberations; he is watching and marking down and checking off for slaughter every individual among us. And we, gallant men that we are, think that we are doing our duty to the republic if we keep out of the way of his frenzied attacks.

You ought, O Catiline, long ago to have been led to execution by command of the consul. That destruction which you have been long plotting against us ought to have already fallen on your own head.

What? Did not that most illustrious man, Publius Scipio, the Pontifex Maximus, in his capacity of a private citizen, put to death Tiberius Gracchus, though but slightly undermining the Constitution? And shall we, who are the consuls, tolerate Catiline, openly desirous to destroy the whole world with fire and slaughter? For I pass over older instances, such as how Caius Servilius Ahala with his own hand slew Spurius Mælius when plotting a revolution in the State. There was—there was once such virtue in this republic, that brave men would repress mischievous citizens with severer chastisement than the most bitter enemy. For we have a resolution of the Senate, a formidable and authoritative decree against you, O Catiline; the wisdom of the republic is not at fault, nor the dignity of this senatorial body. We, we alone,—I say it openly,—we, the consuls, are wanting in our duty.

The Senate once passed a decree that Lucius Opimius, the consul, should take care that the Republic suffered no injury. Not one night elapsed. There was put to death, on some mere suspicion of disaffection, Caius Gracchus, a man whose family had borne the most unblemished reputation for many generations. There were slain Marcus Fulvius, a man of consular rank, and all his children. By a like decree of the Senate the safety of the Republic was intrusted to Caius Marius and Lucius Valerius, the

consuls. Did not the vengeance of the Republic, did not execution overtake Lucius Saturninus, a tribune of the people, and Caius Servilius, the prætor, without the delay of one single day? But we, for these twenty days, have been allowing the edge of the Senate's authority to grow blunt, as it were. For we are in possession of a similar decree of the Senate, but we keep it locked up in its parchment—buried, I may say, in the sheath; and according to this decree you ought, O Catiline, to be put to death this instant. You live,—and you live, not to lay aside, but to persist in your audacity.

I wish, O conscript fathers, to be merciful; I wish not to appear negligent amid such danger to the State; but I do now accuse myself of remissness and culpable inactivity. A camp is pitched in Italy, at the entrance of Etruria, in hostility to the Republic; the number of the enemy increases every day; and yet the general of that camp, the leader of those enemies, we see within the walls—aye, and even in the Senate—planning every day some internal injury to the Republic. If, O Catiline, I should now order you to be arrested, to be put to death, I should, I suppose, have to fear lest all good men should say that I had acted tardily, rather than that any one should affirm that I acted cruelly. But yet this, which ought to have been done long since, I have good reason for not doing as yet; I will put you to death then, when there shall be not one person possible to be found so wicked, so abandoned, so like yourself, as not to allow that it has been rightly done. As long as one person exists who can dare to defend you, you shall live; but you shall live as you do now, surrounded by my many and trusty guards, so that you shall not be able to stir one finger against the Republic; many eyes and ears shall still observe and watch you, as they have hitherto done, though you shall not perceive them.

For what is there, O Catiline, that you can still expect, if night is not able to veil your nefarious meetings in darkness, and if private houses cannot conceal the voice of your conspiracy within their walls;—if everything is seen and displayed? Change your mind; trust me; forget the slaughter and conflagration you are meditating. You are hemmed in on all sides; all your plans are clearer than the day to us; let me remind you of them. Do you recollect that on the twenty-first of October I said in the Senate, that on a certain day, which was to be the twenty-seventh of October, C. Manlius, the satellite and servant of

your audacity, would be in arms? Was I mistaken, Catiline, not only in so important, so atrocious, so incredible a fact, but, what is much more remarkable, in the very day? I said also in the Senate that you had fixed the massacre of the nobles for the twenty-eighth of October, when many chief men of the Senate had left Rome, not so much for the sake of saving themselves as of checking your designs. Can you deny that on that very day you were so hemmed in by my guards and my vigilance that you were unable to stir one finger against the Republic; when you said that you would be content with the flight of the rest, and the slaughter of us who remained? What? when you made sure that you would be able to seize Præneste on the first of November by a nocturnal attack, did you not find that that colony was fortified by my order, by my garrison, by my watchfulness and care? You do nothing, you plan nothing, you think of nothing which I not only do not hear, but which I do not see and know every particular of.

Listen while I speak of the night before. You shall now see that I watch far more actively for the safety than you do for the destruction of the Republic. I say that you came the night before (I will say nothing obscurely) into the Scythedealer's street, to the house of Marcus Lecca; that many of your accomplices in the same insanity and wickedness came there too. Do you dare to deny it? Why are you silent? I will prove it if you do deny it; for I see here in the Senate some men who were there with you.

O ye immortal gods, where on earth are we? in what city are we living? what constitution is ours? There are here,—here in our body, O conscript fathers, in this the most holy and dignified assembly of the whole world, men who meditate my death, and the death of all of us, and the destruction of this city, and of the whole world. I, the consul, see them; I ask them their opinion about the republic, and I do not yet attack, even by words, those who ought to be put to death by the sword. You were, then, O Catiline, at Lecca's that night; you divided Italy into sections; you settled where every one was to go; you fixed whom you were to leave at Rome, whom you were to take with you; you portioned out the divisions of the city for conflagration; you undertook that you yourself would at once leave the city, and said that there was then only this to delay you, that I was still alive. Two Roman knights were found to deliver you from this anxiety,

and to promise that very night, before daybreak, to slay me in my bed. All this I knew almost before your meeting had broken up. I strengthened and fortified my house with a stronger guard; I refused admittance, when they came, to those whom you sent in the morning to salute me, and of whom I had foretold to many eminent men that they would come to me at that time.

As, then, this is the case, O Catiline, continue as you have begun. Leave the city at last; the gates are open; depart. That Manlian camp of yours has been waiting too long for you as its general. And lead forth with you all your friends, or at least as many as you can; purge the city of your presence; you will deliver me from a great fear when there is a wall between me and you. Among us you can dwell no longer—I will not bear it, I will not permit it, I will not tolerate it. Great thanks are due to the immortal gods, and to this very Jupiter Stator, in whose temple we are, the most ancient protector of this city, that we have already so often escaped so foul, so horrible, and so deadly an enemy to the republic. But the safety of the commonwealth must not be too often allowed to be risked on one man. As long as you, O Catiline, plotted against me while I was the consul-elect, I defended myself not with a public guard, but by my own private diligence. When, in the next consular comitia, you wished to slay me when I was actually consul, and your competitors also, in the Campus Martius, I checked your nefarious attempt by the assistance and resources of my own friends, without exciting any disturbance publicly. In short, as often as you attacked me, I by myself opposed you, and that, too, though I saw that my ruin was connected with great disaster to the republic. But now you are openly attacking the entire republic.

You are summoning to destruction and devastation the temples of the immortal gods, the houses of the city, the lives of all the citizens; in short, all Italy. Wherefore, since I do not yet venture to do that which is the best thing, and which belongs to my office and to the discipline of our ancestors, I will do that which is more merciful if we regard its rigor, and more expedient for the State. For if I order you to be put to death, the rest of the conspirators will still remain in the republic; if, as I have long been exhorting you, you depart, your companions, those worthless dregs of the republic, will be drawn off from the city too. What is the matter, Catiline? Do you hesitate to do that when I order you, which you were already doing of your own

accord? The consul orders an enemy to depart from the city. Do you ask me, are you to go into banishment? I do not order it; but, if you consult me, I advise it.

For what is there, O Catiline, that can now afford you any pleasure in this city? for there is no one in it, except that band of profligate conspirators of yours, who does not fear you,—no one who does not hate you. What brand of domestic baseness is not stamped upon your life? What disgraceful circumstance is wanting to your infamy in your private affairs? From what licentiousness have your eyes, from what atrocity have your hands, from what iniquity has your whole body ever abstained? Is there one youth, when you have once entangled him in the temptations of your corruption, to whom you have not held out a sword for audacious crime, or a torch for licentious wickedness?

What? when lately by the death of your former wife you had made your house empty and ready for a new bridal, did you not even add another incredible wickedness to this wickedness? But I pass that over, and willingly allow it to be buried in silence, that so horrible a crime may not be seen to have existed in this city, and not to have been chastised. I pass over the ruin of your fortune, which you know is hanging over you against the ides of the very next month; I come to those things which relate not to the infamy of your private vices, not to your domestic difficulties and baseness, but to the welfare of the republic and to the lives and safety of us all.

Can the light of this life, O Catiline, can the breath of this atmosphere be pleasant to you, when you know that there is not one man of those here present who is ignorant that you, on the last day of the year, when Lepidus and Tullus were consuls, stood in the assembly armed; that you had prepared your hand for the slaughter of the consuls and chief men of the State, and that no reason or fear of yours hindered your crime and madness, but the fortune of the republic? And I say no more of these things, for they are not unknown to every one. How often have you endeavored to slay me, both as consul-elect and as actual consul? how many shots of yours, so aimed that they seemed impossible to be escaped, have I avoided by some slight stooping aside, and some dodging, as it were, of my body? You attempt nothing, you execute nothing, you devise nothing that can be kept hid from me at the proper time; and yet you do not cease to attempt and to contrive. How often already has that dagger

of yours been wrested from your hands? how often has it slipped through them by some chance, and dropped down? and yet you cannot any longer do without it; and to what sacred mysteries it is consecrated and devoted by you I know not, that you think it necessary to plunge it in the body of the consul.

But now, what is that life of yours that you are leading? For I will speak to you not so as to seem influenced by the hatred I ought to feel, but by pity, nothing of which is due to you. You came a little while ago into the Senate: in so numerous an assembly, who of so many friends and connections of yours saluted you? If this in the memory of man never happened to any one else, are you waiting for insults by word of mouth, when you are overwhelmed by the most irresistible condemnation of silence? Is it nothing that at your arrival all those seats were vacated? that all the men of consular rank, who had often been marked out by you for slaughter, the very moment you sat down left that part of the benches bare and vacant? With what feelings do you think you ought to bear this? On my honor, if my slaves feared me as all your fellow-citizens fear you, I should think I must leave my house. Do not you think you should leave the city? If I saw that I was even undeservedly so suspected and hated by my fellow-citizens, I would rather flee from their sight than be gazed at by the hostile eyes of every one. And do you, who, from the consciousness of your wickedness, know that the hatred of all men is just and has been long due to you, hesitate to avoid the sight and presence of those men whose minds and senses you offend? If your parents feared and hated you, and if you could by no means pacify them, you would, I think, depart somewhere out of their sight. Now, your country, which is the common parent of all of us, hates and fears you, and has no other opinion of you, than that you are meditating parricide in her case; and will you neither feel awe of her authority, nor deference for her judgment, nor fear of her power?

And she, O Catiline, thus pleads with you, and after a manner silently speaks to you:—There has now for many years been no crime committed but by you; no atrocity has taken place without you; you alone unpunished and unquestioned have murdered the citizens, have harassed and plundered the allies; you alone have had power not only to neglect all laws and investigations, but to overthrow and break through them. Your former actions, though they ought not to have been borne, yet I did

bear as well as I could; but now that I should be wholly occupied with fear of you alone, that at every sound I should dread Catiline, that no design should seem possible to be entertained against me which does not proceed from your wickedness, this is no longer endurable. Depart, then, and deliver me from this fear; that, if it be a just one, I may not be destroyed; if an imaginary one, that at least I may at last cease to fear.

If, as I have said, your country were thus to address you, ought she not to obtain her request, even if she were not able to enforce it? What shall I say of your having given yourself into custody? what of your having said, for the sake of avoiding suspicion, that you were willing to dwell in the house of Marcus Lepidus? And when you were not received by him, you dared even to come to me, and begged me to keep you in my house; and when you had received answer from me that I could not possibly be safe in the same house with you, when I considered myself in great danger as long as we were in the same city, you came to Quintus Metellus, the prætor, and, being rejected by him, you passed on to your associate, that most excellent man, Marcus Marcellus, who would be, I suppose you thought, most diligent in guarding you, most sagacious in suspecting you, and most bold in punishing you; but how far can we think that man ought to be from bonds and imprisonment who has already judged himself deserving of being given into custody?

Since, then, this is the case, do you hesitate, O Catiline, if you cannot remain here with tranquillity, to depart to some distant land, and to trust your life, saved from just and deserved punishment, to flight and solitude? Make a motion, say you, to the Senate (for that is what you demand), and if this body votes that you ought to go into banishment, you say that you will obey. I will not make such a motion, it is contrary to my principles, and yet I will let you see what these men think of you. Be gone from the city, O Catiline, deliver the republic from fear; depart into banishment, if that is the word you are waiting for. What now, O Catiline? Do you not perceive, do you not see the silence of these men; they permit it, they say nothing; why wait you for the authority of their words when you see their wishes in their silence?

But had I said the same to this excellent young man, Publius Sextius, or to that brave man, Marcus Marcellus, before this time the Senate would deservedly have laid violent hands on me,

consul though I be, in this very temple. But as to you, Catiline, while they are quiet they approve, while they permit me to speak they vote, while they are silent they are loud and eloquent. And not they alone, whose authority forsooth is dear to you, though their lives are unimportant, but the Roman knights too, those most honorable and excellent men, and the other virtuous citizens who are now surrounding the Senate, whose numbers you could see, whose desires you could know, and whose voices you a few minutes ago could hear,—aye, whose very hands and weapons I have for some time been scarcely able to keep off from you; but those, too, I will easily bring to attend you to the gates if you leave these places you have been long desiring to lay waste.

And yet, why am I speaking? that anything may change your purpose? that you may ever amend your life? that you may meditate flight or think of voluntary banishment? I wish the gods may give you such a mind; though I see, if alarmed at my words you bring your mind to go into banishment, what a storm of unpopularity hangs over me, if not at present, while the memory of your wickedness is fresh, at all events hereafter. But it is worth while to incur that, as long as that is but a private misfortune of my own, and is unconnected with the dangers of the republic. But we cannot expect that you should be concerned at your own vices, that you should fear the penalties of the laws, or that you should yield to the necessities of the republic, for you are not, O Catiline, one whom either shame can recall from infamy, or fear from danger, or reason from madness.

Wherefore, as I have said before, go forth, and if you wish to make me, your enemy as you call me, unpopular, go straight into banishment. I shall scarcely be able to endure all that will be said if you do so; I shall scarcely be able to support my load of unpopularity if you do go into banishment at the command of the consul; but if you wish to serve my credit and reputation, go forth with your ill-omened band of profligates; betake yourself to Manlius, rouse up the abandoned citizens, separate yourself from the good ones, wage war against your country, exult in your impious banditti, so that you may not seem to have been driven out by me and gone to strangers, but to have gone invited to your own friends.

Though why should I invite you, by whom I know men have been already sent on to wait in arms for you at the forum **Aurelium**; who I know has fixed and agreed with Manlius upon

a settled day; by whom I know that that silver eagle, which I trust will be ruinous and fatal to you and to all your friends, and to which there was set up in your house a shrine, as it were, of your crimes, has been already sent forward. Need I fear that you can long do without that which you used to worship when going out to murder, and from whose altars you have often transferred your impious hand to the slaughter of citizens?

You will go at last where your unbridled and mad desire has been long hurrying you. And this causes you no grief, but an incredible pleasure. Nature has formed you, desire has trained you, fortune has preserved you for this insanity. Not only did you never desire quiet, but you never even desired any war but a criminal one; you have collected a band of profligates and worthless men, abandoned not only by all fortune but even by hope.

Then what happiness will you enjoy, with what delight will you exult, in what pleasure will you revel, when in so numerous a body of friends you neither hear nor see one good man! All the toils you have gone through have always pointed to this sort of life; your lying on the ground not merely to lie in wait to gratify your unclean desires, but even to accomplish crimes; your vigilance, not only when plotting against the sleep of husbands, but also against the goods of your murdered victims, have all been preparations for this. Now you have an opportunity of displaying your splendid endurance of hunger, of cold, of want of everything; by which in a short time you will find yourself worn out. All this I effected when I procured your rejection from the consulship, that you should be reduced to make attempts on your country as an exile, instead of being able to distress it as consul, and that that which had been wickedly undertaken by you should be called piracy rather than war.

Now that I may remove and avert, O conscript fathers, any in the least reasonable complaint from myself, listen, I beseech you, carefully to what I say, and lay it up in your inmost hearts and minds. In truth, if my country, which is far dearer to me than my life,—if all Italy,—if the whole Republic were to address me, “Marcus Tullius, what are you doing? will you permit that man to depart whom you have ascertained to be an enemy? whom you see ready to become the general of the war? whom you know to be expected in the camp of the enemy as their chief, the author of all this wickedness, the head of the con-

spiracy, the instigator of the slaves and abandoned citizens, so that he shall seem not driven out of the city by you, but let loose by you against the city? Will you not order him to be thrown into prison, to be hurried off to execution, to be put to death with the most prompt severity? What hinders you? is it the customs of our ancestors? But even private men have often in this republic slain mischievous citizens. Is it the laws which have been passed about the punishment of Roman citizens? But in this city those who have rebelled against the republic have never had the rights of citizens. Do you fear odium with posterity? You are showing fine gratitude to the Roman people who have raised you, a man known only by your own actions, of no ancestral renown, through all the degrees of honor at so early an age to the very highest office, if from fear of unpopularity or of any danger you neglect the safety of your fellow-citizens. But if you have a fear of unpopularity, is that arising from the imputation of vigor and boldness, or that arising from that of inactivity and indecision most to be feared? When Italy is laid waste by war, when cities are attacked and houses in flames, do you not think that you will be then consumed by a perfect conflagration of hatred?"

To this holy address of the republic, and to the feelings of those men who entertain the same opinion, I will make this short answer:—If, O conscript fathers, I thought it best that Catiline should be punished with death, I would not have given the space of one hour to this gladiator to live in. If, forsooth, those excellent men and most illustrious cities not only did not pollute themselves, but even glorified themselves by the blood of Saturninus, and the Gracchi, and Flaccus, and many others of old time, surely I had no cause to fear lest by slaying this parricidal murderer of the citizens any unpopularity should accrue to me with posterity. And if it did threaten me to ever so great a degree, yet I have always been of the disposition to think unpopularity earned by virtue and glory, not unpopularity.

Though there are some men in this body who either do not see what threatens, or dissemble what they do see; who have fed the hope of Catiline by mild sentiments, and have strengthened the rising conspiracy by not believing it; influenced by whose authority many, and they not wicked, but only ignorant, if I punished him would say that I had acted cruelly and tyrannically. But I know that if he arrive at the camp of Manlius to which

he is going, there will be no one so stupid as not to see that there has been a conspiracy, no one so hardened as not to confess it. But if this man alone were put to death, I know that this disease of the republic would be only checked for a while, not eradicated forever. But if he banish himself, and take with him all his friends, and collect at one point all the ruined men from every quarter, then not only will this full-grown plague of the republic be extinguished and eradicated, but also the root and seed of all future evils.

We have now for a long time, O conscript fathers, lived among these dangers and machinations of conspiracy; but somehow or other, the ripeness of all wickedness, and of this long-standing madness and audacity, has come to a head at the time of my consulship. But if this man alone is removed from this piratical crew, we may appear, perhaps, for a short time relieved from fear and anxiety, but the danger will settle down and lie hidden in the veins and bowels of the republic. As it often happens that men afflicted with a severe disease, when they are tortured with heat and fever seem at first to be relieved if they drink cold water, but afterwards suffer more and more severely, so this disease which is in the republic, if relieved by the punishment of this man, will only get worse and worse, as the rest will be still alive.

Wherefore, O conscript fathers, let the worthless begone,—let them separate themselves from the good,—let them collect in one place,—let them, as I have often said before, be separated from us by a wall; let them cease to plot against the consul in his own house,—to surround the tribunal of the city prætor,—to besiege the Senate House with swords,—to prepare brands and torches to burn the city; let it, in short, be written on the brow of every citizen, what are his sentiments about the republic. I promise you this, O conscript fathers, that there shall be so much diligence in us the consuls, so much authority in you, so much virtue in the Roman knights, so much unanimity in all good men, that you shall see everything made plain and manifest by the departure of Catiline,—everything checked and punished.

With these omens, O Catiline, begone to your impious and nefarious war, to the great safety of the republic, to your own misfortune and injury, and to the destruction of those who have joined themselves to you in every wickedness and atrocity. Then do you, O Jupiter, who were consecrated by Romulus with the

same auspices as this city, whom we rightly call the stay of this city and empire, repel this man and his companions from your altars and from the other temples,—from the houses and walls of the city,—from the lives and fortunes of all the citizens; and overwhelm all the enemies of good men, the foes of the republic, the robbers of Italy, men bound together by a treaty and infamous alliance of crimes, dead and alive, with eternal punishments.

CATILINE'S DEPARTURE

(From the Second Oration Against Catiline)

AT LENGTH, O Romans, we have dismissed from the city, or driven out, or, when he was departing of his own accord, we have pursued with words, Lucius Catiline, mad with audacity, breathing wickedness, impiously planning mischief to his country, threatening fire and sword to you and to this city. He is gone, he has departed, he has disappeared, he has rushed out. No injury will now be prepared against these walls within the walls themselves by that monster and prodigy of wickedness. And we have, without controversy, defeated him, the sole general of this domestic war. For now that dagger will no longer hover about our sides; we shall not be afraid in the campus, in the forum, in the Senate House,—aye, and within our own private walls. He was moved from his place when he was driven from the city. Now we shall openly carry on a regular war with an enemy without hindrance. Beyond all question we ruin the man; we have defeated him splendidly when we have driven him from secret treachery into open warfare. But that he has not taken with him his sword red with blood as he intended,—that he has left us alive,—that we wrested the weapon from his hands,—that he has left the citizens safe and the city standing, what great and overwhelming grief must you think that this is to him! Now he lies prostrate, O Romans, and feels himself stricken down and abject, and often casts back his eyes towards this city, which he mourns over as snatched from his jaws, but which seems to me to rejoice at having vomited forth such a pest, and cast it out of doors.

But if there be any one of that disposition which all men should have, who yet blames me greatly for the very thing in which my speech exults and triumphs,—namely, that I did not

arrest so capital, so mortal an enemy rather than let him go,—that is not my fault, O citizens, but the fault of the times. Lucius Catiline ought to have been visited with the severest punishment, and to have been put to death long since; and both the customs of our ancestors, and the rigor of my office, and the republic, demanded this of me; but how many, think you, were there who did not believe what I reported? how many who out of stupidity did not think so? how many who even defended him,—how many who, out of their own depravity, favored him? If, in truth, I had thought that, if he were removed, all danger would be removed from you, I would long since have cut off Lucius Catiline, had it been at the risk, not only of my popularity, but even of my life.

But as I saw that, since the matter was not even then proved to all of you, if I had punished him with death, as he had deserved, I should be borne down by unpopularity, and so be unable to follow up his accomplices, I brought the business on to this point, that you might be able to combat openly when you saw the enemy without disguise. But how exceedingly I think this enemy to be feared now that he is out of doors, you may see from this,—that I am vexed even that he has gone from the city with but a small retinue. I wish he had taken with him all his forces. He has taken with him Tongillus, with whom he had been said to have a criminal intimacy, and Publicius, and Munatius, whose debts contracted in taverns could cause no great disquietude to the republic. He has left behind him others—you all know what men they are, how overwhelmed with debt, how powerful, how noble.

Therefore, with our Gallic legions, and with the levies which Quintus Metellus has raised in the Picenian and Gallic territory, and with these troops which are every day being got ready by us, I thoroughly despise that army composed of desperate old men, of clownish profligates, and uneducated spendthrifts; of those who have preferred to desert their bail rather than that army; and which will fall to pieces if I show them not the battle array of our army, but an edict of the prætor. I wish he had taken with him those soldiers of his whom I see hovering about the forum, standing about the Senate House, even coming into the Senate, who shine with ointment, who glitter in purple; and if they remain here, remember that that army is not so much to be feared by us as these men who have deserted the army. And

they are the more to be feared, because they are aware that I know what they are thinking of, and yet they are not influenced by it.

I know to whom Apulia has been allotted, who has Etruria, who the Picenian territory, who the Gallic district, who has begged for himself the office of spreading fire and sword by night through the city. They know that all the plans of the preceding night are brought to me. I laid them before the Senate yesterday. Catiline himself was alarmed, and fled. Why do these men wait? Verily, they are greatly mistaken if they think that former lenity of mine will last forever.

What I have been waiting for, that I have gained,—namely, that you should all see that a conspiracy has been openly formed against the republic; unless, indeed, there be any one who thinks that those who are like Catiline do not agree with Catiline. There is not any longer room for lenity; the business itself demands severity. One thing, even now, I will grant,—let them depart, let them begone. Let them not suffer the unhappy Catiline to pine away for want of them. I will tell them the road. He went by the Aurelian road. If they make haste, they will catch him by the evening. O happy republic, if it can cast forth these dregs of the republic! Even now, when Catiline alone is got rid of, the republic seems to me relieved and refreshed; for what evil or wickedness can be devised or imagined which he did not conceive? What prisoner, what gladiator, what thief, what assassin, what parricide, what forger of wills, what cheat, what debauchee, what spendthrift, what adulterer, what abandoned woman, what corrupter of youth, what profligate, what scoundrel can be found in all Italy, who does not avow that he has been on terms of intimacy with Catiline? What murder has been committed for years without him? What nefarious act of infamy that has not been done by him? . . .

Array now, O Romans, against these splendid troops of Catiline your guards and your armies; and first of all oppose to that worn-out and wounded gladiator your consuls and generals; then against that banished and enfeebled troop of ruined men lead out the flower and strength of all Italy: instantly the cities of the colonies and municipalities will match the rustic mounds of Catiline; and I will not condescend to compare the rest of your troops and equipments and guards with the want and destitution of that highwayman. But if, omitting all these things in which

we are rich and of which he is destitute,—the Senate, the Roman knights, the people, the city, the treasury, the revenues, all Italy, all the provinces, foreign nations,—if, I say, omitting all these things, we choose to compare the causes themselves which are opposed to one another, we may understand from that alone how thoroughly prostrate they are. For on the one side are fighting modesty, on the other wantonness; on the one chastity, on the other uncleanness; on the one honesty, on the other fraud; on the one piety, on the other wickedness; on the one consistency, on the other insanity; on the one honor, on the other baseness; on the one continence, on the other lust; in short equity, temperance, fortitude, prudence, all the virtues contend against iniquity with luxury, against indolence, against rashness, against all the vices; lastly, abundance contends against destitution, good plans against baffled designs, wisdom against madness, well-founded hope against universal despair. In a contest and war of this sort, even if the zeal of men were to fail, will not the immortal gods compel such numerous and excessive vices to be defeated by these most eminent virtues?

THE CRUCIFIXION OF GAVIUS

(From the Oration Against Verres)

WHY should I speak of Publius Gavius, a citizen of the municipality of Cosa, O judges? or with what vigor of language, with what gravity of expression, with what grief of mind shall I mention him? But, indeed, that indignation fails me. I must take more care than usual that what I am going to say be worthy of my subject—worthy of the indignation which I feel. For the charge is of such a nature, that when I was first informed of it I thought I should not avail myself of it. For although I knew that it was entirely true, still I thought that it would not appear credible. Being compelled by the tears of all the Roman citizens who are living as traders in Sicily, being influenced by the testimonies of the men of Valentia, most honorable men, and by those of all the Rhegians, and of many Roman knights who happened at that time to be at Messina, I produced at the previous pleading only just that amount of evidence which might prevent the matter from appearing doubtful to any one. What shall I do now? When I have been speaking

for so many hours of one class of offenses, and of that man's nefarious cruelty,—when I have now expended nearly all my treasures of words of such a sort as are worthy of that man's wickedness on other matters, and have omitted to take precautions to keep your attention on the stretch by diversifying my accusations, how am I to deal with an affair of the importance that this is? There is, I think, but one method, but one line open to me. I will place the matter plainly before you, which is of itself of such importance that there is no need of my eloquence—and eloquence, indeed, I have none, but there is no need of any one's eloquence to excite your feelings. ' This Gavius whom I am speaking of, a citizen of Cosa, when he (among that vast number of Roman citizens who had been treated in the same way) had been thrown by Verres into prison, and somehow or other had escaped secretly out of the stone quarries, and had come to Messana, being now almost within sight of Italy and of the walls of Rhegium, and being revived, after that fear of death and that darkness, by the light, as it were, of liberty and of the fragrance of the laws, began to talk at Messana, and to complain that he, a Roman citizen, had been thrown into prison. He said that he was now going straight to Rome, and that he would meet Verres on his arrival there.

The miserable man was not aware that it made no difference whether he said this at Messana, or before the man's face in his own prætorian palace. For, as I have shown you before, that man had selected this city as the assistant in his crimes, the receiver of his thefts, the partner in all his wickedness. Accordingly, Gavius is at once brought before the Mamertine magistrates; and, as it happened, Verres came on that very day to Messana. The matter is brought before him. He is told that the man was a Roman citizen, who was complaining that at Syracuse he had been confined in the stone quarries, and who, when he was actually embarking on board ship, and uttering violent threats against Verres, had been brought back by them, and reserved in order that he himself might decide what should be done with him. He thanks the men and praises their good-will and diligence in his behalf. He himself, inflamed with wickedness and frenzy, comes into the forum. His eyes glared; cruelty was visible in his whole countenance. All men waited to see what steps he was going to take,—what he was going to do; when all of a sudden he orders the man to be seized, and to be

stripped and bound in the middle of the forum, and the rods to be got ready. The miserable man cried out that he was a Roman citizen, a citizen, also, of the municipal town of Cosa,—that he had served with Lucius Pretius, a most illustrious Roman knight, who was living as a trader at Panormus, and from whom Verres might know that he was speaking the truth. Then Verres says that he has ascertained that he had been sent into Sicily by the leaders of the runaway slaves, in order to act as a spy; a matter as to which there was no witness, no trace, nor even the slightest suspicion in the mind of any one. Then he orders the man to be most violently scourged on all sides. In the middle of the forum of Messana a Roman citizen, O judges, was beaten with rods; while in the meantime no groan was heard, no other expression was heard from that wretched man, amid all his pain, and between the sound of the blows, except these words, “I am a citizen of Rome.” He fancied that by this one statement of his citizenship he could ward off all blows, and remove all torture from his person. He not only did not succeed in averting by his entreaties the violence of the rods, but as he kept on repeating his entreaties and the assertion of his citizenship, a cross—a cross, I say—was got ready for that miserable man, who had never witnessed such a stretch of power.

O the sweet name of liberty! O the admirable privileges of our citizenship! O Porcian law! O Sempronian laws! O power of the tribunes, bitterly regretted by, and at last restored to the Roman people! Have all our rights fallen so far, that in a province of the Roman people,—in a town of our confederate allies,—a Roman citizen should be bound in the forum, and beaten with rods by a man who only had the fasces and the axes through the kindness of the Roman people? What shall I say? When fire, and red-hot plates, and other instruments of torture were employed? If the bitter entreaties and the miserable cries of that man had no power to restrain you, were you not moved even by the weeping and loud groans of the Roman citizens who were present at that time? Did you dare to drag any one to the cross who said that he was a Roman citizen?

If you, O Verres, being taken among the Persians or in the remotest parts of India, were being led to execution, what else would you cry out but that you were a Roman citizen? And if that name of your city, honored and renowned as it is among all men, would have availed you, a stranger among strangers, among

barbarians, among men placed in the most remote and distant corners of the earth, ought not he, whoever he was, whom you were hurrying to the cross, who was a stranger to you, to have been able, when he said that he was a Roman citizen, to obtain from you, the prætor, if not an escape, at least a respite from death by his mention of and claims to citizenship?

Men of no importance, born in an obscure rank, go to sea; they go to places which they have never seen before; where they can neither be known to the men among whom they have arrived, nor always find people to vouch for them. But still, owing to this confidence in the mere fact of their citizenship, they think that they shall be safe, not only among our own magistrates, who are restrained by fear of the laws and of public opinion, nor among our fellow-citizens only, who are united with them by community of language, of rights, and of many other things; but wherever they come they think that this will be a protection to them. Take away this hope, take away this protection from Roman citizens; establish the fact that there is no assistance to be found in the words, "I am a Roman citizen"; that a prætor, or any other officer, may with impunity order any punishment he pleases to be inflicted on a man who says that he is a Roman citizen, though no one knows that it is not true; and at one blow, by admitting that defense, you cut off from the Roman citizens all the provinces, and the kingdoms, all free cities, and indeed the whole world, which has hitherto been open most especially to our countrymen.

But why need I say more about Gavius? as if you were hostile to Gavius, and not rather an enemy to the name and class of citizens, and to all their rights. You were not, I say, an enemy to the individual, but to the common cause of liberty. For what was our object in ordering the Mamertines, when, according to their regular custom and usage, they had erected the cross behind the city in the Pompeian road, to place it where it looked towards the strait; and in adding, what you can by no means deny, what you said openly in the hearing of every one, that you chose that place in order that the man who said that he was a Roman citizen might be able from his cross to behold Italy and to look towards his own home? And accordingly, O judges, that cross, for the first time since the foundation of Messana, was erected in that place. A spot commanding a view of Italy was picked out by that man for the express purpose that

the wretched man who was dying in agony and torture might see that the rights of liberty and of slavery were only separated by a very narrow strait, and that Italy might behold her son murdered by the most miserable and most painful punishment appropriate to slaves alone.

It is a crime to bind a Roman citizen; to scourge him is a wickedness; to put him to death is almost parricide. What shall I say of crucifying him? So guilty an action cannot by any possibility be adequately expressed by any name bad enough for it. Yet with all this that man was not content. "Let him behold his country," said he; "let him die within sight of laws and liberty." It was not Gavius, it was not one individual, I know not whom,—it was not one Roman citizen,—it was the common cause of freedom and citizenship that you exposed to that torture and nailed on that cross. But now consider the audacity of the man. Do not you think that he was indignant that he could not erect that cross for Roman citizens in the forum, in the comitium, in the very rostra? For the place in his province which was the most like those places in celebrity, and the nearest to them in point of distance, he did select. He chose that monument of his wickedness and audacity to be in the sight of Italy, in the very vestibule of Sicily, within sight of all passers-by as they sailed to and fro.

SUPERNATURAL JUSTICE

(From the Oration for Milo)

THIS investigation relates to the death of Publius Clodius. Imagine in your minds,—for our thoughts are free, and contemplate whatever they choose in such a manner that we do discern those things which we think we see;—place, therefore, before your mind's eye the image of this my condition if I were able to induce you to acquit Milo, but still only on condition of Publius Clodius being restored to life. What fear is it you show by your countenances? How would he affect you if alive, when even now that he is dead he has so agitated you by the bare thought of him? What? if Cneius Pompeius himself, who is a man of such virtue and such good fortune that he has at all times been able to do things which no one except him ever could have done,—if even he, I say, had been able, in

the same manner as he has ordered an investigation into the death of Publius Clodius to take place, so also to raise him from the dead, which do you think he would have preferred to do? Even if out of friendship he had been willing to raise him from the shades below, out of regard for the republic he would not have done it. You, then, are sitting now as avengers of the death of that man, whom you would not restore to life if you thought it possible that his life could be restored by you. And this investigation is appointed to be made into the death of a man who would never have seen such a law passed, if the law which ordered the inquiry had been able to restore him to life. Ought, then, the slayer of this man, if any such slayer there be, to have any reason, while confessing the deed, to fear punishment at the hand of those men whom he delivered by the deed?

Grecian nations give the honors of the gods to those men who have slain tyrants. What have I not seen at Athens? what in the other cities of Greece? What divine honors have I not seen paid to such men? What odes, what songs have I not heard in their praise? They are almost consecrated to immortality in the memories and worship of men. And will you not only abstain from conferring any honors on the savior of so great a people, and the avenger of such enormous wickedness, but will you even allow him to be borne off for punishment? He would confess,—I say, if he had done it, he would confess with a high and willing spirit that he had done it for the sake of the general liberty; a thing which would certainly deserve not only to be confessed by him, but even to be boasted of.

In truth, if he does not deny an action from which he seeks no advantage beyond being pardoned for having done it, would he hesitate to avow an action for which he would be entitled to claim rewards? Unless, indeed, he thinks it more pleasing to you to look upon him as having been the defender of his own life, rather than of you; especially as from that confession, if you were to choose to be grateful, he would reap the very highest honors. If his action were not approved of by you (although, how is it possible that any one should not approve of what secured his own safety?)—but still, if the virtue of a most gallant man had happened to be at all displeasing to his fellow-citizens, then with a lofty and firm mind he would depart from an ungrateful city. For what could be more ungrateful than for all other men to be rejoicing, and for him alone to be mourning,

to whom it was owing that the rest were rejoicing? Although we have all at all times been of this disposition with respect to crushing traitors to our country,—that since the glory would be ours, we should consider the danger and the unpopularity ours also. For what praise should I have deserved to have given to me, when I showed so much courage in my consulship on behalf of you and of your children, if I had supposed that I could venture on the exploits which I was attempting without very great struggles and dangers to myself? What woman is there who would not dare to slay a wicked and mischievous citizen, if she was not afraid of the danger of the attempt? But the man who, though unpopularity, and death, and punishment are before his eyes, still ventures to defend the republic with no less alacrity than if no such evils threatened him, he deserves to be considered really a man.

It behooves a grateful people to reward those citizens who have deserved well of the republic; it is the part of a brave man, not to be so moved even by execution itself, as to repent of having acted bravely. Wherefore, Titus Annius may well make the same confession which Ahala made, which Nasica, which Opimius, which Marius, which we ourselves have made: and then, if the republic were grateful, he would rejoice; if ungrateful, then, though under the pressure of heavy misfortune, he would still be supported by his own conscience.

But, O judges, the fortune of the Roman people, and your felicity, and the immortal gods, all think that they are entitled to your gratitude for this service which has been thus done to you. Nor, indeed, can any one think otherwise except it be a man who thinks that there is no such thing at all as any divine power or authority—a man who is neither moved by the vastness of your empire, nor by that sun above us, nor by the motions of heaven and of the stars, nor by the vicissitudes and regular order of things, nor (and that is the greatest thing of all) by the wisdom of our ancestors; who both themselves cultivated with the most holy reverence the sacred rites and religious ceremonies and auspices, and also handed them down to us their posterity to be so cultivated by us.

There is—there is indeed, such a heavenly power! It is not the truth, that in these bodies and in this feebleness of ours there is something which is vigorous and endued with feeling, and nothing which is so in this vast and beautiful move-

ment of nature. Unless, perhaps, some people think that there is no such thing in existence because it is not apparent, nor visible; just as if we were able to see our own mind,—that by which we are wise, by which we have foresight, by which we do and say these very things which we are doing and saying; or as if we could plainly feel what sort of thing it is, or where it is. That divine power, that very same divine power which has often brought incredible prosperity and power to this city, has extinguished and destroyed this mischief; by first of all inspiring it with the idea of venturing to irritate by violence and to attack with the sword the bravest of men, and so leading it on to be defeated by the man whom, if it had only been able to defeat, it would have enjoyed endless license and impunity. That result was brought about, O judges, not by human wisdom, nor even by any moderate degree of care on the part of the immortal gods. In truth, those very holy places themselves which beheld that monster fall appear to have been moved themselves and to have asserted their rights over him.

I implore you, I call you to witness,—you, I say, O ye Alban hills and groves, and you, O ye altars of the Albans, now overthrown, but nevertheless partners of and equals in honor with the sacred rites of the Roman people,—ye, whom that man with headlong insanity, having cut down and destroyed the most holy groves, had overwhelmed with his insane masses of buildings; it was your power then that prevailed, it was the divinity of your altars, the religious reverence due to you, and which he had profaned by every sort of wickedness that prevailed; and you, too, O sacred Jupiter of Latium, whose lakes and groves and boundaries he had constantly polluted with every sort of abominable wickedness and debauchery, you at last, from your high and holy mountain, opened your eyes for the purpose of punishing him; it is to you, to all of you, that those punishments, late indeed, but still just and well deserved, have been made an atonement for his wickedness.

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CATO AND THE STOICS

(From the Oration Defending Lucius Murena Against a Charge of Bribery)

I COME now to Marcus Cato, who is the mainstay and prop of the whole prosecution; who is, however, so zealous and vehement a prosecutor, that I am much more afraid of the weight of his name than of his accusation. And with respect to this accuser, O judges, first of all I will entreat you not to let Cato's dignity, nor your expectation of his tribuneship, nor the high reputation and virtue of his whole life, be any injury to Lucius Murena. Let not all the honors of Marcus Cato, which he has acquired in order to be able to assist many men, be an injury to my client alone. Publius Africanus had been twice consul, and had destroyed those two terrors of this empire, Carthage and Numantia, when he prosecuted Lucius Cotta. He was a man of the most splendid eloquence, of the greatest good faith, of the purest integrity; his authority was as great almost as that of the Roman people itself, in that empire which had been mainly saved by his means. I have often heard old men say that this very extraordinarily high character of the accuser was of the greatest service to Lucius Cotta. Those wise men who then were the judges in that cause did not like any one to be defeated in any trial, if he was to appear overwhelmed only by the excessive influence of his adversary. What more shall I say? Did not the Roman people deliver Sergius Galba (the fact is preserved in the recollection of every one) from your grandfather, that most intrepid and prosperous man, Marcus Cato, who was zealously seeking his ruin? At all times in this city the whole people, and also the judges, wise men, looking far into futurity, have resisted the overweening power of prosecutors. I do not like an accuser bringing his personal power, or any predominant influence, or his own eminent authority, or his own excessive popularity, into a court of justice. Let all these things have weight to insure the safety of the innocent, to aid the weak, to succor the unfortunate. But in a case where the danger and ruin of citizens may ensue, let them be rejected. For if, perchance, any one should say that Cato would not have come forward as an accuser if he had not previously made up his mind about the justice of the cause, he will then be laying down a most unjust law, O judges, and establishing a miserable condition for men in their danger, if he thinks that the opinion of an

accuser is to have against a defendant the weight of a previous investigation legally conducted.

I, O Cato, do not venture to find fault with your intentions, by reason of my extraordinarily high opinion of your virtue; but in some particulars I may perhaps be able slightly to amend and reform them. "You are not very wrong," said an aged tutor to a very brave man; "but if you are wrong, I can set you right." But I can say with the greatest truth that you never do wrong, and that your conduct is never such in any point as to need correction, but only such as occasionally to require being guided a little. For nature has herself formed you for honesty and gravity and moderation and magnanimity and justice and for all the virtues required to make a great and noble man. To all these qualities are added an education not moderate, nor mild, but, as it seems to me, a little harsh and severe, more so than either truth or nature would permit. And since we are not to address this speech either to an ignorant multitude, or to any assembly of rustics, I will speak a little boldly about the pursuits of educated men, which are both well known and agreeable to you, O judges, and to me. Learn then, O judges, that all these good qualities, divine and splendid as they are, which we behold in Marcus Cato, are his own peculiar attributes. The qualities which we sometimes wish for in him are not all those which are implanted in a man by nature, but some of them are such as are derived from education. For there was once a man of the greatest genius, whose name was Zeno, the imitators of whose example are called Stoics. His opinions and precepts are of this sort: that a wise man is never influenced by interest; never pardons any man's fault; that no one is merciful except a fool and a trifier; that it is not the part of a man to be moved or pacified by entreaties; that wise men, let them be ever so deformed, are the only beautiful men; if they be ever such beggars, they are the only rich men; if they be in slavery, they are kings. And as for all of us who are not wise men, they call us runaway slaves, exiles, enemies, lunatics. They say that all offenses are equal; that every sin is an unpardonable crime; and that he does not commit a less crime who kills a cock, if there was no need to do so, than the man who strangles his father. They say that a wise man never feels uncertain on any point, never repents of anything, is never deceived in anything, and never alters his opinion.

All these opinions that most acute man, Marcus Cato, having been induced by learned advocates of them, has embraced; and that, not for the sake of arguing about them, as is the case with most men, but of living by them. Do the Publicans ask for any thing? "Take care that their influence has no weight." Do any supplicants, miserable and unhappy men, come to us? "You will be a wicked and infamous man if you do anything from being influenced by mercy." Does any one confess that he has done wrong; and beg pardon for his wrong-doing? "To pardon is a crime of the deepest dye." "But it is a trifling offense." "All offenses are equal." You say something. "That is a fixed and unalterable principle." "You are influenced not by the facts, but by your opinion." "A wise man never forms mere opinions." "You have made a mistake in some point." He thinks that you are abusing him. And in accordance with these principles of his are the following assertions: "I said in the Senate, that I would prosecute one of the candidates for the consulship." "You said that when you were angry." "A wise man never is angry." "But you said it for some temporary purpose." "It is the act," says he, "of a worthless man to deceive by a lie; it is a disgraceful act to alter one's opinion; to be moved by entreaties is wickedness; to pity any one is an enormity." But our philosophers (for I confess, O Cato, that I too, in my youth, distrusting my own abilities, sought assistance from learning), our philosophers, I say, men of the school of Plato and Aristotle, men of soberness and moderation, say that private interest does sometimes have weight even with a wise man. They say that it does become a virtuous man to feel pity; that there are different gradations of offenses, and different degrees of punishment appropriate to each; that a man with every proper regard for firmness may pardon offenses; that even the wise man himself has sometimes nothing more than opinion to go upon, without absolute certainty; that he is sometimes angry; that he is sometimes influenced and pacified by entreaty; that he sometimes does change an opinion which he may have expressed, when it is better to do so; that he sometimes abandons his previous opinions altogether; and that all his virtues are tempered by a certain moderation.

If any chance, O Cato, had conducted you, endowed with your existing natural disposition, to those tutors, you would not indeed have been a better man than you are, nor a braver one, nor

more temperate, nor more just than you are (for that is not possible), but you would have been a little more inclined to lenity; you would not, when you were not induced by any enmity, or provoked by any personal injury, accuse a most virtuous man, a man of the highest rank and the greatest integrity; you would consider that as fortune had intrusted the guardianship of the same year to you and to Murena, that you were connected with him by some certain political union; and the severe things which you have said in the Senate you would either not have said, or you would have guarded against their being applied to him, or you would have interpreted them in the mildest sense. And even you yourself (at least that is my opinion and expectation), excited as you are at present by the impetuosity of your disposition, and elated as you are both by the vigor of your natural character and by your confidence in your own ability, and inflamed as you are by your recent study of all these precepts, will find practice modify them, and time and increasing years soften and humanize you. In truth, those tutors and teachers of virtue, whom you think so much of, appear to me themselves to have carried their definitions of duties somewhat further than is agreeable to nature; and it would be better if, when we had in theory pushed our principles to extremities, yet in practice we stopped at what was expedient. "Forgive nothing." Say rather, forgive some things, but not everything. "Do nothing for the sake of private influence." Certainly resist private influence when virtue and good faith require you to do so. "Do not be moved by pity." Certainly if it is to extinguish all impartiality; nevertheless, there is some credit due to humanity. "Abide by your own opinion." Very true, unless some other sounder opinion convinces you. That great Scipio was a man of this sort, who had no objection to do the same thing that you do; to keep a most learned man, a man of almost divine wisdom, in his house; by whose conversation and precepts, although they were the very same that you are so fond of, he was nevertheless not made more severe, but (as I have heard said by old men) he was rendered most merciful. And who was more mild in his manners than Caius Lælius? who was more agreeable than he? (devoted to the same studies as you); who was more virtuous or more wise than he? I might say the same of Lucius Philus and of Caius Gallus; but I will conduct you now into your own house. Do you think that there was any man more courteous,

more agreeable; any one whose conduct was more completely regulated by every principle of virtue and politeness, than Cato, your great-grandfather? And when you were speaking with truth and dignity of his virtue, you said that you had a domestic example to imitate. That, indeed, is an example set up for your imitation in your own family, and the similarity of nature ought rather to influence you who are descended from him than any one of us; but still that example is as much an object for my imitation as for yours. But if you were to add his courtesy and affability to your own wisdom and impartiality, I will not say that those qualities which are now most excellent will be made intrinsically better, but they will certainly be more agreeably seasoned.

Wherefore, to return to the subject which I began to speak of, take away the name of Cato out of the cause; remove and leave out of the question all mention of authority, which in courts of justice ought either to have no influence at all, or only influence to contribute to some one's safety; and discuss with me the charges themselves. What do you accuse him of, Cato? What action of his is it that you bring before the court? What is your charge? Do you accuse him of bribery? I do not defend bribery. You blame me because you say I am defending the very conduct which I brought in a law to punish. I punished bribery, not innocence. And any real case of bribery I will join you in prosecuting if you please. You have said that a resolution of the Senate was passed, on my motion, "that if any men who had been bribed had gone to meet the candidates, if any hired men followed them, if places were given men to see the shows of gladiators according to their tribes, and also, if dinners were given to the common people, that appeared to be a violation of the Calpurnian law." Therefore the Senate decides that these things were done in violation of the Calpurnian law, if they were done at all; it decides what there is not the least occasion for, out of complaisance for the candidates. For there is a great question whether such things have been done or not. That, if they have been done, they were done in violation of the law, no one can doubt. It is, therefore, ridiculous to leave that uncertain which was doubtful, but to give a positive decision on that point which can be doubtful to no one. And that decree is passed at the request of all the candidates, in order that it might be quite impossible to make out from the resolution of the Sen-

ate whose interests were consulted, or against whose interests it was passed. Prove, then, that these actions have been done by Lucius Murena, and then I will grant to you that they have been done in violation of the law. . . .

But I must change my tone, for Cato argues with me on rigid and stoic principles. He says that it is not true that goodwill is conciliated by food. He says that men's judgments, in the important business of electing to magistracies, ought not to be corrupted by pleasures. Therefore, if any one, to promote his canvass, invites another to supper, he must be condemned. "Shall you," says he, "seek to obtain supreme power, supreme authority, and the helm of the republic, by encouraging men's sensual appetites, by soothing their minds, by tendering luxuries to them? Are you asking employment as a pimp from a band of luxurious youths, or the sovereignty of the world from the Roman people?" An extraordinary sort of speech! but our usages, our way of living, our manners, and the constitution itself, rejects it. For the Lacedæmonians, the original authors of that way of living and of that sort of language, men who lie at their daily meals on hard oak benches, and the Cretans, of whom no one ever lies down to eat at all, have neither of them preserved their political constitutions or their power better than the Romans, who set apart times for pleasure as well as times for labor; for one of those nations was destroyed by a single invasion of our army; the other only preserves its discipline and its laws by means of the protection afforded to it by our supremacy.

Do not, then, O Cato, blame with too great severity of language the principles of our ancestors, which facts, and the length of time that our power has flourished under them, justify. There was, in the time of our ancestors, a learned man of the same sect, an honorable citizen, and one of high rank, Quintus Tubero. He, when Quintus Maximus was giving a feast to the Roman people, in the name of his uncle Africanus, was asked by Maximus to prepare a couch for the banquet, as Tubero was a son of the sister of the same Africanus. And he, a most learned man and a Stoic, covered for that occasion some couches, made in the Carthaginian fashion, with skins of kids, and exhibited some Samian vessels, as if Diogenes the Cynic had been dead, and not as if he were paying respect to the obsequies of that godlike Africanus,—a man with respect to whom Maximus, when he was pronouncing his funeral panegyric on the day of his death,

expressed his gratitude to the immortal gods for having caused that man to be born in this republic above all others, for that it was quite inevitable that the sovereignty of the world must belong to that state of which he was a citizen. At the celebration of the obsequies of such a man the Roman people were very indignant at the perverse wisdom of Tubero, and therefore he, a most upright man, a most virtuous citizen, though he was the grandson of Lucius Paullus, the sister's son, as I have said before, of Publius Africanus, lost the prætorship by his kid-skins.

The Roman people disapproves of private luxury, but admires public magnificence. It does not love profuse banquets, still less does it love sordid and uncivilized behavior. It makes a proper distinction between different duties and different seasons, and allows of vicissitudes of labor and pleasure. For as to what you say, that it is not right for men's minds to be influenced in appointing magistrates by any other consideration than that of the worth of the candidates, this principle even you yourself—you, a man of the greatest worth—do not in every case adhere to. For why do you ask any one to take pains for you, to assist you? You ask me to make you governor over myself, to intrust myself to you. What is the meaning of this? Ought I to be asked this by you, or should not you rather be asked by me to undertake labor and danger for the sake of my safety? Nay more, why is it that you have a nomenclator with you? for in so doing you are practicing a trick and a deceit. For if it be an honorable thing for your fellow-citizens to be addressed by name by you, it is a shameful thing for them to be better known to your servant than to yourself. If, though you know them yourself, it seems better to use a prompter, why do you sometimes address them before he has whispered their names in your ear? Why, again, when he has reminded you of them, do you salute them as if you knew them yourself? And why, after you are once elected, are you more careless about saluting them at all? If you regulate all these things by the usages of the city, it is all right; but if you choose to weigh them by the precepts of your sect, they will be found to be entirely wrong. Those enjoyments, then, of games and gladiators and banquets, all of which our ancestors desired, are not to be taken away from the Roman people, nor ought candidates to be forbidden the exercise of that kindness, which is liberality rather than bribery.

Oh, but it is the interest of the republic that has induced you to become a prosecutor. I do believe, O Cato, that you have come forward under the influence of those feelings and of that opinion. But you err out of ignorance. That which I am doing, O judges, I am doing out of regard to my friendship for Lucius Murena and to his own worth, and I also do assert and call you all to witness that I am doing it for the sake of peace, of tranquillity, of concord, of liberty, of safety—aye, even for the sake of the lives of us all.

FOR THE POET ARCHIAS

(Prosecuted on a Charge of Falsely Claiming to be a Roman Citizen)

IF THERE be any natural ability in me, O judges—and I know how slight that is; or if I have any practice as a speaker—and in that line I do not deny that I have some experience; or if I have any method in my oratory, drawn from my study of the liberal sciences, and from that careful training to which I admit that at no part of my life have I ever been disinclined; certainly, of all those qualities, this Aulus Licinius is entitled to be among the first to claim the benefit from me as his peculiar right. For as far as ever my mind can look back upon the space of time that is past, and recall the memory of its earliest youth, tracing my life from that starting-point, I see that Archias was the principal cause of my undertaking, and the principal means of my mastering, those studies. And if this voice of mine, formed by his encouragement and his precepts, has at times been the instrument of safety to others, undoubtedly we ought, as far as lies in our power, to help and save the very man from whom we have received that gift which has enabled us to bring help to many and salvation to some. And lest any one should, perchance, marvel at this being said by me, as the chief of his ability consists in something else, and not in this system and practice of eloquence, he must be told that even we ourselves have never been wholly devoted to this study. In truth, all the arts which concern the civilizing and humanizing of men have some link which binds them together, and are, as it were, connected by some relationship to one another.

And, that it may not appear marvelous to any one of you, that I, in a formal proceeding like this, and in a regular court

of justice, when an action is being tried before a prætor of the Roman people, a most eminent man, and before most impartial judges, before such an assembly and multitude of people as I see around me, employ this style of speaking, which is at variance, not only with the ordinary usages of courts of justice, but with the general style of forensic pleading, I entreat you in this cause to grant me this indulgence, suitable to this defendant, and as I trust not disagreeable to you—the indulgence, namely, of allowing me, when speaking in defense of a most sublime poet and most learned man, before this concourse of highly-educated citizens, before this most polite and accomplished assembly, and before such a prætor as him who is presiding at this trial, to enlarge with a little more freedom than usual on the study of polite literature and refined arts, and, speaking in the character of such a man as that, who, owing to the tranquillity of his life and the studies to which he has devoted himself, has but little experience of the dangers of a court of justice, to employ a new and unusual style of oratory. And if I feel that that indulgence is given and allowed me by you, I will soon cause you to think that this Aulus Licinius is a man who not only, now that he is a citizen, does not deserve to be expunged from the list of citizens, but that he is worthy, even if he were not one, of being now made a citizen.

For when first Archias grew out of childhood, and out of the studies of those arts by which young boys are gradually trained and refined, he devoted himself to the study of writing. First of all at Antioch (for he was born there, and was of high rank there), formerly an illustrious and wealthy city, and the seat of learned men and of liberal sciences; and there it was his lot speedily to show himself superior to all in ability and credit. Afterward, in the other parts of Asia, and over all Greece, his arrival was so talked of wherever he came, that the anxiety with which he was expected was even greater than the fame of his genius; but the admiration which he excited when he had arrived exceeded even the anxiety with which he was expected. Italy was at that time full of Greek science and of Greek systems, and these studies were at that time cultivated in Latium with greater zeal than they now are in the same towns; and here too at Rome, on account of the tranquil state of the republic at that time, they were far from neglected. Therefore, the people of Tarentum and Rhegium and Neapolis presented him

with the freedom of the city and with other gifts; and all men who were capable of judging of genius thought him deserving of their acquaintance and hospitality. When, from this great celebrity of his, he had become known to us, though absent, he came to Rome, in the consulship of Marius and Catulus. It was his lot to have those men as his first consuls, the one of whom could supply him with the most illustrious achievements to write about, the other could give him, not only exploits to celebrate, but his ears and judicious attention. Immediately the Luculli, though Archias was as yet but a youth, received him in their house. But it was not only to his genius and his learning, but also to his natural disposition and virtue, that it must be attributed that the house which was the first to be opened to him in his youth, is also the one in which he lives most familiarly in his old age. He at that time gained the affection of Quintus Metellus, that great man who was the conqueror of Numidia, and his son Pius. He was eagerly listened to by Marcus Æmilius; he associated with Quintus Catulus—both with the father and the sons. He was highly respected by Lucius Crassus; and as for the Luculli and Drusus and the Octavii and Cato and the whole family of the Hortensii, he was on terms of the greatest possible intimacy with all of them, and was held by them in the greatest honor. For, not only did every one cultivate his acquaintance who wished to learn or to hear anything, but even every one pretended to have such a desire.

In the meantime, after a sufficiently long interval, having gone with Lucius Lucullus into Sicily, and having afterward departed from that province in the company of the same Lucullus, he came to Heraclea. And as that city was one which enjoyed all the rights of a confederate city to their full extent, he became desirous of being enrolled as a citizen of it. And, being thought deserving of such a favor for his own sake, when aided by the influence and authority of Lucullus, he easily obtained it from the Heracleans. The freedom of the city was given him in accordance with the provisions of the law of Silvanus and Carbo: "If any men had been enrolled as citizens of the confederate cities, and if, at the time that the law was passed, they had a residence in Italy, and if within sixty days they had made a return of themselves to the prætor." As he had now had a residence at Rome for many years, he returned himself as a citizen to the prætor, Quintus Metellus, his most intimate friend. If we have nothing

else to speak about except the rights of citizenship, and the law, I need say no more. The cause is over. For which of all these statements, O Gratus, can be invalidated? Will you deny that he was enrolled, at the time I speak of, as a citizen of Heraclea? There is a man present of the very highest authority, a most scrupulous and truthful man, Lucius Lucullus, who will tell you not that he thinks it, but that he knows it; not that he has heard of it, but that he saw it; not even that he was present when it was done, but that he actually did it himself. Deputies from Heraclea are present, men of the highest rank. They have come expressly on account of this trial, with a commission from their city, and to give evidence on the part of their city; and they say that he was enrolled as a Heracleian. On this you ask for the public registers of the Heracleans, which we all know were destroyed in the Italian war, when the register-office was burned. It is ridiculous to say nothing to the proofs which we have, but to ask for proofs which it is impossible for us to have; to disregard the recollection of men, and to appeal to the memory of documents; and when you have the conscientious evidence of a most honorable man, the oath and good faith of a most respectable municipality, to reject those things which cannot by any possibility be tampered with, and to demand documentary evidence, though you say at the same moment that that is constantly played tricks with. "But he had no residence at Rome." What, not he who for so many years before the freedom of the city was given to him, had established the abode of all his property and fortunes at Rome? "But he did not return himself." Indeed he did, and in that return which alone obtains with the college of prætors the authority of a public document.

For as the returns of Appius were said to have been kept carelessly, and as the trifling conduct of Gabinius, before he was convicted, and his misfortune after his condemnation, had taken away all credit from the public registers, Metellus, the most scrupulous and moderate of all men, was so careful, that he came to Lucius Lentulus, the prætor, and to the judges, and said that he was greatly vexed at an erasure which appeared in one name. In these documents, therefore, you will see no erasure affecting the name of Aulus Licinius. And as this is the case, what reason have you for doubting about his citizenship, especially as he was enrolled as a citizen of other cities also? In

truth, as men in Greece were in the habit of giving rights of citizenship to many men of very ordinary qualifications, and endowed with no talents at all, or with very moderate ones, without any payment, it is likely, I suppose, that the Rhegians and Locrians and Neapolitans and Tarentines should have been unwilling to give to this man, enjoying the highest possible reputation for genius, what they were in the habit of giving even to theatrical artists. What, when other men, who not only after the freedom of the city had been given, but even after the passing of the Papian law, crept somehow or other into the registers of those municipalities, shall he be rejected who does not avail himself of those other lists in which he is enrolled, because he always wished to be considered a Heracleian? You demand to see our own censor's returns. I suppose no one knows that at the time of the last census he was with that most illustrious general, Lucius Lucullus, with the army; that at the time of the preceding one he was with the same man when he was in Asia as quæstor; and that in the census before that, when Julius and Crassus were censors, ~~no~~ regular account of the people was taken. But, since the census does not confirm the right of citizenship, but only indicates that he, who is returned in the census, did at that time claim to be considered as a citizen, I say that, at that time, when you say, in your speech for the prosecution, that he did not even himself consider that he had any claim to the privileges of a Roman citizen, he more than once made a will according to our laws, and he entered upon inheritances left him by Roman citizens; and he was made honorable mention of by Lucius Lucullus, both as prætor and as consul, in the archives kept in the treasury.

You must rely wholly on what arguments you can find. For he will never be convicted either by his own opinion of his case, or by that which is formed of it by his friends.

You ask us, O Gratius, why we are so exceedingly attached to this man. Because he supplies us with food whereby our mind is refreshed after this noise in the forum, and with rest for our ears after they have been wearied with bad language. Do you think it possible that we could find a supply for our daily speeches, when discussing such a variety of matters, unless we were to cultivate our minds by the study of literature; or that our minds could bear being kept so constantly on the stretch if we did not relax them by that same study? But I

confess that I am devoted to those studies; let others be ashamed of them if they have buried themselves in books without being able to produce anything out of them for the common advantage, or anything which may bear the eyes of men and the light. But why need I be ashamed, who for many years have lived in such a manner as never to allow my own love of tranquillity to deny me to the necessity or advantage of another, or my fondness for pleasure to distract, or even sleep to delay my attention to such claims? Who then can reproach me, or who has any right to be angry with me, if I allow myself as much time for the cultivation of these studies as some take for the performance of their own business, or for celebrating days of festival and games, or for other pleasures, or even for the rest and refreshment of mind and body, or as others devote to early banquets, to playing at dice, or at ball? And this ought to be permitted to me, because by these studies my power of speaking and those faculties are improved, which, as far as they do exist in me, have never been denied to my friends when they have been in peril. And if that ability appears to any one to be but moderate, at all events I know whence I derive those principles which are of the greatest value. For if I had not persuaded myself from my youth upward, both by the precepts of many masters and by much reading, that there is nothing in life greatly to be desired, except praise and honor, and that while pursuing those things all tortures of the body, all dangers of death and banishment, are to be considered but of small importance, I should never have exposed myself, in defense of your safety, to such numerous and arduous contests, and to these daily attacks of profligate men. But all books are full of such precepts, and all the sayings of philosophers and all antiquity are full of precedents teaching the same lesson; but all these things would lie buried in darkness, if the light of literature and learning were not applied to them. How many images of the bravest men, carefully elaborated, have both the Greek and Latin writers bequeathed to us, not merely for us to look at and gaze upon, but also for our imitation! And I, always keeping them before my eyes as examples for my own public conduct, have endeavored to model my mind and views by continually thinking of those excellent men.

Some one will ask, "What? were those identical great men, whose virtues have been recorded in books, accomplished in all that learning which you are extolling so highly?" It is difficult

to assert this of all of them; but still I know what answer I can make to that question: I admit that many men have existed of admirable disposition and virtue, who, without learning, by the almost divine instinct of their own mere nature, have been, of their own accord, as it were, moderate and wise men. I even add this, that very often nature without learning has had more to do with leading men to credit and to virtue than learning when not assisted by a good natural disposition. And I also contend, that when to an excellent and admirable natural disposition there is added a certain system and training of education, then from that combination arises an extraordinary perfection of character; such as is seen in that godlike man, whom our fathers saw in their time, Africanus; and in Caius Lælius and Lucius Furius, most virtuous and moderate men; and in that most excellent man, the most learned man of his time, Marcus Cato the elder; and all these men, if they had been to derive no assistance from literature in the cultivation and practice of virtue, would never have applied themselves to the study of it. Though, even if there were no such great advantage to be reaped from it, and if it were only pleasure that is sought from these studies, still I imagine you would consider it a most reasonable and liberal employment of the mind: for other occupations are not suited to every time, nor to every age or place; but these studies are the food of youth, the delight of old age; the ornament of prosperity, the refuge and comfort of adversity; a delight at home, and no hindrance abroad; they are companions by night, and in travel, and in the country.

And if we ourselves were not able to arrive at these advantages, nor even taste them with our senses, still we should have admired them, even when we saw them in others. Who of us was of so ignorant and brutal a disposition as not lately to be grieved at the death of Roscius, who, though he was an old man when he died, yet, on account of the excellence and beauty of his art, appeared to be one who on every account ought not to have died? Therefore, had he by the gestures of his body gained so much of our affections, and shall we disregard the incredible movements of the mind and the rapid operations of genius? How often have I seen this man Archias, O judges (for I will take advantage of your kindness, since you listen to me so attentively while speaking in this unusual manner)—how often have I seen him, when he had not written a single word, repeat

extempore a great number of admirable verses on the very events which were passing at the moment! How often have I seen him go back, and describe the same thing over again with an entire change of language and ideas! And what he wrote with care and with much thought, that I have seen admired to such a degree as to equal the credit of even the writings of the ancients. Should not I, then, love this man? should not I admire him? should not I think it my duty to defend him in every possible way? And, indeed, we have constantly heard from men of the greatest eminence and learning, that the study of other sciences was made up of learning and rules and regular method, but that a poet was such by the unassisted work of nature, and was moved by the vigor of his own mind, and was inspired, as it were, by some divine wrath. Wherefore rightly does our own great Ennius call poets holy; because they seem to be recommended to us by some especial gift, as it were, and liberality of the gods. Let then, judges, this name of poet, this name which no barbarians even have ever disregarded, be holy in your eyes, men of cultivated minds as you all are. Rocks and deserts reply to the poet's voice; savage beasts are often moved and arrested by song; and shall we, who have been trained in the pursuit of the most virtuous acts, refuse to be swayed by the voice of poets? The Colophonians say that Homer was their citizen; the Chians claim him as theirs; the Salaminians assert their right to him; but the men of Smyrna loudly assert him to be a citizen of Smyrna, and they have even raised a temple to him in their city. Many other places also fight with one another for the honor of being his birthplace.

They, then, claim a stranger, even after his death, because he was a poet; shall we reject this man while he is alive,—a man who by his own inclination and by our laws does actually belong to us? especially when Archias has employed all his genius with the utmost zeal in celebrating the glory and renown of the Roman people? For, when a young man, he touched on our wars against the Cimbri, and gained the favor even of Caius Marius himself, a man who, as a rule, was proof against this sort of study. For there was no one so disinclined to the Muses as not willingly to endure that the praise of his labors should be made immortal by means of verse. They say that the great Themistocles, the greatest man that Athens produced, said, when some one asked him what sound or whose voice he took the greatest

delight in hearing, "The voice of that by whom his own exploits were best celebrated." Therefore the great Marius was also exceedingly attached to Lucius Plotius, because he thought that the achievement which he had performed could be celebrated by his genius. And the whole Mithridatic war, great and difficult as it was, and carried on with so much diversity of fortune by land and sea, has been related at length by him; and the books in which that is sung of, not only make illustrious Lucius Lucullus, that most gallant and celebrated man, but they do honor also to the Roman people. For, while Lucullus was general, the Roman people opened Pontus, though it was defended both by the resources of the king and by the character of the country itself. Under the same general the army of the Roman people, with no very great numbers, routed the countless hosts of the Armenians. It is the glory of the Roman people that, by the wisdom of that same general, the city of the Cyzicenes, most friendly to us, was delivered and preserved from all the attacks of the kind, and from the very jaws, as it were, of the whole war. Ours is the glory which will be forever celebrated, which is derived from the fleet of the enemy which was sunk after its admirals had been slain, and from the marvelous naval battle off Tenedos; those trophies belong to us, those monuments are ours, those triumphs are ours. Therefore, I say that the men by whose genius these exploits are celebrated make illustrious at the same time the glory of the Roman people. Our countryman, Ennius, was dear to the elder Africanus; and even on the tomb of the Scipios his effigy is believed to be visible, carved in the marble. But undoubtedly it is not only the men who are themselves praised who are done honor to by those praises, but the name of the Roman people also is adorned by them. Cato, the ancestor of this Cato, is extolled to the skies. Great honor is paid to the exploits of the Roman people. Lastly, all those great men, the Maximi, the Marcelli, and the Fulvii, are done honor to, not without all of us having also a share in the panegyric.

Therefore our ancestors received the man who was the cause of all this, a man of Rudiaë, into their city as a citizen; and shall we reject from our city a man of Heraclea, a man sought by many cities, and made a citizen of ours by these very laws?

For if any one thinks that there is a smaller gain of glory derived from Greek verses than from Latin ones, he is greatly

mistaken, because Greek poetry is read among all nations, Latin is confined to its own natural limits, which are narrow enough. Wherefore, if those achievements which we have performed are limited only by the bounds of the whole world, we ought to desire that, wherever our vigor and our arms have penetrated, our glory and our fame should likewise extend. Because, as this is always an ample reward for those people whose achievements are the subject of writings, so especially is it the greatest inducement to encounter labors and dangers to all men who fight for themselves for the sake of glory. How many historians of his exploits is Alexander the Great said to have had with him; and he, when standing on Cape Sigeum at the grave of Achilles, said: "O happy youth, to find Homer as the panegyrist of your glory!" And he said the truth; for, if the *Iliad* had not existed, the same tomb which covered his body would have also buried his renown. What, did not our own Magnus, whose valor has been equal to his fortune, present Theophanes the Mitylenæan, a relator of his actions, with the freedom of the city in an assembly of the soldiers? And those brave men, our countrymen, soldiers and country-bred men as they were, still being moved by the sweetness of glory, as if they were to some extent partakers of the same renown, showed their approbation of that action with a great shout. Therefore, I suppose, if Archias were not a Roman citizen according to the laws, he could not have contrived to get presented with the freedom of the city by some general! Sylla, when he was giving it to the Spaniards and Gauls, would, I suppose, have refused him if he had asked for it! A man whom we ourselves saw in the public assembly, when a bad poet of the common people had put a book in his hand, because he had made an epigram on him with every other verse too long, immediately ordered some of the things which he was selling at the moment to be given him as a reward, on condition of not writing anything more about him for the future. Would not he who thought the industry of a bad poet still worthy of some reward have sought out the genius and excellence and copiousness in writing of this man? What more need I say? Could he not have obtained the freedom of the city from Quintus Metellus Pius, his own most intimate friend, who gave it to many men, either by his own request, or by the intervention of the Luculli? especially when Metellus was so anxious to have his own deeds celebrated in writing, that

he gave his attention willingly to poets born even at Cordova, whose poetry had a very heavy and foreign flavor.

For this should not be concealed, which cannot possibly be kept in the dark, but it might be avowed openly: we are all influenced by a desire of praise, and the best men are the most especially attracted by glory. Those very philosophers, even in the books which they write about despising glory, put their own names on the title-page. In the very act of recording their contempt for renown and notoriety, they desire to have their own names known and talked of. Decimus Brutus, the most excellent citizen and consummate general, adorned the approaches to his temples and monuments with the verses of Attius. And lately that great man Fulvius, who fought with the Ætolians, having Ennius for his companion, did not hesitate to devote the spoils of Mars to the Muses. Wherefore, in a city in which generals, almost in arms, have paid respect to the name of poets and to the temples of the Muses, these judges in the garb of peace ought not to act in a manner inconsistent with the honor of the Muses and the safety of poets.

And that you may do that the more willingly, I will now reveal my own feelings to you, O judges, and I will make a confession to you of my own love of glory—too eager perhaps, but still honorable. For this man has in his verses touched upon and begun the celebration of the deeds which we in our consulship did in union with you, for the safety of this city and empire, and in defense of the life of the citizens and of the whole republic. And when I had heard his commencement, because it appeared to me to be a great subject and at the same time an agreeable one, I encouraged him to complete his work. For virtue seeks no other reward for its labors and its dangers beyond that of praise and renown; and if that be denied to it, what reason is there, O judges, why in so small and brief a course of life as is allotted to us, we should impose such labors on ourselves? Certainly, if the mind had no anticipations of posterity, and if it were to confine all its thoughts within the same limits as those by which the space of our lives is bounded, it would neither break itself with such severe labors, nor would it be tormented with such cares and sleepless anxiety, nor would it so often have to fight for its very life. At present there is a certain virtue in every good man, which night and day stirs up the mind with the stimulus of glory, and reminds it that all

mention of our name will not cease at the same time with our lives, but that our fame will endure to all posterity.

Do we all who are occupied in the affairs of the State, and who are surrounded by such perils and dangers in life, appear to be so narrow-minded, as, though to the last moment of our lives we have never passed one tranquil or easy moment, to think that everything will perish at the same time as ourselves? Ought we not, when many most illustrious men have with great care collected and left behind them statues and images, representations not of their minds but of their bodies, much more to desire to leave behind us a copy of our counsels and of our virtues, wrought and elaborated by the greatest genius? I thought, at the very moment of performing them, that I was scattering and disseminating all the deeds which I was performing, all over the world for the eternal recollection of nations. And whether that delight is to be denied to my soul after death, or whether, as the wisest men have thought, it will affect some portion of my spirit, at all events I am at present delighted with some such idea and hope.

Preserve then, O judges, a man of such virtue as that of Archias, which you see testified to you not only by the worth of his friends, but by the length of time during which they have been such to him; and of such genius as you ought to think is his, when you see that it has been sought by most illustrious men. And his cause is one which is approved of by the benevolence of the law, by the authority of his municipality, by the testimony of Lucullus, and by the documentary evidence of Metellus. And as this is the case, we do entreat you, O judges, if there may be any weight attached, I will not say to human, but even to divine recommendation in such important matters, to receive under your protection that man who has at all times done honor to your generals and to the exploits of the Roman people,—who even in these recent perils of our own, and in your domestic dangers, promises to give an eternal testimony of praise in our favor, and who forms one of that band of poets who have at all times and in all nations been considered and called holy, so that he may seem relieved by your humanity, rather than overwhelmed by your severity.

The things which, according to my custom, I have said briefly and simply, O judges, I trust have been approved by all of you. Those things which I have spoken, without regarding the habits

of the forum or judicial usage, both concerning the genius of the man and my own zeal in his behalf, I trust have been received by you in good part. That they have been so by him who presides at this trial, I am quite certain.

THE FOURTH PHILIPPIC

(Delivered to the People in the Roman Forum Against Antony)

THE great numbers in which you are here met this day, O Romans, and this assembly, greater than, it seems to me, I ever remember, inspires me with both an exceeding eagerness to defend the republic, and with a great hope of re-establishing it. Although my courage indeed has never failed, what has been unfavorable is the time; and the moment that that has appeared to show any dawn of light, I at once have been the leader in the defense of your liberty. And if I had attempted to have done so before, I should not be able to do so now. For this day, O Romans (that you may not think it is but a trifling business in which we have been engaged), the foundations have been laid for future actions. For the Senate has no longer been content with styling Antonius an enemy in words, but it has shown by actions that it thinks him one. And now I am much more elated still, because you too with such great unanimity and with such a clamor have sanctioned our declaration that he is an enemy.

And indeed, O Romans, it is impossible but that either the men must be impious who have levied armies against the consul, or else that he must be an enemy against whom they have rightly taken arms. And this doubt the Senate has this day removed—not indeed that there really was any; but it has prevented the possibility of there being any. Caius Cæsar, who has upheld and who is still upholding the republic and your freedom by his zeal and wisdom, and at the expense of his patrimonial estate, has been complimented with the highest praises of the Senate.

I praise you,—yes, I praise you greatly, O Romans, when you follow with the most grateful minds the name of that most illustrious youth, or rather boy; for his actions belong to immortality, the name of youth only to his age. I can recollect many things; I have heard of many things; I have read of many

things; but in the whole history of the whole world I have never known anything like this. For, when we were weighed down with slavery, when the evil was daily increasing, when we had no defense, while we were in dread of the pernicious and fatal return of Marcus Antonius from Brundisium, this young man adopted the design which none of us had ventured to hope for, which beyond all question none of us were acquainted with, of raising an invincible army of his father's soldiers, and so hindering the frenzy of Antonius, spurred on as it was by the most inhuman counsels, from the power of doing mischief to the republic.

For who is there who does not see clearly that if Cæsar had not prepared an army the return of Antonius must have been accompanied by our destruction? For, in truth, he returned in such a state of mind, burning with hatred of you all, stained with the blood of the Roman citizens, whom he had murdered at Suessa and at Brundisium, that he thought of nothing but the utter destruction of the republic. And what protection could have been found for your safety and for your liberty if the army of Caius Cæsar had not been composed of the bravest of his father's soldiers? And with respect to his praises and honors,—and he is entitled to divine and everlasting honors for his god-like and undying services,—the Senate has just consented to my proposals, and has decreed that a motion be submitted to it at the very earliest opportunity.

Now, who is there who does not see that by this decree Antonius has been adjudged to be an enemy? For what else can we call him, when the Senate decides that extraordinary honors are to be devised for those men who are leading armies against him? What? did not the Martial legion (which appears to me by some divine permission to have derived its name from that god from whom we have heard that the Roman people descended) decide by its resolutions that Antonius was an enemy before the Senate had come to any resolution? For if he be not an enemy, we must inevitably decide that those men who have deserted the consul are enemies. Admirably and seasonably, O Romans, have you by your cries sanctioned the noble conduct of the men of the Martial legion, who have come over to the authority of the Senate, to your liberty, and to the whole republic, and have abandoned that enemy and robber and parricide of his country. Nor did they display only their spirit and courage in

doing this, but their caution and wisdom also. They encamped at Alba, in a city convenient, fortified, near, full of brave men and loyal and virtuous citizens. The fourth legion imitating the virtue of this Martial legion, under the leadership of Lucius Egnatuleius, whom the Senate deservedly praised a little while ago, has also joined the army of Caius Cæsar.

What more adverse decisions, O Marcus Antonius, can you want? Cæsar, who has levied an army against you, is extolled to the skies. The legions are praised in the most complimentary language, which have abandoned you, which were sent for into Italy by you, and which, if you had chosen to be a consul rather than an enemy, were wholly devoted to you. And the fearless and honest decision of those legions is confirmed by the Senate, is approved of by the whole Roman people,—unless, indeed, you to-day, O Romans, decide that Antonius is a consul and not an enemy. I thought, O Romans, that you did think as you show you do. What? do you suppose that the municipal towns and the colonies and the prefectures have any other opinion? All men are agreed with one mind; so that every one who wishes the State to be saved must take up every sort of arms against that pestilence. What? I should like to know!—does the opinion of Decimus Brutus, O Romans, which you can gather from his edict, which has this day reached us, appear to any one deserving of being lightly esteemed? Rightly and truly do you say No, O Romans. For the family and name of Brutus has been by some especial kindness and liberality of the immortal gods given to the republic, for the purpose of at one time establishing, and at another of recovering, the liberty of the Roman people. What, then, has been the opinion which Decimus Brutus has formed of Marcus Antonius? He excludes him from his province. He opposes him with his army. He rouses all Gaul to war, which is already roused of his own accord, and in consequence of the judgment which it has itself formed. If Antonius be consul, Brutus is an enemy. Can we then doubt which of these alternatives is the fact?

And just as you now with one mind and one voice affirm that you entertain no doubt, so did the Senate just now decree that Decimus Brutus deserved excellently well of the republic, inasmuch as he was defending the authority of the Senate and the liberty and empire of the Roman people. Defending it against whom? Why, against an enemy. For what other sort of

defense deserves praise? In the next place the province of Gaul is praised, and is deservedly complimented in most honorable language by the Senate for resisting Antonius. But if that province considered him the consul, and still refused to receive him, it would be guilty of great wickedness. For all the provinces belong to the consul of right, and are bound to obey him. Decimus Brutus, imperator and consul-elect, a citizen born for the republic, denies that he is consul; Gaul denies it; all Italy denies it; the Senate denies it; you deny it. Who then thinks that he is consul except a few robbers? Although even they themselves do not believe what they say; nor is it possible that they should differ from the judgment of all men, impious and desperate men though they be. But the hope of plunder and booty blinds their minds; men whom no gifts of money, no allotment of land, nor even that interminable auction has satisfied; who have proposed to themselves the city, the properties, and fortunes of all the citizens as their booty; and who, as long as there is something for them to seize and carry off, think that nothing will be wanting to them; among whom Marcus Antonius (O ye immortal gods, avert, I pray you, and efface this omen) has promised to divide this city. May things rather happen, O Romans, as you pray that they should, and may the chastisement of this frenzy fall on him and on his friend. And, indeed, I feel sure that it will be so. For I think that at present not only men, but the immortal gods, have all united together to preserve this republic. For if the immortal gods foreshow us the future, by means of portents and prodigies, then it has been openly revealed to us that punishment is near at hand to him, and liberty to us. Or if it was impossible for such unanimity on the part of all men to exist without the inspiration of the gods, in either case how can we doubt as to the inclinations of the heavenly deities?

It only remains, O Romans, for you to persevere in the sentiments which you at present display.

I will act, therefore, as commanders are in the habit of doing when their army is ready for battle, who, although they see their soldiers ready to engage, still address an exhortation to them; and in like manner I will exhort you who are already eager and burning to recover your liberty. You have not—you have not, indeed, O Romans, to war against an enemy with whom it is possible to make peace on any terms whatever. For he does not

now desire your slavery, as he did before, but he is angry now and thirsts for your blood. No sport appears more delightful to him than bloodshed and slaughter and the massacre of citizens before his eyes. You have not, O Romans, to deal with a wicked and profligate man, but with an unnatural and savage beast. And, since he has fallen into a well, let him be buried in it. For if he escapes out of it, there will be no inhumanity of torture which it will be possible to avoid. But he is at present hemmed in, pressed, and besieged by those troops which we already have, and will soon be still more so by those which in a few days the new consuls will levy. Apply yourselves then to this business, as you are doing. Never have you shown greater unanimity in any cause; never have you been so cordially united with the Senate. And no wonder. For the question now is not in what condition we are to live, but whether we are to live at all, or to perish with torture and ignominy.

Although nature, indeed, has appointed death for all men, yet valor is accustomed to ward off any cruelty or disgrace in death. And that is an inalienable possession of the Roman race and name. Preserve, I beseech you, O Romans, this attribute which your ancestors have left you as a sort of inheritance. Although all other things are uncertain, fleeting, transitory, virtue alone is planted firm with very deep roots. It cannot be undermined by any violence; it can never be moved from its position. By it your ancestors first subdued the whole of Italy; then destroyed Carthage, overthrew Numantia, and reduced the most mighty kings and most warlike nations under the dominion of this empire.


And your ancestors, O Romans, had to deal with an enemy who had also a republic, a Senate House, a treasury, harmonious and united citizens, and with whom, if fortune had so willed it, there might have been peace and treaties on settled principles. But this enemy of yours is attacking your republic, but has none himself; is eager to destroy the Senate, that is to say, the council of the whole world, but has no public council himself; he has exhausted your treasury, and has none of his own. For how can a man be supported by the unanimity of his citizens, who has no city at all? And what principles of peace can there be with that man who is full of incredible cruelty, and destitute of faith?

The whole, then, of the contest, O Romans, which is now before the Roman people, the conqueror of all nations, is with an

assassin, a robber, a Spartacus. For as to his habitual boast of being like Catilina, he is equal to him in wickedness, but inferior in energy. He, though he had no army, rapidly levied one. This man has lost that very army which he had. As, therefore, by my diligence, and the authority of the Senate, and your own zeal and valor, you crushed Catilina, so you will very soon hear that this infamous piratical enterprise of Antonius has been put down by your own perfect and unexampled harmony with the Senate, and by the good fortune and valor of your armies and generals. I, for my part, as far as I am able to labor and to effect anything by my care and exertions and vigilance and authority and counsel, will omit nothing which I may think serviceable to your liberty. Nor could I omit it without wickedness after all your most ample and honorable kindness to me. However, on this day, encouraged by the motion of a most gallant man, and one most firmly attached to you, Marcus Servilius, whom you see before you, and his colleagues also, most distinguished men, and most virtuous citizens; and partly, too, by my advice and my example, we have, for the first time after a long interval, fired up again with a hope of liberty.

CHAMP CLARK

(1850-)

NDER the act of Congress which invites the States to present memorials of their most noted historical characters to be preserved in the Capitol, the busts of Thomas H. Benton and Francis P. Blair were presented by Missouri to the United States on February 4th, 1899. Congressman Champ Clark of the Ninth Missouri District, one of the orators selected to speak for the State, devoted his attention to Blair. As another volume of this work contains Blair's analysis of Benton's character, Mr. Clark's analysis of the qualities which made Blair himself a leader is here given.

Mr. Clark was born near Lawrenceburg, Kentucky, March 7th, 1850. He was educated at the Kentucky University, Bethany College, West Virginia, and at the Cincinnati Law School. In 1873-74 he was president of the first normal school established in West Virginia; and when he came to Missouri in 1875, it was to serve as principal of the High School at Louisiana. In 1876 he gave up teaching for the practice of law. He was elected to Congress in 1892 and has been re-elected at each succeeding election.

THE COURAGE OF LEADERSHIP

(From the Address Delivered February 4th, 1899, at the Presentation by Missouri to the United States of the Busts of Thomas H. Benton and Francis P. Blair)

IN THE outskirts of Louisiana, Missouri, stand four immense sugar trees, which, if the Druidical religion were in vogue in the Mississippi Valley, would be set aside as objects of worship by Democrats. They form the corners of a rectangle about large enough for a speaker's platform. Beneath their grateful shadow, with the Father of Waters behind him, the eternal hills in front of him, the blue sky above his head, in the presence of a great and curious concourse of people, Frank Blair made the first Democratic speech delivered in Missouri after the close of the Civil War. Excitement was intense. Armed men of all shades of opinion abounded on every hand. When Blair arose

to speak he unbuckled his pistol belt and coolly laid two navy revolvers on the table. He prefaced his remarks as follows:—

Fellow-citizens, I understand that I am to be killed here to-day. I have just come out of four years of that sort of business. If there is to be any of it here, it had better be attended to before the speaking begins.

That calm but pregnant exordium has perhaps no counterpart in the entire range of oratory.

“There was silence deep as death;
And the boldest held his breath
For a time.”

He then proceeded with his speech, but had not been going more than five minutes until a man of gigantic proportions started toward him, shaking his huge fist and shouting: “He’s an arrant rebel! Take him out! Take him out!” Blair stopped, looked the man in the face, crooked his finger at him, and said: “You come and take me out!” which put an end to that episode, for the man who was yelling “Take him out!” suddenly realized that Blair’s index finger which was beckoning him on would soon be pressing the trigger of one of those pistols if he did go on, and he prudently declined Blair’s invitation.

He got through that day without bloodshed, but when he spoke at Warrensburg, a little later, he had not proceeded a quarter of an hour before a prominent citizen sitting on the speaker’s stand started toward Blair with a pistol in his hand and with a mighty oath, yelling: “That statement is a lie!” which instantly precipitated a free fight in which one man was killed and several severely wounded. Blair went on with his speech amid ceaseless interruptions. I know a venerable, mild-mannered, Christian statesman, now in this very Capitol, who for two mortal hours of that pandemonium stood with his hand upon his revolver ready to shoot down any man who assaulted Blair.

Afterwards Blair was advertised to speak at Marshall, in Saline County. On the day of his arrival an armed mob was organized to prevent him from speaking, and an armed body of Democrats swore he should. A collision occurred, resulting in a regular pitched battle in which several men lost their lives and others were badly injured. But Blair made his speech.

One night he was speaking in Lucas Market Place, in St. Louis, when a man in the crowd, not twenty feet from the stand, pointed a revolver directly at him. Friendly hands interposed to turn the aim skywards. "Let him shoot, if he dare," said Blair, gazing coolly at his would-be murderer; "if I am wrong I ought to be shot, but this man is not the proper executioner." The fellow was hustled from the audience.

Amid such scenes he toured the State from the Des Moines River to the Arkansas line, and from the Mississippi to the mouth of the "raging Kaw." The man who did that had a lion's heart in his breast.

The old Latin dictum runs: *Poeta nascitur, non fit*. The same is true of the leader of men—he is born, not made.

What constitutes the quality of leadership, Mr. Speaker? You do not know. I do not know. None of us knows. No man can tell.

Talent, genius, learning, courage, eloquence, greatness in many fields we may define with something approximating exactness; but who can inform us as to the constituent elements of leadership? We all recognize the leader the moment we behold him, but what entitles him to that distinction is and perhaps must forever remain one of the unsolved mysteries of psychology.

Talent, even genius, does not make a man a leader, for some men of the profoundest talents, others of the most dazzling genius, have been servile followers and have debased their rich gifts from God to the flattery of despots. Most notable among those was Lord Bacon, the father of the inductive philosophy, who possessed the most exquisite intellect ever housed in a human skull, with a spirit so abject, so groveling that he was not unjustly described in that blistering, scornful couplet by Alexander Pope:—

"If parts allure thee, think how Bacon shin'd,
The wisest, brightest, meanest of mankind!"

Courage is not synonymous with the quality of leadership, though necessary to it, for some of the bravest soldiers that ever met Death upon the battlefield and defied him to his face were amazingly lacking in that regard.

Learning does not render a man a leader, for some of the greatest scholars of whom history tells were wholly without influence over their fellow-men. Eloquence does not make a

leader, for some of the world's greatest orators, among them Cicero, have been the veriest cravens; and no craven can lead men.

Indeed, eloquence, learning, talents, genius, courage, all combined do not make a leader.

But whatever the quality is, people recognize it instinctively, and inevitably follow the man who possesses it.

Frank Blair was a natural leader.


Yet during his career there were finer scholars in Missouri than he, though he was an excellent scholar, a graduate from Princeton; there were more splendid orators, though he ranked with the most convincing and persuasive; there were profounder lawyers, though he stood high at the bar; there were better mixers, though he was of cordial and winning manners; there were men, perhaps, of stronger mental force, though he was amply endowed with brains, so good a judge of human nature as Abraham Lincoln saying of him, "He has abundant talents;" there were men as brave, though he was of the bravest; but as a leader he overtopped them all.

Believing sincerely that human slavery was wrong *per se* and that it was of most evil to the States where it existed, he fought it tooth and nail, not from sympathy for the negroes so much as from affection for the whites, and created the Republican party in Missouri before the Civil War—a most hazardous performance in that day and latitude. At its close, when, in his judgment, his party associates had become the oppressors of the people and the enemies of liberty, he left them, and lifting in his mighty arms the Democracy, which lay bleeding and swooning in the dust, he breathed into its nostrils the breath of life.

This man was of the stuff out of which martyrs are made, and he would have gone grimly, undauntedly, unflinchingly, and defiantly to the block, the scaffold, or the stake, in defense of any cause which he considered just. Though he was imperious, tempestuous, dogmatic, and impetuous, though no danger could swerve him from the path of duty, though he gave tremendous blows to his antagonists and received many of the same kind, he had infinite compassion for the helpless and the weak, and to the end his heart remained tender as a little child's.

CASSIUS MARCELLUS CLAY

(1810-)

S A representative of the fierce devotion to the Union, which, antagonizing an equally fierce devotion to the South, made the Civil War in Kentucky so bloody, Cassius M. Clay was one of the most noted characters of the border States from the repeal of the Missouri Compromise to the surrender at Appomattox. He was born in Madison County, Kentucky, October 19th, 1810. His opposition to slavery and his absolute fearlessness in proclaiming his opinions in the face of an intensely hostile community gave him a standing in the Republican party which resulted in his selection as Minister to Russia during President Lincoln's administration. He lived to extreme age.

A RHAPSODY

I MAY be an enthusiast; but I cannot but give utterance to the conceptions of my own mind. When I look upon the special developments of European civilization; when I contemplate the growing freedom of the cities, and the middle class which has sprung up between the pretenders to divine rule on the one hand, and the abject serf on the other; when I consider the Reformation, and the invention of the press, and see, on the southern shore of the continent, an humble individual, amidst untold difficulties and repeated defeats, pursuing the mysterious suggestions which the mighty deep poured unceasingly upon his troubled spirit, till at last, with great and irrepressible energy of soul, he discovered that there lay in the far western ocean a continent open for the infusion of those elementary principles of liberty which were dwarfed in European soil,—I conceive that the hand of destiny was there!

When I see the immigration of the Pilgrims from the chalky shores of England,—in the night fleeing from their native home—so dramatically and ably pictured by Mr. Webster in his celebrated oration,—when father, mother, brother, wife, sister, lover, were all lost by those melancholy wanderers—"stifling," in the language of one who is immortal in the conception, "the mighty

hunger of the heart," and landing, amidst cold and poverty and death, upon the rude rocks of Plymouth,—I venture to think the will of Deity was there!

When I have remembered the Revolution of '76,—the Seven Years' War—three millions of men in arms against the most powerful nation in history, and vindicating their independence,—I have thought that their sufferings and death were not in vain! When I have seen the forsaken hearthstone,—looked upon the battlefield, upon the dying and the dead,—heard the agonizing cry, "Water, for the sake of God! water!" seeing the dissolution of being,—pale lips pressing in death the yet loved images of wife, sister, lover,—I have not deemed—I will not deem all these things in vain! I cannot regard this great continent, reaching from the Atlantic to the far Pacific, and from the St. John's to the Rio del Norté, as the destined home of a barbarian people of third-rate civilization.

Like the Roman who looked back upon the glory of his ancestors, in woe exclaiming,

"Great Scipio's ghost complains that we are slow,
And Pompey's shade walks unavenged among us,"

the great dead hover around me:—Lawrence, "Don't give up the ship!"—Henry, "Give me liberty or give me death!"—Adams, "Survive or perish, I am for the Declaration!"—Allen, "In the name of the living God, I come!"

Come then, thou Eternal, who dwellest not in temples made with hands, but who, in the city's crowd or by the far forest stream, revealest thyself to the earnest seeker after the true and right, inspire my heart; give me undying courage to pursue the promptings of my spirit; and, whether I shall be called in the shades of life to look upon as sweet and kind and lovely faces as now, or, shut in by sorrow and night, horrid visions shall gloom upon me in my dying hour—O, my country, mayest thou yet be free!

ASPIRATIONS FOR THE UNION

WHILE the Union lasts, amid these fertile, verdant fields, these ever-flowing rivers, these stately groves, this genial, healthful clime, this "old Kentucky land,"—hallowed by the blood of our sires, endeared by the beauty of her daughters,

illustrious by the valor and eloquence of her sons, the centre of a most glorious empire, guarded by a cordon of States garrisoned by freemen, girt round by the rising and setting seas,—we are the most blessed of all people. Let the Union be dissolved, let that line be drawn where it must be drawn, and we are a border State; in time of peace, with no outlet to the ocean, the highway of nations, a miserable dependency; in time of war the battle ground of more than Indian warfare—of civil strife and indiscriminate slaughter! And then, worse than Spanish provinces, we shall contend not for glory and renown, but, like the aborigines of old, for a contemptible life and miserable subsistence! Let me not see it! Among those proud courts and lordly coteries of Europe's pride, where fifty years ago we were regarded as petty provinces, unknown to ears polite, let me go forth great in the name of an American citizen! Let me point them to our statesmen and the laws and government of their creation, the rapid advance of political science, the monuments of their fame, now the study of all Europe! Let them look at our rapidly increasing and happy population, see our canals and turnpikes and railroads, stretching over more space than combined Britain and continental Europe have reached by the same means! Let them send their philanthropists to learn of our penitentiary systems, our schools, and our civil institutions! Let them behold our skill in machinery, in steamboat and ship-building! Let them hail the most gallant ship that breasts the mountain wave, and she shall wave from her flagstaff the stars and stripes! These are the images which I cherish; this the nation which I honor; and never will I throw one pebble in her track, to jostle the footsteps of her glorious march!

AMERICA AS A MORAL FORCE

How many, like the great Emmet, have died, and left only a great name to attract our admiration for their virtues, and our regret for their untimely fall, to excite to deeds which they would but could not effect! But what has Washington left behind, save the glory of a name? The independent mind, the conscious pride, the ennobling principle of the soul,—a nation of freemen. What did he leave? He left us to ourselves. This is the sum of our liberties, the first principle of government, the

power of public opinion, the only permanent power on earth. When did a people flourish like Americans? Yet where, in a time of peace, has more use been made of the pen, or less with the sword of power? When did a religion flourish like the Christian, since they have done away with intolerance? Since, men have come to believe that physical force cannot effect the immortal part, and that religion is between the conscience and the Creator only. He of 622, who with the sword propagated his doctrines through Arabia, and the greater part of the barbarian world, against the power of whose tenets the physical force of all Christendom was opposed in vain, under the effective operations of freedom of opinion, is fast passing the way of all error. Napoleon, the contemporary of our Washington, is fast dying away from the lips of men. He who shook the whole civilized earth; who, in an age of knowledge and concert among nations, held the world at bay;—at whose exploits the imagination becomes bewildered,—who, in the eve of his glory, was honored with the pathetic appellation of “the last lone captive of millions in war,”—even he is now known only in history. The vast empire was fast tumbling to ruins while he yet held the sword. He passed away, and left no successor there! The unhallowed light which obscured is gone; but brightly beams yet the name of Washington!


This freedom of opinion, which has done so much for the political and religious liberty of America, has not been confined to this continent. People of other countries begin to inquire, to examine, to reason for themselves. Error has fled before it, and the most inveterate prejudices are dissolved and gone. Such an unlimited remedy has in some cases, indeed, apparently proved injurious, but the evil is to be attributed to the peculiarity of the attendant circumstances, or the ill-timed application. Let us not force our tenets upon foreigners. For, if we subject opinion to coercion, who shall be our inquisitors? No; let us do as we have done, as we are now doing, and then call upon the nations to examine, to scrutinize, and to condemn! No! they cannot look upon America, to-day, and pity; for the gladdened heart disclaims all woe. They cannot look upon her, and deride; for genius and literature and science are soaring above the high places of birth and pageantry. They cannot look upon us, and defy; for the hearts of thirteen millions are warm in virtuous emulation—their arms steeled in the cause of their country.

Her productions are wafted to every shore; her flag is seen waving in every sea. She has wrested the glorious motto from the once queen of the sea, and high on our banner, by the stars and stripes, is seen:—

“Columbia needs no bulwark,
No towers along the steep,
Her march is o’er the mountain wave,
Her home is on the deep.”

CLEMENT C. CLAY, SR.

(1789-1866)

S UNITED STATES Senator from Alabama in 1837, Clement C. Clay opposed the financial policies advocated by Henry Clay, of Kentucky, and made what was considered at the time one of the most effective speeches during the debate on the Subtreasury Bill of that year. He was born in Halifax County, Virginia, December 17th, 1789. After his graduation at the University of East Tennessee, he was admitted to the bar and removed to Huntsville, Alabama, becoming prominent as a lawyer and public man. He served as a member of the Territorial Council of Alabama, as a Judge of the Circuit Court, as a Chief-Justice of Alabama, Speaker of the State Legislature, Member of Congress, Governor of Alabama, and as United States Senator from 1837 till 1842.

THE SUBTREASURY BILL OF 1837

(From a Speech in the United States Senate, October 4th, 1837)

Mr. President:—

I CONFESS, sir, when this delicate and important subject was first brought forward, I had some hesitation, some doubt, as to its probable tendency; but the more I have reflected, deliberated, investigated the subject, the better I have become satisfied that its effects will be salutary, in regard to the immediate interests of the Government itself, and that they will not be pernicious, but, on the contrary, beneficial to the interests of the people—our constituents.

As the measure was at first proposed by the Committee on Finance, I apprehended the disconnection—divorce, if you choose—of the Government from the banks would be too sudden and would consequently cripple the banks and occasion a shock in the monetary affairs of the country generally. But, sir, these apprehensions have been obviated and removed by the amendment offered by the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Calhoun], as it is now modified. Under that amendment, the bills of such banks as now pay specie, or as may think proper to resume

specie payments, will be receivable in payment, and to the full amount, of all public dues, for customs, lands, etc., till the first of January, 1839; thereafter, three-fourths of such public dues, till the first of January, 1840; thereafter one-half till the first of January, 1841; and, thereafter one-fourth till the first of January, 1842.

Here, then, is inducement, held out to the banks now paying, to continue, and to such as have stopped, to resume, specie payments. We say to them, in effect: "We invite you to resume specie payments; show that you are solvent, that your notes are convertible into specie when desirable, and we will receive them in payment for public lands, and for all other revenue"; in the strong language of some of the gentlemen who have addressed us: "Do this, and we will indorse your notes." What stronger motive could be held out to such banking institutions as are solvent, honest, and desirous to effectuate the purposes of their creation? If the public interest and convenience be the object of bank directors, as legitimately they ought, would they not, by responding to this invitation and offer on our part, give greater value to their paper, give it a wider circulation, and adapt it to the use and interest of the community? And would not such banks as resumed, at once derive all the advantages of superior credit, furnish the circulating medium, and do the business of the country, to the exclusion of such as failed or refused to comply? The answer is palpable—no man can doubt on these questions.

Again, sir: The change in the mode of collecting the public revenue, in the kind of money receivable for it, will be so gradual as to occasion no shock whatever to the credit of the banks or to the commercial community. Before we entirely discontinue receiving bank paper, more than four years will have elapsed. All this time will be allowed for the banks and merchants to adapt their business to the new system contemplated and to conform their business to the new state of things. It will give time for the State legislatures to regulate their banking institutions, so as, in future, to prevent over-issues of paper; to restrain them from generating, or encouraging, a spirit of over-trading and inordinate speculation; to restrain them from making promises they cannot redeem, thus restoring to the country a sound circulating medium, the just equilibrium of trade, and business of every description.

Moreover, we ourselves shall have time to see how the new system works,—to check its velocity, if it be too great—or accelerate it, if it be too slow; and modify it, in all respects, as its results may indicate to be safe and expedient. As already shown, no change in the description of funds, receivable for public dues, will take place for the next fifteen months; for the year 1839, a reduction of one-fourth; for 1840, one-half may be paid in specie-paying bank paper; and so on to the consummation of the plan. If it be discovered that the policy operates injuriously, there will be ample time to amend or modify it.

But, sir, I have no apprehension that any injurious result will follow the adoption of this measure. The chief embarrassments of the community have arisen out of inordinate expansions of the circulating medium, excessive accommodations, begetting extravagance, and reckless speculations; and then sudden contractions, withdrawals of those enormous loans, reductions of the amount of circulation, and thus, almost in a moment, reducing the value of property one-third, sometimes one-half. The government deposits have, doubtless, heretofore, nurtured and increased this propensity of all banks to excessive issues and accommodations. They have loaned out the public money as if their own, and when called upon to pay it over, they have been necessarily compelled to press and coerce payments from their borrowers, who had, in their turn, treated this borrowed money as their own; and have thus occasioned embarrassment, the sacrifice of property, and, in too many instances, the impoverishment and ruin of their customers. To illustrate the correctness of these remarks, I need only refer you to the greater pecuniary distress and embarrassment of communities around any of the banks, which have been large depositaries of the public money, compared with those remote from such institutions. If they have no large sums of public money on general deposit, on which to grant accommodations, they will know and understand better the proper limits to prescribe to their liberality; they will have no fluctuations, no augmentations, no diminutions of capital to mislead them; their accommodations will be more uniform, and the amount of their circulation bear some relation to the amount of specie in their vaults. This being brought about, the value of produce, and property of all descriptions, will be more steady and uniform; we shall not have a negro, costing a thousand or fifteen hundred dollars to-day, sold twelve months hence to pay

half the amount of consideration—land at one time worth fifty dollars per acre, at another not more than twenty—and our great staple one while commanding twenty-five dollars, and then not worth eight.

Sir, the Government ought always to be able to command its funds and have them ever ready to meet any exigency. Experience has taught us that this cannot be expected while we rely on banks. Gentlemen tell us that, although the State banks have failed to meet our expectations, we ought to continue their agency. They ask us, would we discontinue the use of steam-boats, because a boiler may sometimes explode and produce fatal results? By no means, sir, while care and skill may reasonably be expected to insure safety and prevent such calamities. But, were we to discover that the machinery is entirely uncontrollable, and the boiler liable to spontaneous combustion,—carrying universal misery and death among the passengers and crew, in despite of all the science, vigilance, and fidelity of the engineer,—would it be wise or prudent to trust ourselves on board? What would have been the situation of the country in May last, when the banks suspended specie payments, had we been involved in war with some powerful foreign enemy? Whatever might have been the emergency, we should not have been able to have commanded the resources of the nation. We might have been without a dollar for the pay or subsistence of an army to resist the invaders; our energies would have been crippled; and the most disastrous consequences might have followed. When we find that such is the unfortunate tendency of "the experiment," as gentlemen choose to call it, it is time we should abandon it, by whomsoever instituted or approved heretofore.

But, sir, was not the Bank of the United States an "experiment," and has not that also failed to answer just expectation? No other government but our own ever did employ such a fiscal agent, with powers of the same magnitude. It was, indeed, a fearful experiment, and well nigh fatal in its results. Yet, the recharter of the late United States Bank, or the establishment of a new one, is now announced as the only efficient remedy—the sovereign panacea—for existing evils. The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. Clay] has, to my astonishment, gone so far as to identify the establishment of such an institution with the permanency of the Union! It would seem the question of a national bank is always portentous—involving consequences of a most

alarming character. Shortly after the removal of the deposits from the late Bank of the United States, we were told, by the same distinguished gentleman, that we were then "in the midst of a revolution!" and the sentiment was responded to, by the presses and politicians of the opposition, from one end of the Union to the other. We were told, on the very floors of Congress, that the deposits must be restored, or a revolution was at hand. The same sentiment was announced, when two Members of Congress, during the same panic session, addressed an assembled multitude in Baltimore on Sunday. According to the newspapers of the day, it was said, by way of justification, "There were no Sabbaths in Revolutionary times!" Sir, the subject of a National or United States Bank cannot be touched without an attempt to produce excitement and agitation. It affords one of the most conclusive reasons against the establishment of such an institution, that it has the ability to produce such tremendous effects. The concentration of such an immense moneyed power in the hands of a few individuals is at war with our peace and quiet; too dangerous to our liberties. It would soon control all our elections, from the highest to the lowest, and direct the operations, nay, usurp the powers, of the Government itself.

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